SOCIAL PROCESS
IN HAWAII

Volume 30
1983
FOREWORD

Michael G. Weinstein

This fourth volume of the modern series of Social Process in Hawaii contains a potpourri of articles that are unified by our most basic interests: the study of Hawaii as a special place combining Polynesian, Asian, and Western influences, and the study of Hawaii as a microcosm of the contemporary and evolving world.

Thus the points raised in Professor Steve Penson's essay can be seen in each article in this issue. When he first delivered these reflections to the Hawaii Sociological Association, the discussion revealed that differences of opinion about the extent to which social scientists in Hawaii should use "insider perspectives" to identify new models, unique to this place but perhaps with wider application as the whole world gets smaller and more interdependent, and the extent to which we should be testing in our "not home laboratory" other theories current in international social science. Each author began to answer the question implicitly in terms of the stance from which he or she has collected data and observed the Hawaiian scene; each reader does too.

* * * * *

We are developing a publication pattern: every other issue is on a more focused theme. Volume 29, 1982, was on "Ethnic Sources in Hawaii"; it sold out and is in a second printing. The next issue, volume 31, 1984, is to be on the theme of the political economy of Hawaii, under the special editorship of Gerard Sullivan of the Department of Sociology and Gary Hawes of the Department of Political Science.

* * * * *

We are pleased to note the publication of two important sets of public documents:
Native Hawaiian Study Commission, chaired by Kina' u Boyd Kamali'i.

- Volume 2, "Claims of Conscience: A Dissenting Study," endorsed by the three Hawaiian members of the commission (384 pages).


ETNIC DIFFERENCES IN THE OUTMIGRATION
OF LOCAL-BORN RESIDENTS FROM HAWAII

Paul Wright

With the exception of black-white differentials, information pertaining to ethnic patterns of long distance migration in the United States is extremely scanty. This is largely attributable to the fact that migration studies are generally dependent on the published census and migration data contained therein are broken (if at all) into "total-nonwhite" or "total-Negro" categories. Another contributing factor is that in the search for "laws" explaining migration behavior, it is often assumed that economic or amenity motivations in long distance migration are paramount and furthermore that desires and tastes are uniformly distributed among the general population. The fact that most migration studies not dependent on census data concentrate on immigrants to a given area also makes measurement of migration patterns by ethnicity difficult as data concerning ethnic characteristics of migrants to other destinations are rarely collected in such studies.

Even where migration differentials by ethnicity are established, as for example when Thelenberg (1973) found that the mainly non-Anglo Saxon foreign-born were disproportionately likely to leave West Virginia during the Great Depression, the length of time lived in a given place is generally not controlled. Because of the "axiom of cumulative inertia," it is to be expected that the bulk of outmigrants from a given area are previous immigrants. In Hawaii, perhaps 95 percent of the nonmilitary related individuals arriving in Hawaii between FY 1965 and the end of FY 1975 were "intended residents" according to surveys of westbound passengers to Hawaii (computed from Hawaii OPOE, 1976:125), a survey in April, 1975 that included all of Hawaii with the exception of the 3.5 percent living in Kauai County revealed that only 65,806 mainland-born whites had lived in Hawaii for less than 11 years. If the
local-born population departed at the same rate, the distinctly Asian and Pacific flavor of the Hawaii population would have been lost long ago.

One study that compared two distinct ethnic groups with local roots in a county in Nova Scotia revealed a different pattern of outmigration. That the French speaking Acadians were characterized by a considerably lower rate of outmigration than those of English ancestry was attributed by Conner (1967) to the "local orientation" of the former whereas the latter strongly identified with the "national society." This study provides valuable insights on how values associated with ethnic status can affect migration.

In this paper, differential outmigration patterns of the local-born by ethnicity from Hawaii are investigated. Basic sources used are published and public-use census data, class lists showing the 1976 locations of persons graduating from Hawaii high schools in 1984, a questionnaire survey sent in 1975 to 200 of the graduates living on the Mainland and an equal number with Hawaii addresses, and formal interviews with 44 of the graduates who were residing on the west coast.

For purposes of analyzing migration patterns of the 1964 high school graduates, the Caucasian group was divided into "Islander" and "Portuguese"; the latter group came to Hawaii as plantation laborers and are locally considered to be culturally distinct from Caucasians of non-Iberman ancestry. "Nonwhite" for practical purposes means nonblack as the number of Hawaiian-born blacks who stay in the islands to maturity is minuscule. Indeed, blacks are here excluded from the 1970 census data referring to nonwhites.

Migration Differentials Prior to World War II

From the 1890s to World War II, Hawaii was economically dominated by the pineapple and sugar plantations, with political control exercised by the numerically small Haole elite. Most of the local-born were descendents of plantation labor immigrants. The historical evidence is that outmigration was spiking among all groups recruited for plantation labor with the exception of the Chinese. However, whereas the outmigration of the descendents of the nonwhite plantation laborers was minimal, a substantial outmigration continued among the Hawaiian-born whites. Nonwhites were generally recruited as unmarried males whereas the Portuguese, Spanish and Puerto Ricans came in family units. Families that left for the west coast attracted interrelated families from Hawaii, but the unrelated nonwhite males who moved exercised no influence over the subsequent movement of the Hawaiian-born. In the case of the Spanish, the outmigration of families became so massive that they coalesced to exist as a separate culture group in Hawaii. Also discouraging the migration of the nonwhite Hawaii-born offshoring of plantation labor was the fact that whereas discrimination against Asians intensified on the west coast after about 1910, plantation conditions were simultaneously improving in Hawaii. Outmigration among the ethnic Hawaiians (including part-Hawaiians) was minimal; the 1920, 1930, and 1940 censuses revealed 12,660, and 650 Hawaiians, respectively, in the contiguous United States. The last figure represents barely one percent of the Hawaiian population enumerated in Hawaii in 1940.

In 1940, approximately 28 percent of Hawaii-born whites and 2 percent of nonwhites resided on the Mainland. Sex ratios (male/female X 100) of those on the Mainland were 102 and 186, respectively, reflecting the outmigration of whites in family groups and the predomiance of unmarried males among the nonwhite outmigrants. California contained four-fifths of the Hawaii-born nonwhites and nearly three quarters of the Hawaii-born whites.

Table 1 shows that in 1940 the distributions of the Hawaii-born whites and nonwhites living in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Prop. (1000)</th>
<th>Hawaii-born</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2,158</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,908</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,482</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,003</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,186</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1940, Race of Birth.
California cities were dissimilar with the whites concentrated in Oakland and the nonwhites in Los Angeles. Most of the local-born Portuguese who moved to the Mainland are known to have moved to Alameda County with the largest number going to Hayward, which is just south of Oakland. The major attraction of Alameda County was the existence of a large immigrant Portuguese community already there. Many in this community had families ties with Portuguese who immigrated to Hawaii. Portuguese comprised at least two-thirds of Hawaiian-born white adults living in Hawaii in 1940 and may have then comprised the majority of Hawaiian-born whites living in California as well.

While the 1940 census provides no ethnic breakdown of the Hawaiian-born nonwhite population in California, Strong's (1934) estimates of 2,300 Hawaiian-born Japanese living in California at the time of the census comprising approximately 60 percent of the Hawaiian-born nonwhites then living in California. Just prior to World War II; approximately half of the Japanese population in California lived in Los Angeles County, and one work pertaining to the pro-World War II Japanese population in Los Angeles County indicates that the Hawaiian-born Japanese comprised 12 percent of the Nisei (second generation) labor force in 1941 (Blom and Riener, 1950). Hence, it appears that the concentration of Hawaiian-born nonwhites in Los Angeles resulted mainly from the migration of Japanese there.

Migration Trends Since World War II

In the period after World War II there was a dramatic rise in the rate of local nonwhite outmigration to Los Angeles. This was the result of large numbers of military dependents among the white outmigrants. Because of the latter development, which reflects the relocation of whites born in Hawaii after World War II are not useful.

The proportion of Hawaiian-born nonwhites living on the Mainland rose from 2.2 percent in 1940 to 3.8 percent in 1945, 15.4 percent in 1950, and 26.4 percent in 1970. Among the whites the corresponding figures were 3.8 percent in 1940, 7.1 percent in 1945, 10.8 percent in 1950, and 10.4 percent in 1970. Among the whites, the corresponding figures were 3.8 percent in 1940, 7.1 percent in 1945, 10.8 percent in 1950, and 10.4 percent in 1970. Among the whites the corresponding figures were 3.8 percent in 1940, 7.1 percent in 1945, 10.8 percent in 1950, and 10.4 percent in 1970. In the latter case, however, the figures become increasingly distorted by the large influx of military dependents after World War II.

The yearly gross outmigration rate for nonwhites increased rapidly from virtually nil during World War II (civilians nonwhites were not permitted to leave their island of residence during World War II) to a peak in the mid-1950s with little fluctuation thereafter until about 1970. I believe the 1950 census will reveal the rate of local-born outmigration has dropped substantially since 1970.

The immediate stimulus for the increased postwar movement among the nonwhites were the economic opportunities in the Mainland, the imprisonment of airline passenger service between the Mainland and Hawaii, and the fact that the Nisei in the military (they comprised 12 percent of all military personnel in Hawaii) were able to experience the Mainland for the first time. Many went to Mainland colleges under the GI bill and some later returned to Hawaii and became leaders in the newly dominant state Democratic Party.

It is thus reasonable to assume that the Japanese were disproportionately represented among the local nonwhite outmigrants in the years immediately after World War II. Although there are no data given in the 1950 and 1960 censuses that allow us to test this surmise, the age composition of the Hawaiian-born nonwhites on the Mainland in 1970 provides a good indication of past trends as most local nonwhites are young adults at the time of their initial move to the Mainland.

The 4 percent sample of the Hawaiian-born living on the west coast shows that among the nonwhites aged 40-44, 24 percent migrated prior to 1940, 18 percent migrated between 1940 and 1944, and 59 percent migrated between 1945 and 1955. Japanese comprise 63 percent of the total.

This share declines consistently toward the young age groups to only 55 percent in the 18-19 age group. In contrast, proportionally more Chinese, Filipinos, and other nonwhites rise continuously in the younger age groups; for the 10-14 age group the corresponding increases are from 11 percent in the 45-49 and 50-54 age groups to 27 percent in the 18-19 age group, and among the other nonwhites (mainly Chinese and Filipinos) the corresponding increase is from 25 to 33 percent.

The 4 percent sample of the west coast and one percent sample of other Mainland areas indicate that the large proportion by ethnicity of local-born nonwhites as a proportion of the total residing in Hawaii in 1970 to be as follows: Japanese, 3.7 percent; Chinese, 4.3 percent; Filipino, 3.6 percent; Korean, 3.5 percent; Hawaiian, 4.8 percent;
"others," 8.7 percent. Excepting the "others" most of whom are Samoan children following their Samoan-born parents to California after a stay in Hawaii and Hawaiians, the outmigration rates are quite similar. In the case of Hawaiians, evidence from the 1964 high school graduates (see below) indicates outmigration rates similar to those of other nonwhites. In the 1970 census, many who were part-Hawaiian declared themselves to be of a non-Hawaiian race. 7 Given the negative Hawaiian stereotypes existing in Hawaii and the magic word "Hawaiian" often carries on the Mainland, 8 it is reasonable to assume that persons of part-Hawaiian ancestry were much more likely to declare themselves Hawaiian on the Mainland than in Hawaii. Most of the part-Hawaiians who declared themselves of another race undoubtedly chose "white" as most part-Hawaiians also have Caucasian ancestry." 9

Estimates of the outmigration rate of the local-born whites have been complicated by the outmigration of military dependents and young children of civilian adults who briefly lived in Hawaii. However, there is little evidence that the 1965-70 outmigration rates of persons aged 18 and older in 1970. The estimated 6,900 Hawai'i-born white adult outmigrants represented 12 percent of their counterparts living in Hawaii in 1970; the comparable percentage was 7 percent for the nonwhites. Actually, the percentage for the whites is understated because many of the Hawai'i-born "whites" were actually part-Hawaiian and part-Hawaiians on the Mainland were more likely to declare themselves "Hawaiian." 5

Alumni and junior year reunion lists were obtained from private and public high schools, respectively, in order to determine the 1974 locations of persons graduating from Hawaii high schools in 1964. Ethnicities were assigned on the basis of surnames except for the exclusive students who were classified as "Hawaiians," as only persons with Hawaiian ancestry are admitted there. Not unexpectedly, Hawaiians (non-Portuguese whites) were disproportionately on the Mainland. However, whereas persons classified as Portuguese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Chinese or Hawaiian on the basis of surname can safely be assumed to have been born in Hawaii, most of the Asians graduating from high school were undoubtedly Mainland-born.

There are four private schools (Punahou, Mid-Pacific, Iolani and Maryknoll) in which most of those with Asian surnames were in fact unilixed Hawaiians who were born or at least raised in Hawaii. These schools are characterized by almost all graduates attending college with most doing so on the Mainland. Their combined class lists show that while 59 percent of persons with Asian surnames were residing on the Mainland in 1974, corresponding shares for those with Chinese and Japanese surnames were only 26 and 21 percent, respectively. It is probable that at least half of the Hawaiian-born Hawaiians graduating from the schools were living on the Mainland as of 1974.

Even though most of the Kamehameha graduates attend college with perhaps half doing so on the Mainland, only 16 percent of the graduates for whom addresses were known (95 percent of the total) were living on the Mainland. Among other non-Hawaiian (and presumably Hawaiian-born) ethnic groups from all schools the indicated percentages on the Mainland were as follows: Chinese and Portuguese, 25 percent each; 20 percent among Filipinos and 18 percent among the Japanese. It is doubtful that the proportion of Hawaiians on the Mainland was significantly higher for all schools than for Kamehameha. This is evidence that the census data indicating a disproportionate number of Hawaiians among the 1965-70 nonwhite outmigrants were in error.

Questionnaires were sent to 200 graduates living on the Mainland and 200 living in Hawaii. Whereas 118 (65 percent of the total successfully delivered) were returned from the Mainland, only 87 (45 percent) were returned from Hawaii. Although the small sample sizes make speculation about relative migration rates a risky enterprise, it is of note that of the 18 Mainland-born Hawaiians in the sample, 16 were living on the Mainland. Eleven of the thirteen local-born Hawaiians were attending college with most doing so on the Mainland. Among the responding 174 questionnaires returned, 83 were from persons living in Hawaii.

Questionnaire results indicated a total of 552 siblings at least 18 years of age; of this number, 372 were living on the Mainland. A breakdown of the proportions by place of birth and ethnicity is presented in Table 2.

Not surprisingly, Table 2 shows the proportion living on the Mainland to be highest among the Mainland-born Hawaiians. Among the Hawaiian-born Hawaiians the proportion is half. Shares are close to a third for
Table 2

Percent of Siblings of the Questionnaire Sample on Mainland by Ethnicity and Place of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group-</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Siblings Aged 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese-Hawaii</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haole-Hawaii</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haole-Mainland</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian-Hawaii</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-Hawaii</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese-Hawaiian</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino-Hawaiian</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-Hawaiian</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total-Hawaii</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total-All Persons</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire Study

the Portuguese, Filipinos and Chinese whereas they are about a quarter for the siblings of the Japanese and Hawaiians. This suggests that the rates of outmigration to the Mainland may be somewhat lower among the Hawaiians and Japanese than other groups, although the small sample sizes and possible biases in the sample may make this a risky supposition.

According to available evidence from the census and the questionnaire sample, the proportion of Hawaiians six months within ten years of reaching the age of 18 may have reached about 50 percent by the late 1950s and remained at that level until at least 1970. The share among the Hawaii-born Haole may well have been as high as two-thirds.

Return Migration

Return migration is a relatively neglected subject in migration studies. The net loss of a local-born population through outmigration can only be measured after return migration is taken into account. Published census data are uninformative concerning return migration. According to the 4 percent public use sample of Hawaii (1970) published census data are given only for "total" and "Negro") the numbers of Hawaii-born nonwhites and whites living on the Mainland in 1965 and in Hawaii in 1970 increased 50 and 40 percent, respectively, over the comparable numbers living on the Mainland in 1953 and in Hawaii in 1960. This reflects much improved economic conditions in Hawaii in the 1960s.

Those returnees aged 23 and over in 1970 were most likely to be at least 18 years of age at the time the initial move to the Mainland was made. According to the 1970 public use census tapes the 7,500 returnees aged 23 and above were 37 percent of the number of local-born 1965-70 outmigrants aged 18 and over in 1970. By ethnic group the estimated ratios of return migration to outmigration were as follows: Filipino, .43; Chinese, .42; Korean, .42; Japanese, .41; white, .37; and Hawaiian, .19. There is a remarkable similarity for all nonwhite groups with the exception of the Hawaiians, who are indicated to have a return rate well below that of the whites. However, the bias towards declaring "Hawaiian-ness" on the Mainland exaggerates a downward influence on the indicated Hawaiian return rate and a corresponding upward influence on the "white" return rate. Another source of bias is that earlier evidence has shown that the proportion of Hawaiians in the outmigration stream during the later 1960s was higher than in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Other evidence concerning return migration comes from the survey of 1964 high school graduates. For purposes of this study, a return migrant was defined as one who lived for at least six months on the Mainland after graduating from high school. Forty-nine of the 87 questionnaires returned from Hawaii residents were from return migrants. By assuming that 60 percent of the returnees completed and mailed back their questionnaires, it was mathematically calculated that 55 percent of the outmigrants among the 1964 high school graduates had returned to Hawaii by 1975. Although the number in the return sample is too small for valid generalization, it is noteworthy that 30 percent of both the returnees and Mainland residents who returned questionnaires were Hawaiian whereas the Hawaii-born Haole comprised 9 percent of the Mainland and 4 percent of the returnee sample.
More evidence concerning the return rate comes from the interviews of the Mainland residents on the west coast. All were quizzed about the migration history of siblings. The indicated return rates of the siblings of both the Hawaiians (10 interviewed with 47 siblings) and other Hawaii-born nonwhites (28 interviewed with 77 siblings) were in the neighborhood of 50 percent. Unfortunately, the three Hawaii-born Hooleas interviewed do not allow for a generalization although it is perhaps noteworthy that none of the four siblings who moved to the Mainland returned to Hawaii.

Based on available samples from the census and the high school survey, I believe that the return rate among the local-born nonwhites generally ranges between 40 and 60 percent, depending on economic conditions in Hawaii. The return rates appear to be similar among all major nonwhite groups. Estimation for the local-born Hooleas who do not leave as children is much more difficult, but it is much lower, perhaps in the neighborhood of 25-35 percent, depending on local conditions. Because of differences in initial out-migration and return migration, the net outmigration of nonwhites between the 1930s and early 1970s was about a quarter and half of Hawaii-born non-Hoolea and Hoolea, respectively, who reached maturity in Hawaii.

Destinations of the Outmigrants

The question of where the outmigrants go actually has the following two components: (1) what is the original destination, and (2) where do those outmigrants choosing not to return to Hawaii eventually decide to make their home. That the distribution of ultimate destinations is quite different from that of the initial destinations and shows much less variety was in fact one of the major unexpected findings of this study.

The 4 percent public use sample of the west coast and 1 percent sample for other areas revealed an overwhelming preference of the Hawaii-born of all nonwhite groups for California (Table 3). The much lower proportion of whites living in California reflects the influence of persons born as military dependents after World War II. In fact, among those whites on the Mainland aged 30 and over in 1970, with perhaps

---

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Total (P.U.C.)</th>
<th>Published Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiians</td>
<td>12,550 (72.4)</td>
<td>71,483 (49.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nonwhites</td>
<td>12,483 (72.0)</td>
<td>71,483 (49.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,033 (72.2)</td>
<td>142,966 (49.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes for Japanese and other nonwhite groups based on public use sample.*

the majority being of Portuguese ancestry, more than two-thirds were living in California.

Among the nonwhites, the Hawaiians were more dispersed than other groups. The 1970 complete census count of Hawaiians (who by definition have Hawaiian ancestry) in fact revealed that 49.7 percent of the 28,804 Hawaiians enumerated on the Mainland were in California with an additional 6.9 percent in Oregon and Washington. Some 17 percent of all Hawaiians but only 5 percent of the other Hawai-born nonwhites on the Mainland were residing in southern states. Of the Hawaii-born siblings on the Mainland in the questionnaire sample, proportions living on the Mainland who were living in California were as follows: Japanese, 70 percent; Chinese, 69 percent; Filipinos, 75 percent; Portuguese, 57 percent; "mixed," 84 percent; Haole, 20 percent (only ten in the sample); and Hawaiians, 47 percent. This dispersed distribution of Hawaiians results in large part from the disproportionate number of Hawaiians who join the armed forces. The military offers an escape from poverty and unemployment for some Hawaiians as it does for some blacks, and Kamameshi, had the best ROTC program in the islands. In 1970, the proportion of employed Hawaiian males who were in the armed forces (9 percent) was double the national average. Additionally, 68 percent of all Hawaiians in college in 1970 were living on the Mainland, and a 1968 survey of colleges attended by Hawaii residents showed that 39 percent of those on the Mainland were attending colleges in California with an additional 23 percent in northeastern states (U.S. Office of Education, 1970). This survey also showed that 29 percent of all Hawaii residents attending college were doing so on the Mainland. The unusually high proportion of Hawaiian attendance in the remainder can largely be attributed to the fact that a high proportion going to college were graduates of Kamhi High School, the only school in the area (like most other private schools) encourages its graduates to attend a Mainland college.

The 1970 public use sample showed that the one non-west-coast state in which the majority of Hawai-born nonwhites in any one main-coast state was the 6 percent of the Japanese residing in Illinois; this compares with 20 percent of other nonwhites. Most of the Japanese in Illinois were male and over 45 years of age; they appear to be the remnants of a significant migration to Illinois in the late 1940s and 1950s. The 1950 census showed that 10 percent of the Hawaii-born nonwhites on the Mainland were residing in Illinois.

From discussions I have had with the middle-aged Hawaii-born Japanese in Hawaii and California, it is evident that many of the Niigai attending college on the U.S. Bill Choson west-coast colleges to escape "conservative Oriental influences" and that the University of Chicago was the favorite college. At present, Illinois is not a magnet for Hawaii-born out migrants; in fact, Chicago suffers from a negative image in the islands.11

According to the public use census tape, approximately 45 percent of all Hawaii-born 1955-70 out migrants aged 18 and over were in California with an additional 12 percent in the northwest. Hawaiians, with only 30 percent in California, showed the most dispersed. According to the class list, some 38 percent of the persons with non-Haole surnames were living in California with an additional 8 percent in the northwest. Again, the Hawaiians (with the sample heavily influenced by the Kamameshi graduates) showed the greatest dispersal with 36 percent in California and an additional 14 percent in the northwest. The overall figure for all persons with Haole surnames is meaningless in that most were not Hawaii-born and some were of mixed ancestry. That Hawaii-born Haoles are more dispersed than the nonwhites is suggested by the Mainland locations of those with Haole surnames who graduated from the earlier mentioned private schools. Approximately a third were in California with an additional tenth each in the northeast, Washington, D.C. area, and the northwest. In contrast, those with Oriental surnames who attended these schools exhibit residence patterns on the Mainland that were similar to those of Orientals from the public schools. Punahou (which contains most of the Haole students in the school sample) has had a strong east coast orientation since its founding and graduates are encouraged to attend prestigious Ivy League colleges.

Among the Hawaii-born in the questionnaire sample, 63 percent of those on the Mainland were residing in California. However, excluding military "boot camp," only 40 percent including returnees who received a weight of two to reflect their assumed proportion in the population originally moved to California. In projecting the moves made by the high school graduates within five years of graduation, it was indicated that a census based on this group would show 47
percent of the 1965-70 migrants to be in California with an additional 12 percent in the northwest. This compares with 48 and 12 percent, respectively, for the Hawaiian-born nonwhite adults as estimated with the 1 percent nationwide tape. The questionnaire sample indicated that California exercised a strong attraction for persons of all ethnic groups who originally moved elsewhere and chose to remain on the mainland. California was generally perceived even by migrants living elsewhere to have the climate most similar to that of Hawaii, excellent economic opportunities, physical closeness to Hawaii, and the chance to live a modified "island lifestyle" because of the high proportions of islanders in the state. However, relative differences between the ethnicities in terms of original dispersal remained.

Patterns of Residence in California

Outside of California, there was no marked concentration of Hawaiian-born in any substate area. From the public use tape a 2 percent sample of "economic areas" is available. In California, counties with more than 150,000 residents are treated as separate economic areas. Hence, we can estimate the distribution of the Hawaiian-born on the county level for the populous areas of California. Areas of concentration by ethnicity in 1970 are shown in Table 4.

Among whites over 30 years of age, the attraction of Alameda County (which contains Oakland) is evident. Also of note is the large number in Santa Clara County (San Jose); most of the Spanish who fled Hawaii moved there. A low relative percentage in Los Angeles County is indicative of a marked preference for the Bay Area. In the under 30 age group, which contains many military veterans, the high percentage in San Diego reflects the importance of San Diego as a Navy town.

Among the Japanese, the overwhelming preference for Los Angeles County reflects the continuance of pre-World War II patterns. Sixty-five percent of the small Korean contingent were also in Los Angeles. Japanese and Koreans in Hawaii are culturally similar as evidenced by a high rate of intermarriage, and it is plausible to assume that the Korean concentration at least in part results from social ties with the Japanese.

| Ethnic Group (Estimated Number) | Leading Counties (20% or Above) | Estimated Population | % of | % Diff. from
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiians (April 70)</td>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Bay Area</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiians (Dec. 70)</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Bay Area</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Bay Area</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipinos</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>+20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Bay Area</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Bay Area includes San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Alameda, Contra Costa and Marin Counties. "Other Bay Area" refers to those counties minor those previously mentioned for the white group under consideration.

2 According to the 1970 census count there were 14,112 Hawaiians (including those multiethnic-born and not showing place of birth). The breakdown by county was as follows: Los Angeles, 4,626; San Diego, 1,022; Alameda, 2,374; and San Francisco, 1,476.

Source: Two percent public use sample of census defined "economic areas" of California.
Hawaiians are highly concentrated in the San Francisco area and are overrepresented in San Diego County as well. Not shown is Monterey County, which in 1970 contained the second-highest (after San Francisco City) relative concentration of Hawaiians. Concentrations in San Diego and Monterey counties reflect the influence of the military; Fort Ord, the basic training camp for all army personnel from Hawaii, is in Monterey County. A number of Hawaiians in the questionnaire sample indicated they chose to live in San Diego or Monterey County because of favorable perceptions gained of these areas while in the military. One explanation for the preference for the Bay Area over Los Angeles is that Hawaiians have intermarried extensively with Portuguese and Chinese whereas they have intermarried much less with Japanese. Chinese and Portuguese have overwhelmingly favored the Bay Area and existing social networks may have drawn Hawaiians there as well.

A marked relative preference of Filipinos for San Diego undoubtedly reflects the high proportion who join the Navy. In the past, natives of the Philippines have joined the Navy in large numbers as stewards to gain U.S. citizenship; the substantial number of Filipinos in the questionnaire sample who originally went to the Mainland in the Navy (this included all of the males) shows that the tradition of joining the Navy has continued among the Hawaii-born Filipinos.

Among the Chinese, the strong preference for San Francisco in particular and the Bay Area in general is easily explainable if one assumes the Hawaii-born Chinese are attracted by the Chinese community already in the Bay Area. However, as will be explained, the distribution of Mainland-born nonchinese little to do with the destinations of Hawaii-born nonchinese of comparable ethnicities.

California locations of the 1964 high school graduates with non-Hoole surnames in general correspond quite well with those indicated by the public school census tapes for comparable ethnic groups. The class lists offer further enlightenment in that they show 12 percent of the Japanese in California to be in the city of Los Angeles compared to 43 percent in the balance of the county. Indeed, there were more in the suburb of Gardena than in the city of Los Angeles. In 1975, when I was interviewing in California, Gardena’s population of 40,000 was at least 10 percent Hawaii-born Japanese. Gardena is

the one Mainland locale in which the Hawaii-born are sufficiently numerous to give a distinctive island flavor to the locale. The historical reasons why Gardena first attracted Hawaii-born Japanese after World War II are obscure, but once the migration started the continuing attraction of Gardena for Hawaii-born Japanese was the existence of friends and relatives of potential migrants who were already living in Gardena.

Clearly, persons in different ethnic groups tend to be attracted to different areas of California. This results from historical factors and the role of friends and relatives in places earlier moved to in attracting present migrants, as well as different places favored by persons migrating for different reasons (see below). The existence of large numbers of Mainland-born Japanese and Chinese in Los Angeles and San Francisco, respectively, do not attract large numbers of Hawaii-born counterparts to these locations. The Hawaii-born in these areas tend to live away from areas of non-Hawaii-born Oriental concentrations, and interviews with Chinese and Japanese in California indicated negative attitudes towards their Mainland-born counterparts. The attraction of San Francisco and Los Angeles among the Hawaii-born Chinese and Japanese, respectively, is the existence of islanders of the same ethnicity who are already there. Probably the same holds for the Hawaii-born Filipinos as well, although there were not enough Filipinos interviewed to make a valid summary.

Demographic Characteristics of the Outmigrants

Not surprisingly, both the 1975 public use sample and the questionnaire survey show the average Hawaii-born migrant to be better educated, to have a higher occupational level, and to earn more income than the average nonmigrant. This generalization holds for all ethnic groups. Of note is the fact that the same differences found among the Hawaii-born in Hawaii hold for those on the Mainland. For example, the Hawaiians, who are characterized by the lowest occupational, educational and income levels in Hawaii, also have these characteristics high among others in Hawaii-born groups on the Mainland. In fact, characteristics of each Hawaii-born ethnic group on the Mainland are more similar to those of the same ethnic group in Hawaii than those of the Hawaii-born of
other ethnicities on the Mainland. This suggests that it is not so much income, educational, or occupational levels per se that induce outmigration but, rather, personality attributes which exist in all ethnic groups and which for each group are positively correlated with educational levels and ultimate occupational and financial success.

Whereas the Hawaii-born nonwhite outmigration is relatively restricted among young adults, the same is not true for the whites. The public use sample shows that a third of white but only an eighth of nonwhite 1965-70 migrants aged 18 and above were over 30 years of age.

Another demographic variation shown by the public use sample is the almost complete absence of children among the Hawaii-born Oriental (i.e., Chinese, Japanese, and Korean) outmigrants. Whereas 14 percent of the Hawaiian and 16 percent of the Filipino outmigrants were under 18 years of age, the comparable share was only 4 percent among the Oriental outmigrants. In the questionnaire sample the same absence of children among the Oriental outmigrants was evident.

These differences reflect different levels of "commitment" to Hawaii. Where social cohesion is strongest, one can expect outmigration to be most concentrated among young unmarried adults as social bonds and obligations are weakest in this group. It is with marriage and children that social ties in a society become a very influential force in discouraging migration. In the case of the Hawaii-born Hawaiians in the sample, the questionnaire and interviews revealed their emotional ties to Hawaii to be the weakest and the pull of relatives on the Mainland the strongest. Where each group is characterized by mutual obligations which are not psychologically binding and personally satisfying for most, these obligations increase after marriage and especially after the first child is born. Thus, the outmigration of the Orientals is especially restricted to young, unmarried adults.

Reasons for Moving and Returning

Reasons for migration can be viewed on two levels: overt purpose and underlying motivation. Those joining the military go where the military sends them.

Those marrying servicemen from the Mainland usually move to the home states of their spouses. Those attending college are heavily concentrated in the northwest and midwest and those seeking employment go almost exclusively to the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas. In fact, on the national level the differences in distribution by ethnicity can be attributed mostly to differences in overt purposes of the original move. Within California, the differences in distribution of initial destinations are tied to where friends and relatives are located.

Underlying motives for the move to the Mainland in the questionnaire sample were mostly psychological rather than economic. This was true even of those who moved to the Mainland to seek employment. Regardless of ethnic group, the main motivations were to "get off the rock," experience something different, and, in many cases, to escape parental control. Excepting those who married servicemen from the Mainland, few envisioned at the time of the initial move that they would be on the Mainland for more than a few years. By contrast, most of those who never moved never had a strong desire to do so. For them, the security of family and friends and the island "way of life" were paramount considerations.

Contrary to a popular impression that most returnees are economic or psychological "failures," the overwhelming majority of returnees in the questionnaire sample believed that the purpose of the Mainland move had been successfully met. In only one case was the return caused in part by economic considerations. Only two of the returnees (both Japanese females) returned because of family obligations. There was no evidence that the traditional Oriental expectation that the oldest son take care of the parents had an appreciable effect on either outmigration or return migration.12 The main, those who returned to Hawaii did so for social reasons, their hearts had always been in Hawaii during their Mainland stays. This was true of all ethnic groups.

By contrast, those in the survey who stayed on the Mainland did so mainly for economic reasons. Whereas those graduating from high school were generally among the generally had better job opportunities and higher wages as well as lower living costs on the Mainland, knowledge of these facts made little practical impression for most and did not provide the stimulus for very much of the outmigration.
However, the practical significance of these facts in terms of standard of living became increasingly obvious with duration of residence on the Mainland. Those who valued their economic improvement more than the social ties of friends and relatives or the local lifestyle were generally the ones who stayed on the Mainland.

Given the facts presented in this section, it is obvious that local ties both retard the rate of outmigration and encourage return migration. Both the questionnaire and interviews revealed the ties of non-Haole (including the Portuguese) to family and the local lifestyle to be much stronger than those of the local-born Haoles. Furthermore, the local-born Haoles on the Mainland were, in the main, much happier there and much less likely than nonwhites to express a wish to return to Hawaii. Perceived discrimination did not play a role in the lesser nonwhite satisfaction with the Mainland. InConnor’s (1961) terms, most of the Hawaii-born Haoles on the Mainland had a “national” orientation whereas many of the nonwhites retained a “local” orientation even after 10 years on the Mainland. Although there are no comparable data for return rates of other groups in the United States, I believe that the rate of return migration among the Hawaii-born nonwhites is much higher than the national average because the local orientation is so strong.

Conclusions and Prospects for the Future

That the outmigration patterns of the different ethnic groups in Hawaii are at considerable variance has been clearly established. Haoles are much more prone to move away from Hawaii and much less likely to return to Hawaii than any of the nonwhite groups. Among the nonwhites, the rates of outmigration and return appear to be similar, but the Mainland destinations vary considerably by ethnic group. Haole outmigrants are least likely to be young adults and Oriental outmigrants are least likely to be children. These differences reflect varying identification with “local values,” the persistence of distinct cultural norms, differing overt reasons for moving to the Mainland, and the influence of historical factors. I expect that where the role of discrimination is not strong in shaping patterns (as it has been in the case of the blacks), the same considerations are of the most importance in explaining ethnic differentials elsewhere in the United States.

What of future differentials among local-born Hawaii nonmigrants? Predicting the future is risky, but I believe the Haole-non-Haole differentials will persist. Ethnic cultural differences in Hawaii are being reduced in the direction of a “local” subculture, but this developing local ethos is overtly anti-Mainlander and often anti-Haole in general. Because of this, I expect Haoles to continue to be less integrated into the general population.

Concerning destinations, overt reasons for moving (for example, the Hawaiian proclivity for joining the armed forces whereas most Orientals go to college) in part reflect socioeconomic circumstances. There is no evidence that disparities between the “haves” (Haoles and Orientals) and “have-nots” (everyone else) are decreasing in Hawaii.

However, one trend that suggests differentials among the nonwhite groups will decline in the future is the increasing social interaction between ethnic groups in Hawaii. This is reflected in the rise of a subculture at the expense of purely ethnic values, an increasing rate of intermarriage, and the increasing proportion of friendships that cross ethnic lines.14 One manifestation of this has been the development of the “Oriental In-group” in which common Oriental heritage is considered more meaningful than separate Chinese, Japanese or Korean ancestry.15 In the future there may be two distinct patterns of Mainland residence among nonwhites: namely that of the Orientals as contrasted to that of the remaining “have-nots.”

These emerging trends do not favor the persistence of ethnic ghettos such as Gardenia. The role of Gardenia as a magnet for Japanese migrants has at any rate disappeared because of the recent immigration of blacks into the city from Watts and other areas to the north. I expect that the 1980 census will reveal a much reduced proportion of Japanese migrants who have moved to Los Angeles County. Among the 1964 graduates the name “Los Angeles” still conjured visions of movie stars, Disneyland, and excitement. The existing image of Los Angeles in Hawaii is considerably less attractive. In the questionnaire sample there was a considerable recent movement from Los Angeles County to the Jersey (and to a lesser extent, Orange County) with the Japanese predominating in the outflow from Los Angeles. These moves undoubtedly result in new migrants attracted to the Bay area rather than to Los Angeles. As is the case in
the United States in general, the local outmigrants from Hawaii are increasingly attracted to perceived amenities of the potential destinations.

NOTES

1. Major findings are that blacks are less likely to make interstate moves than whites but that the interstate moves tend to involve longer distances.

2. The survey (termed a "conga update survey") was undertaken by the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity. The number of Hawaiian-bred whites who had lived in Hawaii less than 11 years was derived from a tape containing the record of the 50,000 persons interviewed.

3. The term "Hula" is Hawaiian for "stranger." The first Caucasians to visit the islands were labeled "Hulae" and the term came to mean someone of Caucasian ancestry. Hawaiian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Puerto Ricans came to work on plantations and furthermore had a different general appearance from Caucasians of non-Hawaiian ancestry. Therefore, they were sometimes labeled as Hulae. The Spanish have ceased to exist as a separate group and none of the persons in the survey were of untested Puerto Rican ancestry.

4. For a more detailed discussion of prewar outmigration patterns, see Paul Wright, 1975, Chapter 4. This paper is adopted from the dissertation and detailed explanation of the survey procedure and research findings are contained therein.

5. Up to 1970 a high proportion of outmigrants originally moved to the mainland for military and educational reasons. Rising out-of-state tuition and increased educational standards in the volunteer army have reduced the number originally moving to the mainland for these purposes. Unfortunately, 1980 census data on migration will probably not be available until 1984.

6. The 1 percent sample tape of the United States census shows 64 percent of the nondates aged 40-44 to be Japanese. This high percentage is due to a concentration of Japanese in the Midwest, especially Illinois. The 4 percent sample of the west coast shows the same general trends as the 1 percent national tape and was chosen because of the larger sample size (1,004 representing 47,100 persons vs. 660 representing 64,600 persons).

7. According to the 1970 census, there were 71,435 Hawaiians in Hawaii. A survey in the same year by the Hawaii State Department of Health indicated 7,897 full- and 125,244 part-Hawaiians. See Hawaii Data Book, 1971, p. 8.

8. This difference between the negative Hawaiian stereotypes in the islands as contrasted to a positive image on the mainland was frequently alluded to by Hawaiians interviewed on the mainland.

9. The 1964 graduating class at Kamehameha High School to which some students with at least one-sixteenth Hawaiian ancestry are admitted, has the following ethnic composition as indicated by surname: 45 percent Haka, 7 percent Portuguese, 25 percent Hawaiian, 15 percent Chinese, 5 percent Filipino, and 2 percent Japanese. This is suggestive of the actual mixture of ethnic strains among those of part-Hawaiian ancestry.

10. Migration durations derived from the return sample suggest that approximately half of all return moves made in a five year period would be captured in a census. Those moves not recorded in return moves would also be missed in the enumeration of outmigration as both the outmigration and return migration occurred within the five years preceding the census. Assuming this to be the case, the 1965-70 outmigration of local-born nonhawaiis was in the neighborhood of 23,000 whereas 12,000 returned in the same period. This supports the argument that more than half of the local-born nonhawaiis migrating in the 1960s eventually returned to Hawaii. This estimate derived from census data may be low because of a tendency for some to erroneously say they lived in the same state five years earlier.

11. A preliminary questionnaire was given to students in an introductory geography class at the University of Hawaii. Respondents were asked to rate 14 cities from 1 (highly unfavorable) to 6 (highly favorable). Among the Hawaiian-born, Chicago, with an average score of 7.3, received the worst rating. In fact, last place was New York with a score of 1.7.

12. The best description of the nature of these mutual obligations and their effect on behavior is Johnson (1972).

13. Proportion living on the mainland were computed by the order. Oldest sons of all ethnicities were no more or
less likely to be on the Mainland than their younger siblings.

14. In a survey of friendship patterns in one public high school, Leon in 1975 found that there was a tendency for cliques to be dominated by one ethnic group, but the incidence nevertheless was considerably lower than indicated in an identical survey taken of the same school in 1957. See Joseph Leon (1975).

15. The best account of this development is contained in Frederick Samuels (1970).

16. In the survey discussed in footnote 11, the Hawaii-born gave Los Angeles an average rating of 2.0, which was ninth among the 14 cities. Most specifically mentioned the smog in Los Angeles. In contrast, San Francisco, with a rating of 3.5, received the highest ranking of all cities.

REFERENCES


ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  
THE HAWAII MODEL  

Peter S. Adler and David B. Chandler  

"The nearest thing to eternal life on earth is a lawsuit."  
—Sid Wolinsky  

Sociologists have long been intrigued by the role conflict plays in enhancing group cohesion (Coser, 1956) and in accomplishing social change (Dahrendorf, 1959). Less well studied is the etiology of conflict and the alternative procedures, both naturally occurring and socially engineered, which resolve disputes. Disagreements between individuals, within groups, and between groups seem to be universal. They arise from differences in values, beliefs, and experience, from competition for limited resources, and from perceived risks to security. Disputes seem to have natural histories. When perceived grievances cannot be resolved at an early, informal and interpersonal level, disputes may result. One model of the transformation of disputes describes this general process.  

Feldstein, Abel, and Sarat (1981:3-4) have shown how unperceived, adverse experience will, in certain conditions, become consciously recognized ("blaming"), altered into grievances when and if a source of the injury is identified ("blaming"), and turned into manifest conflict if any claims made are rejected or avoided. Unresolved conflict, in turn, may escalate in a variety of ways. New actors may wittingly or unwittingly be swept into disagreement. New issues may emerge as interests shift or as new information becomes available. Positions may harden over time and the dispute may be protracted by external events. As the cost of contention increases, conflict typically intensifies. Left unchecked, any dispute runs the risk of spiralling into psychological or physical warfare.  

Conflict Resolution  

Conflicts that escalate into disputes can also be resolved by avoidance, bargaining, and competitive substitution. More common in Western societies is their transformation into legal and administrative battles and the use of judges and jurors to impose outcomes. Formal resolution procedures vary greatly (Sander, 1982) but perform common social functions: the allocation of authority, the interpretation of relationships, and the sanctioning of behavior (Schur, 1968). Governed by explicit rules, courts and other formal forums provide a factual and orderly process for decision-making and systematic methods of compliance and social control. Legal recourse, however, has built-in limitations. It is expensive, time consuming, and complicated. Because of the court's formality, conflict must often be reduced to its narrowest and sometimes least meaningful dimensions. Likewise conflict is not always terminated by judgment. In the win-lose atmosphere of the adversarial system, compromises where both parties gain may not be found. The system then encourages more litigation (appeals and countersuits), additional expenses and delays, and the problem of legal overload (Zulich, 1976; Marcus, 1979).  

As an adversarial system, American legal process seems to recapitulate Greek and Roman traditions in which entitled gladiators (lawyers) do direct-to-direct combat (litigation) in a ritualized and mysterious arena (the courtroom) before an ultimate authority (the judge) who must—according to the rules of the game—find one party a loser. Litigation and adjudication are important functions in a complex society. They do not, however, guarantee that "personal justice"—an individual's private sense of fair play—will be served. Nor does court processing inherently imply compliance which often must be sought in separate legal actions. In civil cases one sometimes wins the case but cannot collect the judgment. Of course, as a practical matter, most "justice" is negotiated by opposing lawyers in the shadow of the law. Settlement conferences and negotiated pleas dispose of the vast majority of civil and criminal cases before trial.  

Since the 1960s a modest but significant social movement aimed at creating viable alternatives has started in the U.S. and other countries (Alper and Nichols, 1981). Conciliation, arbitration, final offer arbitration, rent-a-judge, mini-trials, fact finding, the use of an ombudsman, mastors or referees are all gaining credibility. More significant, perhaps, is the emergence of privately incorporated peacemaking programs that provide direct services to families, neighborhoods, and the public-at-large.
Mediation, the foremost method used in such programs, involves a neutral third-party who helps people in conflict come to a voluntarily negotiated out-of-court settlement. A mediator has no power to render decisions, to force people into agreements, or to judge right and wrong. To the contrary, mediators use a variety of techniques to help people communicate, negotiate, and then formulate specific agreements that are fair by the disputants' own definition.

As a method of conflict resolution, mediation can be an intermediate step between private negotiation and adjudication. The neutral mediator convenes meetings, acts as a facilitator, helps defuse interpersonal animosities, sends and carries messages, and helps all parties focus on potential solutions to the issues that divide them. Historically, mediation has been most closely associated with labor-management bargaining (Sinkin, 1971). In the last two decades, however, the range of applications has expanded dramatically and will continue to expand: environmental and land-use conflicts, divorce disputes, consumer problems, disputes over educational placement (Chandler and Braggs, 1983), and conflicts that arise in the home and workplace. The idea of mediation is not new (Nader and Todd, 1978; Gulliver, 1979; Witty, 1981). It has been rediscovered and developed for contemporary social problems. The need is great and being recognized. Social scientists have a significant role to play in studying and developing the relatively untapped potential of alternative dispute resolving tools.

The Hawaii Model

The use of non-adversarial techniques to resolve interpersonal problems is not new in Asia and the Pacific. In China, extrajudicial mediation takes place through the use of two hundred thousand semi-official People's Mediation Committees operating in both rural and urban areas. In Japan the "Jidan" system of police conciliation along with the use of lawyer-conciliators in civil and marital disputes is common (Barnes and Adler, 1983). Historically, in Hawaii and other island systems in the Pacific, natural dispute resolving mechanisms were used for conflicts arising within and between families. The best-known example of this is the traditional Hawaiian group discussion, ko'oponopono, meaning "to set right" (Pukui, et al., 1972; Shook, 1981). Drawing on its own as well as other resources, Hawaii has, since 1979, developed still another system.

In 1978, two political scientists from the University of Hawaii and their students began to interest others in the idea of bringing community-based "minor dispute" mediation to Hawaii (Becker and Slaton, 1981). A committee of the Makiki Neighborhood Board, chaired by lawyer H. William Burgess, and the political science department each started similar programs in late 1979. Unlike many of the mediation programs started in mainland U.S. cities and Canada both of Hawaii's programs began to receive significant numbers of disputes from the courts and other agencies and from efforts at public education. Within a year the mediators from the University program were working closely with the neighborhood board program which had expanded into the Neighborhood Justice Center of Honolulu (NJC) to serve the entire island of Oahu. What began as a limited experiment to train and provide volunteer mediators at no cost to citizens with minor disputes quickly became an island-wide program in which neighborhood, family, money, lifestyle disputes and even minor criminal matters were brought to mediation with considerable success.

Mediation Philosophy and Training

Over the past three years, the Neighborhood Justice Center has been funded from a variety of sources including the U.S. Department of Justice; state, county, and judiciary grants; and funds from local and mainland foundations. The Neighborhood Justice Center's first mediators were trained in 1979 by the Neighborhood Justice Center of Atlanta. The training lasted a total of over 40 hours. Another 40 hour training was conducted for University mediators by the Institute of Mediation and Conflict Resolution of New York. Since that time, the NJC of Honolulu has evolved its own training which emphasizes the neutrality of mediators, facilitation skills which allow disputants to voice grievances and communicate these effectively, and an ideology which emphasizes the importance of disputant self-determination over a concern about getting agreements. There are now over 250 volunteer mediators who have received at least 40 hours of training. Many are human service professionals and attorneys who volunteer their time. Some are professionals in unrelated areas, and many are ordinary working people.
The Disputes

Since it was established in November, 1979, over 4,000 disputes have been brought to the attention of the NJC. In almost half of these cases, the second party refused to mediate or the first party decided against pursuing the dispute. Of the 53 percent in which both parties agreed to participate, almost one-half were successfully conciliated without the parties coming to the Center, typically through telephone calls back and forth by volunteer and paid staff at the Center.

From November, 1979, to December, 1982, the paths by which disputes came to the Center varied considerably. Almost half (about 1,600) seemed to come directly from private citizens. These people called the Center as a result of vigorous public education programs or because friends or advisors such as attorneys had suggested it. (Overall 23 percent were self-referrals and 22 percent were "referred by others." ) About 25 percent of the cases originated in a government agency, mainly landlord/tenant disputes which were referred from the Office of Consumer Protection in Honolulu. Another source of disputes was the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney which referred 339 cases (9 percent); these were typically minor disputes criminalized with harassment, trespass, or assault charges. Other sources included the judiciary (5 percent), family court (4 percent), legal aid (4 percent), small claims court (2 percent) and the police (2 percent). Mediation was not obligatory at the referral source, as a matter of policy, and there is no indication that any coercion was applied in individual cases. The intake of the Justice Center and the mediator frequently reminded disputants that mediation is a voluntary process and that either of them can discontinue or postpone the process.

From all sources, there were over 1,312 landlord/tenant disputes (36 percent). The next largest category was domestic disputes (977 or 24 percent). Consumer/merchant disputes were 13 percent (491), neighborhood disputes totalled 12 percent and disputes among "friends" were 6 percent.

In the first three years (1980-1982), there were 1,114 disputes mediated. With most disputes requiring only one session, that is an average of a little more than one mediation per day.

Some of the disputes are single issues, relatively unemotional disagreements which have a high agreement rate in mediation. For example, the agreement rate in landlord/tenant disputes is close to 85 percent and they rarely take more than one session with one mediator. On the other hand, mediation of past divorce visitation disputes may take several sessions with a male and female mediator team and the agreement rate is closer to 80 percent. The Hawaii model of mediation also uses highly trained volunteer mediators for more specialized and complex disputes such as divorce and environmental conflicts, an approach that is unique in the United States and one that appears to be successful and accepted.

Programs replicating the NJC's work are now beginning on the neighbor islands and are garnering strong local support. The NJC in Honolulu has also helped start similar programs in Berkeley, California and Halifax, Nova Scotia, both of which are closely connected to universities and their sociology departments. Courses in several University of Hawaii departments and a Master's level mediation program in Political Science have started. A few private, fee for service mediation programs are also beginning in Hawaii. The idea of non-adversarial dispute resolution provided by well-trained volunteers seems to be established in Hawaii.

Goals and Assumptions of Community Mediation

A number of general ideas characterize mediation as a social movement and the people involved in it. First, in mediation, conflict is not viewed as a problem in and of itself. The aim of mediation is not to suppress argument but to give it a meaningful form. Most legal and political institutions assume conflict is an aberration, something to be investigated and then "treated," fixed, or suppressed. Mediators, on the other hand, tend to regard conflict as a legitimate vehicle for social, and in some cases, personal change, to achieve new, personally just and workable social relations.

In mediation, the dispute and outcome of the dispute remains in the hands of the disputants. In contrast to the adjudication process, mediation does not rely on rules of evidence or formal process. Issues that involve underlying relationships may be, and often are, more important than legal facts. Nor does
Mediation addresses itself to discovering truth and establishing fault. The emphasis is on future behavior: mutually agreed upon ground rules that the parties can live by once they leave the neutral ground of the mediation process.

Mediation pays great attention to the incentives and disincentives parties bring to interpersonal negotiations. Here, the Asian view comes into play. In Chinese, the word "crisis" is divided into two ideograms: "danger" and "opportunity." The response of a mediator to a crisis—a dispute—runs parallel. In the early or "Forum" stage of Hawaii's mediation process, disputants have ample opportunity to air their feelings and concerns without third party evaluation. In open session and in private meetings, the mediator helps each party to identify their needs and interests and to think through the "danger" of their situation in their own words and own way. Once that is accomplished, a mediator shifts into a later "problem-solving" phase, a time when each party can explore their potential interests and needs. Here they can identify alternative ways of forging agreements. The focus is on "opportunity."

Out of the mediation process itself flows the notion of empowerment. Disputants are neither coerced nor directed into specific agreements. The dispute, and any agreement to the dispute, must come from the parties in conflict. The mediator may carefully raise ideas to be considered and make "soft" proposals but the power to accept or reject those ideas stays with the disputants. This principle of mediation is fundamental. Mediators may exert a great amount of control on the organization of the meeting and carefully guide the dispute resolution process, but ownership and responsibility for the outcome always rests with the parties.

In Hawaii, this principle of empowerment is carried farther. This is in contrast to the impetus in American society to "solve" social problems by government intervention. In Hawaii, social innovations turned into paying jobs and centralized bureaucratic routines. Leisure, recreation, medicine, education, and the law all tend to illustrate this cycle. A potential innovation is tried, tested, and evaluated. If it proves successful or is popular, the new idea is then "colonized" by professionals and monopolized by a fee-for-service system. In turn, this often requires that the successful ideas then be subsidized through public dollars to keep them available to the poor. It is useful to remember that what is now known as modern social work started in the last century as a voluntary and charitable activity in the slums of English and American cities.

Bureaucracy is a powerful imperative. As an innovative alternative to many kinds of legislation, mediation might be expected to follow the same pattern of professionalization as other "helping" professions. The Hawaii model, however, keeps mediation a voluntary, non-coercive activity that is done by ordinary people. Integral to this is the notion that the benchmark of true professionalism is not level of salary or who pays it, but quality of training and the commitment of the practitioners. To that extent, the Hawaii model builds on a disappearing but still useful notion: people helping others in their own community. Communities may be geographic or based on common interests or both. The equation remains the same. Volunteers are offered professional training and education in dispute resolution. In exchange, they are asked to help settle real conflicts in their own area (or areas) of interest free-of-charge. Skills are disseminated, cases are settled, and the rise of a mediation bureaucracy is short-circuited.

Organized on a volunteer basis, mediation may also have consequences that go beyond the settlement of disputes. Mediation is inherently good social process. Within the mediation forum itself, disputants observe and participate in procedures that acknowledge and honor diversity. People see, and perhaps in some cases learn, that social control can be internally created rather than externally imposed. Communication is maximized: emotional, perception, and interest differences are aired and the notion of a safe and neutral ground for negotiating is demonstrated. Beyond the confines of the conflict, the notion of "responsibility" potentially gains new meaning and becomes behaviorally concrete. Neighbors become responsible for what goes on in their own neighborhood and people in conflict become responsible for their own solutions. For example, the NUC trained students to mediate disputes in their own high school. This modest but interesting experiment showed a range of improved student relations and, perhaps more significantly, an unusual rise in the grade point averages of those students serving as mediators (Mohan, 1982).

As the Neighborhood Justice Center has evolved, more than 200 volunteers from the community have been trained and integrated into the center's three program.
areas (Neighborhood Justice Center, 1983a). The Family Mediation Service (FMS) assists both immediate and extended families caught up in conflicts related to divorce, custody, visitation, juvenile problems, settlement issues, and domestic violence. The Neutral Ground Program (NGP) offers mediation services to people involved in neighborhood disputes. Landlord-tenant conflicts, consumer-merchant disagreements, and problems that take place in local schools. Neutral Ground is a decentralized neighborhood-based program which organizes trained volunteers on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis to (1) identify problems; (2) provide local outreach; (3) perform case management; and (4) help resolve those problems within the neighborhood setting.

The Conflict Management Program (CMP) utilizes a small number of highly trained and motivated volunteers to help government officials, private developers, and community action groups negotiate solutions to public policy disputes. Most of these cases center on environmental and land-use issues and involve multiple parties and issues. Although the methods used for these cases are still highly experimental, the idea of volunteers, both professionals and non-professionals, doing service as mediators in complex public policy cases holds great promise.

Family mediation, community mediation, and environmental mediation differ dramatically from each other in their intensity, time frame, case substance, stakeholder characteristics, and interaction patterns. Regardless of case type, most mediations in Hawaii take place in a sequence of joint meetings and private caucuses in which the mediator will try to accomplish an orderly program of: (1) exploration; (2) entry; (3) information gathering; (4) analysis; (5) design; (6) implementation; (7) joint decision making; and (8) closure (Adler, 1983). While these eight generic steps are implicit in virtually every successful mediation, the timing and staging of each step varies greatly. Single-issue, two party disputes are often mediated in a matter of hours while family conflicts with multiple issues and more intensive histories may take four or five sessions. Environmental, inter-organizational, and public policy disputes may take six months to a year or more. The following cases illustrate two of the many kinds of problems the NBC handles.

Case #1

Sam and Mary Smith had been divorced for approximately a year and a half. Under the terms of their divorce decree, Mary was awarded custody of their two children, and Sam was given "reasonable visitation" rights. Sam was also required to pay child support and to clear up a number of overdue bills from a joint credit card. Sometime after their divorce, Sam lost his job and was unable to meet his support and installment payments. Mary, in turn, refused to allow him to see the children for visitation. Mary contended that Sam was a "poor model" and bad influence for her children since he was unable to hold a job.

At the urging of the Family Court, both parties met with mediators from the Justice Center for three sessions approximately a week apart from each other. During the first session, the mediators allowed both parties to air their feelings and identify the issues as they saw them. At the end of the first session, an interim agreement was reached in which Mary agreed that Sam could again begin seeing the children one day a week. For his part, Sam agreed to pay off some of the outstanding bills since the collectors were continually calling Mary at home. Over the next several sessions, both Mary and Sam agreed to develop a new plan for meeting their mutual needs: a method of paying for child support and a phased experiment for increasing visitation.

Case #2

The Souza and Chong are neighbors for a number of years, but have been feuding in recent months over an initial problem stemming from barking dogs. Both families keep animals. the Souza has a large watchdog, the Chong a small poodle. Both families complained that their neighbors' dog was irritating and menacing. Other incidents had occurred as well. The Chong had complained to Souza about Mr. Souza's late night parties. the Souza and Chong teenagers had gotten into a fight. In addition, both families seemed to be intentionally blocking each other out of parking spaces on the street. After a confrontation in which Mr. Souza and Mr. Chong got into a pushing and shoving match, both parties filed charges at the Prosecuting Attorney's office for harassment and assault. At the Prosecutor's urging, both parties agreed to mediate.
The mediation session was held at a community church in the disputants' own neighborhood on a weekday evening. Both parties showed up for the meeting with a number of family and friends. After an opening statement in which the mediator assured the two families of confidentiality and neutrality, each side was given a chance to tell their views of the situation without interruption. Mr. Souza, extremely agitated, spoke harshly of the Chongs and felt that the Prosecutor was remiss in not seeking punishment of the Chongs. Souza's main concern centered on the parking spaces since he needed to keep a number of cars and trucks near his house for work purposes. Chong's main concern was the dogs. He believed Souza's dog was a source of constant problems, not just for himself, but for the entire neighborhood.

After a number of private caucuses with each party, the mediators convened Mr. Souza and Mr. Chong alone without their families. Both men, though still angry, agreed that they did not want the dispute to continue. Working with the two principle parties alone, the mediators helped both men develop an agreement in which: (1) Souza's dog was moved to another part of the yard away from the Chongs; (2) Chong's dog would be kept inside the house at night; (3) both agreed to make a special effort to reduce noise after 10:00 p.m.; and (4) both parties agreed to make every effort to not block the other's vehicles. Both parties also agreed to petition the Prosecutor to dismiss charges.

Hawaii's mediation program is unique both in the range of services offered to the community and, more importantly, in the extensive training it provides to volunteers. Access to training may, in fact, be one of the prime motivators for would-be mediators. Typically, volunteers represent a broad social and economic spectrum: students, retired people, mainstream professionals, and people from different ethnic groups. Selection of volunteer mediators is done by other volunteers and, increasingly, volunteers are being asked to help train, administer, and assist with governance. Like the Community Boards of San Francisco and the Cambridge Problem Center, Honolulu's mediation program sets an important precedent in the field of voluntary action, one that may have implications for a number of other social service areas.

Issues and Implications

The growth of the alternative dispute resolution movement, the development and popularization of mediator training, and the use of volunteers in professional roles all evoke important questions for applied, theoretical, and research oriented sociologists. Who, for example, should be trained in mediation and what prerequisites, if any, should be required? Are the dynamics of disputing and bargaining situational or are there archetype patterns? Once a dispute is a case, what are the contingent and non-contingent moves available to a mediator? What are the implications and consequences of private bargaining done in the "shadow of the law"? Finally, what should the goals of mediation be? Is success defined as closure on a particular case, the prevention of crime, the reduction of court delays, or simply an improved opportunity for face-to-face communication?

The mediation movement in general and neighborhood justice centers in particular have been criticized on a number of grounds. Lawyers argue that the "compromise imperative" implicit in mediation leaves the weaker side in any dispute vulnerable to coercion and dominance (Crouch, 1982). Protecting the interests of people in conflict, Crouch suggests, is the natural territory of attorneys. Anthropologist Laura Nader (1980) argues that mediation is appropriate only in cases where power is relatively balanced, a condition missing, she notes, in most consumer complaints between individuals and large corporations. Others argue that mediated agreements perpetuate differences in social status and tend to reinforce status quo social arrangements (Merry, 1979:39).

Sharper still are those critics who take the community mediation movement to task for its lack of hard performance. Tomasic and Peely (1982) argue that informal mediation has not significantly reduced court congestion nor has it proven itself speedier or less costly than adjudication. Moreover, they suggest, mediation has not proven itself more effective at dealing with case recidivism than the courts themselves. Finally, they argue, there is no evidence that mediation centers provide easier or more effective access to justice than that available through the normal channels of the criminal justice system.

While research on community mediation in Hawaii is still in its formative stages, early findings in cases from the Neighborhood Justice Center suggest at least partial responses to some of the criticisms leveled at the movement as a whole. In a detailed case study of bargaining imbalances and just agreements, Beeson and
chandler (1983) found both attorneys and social scientists unable to quantitatively rate the respective power levels of disputants involved in actual cases mediated in Honolulu. They suggest that by expanding the resources to be exchanged in a dispute resolution to intangibles such as honor and self-image, structural power differences are mitigated and "just" resolutions can occur. Another study comparing mediated and litigated custody disputes in Honolulu showed significantly higher rates of speed, satisfaction, and predicted durability for cases employing mediation (Watson and Morton, 1983).

While mediation requires more methodological research to substantiate the premises being held out for it by its proponents, there is mounting evidence that the movement is here to stay. If so, then sociologists will be presented with a unique research agenda that can be of substantial benefit to both theoreticians and practitioners. The question of how power, coercion, and compromise function in private settlement meetings needs far more study and analysis as does comparative negotiation behavior based on status, class, and ethnicity. Access to dispute processing and, in particular, the charge that mediation is "second class" or "poor men's" justice requires a more detailed examination of the relationship between mediation and adjudication. Mediated settlements permit the investigation of principles of ordinary people's justice, which might ultimately improve statutory law by reflecting more closely community justice standards in use. Finally, the continuing historical debate on conflict, change, and equilibrium might be looked at through the evolving cumulative record of mediation as a social movement.

As the shift to alternative forms of dispute resolution gains momentum in the face of a costly and overcrowded court system, mediation also runs the danger of being victimized by its own success. Mediation is an interdisciplinary hybrid that draws theory and insights knowledge to a number of academic areas: sociology, psychology, political science, law, communication, organizational development, social work, planning and industrial relations. As different disciplines attempt to add mediation to their applied repertoires there is a potential problem of dilution. Counsellors, for example, might view mediation as a simple adjunct to their primary treatment role, just as lawyers might see it as a diversionary tactic in advancing for clients. Planners might be tempted to use mediation to short-circuit broader citizen participation efforts (though citizens are unlikely to put up with it). These developments could, however, undermine the fundamental neutrality of mediators as trusted, helpful yet functionally disinterested intermediaries.

Mediation is also gaining acceptance as a stand-alone training activity. As mediation training becomes more widely adopted, there is the danger that the basic process may be oversold, made trendy and faddish, or simply diffused into personal growth experiences. To some extent this is already taking place. On the east and west coasts as well as in Hawaii, mediation training is being marketed and sold to lawyers, social workers, and therapists. With little or no mediation case experience, professionals in these more traditional problem-solving disciplines are now beginning to argue for standardization, certification, and control of the field. It is interesting that the growing "turf" problem between lawyers and therapists blindly excludes the idea of trained volunteers, a centerpiece of the Hawaii experience.

While the Hawaii model of mediation may, in part, reflect the unique political and cultural characteristics of the 50th State, volunteers resolving disputes in their own communities is a powerful and compelling notion. Highly voluntarized programs like the Neighborhood Justice Center are important social experiments. They offer us two potential insights: the utility of investing money in the human "capital" of our primary institutions (families, schools, neighborhoods); and the value of empowering people to settle their own conflicts. The success of these experiments will, in large part, depend on their ability to sustain and improve on applied social science research.

REFERENCES


Barnes, E. and P. Adler

Beeson, D. and  D. B. Chandler

Becker, T. and C. Slater.
1981 "Peacemakers and Community Mediation: The University-Based Model of Neighborhood Justice Centers." Paper delivered at the conference of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, California.

Chandler, D. B.

Chandler, D. B. and J. Bragg

Comer, L.

Cornell, H.

Elschen, R.

Ehrlich, T.

Feitelson, M. et al.

Gallivier, P. R.

Marcus, M.

Meahan, K.

Meary, S.

Nabok, L.

Nabok, L. and B. Seldin

Neighborhood Justice of Honolulu, Inc.
1978a "Report to the McKinney Foundation.

Neighborhood Justice of Honolulu, Inc.
1978b "Program and Services."

Pabst, M. et al.

Rucker, F.

Schur, L.

Shook, V.

Sinkin, W.

Tomasic, J. and R. Pailey
JAPANESE BON DANCE AND HAWAII: MUTUAL INFLUENCES

Judy Van Zile

Changes that have occurred in bon dancing in Hawaii since its introduction by Japanese immigrants in the early 1900s are indicative of types of changes that can occur as members of one cultural group modify their traditional practices to accommodate members of other cultural groups. Examination of these changes reveals ways in which Hawaii's ethnically mixed community has influenced bon dance practices as well as how bon dancing has contributed to Hawaii's multi-cultural environment.

While the origin of bon dancing is rooted in a Buddhist religious observance, some bon dance participants in Hawaii have little or no understanding of this source. For some, bon dancing is a pleasant evening social activity during the summer months. For others, it is only one component of a Japanese Buddhist observance to honor the deceased. The following comments are based on the most publicly visible element of the O-bon celebration—dancing. The information presented can be examined from the perspective of how a traditional practice not native to Hawaii and the cultural milieu of Hawaii's multi-ethnic community have interacted, and the resulting influences each has experienced.

Prior to World War II three influences contributed to changes in the environment in which bon dancing occurred and its significance to participants: (1) the lifestyle and work schedule of a new geographic location, (2) the intervention of theatrical promoters, and (3) a second generation losing ties with its parent culture.

O-bon observances traditionally occurred between the 13th and 17th days of the 7th month, usually according to the solar calendar. Because plantation work schedules followed the Western five-day week, bon dances began to be scheduled for weekends, rather than the traditionally prescribed calendar dates, so that workers following the local work schedule could participate. This scheduling modification was easy.
accommodation to a new environment in which bon dance participants were a minority group who needed to follow the work routine of the majority. Today, bon dances are almost always held on Friday and Saturday evenings, the times usually set aside for major social activities.

In addition to changes in scheduling, competitiveness and commercialism began to influence bon dancing in the early 1930s. Theatrical promoters sponsored competitions between local Japanese folk dance groups, and in 1937 cash prizes were awarded to the best troupes (Kurihara 1937:21). At the conclusion of the competition the audience was invited to join the participants in bon dances (Oishi 1938:56). These new dance environments were of great concern to temple officials and older generation Japanese—what was once part of a Japanese Buddhist ritual was becoming a commercialized secular activity, a changed context considered inappropriate by many people.

As the second generation of Japanese grew up they were influenced by the sometimes conflicting values and practices of their non-Japanese friends and those perpetuated by their parents. Many attended bon dances but had little understanding of their religious significance. Their motivation may have reflected a sense of duty to show an interest in "things Japanese" because of their parents, rather than a conscious involvement with a religious activity.

Besides changes in the context in which bon dancing has occurred changes may also be found in the nature of the event itself. As Japanese immigrants began working in the sugarcane fields they discarded their traditional kimonos in favor of attire more practical for their work and readily available in local stores. Many people came to bon dances dressed in their work clothes. Temple officials did not feel this appropriate to the occasion and encouraged participants to wear traditional Japanese kimonos or yukata (Ihno 1978), a request that apparently did not appeal to everyone (Kurihara 1937:21). Today, there is varied concern over what people wear. Some temples insist that those who may not participate unless appropriately attired. This means yukatas for women and yukuas or happy coats for men. At temples, however, are not concerned with what dancers wear—female dancers may be seen wearing pants and happy coats, and dancers of either sex may be seen in almost any attire. For those who advocate its use the yukata and happy coat serve as symbols of respect.

The fact that non-Japanese participants are encouraged to wear yukata or happy coat is perhaps also an indication of their function as an identifier of a tradition that is Japanese, regardless of who is practicing it.

In recent years yukatas and happy coats have been in show clothes in foreign countries. Happy coats may be seen in fabrics sporting stylizations of ancient Hawaiian petroglyphs and insignias of contemporary local clubs. In 1979 a formally organized bon dance club adopted, as a kind of uniform, yukatas of a Hawaiian-style print form. And at least one politician has taken advantage of his happy coat as an advertising—be seen at many bon dance celebrations in his district trying to follow the line of dancers and shaking hands with local residents while sporting a happy coat with his name emblazoned on the back.

A common item seen at bon dances is the tenugui—a small towel about the size of a hand towel. Traditionally distributed to dance participants and those who gave donations to the temple, they are now frequently sold to anyone who wishes to make a purchase. The towels are sometimes manipulated during dances but when not in use either rest gracefully draped around the neck or following the lines of the yukata collar, or are sometimes neatly folded into a long rectangle and tied about the head of male dancers. Following contemporary trends in fashion the tenugui may be seen today tightly rolled and tied around the forehead of both young men and women. These changes exemplify modifications rooted in the host culture and contemporary trends existing simultaneously with some consider a traditional bon dance component.

Changes may also be seen in the music to which bon dances are performed. It is commonly believed that "Taikuni Ono" and "Fukushina Ono" are among the oldest repertoire items still performed today. Traditional song texts brought from Japan or texts patterned on those brought from Japan deal with such subjects as fillial piety and famous Japanese historical battles. But texts have also been composed in Hawaii relating to such things as events important to the lives of early immigrants working on the plantations, World War II, and contemporary activities.

Newly composed songs (with new melodies as well as song texts) describe activities and events relevant to the Japanese in Hawaii. "Hole Hole Ono" describes
cutting sugarcane; "Hawaii Ondo" suggests that people work hard in the fields during the day and do the hula at night; and "The Nisei Volunteers" honors the famed 442nd Regimental Combat Team and the 100th Infantry Battalion.

Very little is known about early changes that may have occurred in movement patterns used in bon dances. Verbal descriptions of movement tend to be very general and other forms of documentation have not been used until recent times. Two interesting references indicative of adaptive changes in movement do exist, however. One source refers to the incorporation of hula gestures in "Hawaii Ondo" (Anonymous 1948:24), and another describes a dance choreographed to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the arrival of the first immigrants from Japan in which dancers manipulated an American flag and a Japanese flag (Taylor 1969:26). While manipulation of hand-held objects is common to bon dancing the objects are usually such Japanese items as fans, towels, and, less frequently, parasols. The use of American and Japanese flags, however, is a literal integration of "things Japanese" and "things American."

Gestures panto miming work activities may be seen in some of the older dances still performed today. "Inko Bushi," which comes from a region in Japan where coal mining was common, incorporates gestures that mimic digging coal, throwing it into a cart, and pushing the cart. But movements reminiscent of the work activities of Hawaii's early Japanese immigrants also found their way into bon dances today. A dance in which participants mine coal mining movements may be followed by one in which they simulate cutting sugarcane.

A recent modification in dance movements of the younger generation reflects the influence of contemporary popular music and dance trends. A distinct bounce and percussive quality have been added to the discotheque and local night spots patronized by the young.

The examples cited are typical of the many ways in which bon dancing has been influenced by its re-location to a new physical and cultural environment. But influence has gone in the other direction as well—bon dancing has had an impact on the Hawaiian community.

Perhaps the most significant impact of bon dancing on Hawaii is that it has come to be what one anthropologist refers to as an identity marker (Royce 1971:109)—a symbol that identifies a particular group. But the question may be raised—what group does it identify—the Japanese, the Buddhists, or the Japanese Buddhists?

In 1951 four Japanese veterans' organizations sponsored what was reported as "the most colorful and biggest Bon Festival ever presented in the Territory," drawing an estimated 25,000 people (Boswell 1974:45). The event was held in Ala Moana Park and was to serve as a tribute to Japanese from Hawaii who had lost their lives in World War II and the Korean War. The celebration lasted three nights in August. Dancing on the first evening was preceded by religious memorial rites and dedicatory speeches with thirty-five priests representing all Buddhist sects in Hawaii participating. In this instance bon dancing was clearly serving to identify something Japanese. The inclusion of religious services, however, also tied the event to Buddhist practices. Although the occasion was not part of a temple O-bon celebration it was clearly a Japanese Buddhist event.

In 1966 the bon dance "Yukumai Ondo" was part of a May 18th folk dance program commemorating the 100th anniversary of the opening of friendly relations between the United States and Japan (United Japanese Society of Hawaii 1971:249). In 1968 a bon dance was held in a public park as one of the activities commemorating the centennial of the first Japanese immigrants to Hawaii. In July, 1976, bon dancing was a special feature of the opening night of the U.S.-

Hawaii-Japan Bicentennial Culture Festival in Honolulu. On all three of these occasions bon dance identified the Japanese as an ethnic group but had no apparent link to Buddhism.

Bon dancing has also had an impact on the Hawaiian community as a bit of exotica. As such, it has been utilized for purely commercial purposes. In 1961 a local newspaper reprinted...

There's a run on kimonos and temple drummers in Honolulu these days.
Another influence of bon dancing on the Hawaii community has been through the establishment of formally organized bon dance clubs. Perhaps because of an interest in the presence of Danzawa who knew specific dances, and a concern for the performance of live music, several clubs have been formed on many of the islands of Hawaii. The major function of these groups is to provide live music and, in some cases, dance leadership, at temple bon dances to which they are invited. While the clubs are seen as a means of preserving a traditional practice they also provide an opportunity for members of a particular ethnic group, and interested non-Japanese, to gather for social purposes. Besides their group participation at bon dances and bon dance rehearsals, club members get together several times during the remainder of the year to socialize and celebrate such occasions as the New Year, a special birthday of a member, or the visit of people from Japan.

The establishment of bon dance clubs has contributed to the perpetuation of the performance of some of the more traditional music by live musicians rather than commercial recordings. This, in turn, seems to have contributed to the prolongation of the observance of Ohomb. Many temples prefer to have at least part of the music at their celebration provided by existing bon dance clubs. Since there are only a limited number of clubs in relation to the number of Buddhist temples a kind of schedule has been established whereby the clubs move from temple to temple on different weekends throughout the summer. Hence, an observance that originally lasted about three days has developed into a kind of "bon dance season" that extends from the end of June to early September.

Local and tourist newspapers frequently carry announcements of the bon dance schedule. Tourists often attend because they get another of Hawaii's "exotic" attractions and local residents who are not a regular part of the bon dance community may attend in lieu of going to a movie or other social event.

Thus, bon dancing has undergone changes resulting from contact with Hawaii's multi-ethnic community and, at the same time, has come to be accepted as a kind of symbol by the community. The appropriateness of such changes is, of course, debatable. Steach traces and argues for the maintenance of tradition in its purest form. Others argue that modification must occur to allow for relevance in a new context.
environment and era. A question then arises, however, regarding the extent of modifications. One writer suggests that, as celebrated in Hawaii, the bon dance has been transformed. It...

...is no longer a Buddhist Japanese festival only...

...it is a many-sided religious, secular, American Hawaiian Island, Buddhist and Japanese occasion for expressing ethnic distinctiveness while sharing and modifying it at the same time...

It has acquired new meanings synthesizing the experiences of the Japanese in Hawaii. (Lawrence Puck in Foreword to Ogawa 1979:xiv, xv)

NOTES

1. The material presented here is based on a paper originally read at the Contributions of Buddhism to Hawaii Seminar, Cultural Contributions and Social Influences of Buddhist Mission, September 15, 1980, sponsored by the Honolulu Buddhist Mission and the Honolulu Young Buddhists Association, Honolulu, Hawaii.

2. For a full explanation of bon dancing in Hawaii see Van Zile (1982), which includes documentation of recently performed dances, and Van Zile and Kischkehor (1981).

3. The first mention of this shift in scheduling appears in Ueyama (1937:19).

4. The re-scheduling of holidays seems to be a frequent occurrence in contemporary America. The federal government has officially shifted the number of observances to allow for long weekends. These have usually been birthdays and events commemorating politically-related figures, however, rather than religious observances.

5. The term "Hawaiian culture" is used here to refer to the contemporary multi-ethnic culture of the state of Hawaii rather than to the culture of the Polynesian inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands.

6. The sponsoring organizations were Club 105, 442nd Veterans Club, N.I.S. Linksmates Association, and 1395 Veterans Club.

REFERENCES


Endo, June 1978 Personal interview, June 21.

Hawaii Visitors Bureau 1952 "Bon Festival." Honolulu Advertiser, August 17: Magazine Section, 8-1.


Loco Moco: A Folk Dish in the Making

James Kelly

Because of their universal character and potential variability, foodways ought to be useful indicators of cultural contact and borrowing. It would seem also that the process of changing foodways, because of contact of cultures, is analogous to language change because of cultural contact. As a result, the terms and methods used in linguistic analysis may be applicable to the study of foodways.

After a discussion of relevant linguistic terminology and language change in Hawaii, this paper describes changing foodways in Hawaii and notes the similarity of these changes with language change. Finally, the paper reports on the creation of the loco moco, an entirely new dish derived from contact of different foodways, and therefore, comparable to a pidgin language.

Language Change

When culture groups and languages come into contact, immigrant families tend to continue to speak their native tongues, often the only language they know (Heinreich, 1974:87). Gradually, however, people with the most outside contacts, such as children and young adults, begin to speak other languages or parts of other languages. The acquired words or phrases may then spread among the large population of the native group. This is called the pre-bilingual period. Essentially what is happening is that a small group of people are borrowing words and structures from one or more languages and slowly disseminating them to others.

Following this, a stage of adult bilingualism is reached where the parts of one language are systematically substituted in the native language. In this case, these substitutions become a regular part of the everyday native language and their use is fairly widespread among the population of the native group; the same words or phrases being consistently employed by
the members of the language group (Kaua‘i, 1972:87). In many cases loan blends may occur in which the parts of another language that are assimilated into the native language are changed. Pronunciation, for example, may be changed although the meaning remains the same.

If language contact continues, a pidgin language may result. A pidgin has structure and lexical items from two or more contact languages, but it is a new language (Froiland and Rodman, 1978:269). Such a pidgin language developed in Hawaii largely as a result of the necessity of plantation workers of different language groups to communicate with each other and with their English-speaking overseers (Lind, 1961:144). As this was occurring, however, the use of native languages declined and became "Americanized." Local Chinese, for example, had increasing trouble with Chinese tones, while the Japanese "r" sound changed to something more like the English "r" or "l" (Horniman, 1960:13).

**Foodways in Hawaii**

Hawaii makes an interesting laboratory for the examination of the thesis of changing foodways because of cultural contact. It is an isolated group of islands to which have come successive waves of people each bringing their own native foods and ways of cooking. The variety includes: American, Hawaiian, Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Portuguese. In the beginning most immigrants continued to eat their own kinds of food, cooked in the same ways as in the old country, subject to availability of food, spices, and kitchen utensils. Major ethnic groups continued to maintain contact with the old country and because they arrived in Hawaii in fairly large numbers, a market was created for the importation of foods into Hawaii. In addition, many of the early plantation workers lived in separate camps, arranged by ethnic group. Each camp or each family, then, could raise or exchange food and, therefore, maintain traditional food habits.

Gradually, however, a system of borrowing other foods began, somewhat comparable to borrowing in language change. Especially in restaurants, people began to try other kinds of foods. Many restaurants that served only Chinese or Japanese food, for example, began to have customers from other ethnic groups. This system of borrowing foods continued until a stage, somewhat comparable to adult bilingualism in language, was reached in which standard foods were borrowed on a consistent basis.

Today in Hawaii, and for the past several decades, most residents eat a combination of borrowed foods from several ethnic groups. Saimin, Japanese raw fish, is a common dish during holidays and as a party snack for almost all households, regardless of ethnic background. Teriyaki steak, another Japanese contribution, is almost as common. The teriyaki sauce is well known and many residents buy prepared teriyaki steak already marinated in the special sauce. Rice is served at many tables and for many people arriving from the mainland, rice has replaced potatoes and bread. At the same time, however, rice in the diet of those people of Oriental ancestry has declined, replaced by breads, macaroni, and other Western starches (Millar, 1947:766).

Sandwiches are common for Orientals, while hot noodles are equally common for Westerners. Westerners generally have adopted the short cooking period for vegetables, while Orientals have begun to use more dairy products and meats. In addition, Orientals have increasingly used more candies, other sugar foods, and soft drinks.

Perhaps the most conspicuous change in diet is the change to Western style breakfast by all groups. Instead of an elaborate breakfast with vegetables and rice, both Orientals and Westerners now eat toast and coffee. On the whole, then, there seems to have been a trend towards fast foods: sandwiches, coffee, and toast. One of the reasons cited for the decline of Japanese food is, for example, that it takes too long to prepare and that it is too troublesome (Masuoka, 1945:765).

As in language change, such borrowing of different foods by different ethnic groups could not occur without some change in the borrowed foods themselves. Saimin, a hot noodle dish popular in Hawaii, is served in many small restaurants including McDonald's. But, this saimin is not a truly Oriental noodle dish. It is instead a modified, even Westernized, version. Similarly, Korean kwan-nish is produced and consumed locally and, though it is "hot," Hawaiian kwan-nish is far from being as hot as the true Korean kwan-nish. The teriyaki steak sometimes appears in a different form
also; "teri-burgers" are served at many fast food outlets. The Japanese plate lunch, a prepared takeout lunch, has also been modified from the Japanese original. In Hawaii the plate lunch may include such Western ingredients as macaroni salad as well as sushi.

The Loco Moco

Not surprising, continuous contact of different foodways has produced at least one new dish, something comparable to a pidgin language. This item is called a loco moco and its invention and diffusion is a good example of the changes in foodways resulting from contact of different culture groups.

The loco moco is prepared by putting a scoop of rice in a bowl, often a waxed, paper bowl, adding a hamburger patty and an egg, fried over-easy, and then pouring gravy over everything. It sells, usually, for $2 to $1.75.

The loco moco originated in a small cafe, called the Lincoln Grill, in downtown Hilo on the island of Hawaii. It was invented by the restaurant's owners and operators, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Inouye in 1949. It originated as an attempt to provide a snack for a group of teenage boys who were tired of eating American sandwiches, yet did not want to bother with time-consuming Oriental food. The contents of the loco moco were suggested by Mrs. Nancy Inouye. Rice was a staple of the cafe as was the gravy that was poured over it. Mr. Inouye had formerly worked at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Honolulu and there learned to make sauces and gravies. The hamburger patty, of course, was also a fairly common part of the cafe's menu because all types of food were served and American hamburgers were popular.

The final product is instructive in many ways. Not only do the ingredients suggest origins in different ethnic foods, but the way they are put together also reveals some blending of foodways. The rice is mixed with the other foods and the gravy, not kept separate as in Japanese food. And the patty, not to be missed, was added at the end giving the entire dish a water taste compared to the dry hamburger. The egg, which was added a few years after the initial invention of the loco moco, seems to add flavor, perhaps in cases where less attention was paid to the gravy, and nutrition.

Overall the loco moco appears to have origins in Oriental and Western food habits. The rice and the use of a sauce are more Oriental and the ground meat and fried egg are mostly Western. Moreover, it is a mixture of eating habits: the slower eating style of Oriental food served in a bowl and the Western style of fast food and simplicity with less concern of messiness.

The name loco moco was chosen by the teenagers themselves. They tried to compose a name made up of their own initials. When this failed they used the nickname of the boy who first ate a loco moco. His nickname was "crazy," which is loco in Portuguese and in the local pidgin. Moco has no meaning and was chosen because it rhymed with loco and sounded better than loco soko, loco doke, or loco koko.

After its invention, the loco moco spread to other neighborhood restaurants in Hilo, to other parts of the Big Island and more recently to Honolulu and other islands. It is a popular dish at school cafeterias and lunch counters. Inquiries about the origin of the loco moco reveal that most people think it was invented on the plantations. Thus, the image of most people is that the loco moco has the same origin as Hawaiian pidgin. Moreover, the loco moco, like pidgin, lacks prestige. It is sold mostly in small local restaurants, in contrast to a dish like salmon that is often served in the most expensive restaurants and at parties. Already it seems to have been adopted as local by some places. A restaurant on Maui, for example, has advertised the loco moco as "Maui's Own." Given this current status and image, the loco moco could become a symbol of localness in the same way as pidgin.

REFERENCES


Loco Moco 63
Nuckolls, Bernhard L.

Lind, Andrew W.

Matsumoto, Jitsuhachi

Miller, Carey

Weinreich, Uriel
1974  Languages In Contact. The Hague: Mouton.
THE ROLE OF TAMOUSHI IN HAWAIIAN BARKING

John M. Derby

While preparing the original study under this title (Derby, 1971), John Derby consulted with Professor Bernhard Herman. Professor Herman has now, with the permission of Mr. Derby, edited and shortened the original work for publication here.

On matters of terminology, particularly the Chinese (Kans) characters involved, Herman consulted his colleague, Professor George Takahashi, who had read the original article. In addition, Herman drew on his four years of residence on the rural outskirts of Canton, China, from 1930 to 1934, where he learned about the Chinese version of tamomoshi as practiced in peasant villages, and on his contacts with hundreds of students in over thirty years of teaching at the University of Hawaii, where he learned of the uses of tamomoshi in Hawaii as described in student papers.

Since the practice of tamomoshi throughout East and Southeast Asia is in the oral tradition of peasants, historical research is not very extensive. The historical section of this paper has consequently been greatly reduced.

The reader should be warned that in the decade or more since this article was first written, the decline of the tamomoshi in Hawaii has continued. The skyrocketing of interest rates on the part of the financial institutions of America has complicated the financial analysis of the tamomoshi, and this section has consequently also been substantially shortened. -- The Editors

Background of the Tamomoshi

Schemes like the private banking arrangements of tamomoshi probably are found throughout East and Southeast Asia, e.g., Vietnam, China, Korea, and Japan, where their spread is connected with that of Buddhism. It is also found in the Philippines, where Chinese merchants may have introduced the custom. Except for resort to the tamomoshi in Japan to finance pilgrimages to Buddhist temples, the use in Japan and elsewhere seems to be primarily secular, and may be found both in rural areas and in cities, e.g., among groups of city women in pre-Communist Vietnam. It has been described in books on Japanese and Chinese village life, where peasants have been able to get much-needed funds by this scheme. In Japan it has now apparently disappeared. See village studies by Debree (1939); Baardes, Hall, and Nord (1959); and Dore (1978); published in twenty year intervals on villages progressively closer to Tokyo. Debree's Japanese, under Ke, an alternative designation, reports on it at length. Baardes, et al mention it, but indicate that other credit facilities and government restrictions have put an end to it. Dore's Chinese does not mention it at all. The Japanese immigrants to Hawaii used the tamomoshi, as is described in Marsh (1971) and Debree (1941), both appearing over forty years ago.

Bernard Herman studied a Chinese village near Canton, China in the early 1930s and there discovered essentially the same system, called by the villagers jin yu, which he described in his unpublished manuscript, "Feeding the Hungry Ghosts." Published descriptions can also be found in Pai (1939), Yang (1959), and Hsia (1990), especially the extensive description starting on page 632.

No clear evidence has been found that the Chinese workers on Hawaii's plantations resorted to the system. However, Chinese merchants found it useful in meeting their debts. One informant said that her father, who was a dry goods merchant in Chinatown, at any given time belonged to more than one such organization.

While details vary and there is the danger of bogging down in details, it is possible to characterize the basic characteristics of the tamomoshi or its Chinese form. It is an association of persons for only one purpose, periodically, say monthly or twice a year, to contribute an agreed upon sum of money, maybe one dollar or twenty or a hundred, into a pool, and which in turn will go to each member until the association has run its course. At that time every member will have had a chance at the pool and everyone will have contributed at least an amount totaling more or less the amount of the pool.

The turn of each member, in the simplest form of the tamomoshi, is decided by lot. The more complicated and more frequent way is to decide by a process of bidding whose turn it is to receive the pool. Bids may be offered to pay not each member a small amount of money for his contribution to the pool. It may also be called a deduction from the amount received from each person. The one whose bid is highest wins. Those who are anxious to receive the money in the pool because of their need for a larger sum of money at the time therefore will bid high; others, willing to hold
off, will bid low. There is a further aspect. Once a number has received the pool, he is no longer entitled at subsequent meetings to the payment or deduction offered by the day’s winning bidder, but must pay the agreed upon periodic contribution.

Thus the persons who win the pool early tend to pay out more than they take in, while the later winners take in more than they pay out. That is, the earlier winners essentially pay interest on their use of the pool, while the later winners, who have been able to wait, receive interest on the amounts they have been lending out.

The Castoese term baw out (発出) means to make an organization. In Japan the term tanomoshi refers to mutual trust between mother and child. By extension, it suggests a mutually dependent relationship between a leader and his followers. One of the meanings of 65 is in a club or association. Tanomoshi thus is a group of persons involved in mutual dependence and trust. The term tanomoshi alone conveys the idea of both the financial arrangements and the group itself and the word 65 is usually dropped. In Hawaii tanomoshi was almost invariably used as a single term.

Tanomoshi in Hawaii

In Hawaii, membership in a tanomoshi was traditionally restricted to members of one’s own race and particularly to friends and well-known associates. Rarely did people of different racial backgrounds comprise the same tanomoshi group. This was later to change.

However, with the mingling of peoples in Hawaii, these restrictions have been broken down and now the tanomoshi is open to other races. This is especially so in the rural communities. Tanomoshibi are frequently found whose members no longer have a close friendship circle, but are mere acquaintances or business associates of a foreign race. Of course, “foreigners” must be of good character and dependable. They usually are store clerks, plantation overseers, school teachers and men of the upper classes. When a tanomoshi assumes this status, it becomes a purely economic organization and relationships, although flavored with friendship, are impersonal. The personal and friendly elements disappear. (Makino, 1937:19).

Although the alien laborer in Hawaii was a very frugal and thrifty individual, there were few credit facilities available to him before World War II. Since their income was limited, few plantation laborers were in a position to borrow from a financial institution.

When a person needed money, he would go to a friend who was considered reputable and a respected member of the community. The influential friend would be asked to help him start a tanomoshi. The leader, or yoa (領), i.e., parent, as he was called, would choose people who were dependable, trying to get as many as he could. They would all meet together and agree upon the rules of the tanomoshi. There could be any number of people and any amount in payments that they could agree on. The more people involved, the larger the tanomoshi would be. If the payment was too large for one person, he could split it with a friend. Or, if someone wanted to pay in a larger amount, he could subscribe to two or more shares.

The yoa would serve as the record keeper as he was the most trusted.

In some cases, each recipient would also ask to provide two shōs or “witnesses” who would act as guarantors for him in the event of his inability to make his payments or in the event of his demise. If the recipient defaulted or left the islands, the guarantors would be responsible. These guarantee arrangements were often put in writing, normally in Japanese characters, and signed by the member and his guarantors. The agreement now used (1939) is a standard guarantee form which is easily obtained from a credit union. The use of guarantors lessens the responsibility of the yoa in the case of default. The members lock to the yoa to cover any missed payments and he in turn is protected if he has recourse to the guarantors.

The yoa generally does not receive or pay any interest. This is because he is responsible to see that all of the money comes in regularly. Meetings are usually held on Sundays when the workers can gather and are normally held at the home of the yoa. “The yoa is obligated to make this a social gathering and has in readiness delicacies and tea for his friends” (Makino, 1937:18). If a payment is not made, the yoa must advance the sum himself and collect from the delinquent or his guarantors. No grace period is allowed and due dates (usually timed to coincide with payday) are strictly adhered to.
The highest of morals are expected in a tamonoshi. A person is bound by his honor to the group. Actually some people do slip out leaving their witnesses to pay for their shares. There is nothing that can compel a dishonest person (from refusing) to pay after he gets his share... There have, however, been many instances when a person, after drawing out his amount, quietly returned to Japan, leaving the unpaid burden to his witnesses. In such cases all friendship bonds are broken and the individual becomes an 'outsider' from the group thereafter. Wherever he goes, if his history is known, he is branded as a 'traitor' and not worthy of normal associations... If a person is of 'good character' and he really cannot pay his share, he does not take the easiest course by running away, but will work harder to meet the situation. Sometimes the witnesses will agree to pay for him temporarily and the amount is later returned to them. (Masuda, 1937:17)

The element of risk in a tamonoshi is high. If the eye is not honest, all of the members can be hurt financially. The members who wait until the latter part of the tamonoshi to take their share, also take the most risk, since the other members before them may default along the way. There is not normally any form of insurance or collateral to protect them.

While all tamonoshis operate in much the same way, they may vary in the number of members and the amount of investment. They may also vary as to purpose. In his study of the Kona, Hawaii coffee farmers, Embree cites two tamonoshis that were started. One for $15 was formed to buy a new automobile for the new Daishi priest. Another was started when one of the hotel keepers wished to improve his hotel. He organized a tamonoshi to raise funds for this purpose (Embree, 1941:91).

Ruth Masuda's article cites some other examples.

A tailor finds that his business is not as prosperous as it should be. As a result he goes on a house-to-house campaign for customers. He manages in interviews seven persons to take suits from him. But a suit costs $35 and they cannot afford to pay him that amount at once. He starts a tamonoshi to carry out a contract with his members. At the first meeting each member brings $5. That makes a total of $35 and the tailor is ready to make a suit for one of the members. Then each one writes the amount of his interest which is usually very small. The one bidding the highest gets the first suit. At the second meeting, the tailor gets another $35 and another suit goes out. Thus, at the end of seven meetings, all of them have their suits and the tailor is prosperous again. (Masuda, 1937:17)

She also describes "another interesting tamonoshi [which was] started by several women who wanted wrist watches. They solicited friends and made up a group of ten members, each agreeing to pay $5 a month. In this way each received her watch eventually. Sometimes a jeweler who wishes to increase his trade initiates a similar enterprise" (Masuda, 1937:16).

A store owner in a small plantation town had a high number of outstanding accounts receivable on his books, and while some of his customers made nominal payments, it would have been hard for them ever to pay off their balances. So the store owner assisted them in forming a tamonoshi so that he could receive funds from those who owed him, to liquidate their bills with him. This way the accounts were cleaned up every two years.

When the Nisei veterans returned from Italy after the conclusion of World War II, found jobs and got married, there was a severe housing shortage in postwar Hawaii. They discovered that they could finance homes through the Veterans Administration, but they needed down payments in order to purchase houses. In many instances, tamonoshi served as the source of the down payment.

Similarly an individual can use a tamonoshi for a down payment on a car and the lending institution will finance the balance. Or he may have the down payment on the car saved but will use the tamonoshi to raise more money to put down on the purchase price so as to lower his monthly payment and interest expense at the lending institution.

A parent may want funds to finance his son or daughter's education on the mainland. He joins a tamonoshi to pay for the whole year's tuition, purchases the plane tickets, and deposits the remaining funds with a bank near the college for the child to draw on throughout the year. In addition to education expenses, tamonoshis are commonly used for insurance premium financing, tax payments, travel expenses, funerals and any other emergency expenditure. The intended use is always confidential.

Bank of Hawaii was once approached by a Japanese couple with a request to finance a restaurant they
proposed to open. They had been employed in a military cafeteria and knew the restaurant business. They had leased a location and had discussed their equipment needs with a restaurant equipment firm. The restaurant supply firm had agreed to finance a portion of their equipment and they applied at the bank for a term loan to pay for inventory and provide working capital. Their equity funds were to come from a tanomoshi that they had been members of for several months. They could get the required amount of equity then needed at the next meeting. Based on their projections, the loan was committed and the restaurant was soon opened. About a year later they approached the bank again with a request to refinance the loan for some additional funds to pay off the restaurant supply house. Since their financial statements showed a nice profit, their request was approved. However, they found it was cheaper to form a tanomoshi and use that instead.

During the Expo-70 in Osaka, Japan, Bank of Hawaii had a special advertising program for travel loans and free packets and brochures from the Japanese Tourist Bureau for distribution to their customers. Bank of Hawaii branches were also official ticket purchasing offices for Expo-70 and yen sales through the branches were encouraged. Nevertheless, the travel loans were shunned by those who were instead using the tanomoshi organized through the Buddhist Mission as a means for financing their trip.

This type of tanomoshi, which accumulates the funds as it progresses and earns a return on the payments as they are made is similar to several banking services banks offer or have offered in the past. Bank of Hawaii has a Christmas Savings Club which accumulates twenty-five payments plus interest payable in November. In this situation, the bank is the oya. The disadvantage to this service is that it starts and ends at the same time each year since it is geared to Christmas. Bank of Hawaii used to have a service called "target savings" whereby one could start an automatic savings plan at any time for a certain number of payments, the bank would do the accounting and pay interest on the funds at the end of the specified period. Banks also have automatic savings plans under which they transfer funds from a customer's checking account to his savings account regularly once or twice a month.

Many people are not thrifty and find that they have difficulty in observing a regular periodic savings plan. The tanomoshi, with its mandatory payments, is a popular way of forcing someone to save. Since you cannot touch your money until you win the bid, you will not spend it ahead of time. Punds saved through an automatic savings plan in a bank can always be withdrawn upon presentation of the passbook. The tanomoshi provides "forced" will power.

At the time of this research in 1969-71, analysis of the rate structure of a typical tanomoshi led to the conclusion that the interest rates could be higher than at that time were allowed by usury law.

Legal Aspects of the Tanomoshi

According to information provided by the State of Hawaii Attorney General's office, the legality of the tanomoshi scheme up to 1970 had never been considered by the State government. Further, there had never been any legislation affecting tanomoshis.

The tanomoshi did receive judicial opinion, however. The Supreme Court of Hawaii in October, 1928, issued a decision in a case which involved an appeal of a case from the lower court (Choi Haylin v. Shin Sung Yit, No. 1843). Supreme Court Judge C. J. Perry found that in a case where a suit for return of money loaned and advanced by the plaintiff (the oya) to the defendant member of the tanomoshi, evidence that the money was loaned in pursuance of the terms of a tanomoshi of which both the plaintiff and the defendant were members, will not sustain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff unless there is proof of the terms and conditions either of tanomoshi in general, if they are all alike, or of the particular tanomoshi in the case.

The case involved a suit for $92.05 before a Honolulu magistrate. In his summary, the Supreme Court Judge wrote:

There was undisputed evidence tending to show that the plaintiff, being desirous of obtaining a loan, organized an enterprise known as a "tanomoshi," composed of twenty-one members, each of whom was to pay the sum of $10 per month for the period of twenty-one months that the plaintiff, as promoter or "boxer" of the tanomoshi, was to have the privilege of receiving the moneys contributed at the first meeting without bidding or paying any commissions, interest or premium therefor, and did accordingly receive at the first meeting the sum of $420, contributed
by the twenty-one members at $20 apiece; that is, each succeeding monthly meeting the $420 contributed was to be loaned to the member holding the highest amount of what the members called "interest," that is to say, a sum of money to be paid by the successful bidder to each of the members who at any particular meeting had not yet received a loan from the association, except that the member who was to receive the loan at the twenty-first and last meeting need not offer or pay any "interest" or premium therefor.

At the fourth meeting, the defendant was the highest bidder as to the amount to be paid to the seventeen members (other than himself) who had not yet received a loan... and at that meeting seventeen members paid $20 apiece and the plaintiff added $90.00 to the amount as contributed, making a total contribution of $420... the defendant received $420 from the meeting and paid a premium or "interest" of seventeen times $5.50... Consequently, the defendant paid to the plaintiff sixteen installments of $20 each on account of the loan or $420 which he received... and furnished groceries to the plaintiff in the sum of $7.95 leaving a balance of $92.05 "unpaid," which was the exact amount of the suit.

It was established in the testimony that the plaintiff had advanced the $420 to make up the deficiency caused by the failure of four members to pay the required $20 each, but it was not clear "whether she did this as a matter of duty under the rules of the tanomoshi or merely as a loan to the four delinquent members."

The defendant's attorney argued that the amount of interest paid for the loan of $420 wasurious and clearly it was ($7 x $5.50 x $83.50 interest on a loan of $420--22.2 percent of the amount borrowed). However, the judge in the Supreme Court sustained the appeal for the reason the plaintiff had not proved that the loan was from her individually to the defendant.

The judge commented, "There is no evidence before the court tending to support a finding that the $420 which the defendant received... was loaned to him by the plaintiff or a finding that the plaintiff was trustee for the other persons who joined her in contributing the amounts which were loaned to the defendant. So far as we know, a "tanomoshi" are enterprises peculiar to certain Oriental races only and were invented in Hawaii only after the coming of considerable members of the people in those races. We do not know, and it is not generally known in this community, what the precise terms of a tanomoshi are or whether all tanomoshis are necessarily alike in all their terms. Insofar as the law of contracts goes, the terms of the tanomoshi may not be the same as the terms of another tanomoshi. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the terms of suchenterprises or contracts."

The effectiveness of this case shows that the burden of proof is upon the person who is trying to get reimbursement for money advanced to a tanomoshi through the courts. Since the rules of the tanomoshi are not normally put in writing, and the agreements with the possible exception of the guarantee agreement signed by co-sponsors are oral, it increases the risk of those involved in tanomoshis. They cannot sue in court for any loss they sustain since there is no means of proving the terms of the arrangement, and the court has held that not all tanomoshis are operated in the same manner.

The Ramifications

The tanomoshi is, in the past, been investigated by the Internal Revenue Service. Since a tanomoshi is an unwritten arrangement and is often informal, the tax effects cannot be thoroughly enforced. In theory, the person who pays more into the tanomoshi than he receives, should be allowed to deduct the interest that he pays on his personal income tax return. Conversely, the individual who receives more from the tanomoshi than he pays in should declare it as income and should be liable for the income taxes on the interest he receives.

There was a large tanomoshi in Maui, Maui in the mid-1960s which had thirty members paying $100 per month, a total monthly collection of $3,000. Thus, in the course of thirty months, $90,000 plus interest was involved. The amounts received and paid in interest were certainly considerable and the Internal Revenue office attempted to learn the details of the transaction. Nothing ever came of their investigation, however.

The State of Hawaii has a personal income tax under Chapter 235 on net income of individuals. Reductions normally follow federal law, and interest and certain types of contributions and dues are deductible. There is also a General Excise tax under
Chapter 217 on gross income, gross receipts, or gross proceeds of all business activities. Various business, occupation and nonbusiness licenses, fees and permits are imposed by either the state or county governments. It is apparent that taxes, licenses and other fees to which normal financial institutions pay are circumvented by the taxomoshi. Under Chapter 241, Banks and other Financial Corporations are taxed on net income, as defined, at 11.7 percent on banks, savings and loan associations, industrial loan companies and other financial corporations (Tax Foundation of Hawaii, 1971).

While they have no published regulations or directives concerning taxomoshi, the State of Hawaii tax office reports that its field auditors in their examinations and audits of taxpayers' records have frequently discovered undeclared income which has been traced to taxomoshi. By examining cash records and bank statements, they have been able to establish income from taxomoshi and as a result have collected taxes due. They also disclosed instances where taxpayers have taken it upon themselves to declare their taxomoshi income and pay taxes on it. The tax office could not recall any instance where interest paid to a taxomoshi was treated as a deduction for income tax purposes.

Comparison with Other Financial Intermediaries

Over time, the taxomoshi has gradually been supplanted by other financial intermediaries. Most consumer savings and lending firms draw funds from household and business enterprises and make them available in turn to the same groups. In this sense, the taxomoshi is a financial intermediary. A taxomoshi, unlike a commercial bank, does not make loans. It is limited to receipt and return of funds. Its economic unit which functions primarily as a depository of short-term funds and all funds are paid out to its members. Its net worth does not increase.

Financial intermediaries as we know them in the United States are essentially a creation of the nineteenth century. At the start of that period, there were less than three dozen commercial banks in existence. The numerous other types of financial intermediaries which we now know were not in existence and most of them had not even been thought of. There were, for example, no savings banks, no savings and loan associations, no credit unions, no mortgage companies, no personal trust departments, no investment companies, no sales or personal finance companies, and no government lending institutions. The development of financial intermediaries during the first half of the nineteenth century was very slow except in the field of commercial banking.

Credits Unions

The first credit union in North America was formed in Quebec, Canada in 1909, and was called the Societé Populaire du Littor. The first law permitting credit unions in this country was passed in Massachusetts in May, 1909. By 1934 State laws had legalized credit unions in 41 of the 48 states and the District of Columbia and over 3,000 credit unions were in existence. In 1934 the Federal Credit Union Act was passed which permitted organization of a credit union anywhere in the country, in the next seven years, the total number of credit unions doubled.

The original law of 1934 limited the amount of an unsecured loan to $50.00 and the maximum maturity on loans was two years. Successive revisions of the law increased the amount of unsecured loans and the maturity was increased.

In Hawaii, as in the rest of the nation, the spread of credit unions made loan and deposit facilities more readily available to the working people. The credit union encourages its members to save regularly and to make deposits into a common pool from which loans are made to members for a wide range of consumer purposes. Credit unions are subject to detailed state regulation and supervision and are deemed a safe and secure place to deposit. Members exercise democratic control on the basis of one vote per member. Capital is derived mainly from the savings of the members and loans are made only to members at reasonable rates of interest. The organizations are non-profit and members have limited liability. No discrimination is made on the basis of race or political or religious beliefs.

Perhaps more than commercial banks, the credit unions in Hawaii have been influential in replacing taxomoshi. Credit unions are a lot less risky than taxomoshi, but they still allow an individual to pool his resources directly with members of his own
community or his fellow employees. Since credit unions rarely have branches and are only loosely associated with each other, their individual members are closely associated. Unlike the tanomoshi, the credit union is managed by a board of directors, who are elected by the membership, rather than being controlled by one man. They also pay and charge interest rates which fluctuate very little from year to year. Some credit unions are federally insured, thus providing their savers maximum security.

Savings and Loan Associations

The first savings and loan activity in Hawaii started in 1890. Not until the 1920s did they begin to spread and enjoy wider acceptance amongst the working people. Since their branch offices are restricted by regulation, some of the outside islands still [171] did not have any savings and loan offices. Before World War II, savings and loan associations were formed to cater to particular ethnic groups. Nowadays they have broad community appeal. Since they deal primarily with long-term real estate loans, they have done little to supply the small loan needs of the consumer. However, as a depository they provided a reasonably safe place for consumers to deposit their savings. For this reason, savings and loan associations have been an important factor in replacing tanomoshis.

Consumer Finance Companies

By the end of World War II the post-up effective demand for consumer durables was enormous—mainly due to depression postponements, wartime deferrals, and greatly expanded incomes. Although consumers had become very large holders of cash and liquid assets, these resources were often too large for the desired purchases. Recourse to consumer credit was quick and grow rapidly in the postwar years.

Sales and personal finance companies arose to meet this demand. While they were in existence prior to 1945, they evolved from the industrial loan companies and their previous emphasis was on business credit. The advent of Statehood in Hawaii in 1959 brought a flood of small finance companies which came along with the economic boom that Hawaii enjoyed. Many had advertised that they were located in every state and now they had to add Hawaii to the list. Normally formed as individual corporations for each branch office, they spread into every major city and town in Hawaii. As secondary financial intermediaries, finance companies derive their funds from other financial intermediaries, rather than from household and non-financial business enterprises.

Consumer finance companies specializing in the smaller personal loan needs of the public became a popular means of obtaining credit throughout Hawaii. Operating small offices with low overhead, their strong advertising campaigns attracted many of the younger generation away from the tanomoshis. Since they offer prompt approval and flexible repayment terms, they became the most convenient source of consumer credit and the most prevalent source after banks.

Investment Clubs and Limited Partnerships

The Hui, which is a Hawaiian word meaning "to come together," and "association" (the similarity to the Mandarin Chinese way of saying wu is coincidental) is a popular form of pooling various resources for speculative joint ventures. Land bails have been very popular, particularly amongst the Chinese in Hawaii. A typical hui is formed like this letter which solicited membership:

June 8, 1970

Dear:

We have acquired a parcel of land consisting of 20 acres of prime farmland located in ______. Terms are $31,400 down with a balance of $35,450 to be paid in five equal annual installments of $7,090 plus interest at 7½ percent, commencing June 15, 1971.

Our Hui will consist of ten shareholders to each contribute $1,000 by June 20, 1970. Out of the $31,400, the down payment of $31,400 will be made, with the balance of $3,000 held in reserve for incidental expenses such as taxes and closing costs. If the property is not sold within a year we will require an assessment of approximately $1,750 each to meet the payment due June 15, 1971.

The total cost of the property is $237,750 which breaks down to under 1½ per square foot. The land is presently being farmed with the lease to us to farm on December 31, 1970. We may [have] to decide to renew the lease for one year if it is determined that this would not impair its salability.

Since time is of the essence, please advise me of your decision as soon as possible.

Sincerely,
Partners who cannot afford the full amount required often split their share in the investment with a friend or business associate. The hui organizer normally acts as the leader, and is the general partner. The numbers are the limited partners.

On the mainland, those arrangements are called real estate investment partnerships. The Horizontal Property Regime Act which in 1964 created the condominium in Hawaii became a natural investment for hui. The front money or seed money often comes from hui by providing the equity which starts a condominium project. The hui normally provides three advantages to its members: limited liability, financial leverage, and a tax advantage through depreciation.

The growth of the financial intermediaries discussed here has tended to provide alternatives to tanumoshi members both for savings and investment and as a source of borrowing funds. The prevalence of these institutions and their liberal credit policies available to the consumer have caused a decline in tanumoshi activity.

**Banks and Tanumoshi**

While working from 1969 to 1971 in the town and plantation community of Lahaina, the tanumoshi was observed in operation. Before World War II, Bank of Hawaii was the only bank in Lahaina, having merged with the Bank of Maui in 1931. There were no other active credit unions, finance companies, savings and loan associations or any other financial institutions located in the Lahaina area in those days.

From the earliest time, the bank's principal customers were business firms, the sugar plantation, the manager and supervisors of the plantation, and certain other upper-class people in the area. Over half of the bank's loans and investments were made to accommodate business firms. Real estate loans rather than consumer loans were the next largest outlet of the bank's funds. Consumer installment credit was at that time still in its infancy.

The alien plantation laborer was generally excluded from the lending policies of the bank. His wages were quite low although his housing and medical expenses were borne by the plantation. The workers were not unionized as they are now and they were housed in camps segregated by racial groups. The bank in those days was not very public relations minded and did not actively solicit business from the laborers. Since payrolls were made in cash, the laborer rarely had any need to come to the bank.

Under these circumstances, it is easy to see what an important role the tanumoshi played in supplying the consumer credit needs of the laboring section of the community. It was the only credit facility available to many individuals who were not able to deal with the bank because of their economic, social, and language barriers.

With the onslaught of the great depression, the demand for business credit contracted sharply. Banks found themselves with an excess of funds available to invest in loans. During the late 1930s and 1940s, consumer installment credit loans became a popular bank investment. As banks, credit unions and savings institutions became more widespread throughout Hawaii, they began gradually to replace the tanumoshi. Banks became a more attractive medium for savings by the consumer. People also found financial institutions more willing to accommodate their credit needs. The Hawaiian-born generation is not as active as their parents in the tanumoshi. They would rather do business with banks which are recognized by the state and are protected by the government.

The tanumoshi began to become less popular as the number of financial institutions increased. Established financial institutions became a much more convenient source of credit after World War II and a safe place to put one's savings. The tanumoshi also carried a stigma since the one who started it was considered to be in financial distress and was sometimes avoided by his associates. A loan from a finance company or a bank is a confidential way to borrow as well as a respected one.

Banks as a general rule gradually relaxed their credit requirements for consumer loans after World War II and their installment lending programs have become more attractive to the consumer. Workers now earn better pay than they used to and this can support more installment credit. While the tanumoshi used to be the only available means of financing in certain areas, people who formerly dealt in tanoumoshi now find that consumer finance companies, credit unions, and banks are much more convenient.

**Tanumoshi**
Bank Marketing Efforts

The marketing programs of Hawaiian banks nowadays place a good deal of emphasis in reaching beyond racial, cultural and language barriers of the people of Hawaii. Banks advertise in Oriental language newspapers, on Filipino and Japanese language radio and television programs, and other media which are geared to reach the non-English speaking people in Hawaii. They also have among their employees many members of these races who are bilingual. Some banks employ specialists in their business development departments who are on the road much of the time traveling in plantation areas where the non-English speaking people are concentrated.

In the post-World War II years, Bank of Hawaii had a Filipino representative who made a circuit periodically through the Filipino plantation camps. His results in soliciting deposit and loan business were very substantial and his efforts were quite effective. He presented what he called his "medicine show" where he held an evening meeting in the camps with free refreshments and Filipino entertainment. Interpersed in the activities, he lectured the Filipinos on the advantages of dealing with the bank, and encouraged them to put their savings in an institution where it would be protected.

Banks in Hawaii project an image of reliability and safety through their marketing programs and they try to appeal to the consumer's basic needs. They stress that they have people who are competent at their jobs and are ready and willing to serve the consumer. It is this image through advertising that has made banks more popular to all groups in Hawaii.

Summary and Conclusion

The tanomoshi is a dying arrangement. It served a useful purpose in Hawaii's financial history and was an important means of providing consumer financing. Today it has been replaced by other financial intermediaries and is becoming part of the past. It is now a memory to many people who used to rely heavily on it.

The tanomoshi is a good example of a service that people can provide to each other in a mutual manner, to their mutual benefit. However, the degree of risk involved in a tanomoshi scheme has made it less preferable to other means of raising money. We have seen that the tanomoshi idea is not a new one and that its history goes back for centuries. We have seen how it came to Hawaii and the useful purpose it served to the Japanese immigrant who had no financial institutions to go to. We have analyzed the risks, capacous, rate structure and some of the mechanics and variations of the tanomoshi (see Derby, 1971). We have also discussed its legal and tax aspects. But we can only conclude that, for understandable reasons, the tanomoshi is no longer as meaningful in the financial system of Hawaii as it used to be.

References

Ball, J. Eyer 1963 "Nihon Chirisan," Hong Kong: Kally and Walsh.
Tax Foundation of Hawaii

Yang, C. K.

NOTE: Current data on banks and other financial institutions in Hawaii are available in the Annual Economic Review, published by Bank of Hawaii every August.

PART THREE: COMMENTARY
The Sociology of Hawaii: Some Reflections
Steve Panton

This article was originally proposed for the keynote speech of the Third Annual Meeting of the Hawaii Sociological Association, March 20, 1962, at the Hilton Hotel, Honolulu. Due to time limitations only a few strands were presented on that occasion, and we are pleased to publish the entire text here.

--The Editors

To the outsider looking in, Hawaii has often presented itself as an opportunity for the classic case-study of the "multi-racial society." There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this—Hawaii does constitute an important case-study if one starts from the point of view of comparative race relations. But there are a number of good reasons for re-thinking this point of view. The first is that it encourages the assumption that 'race' (or 'ethnicity') is the predominant structural and cultural feature of Hawaiian society; to assume this is a mistake or at least a mistaken emphasis. Sociologists residing in Hawaii, especially since the mid-1960s, have turned their attention to all manner of social phenomena—the family, education, crime, medicine in Hawaii—quite apart from exercising the obvious choice not to concentrate on Hawaii at all. Even where attention has been on Hawaii, ethnicity has often appeared as simply one variable in a multi-factorial analysis of the subject at hand.¹ No study of the law and crime in Hawaii could omit 'ethnicity' as a variable; equally such a study would probably not start from a problematic issue originating in a theory of race relations. It may well be a comparative study—let us say comparative criminology—but its roots are in the problematic issues of criminology, not in the problematic issues of Hawaiian society (as it is presented to be an ethnically structured society). This 'universalizing tendency may have been an unthinking decision of recent Hawaiian sociology; it may partly reflect the mood engendered by the University's wish not to be, or to be seen as, a primarily 'local' institution. I only wish to hint that the time for a bit more reflection on this question may be here.

The reason for this is that a judgment of whether the 'universalizing,'² but subject-area specialized, tendency is correct, depends in part on a judgment of whether ethnicity (or race) is central, peripheral or otherwise in Hawaiian society. Only if it is peripheral—or 'just one factor among many'—is the recent tendency to be viewed as partly justified. If it is central, then this implies that a general theoretical understanding of Hawaiian society, and the place of ethnic and racially-defined groups in it, is essential to the understanding of any phase of Hawaiian social process, be it education, medicine, voting behavior or whatever. By analogy, to proceed otherwise would be like studying, let us say, education in South Africa without placing that study within a general understanding of apartheid. In the end, of course, the analysis of any particular sphere of social action (the law, education, etc.) must be situated in some general theory of the society in which it is found. The question is, what kind of general theory? and, in Hawaii's case, with what kind of attention to 'ethnicity'?²

A second reason for re-thinking our position on race and ethnicity in Hawaii is that, over the last fifty years (since the period in which sociology in Hawaii began in earnest—with a substantial focus on 'race'), there have been a number of important paradigms shifts in the sociological approach to race relations. My intention in this paper is to sketch out some of those shifts and then to present some judgments about their application to Hawaiian society. One striking feature of the Hawaiian sociology of race relations is that the burden of work in the area has continued to be carried by the earliest practitioners (Andrew Lind, Bernhard Horrorn and Clarence Glick), not exclusively, but to a substantial degree. Important shifts of emphasis can be found in their work but the divergent interests of recent Hawaiian sociology have meant that an explicit 'confrontation' or debate about 'the right approach' to race and ethnicity in Hawaiian society has not been provoked.³

Paradigms in Race Relations Studies

In detailing different paradigms in the sociology of 'race' and 'ethnicity' one might begin by identifying any that could be called the pre-sociological phase of social theory. One well-documented aspect of the growth of sociological theory has been its steady detachment from pre-sociological
forms of thought in which the subject was 'society' but the method was not 'sociological.' This is the case with sociology's critique of classical economics (the rejection of utilitarian assumptions), the emphasis on evidence—social facts—and the testing of propositions (the rejection of metaphysics and speculation), and with the gradual abandonment of biological and psychological reductionism. In the sociology of 'race,' it is the last of these which is the most important. The attention to 'race biology' and 'race psychology' was part of a wider paradigm in the study of society in which fundamental biological and psychological commonalities and differences were seen to be critical. In many instances—Durkheim is a good example—the biological analogies persisted after the biological theorizing had been jettisoned, but it is also clear that Durkheim saw his refutation of 'racial' explanations (most notably in 1912) as but one phase of a general refutation of biological and psychological reductionism (see Fairbank, 1980). In the United States the new orthodoxy was carried by, above all, Franz Boas. Once the first waves of American sociologists—of the 1880s and 1890s—had passed (and this wave did include, as Freireich [1980] has documented, men who took biological differences seriously), scientific racism was on the wane.

Robert Park, as I have suggested before (Fenton, 1981), stood at the juncture of this first paradigm shift, and fostered the sociology of race relations while retaining vestiges of the earlier framework. Although the Hawaiian sociologists' emphasis on intermarriage or "biological assimilation" (and the undoubted interest in this issue of the visitors to Hawaii for the 1934 conference, see Lind, 1934) could be seen as an echo of the biological tradition, the manner in which intermarriage has, for the most part, been studied, suggests that we should regard it as no more than a residual echo. In other words the pro-sociological tradition of Hawaiian sociological history begins with Robert Park. Bio-psychological modes of explanation were repudiated in Hawaii but not in sociology. They took shape in the work of Stanley Porter, and through him had an undoubted influence in the islands, but we also know that the connections between his work and that of the sociology department were slight, perhaps nonexistent.

All this indicates that we can, for most purposes, begin with the Parkian paradigm and its influence on Hawaiian sociology, and on this I have already made some comments (Fenton, 1981). The main points can be summarized here:

1. Park did retain some elements of the notion of 'racial difference' treated en generale, but for the most part he treated racial and ethnic groups as socially emergent, and race prejudice as a product of particular situations and not as an instinctive function.

2. The race relations cycle idea was undoubtedly important but not in the single-minded deterministic way that later writers have implied. However, it was an influential model that had an important bearing on Hawaii in at least two ways: (i) in considering the importance of 'Americanization,' especially in the territorial period, and (ii) in considering the importance of the marketplace (Honoikai, the urban center) for social relations. The latter was by implicit contrast to the understanding of social relations, structured by the plantation or in contrast to the 'traditional' Hawaiian economy.

3. Park embraced the ideas of conflict and competition in ways which were Social Darwinian rather than Marxist, but which nonetheless allowed the application of a global perspective even though the setting of competition was commonly confined to the city. He insisted for example on the importance of colonial penetration and domination in which peoples and civilizations were imposed on other peoples and civilizations. His address to the University of Hawaii convention speculated about the potential ascendancy of non-Western cultures in an international shift in the balance of power and influence. He did not neglect class struggle, but he did not see class struggles as tending towards a single specific resolution (e.g., socialism or as driven by a specific historical motor (e.g., the consequences of the need to seek for profit). Rather than sliding 'racial' struggles with class struggles, or sympathizing how racial categorization infected class struggles (he did do this in a precolonal sort of way), he tended to see racial or ethnic groups as the units of struggle—these were the "es generale" social groups who were competing with each other. He did acknowledge however that ethnic struggles could become, or be replaced by, overtly class struggles.

4. Park had an sliding interest in social psychology or what we might now call, ethnoanthropology that is, he gathered, more or less systematically, observations of face-to-face social relations and of styles of self-presentation which might be seen as the small-scale significance of changing modes of 'race relations.'
aggression directed towards a particular group, the
aggression being generated by frustration in social
experience, the group being 'chosen' by dint of its
being a socially permissible 'target.' But, in my
view, the striking element of Dillard's analysis is
the acknowledgment of the necessity of understanding
the system of economic and political power within
which this prejudice was dispensed. Hence prejudice
is also seen as constituting the means whereby a
number of gains are preserved in the system of race
relations—prestige gains, sexual gains, and economic
gains. Whites benefit from the deference shown by
Black people, from the unequal access to sexual inter-
course, and from inequalities in economic relations.
Prejudice justifies and preserves these gains. Thus
in Dillard's analysis we see the juxtaposition of the
argument that prejudice is a psychological response
to social and emotional pressures and an attitude
which coheres with a social system of inequality,
social super- and subordination. The social system
(and by implication, 'functional') model is most evi-
dent in the caste-class approaches of Davis and Warner.
The application of the concept of caste seemed appro-
priate to describe a system of segregation and defer-
ence which went beyond the simple requisite of
guaranteeing class dominance. But Cox (1948) found
this to be unsatisfactory, primarily because he saw
the caste system as being ideal—typically portrayed
by Indian society, many of whose featural Southern
African society lacked. This may be so, but at al-
most fifty years distance it seems difficult to under-
stand why he could not accept that Southern African
society contained a system of class domination which
had 'imported' some important features of a caste
regime.

However, Cox's (1948) main purpose was to shift
the study of 'race relations' away from its grounding
in psychological and ideological facts, and establish
the infrastructure of capitalist class relations as the
basis of understanding. In this view, racist
ideologies can only be explained in the context of
the class relations which they served to perpetuate;
in order to examine the ideas and beliefs about 'race' it was
necessary to consider the role that ideologies of social
relations for the study of social relations them-
olves—i.e., the study of the material substratum
upon which racist ideologies were constructed. Thus
writing pre-figured a much later injection of Marxist
and other insights into the study of race relativ-
ities, which has had the virtue of insisting upon an
understanding of class relations as the primary ground in which social configurations grow, without some of the restrictions which Cox's determinist position has appeared to contain.

The publication of *American Dilemma* (Myrdal, 1944) was a major turning point about which I have only time and space to make two points. The first is that the book clearly indicated that the 'race' problem was a white problem, located in the beliefs and practices of white people in America. The solution, Myrdal implied, was in their hands—to extend to Black Americans the same rights and opportunities which White Americans enjoyed. The second is that Myrdal clearly perceived a contradiction—between American traditions of freedom and the beliefs and practices vis-à-vis Black people—but tended to see this as a dilemma, i.e., as a choice which White Americans had to make, rather than appreciating that the American social system and ideological system, like those of all societies, are quite capable of containing contradictions.

We have already mentioned some of the postwar developments but little of this could be understood without appreciating the changes outside the academies which set the agenda for the sociological focus—that is, the dramatic changes in the social patterns of the South, the civil rights movement and the Kennedy-Johnson legislation of the 1960s, and the rise of Black Power and Black Nationalist movements. The changes in civil rights and in patterns of institutional segregation were important because they laid to rest the notion that previous patterns were so deeply embedded in the 'race norm' of the South (ia particularly) that they could not be changed. The Black Power movement raised a great number of questions but from an interpretive point of view perhaps the most important was, (i) the revival of the question of Black culture and nationhood, (ii) the challenge to the view of Blacks as a separate set apart in history, and (iii) the emergence of an analysis which went beyond civil rights and social relations to an analysis of structural disadvantage which was more deeply rooted than either the laws or interpersonal attitudes and social practices.

The cultural counter-attack has been extremely important—taking shape as the demand for Black studies, the re-writing of history, and the characterization of American culture in all aspects as containing a predominant and oppressive theme of white supremacy—but the political opposition to, and the analysis of, structured disadvantage has been most problematic. The strength of the Black culture theme, and the distrust of a predominantly white American left has meant that a simple importation of Marxist class analysis has always been unlikely—i.e., an analysis which 'simply' reduced the question of race to a question of class. But the need for an analysis of the substratum of material social relations has meant that class structures have always played an important role. This is the case, for example, with the idea of 'internal colonialism' which, in drawing at least an analogy between the position of subordinate peoples within a capitalist society and the position of peoples in colonial or neo-colonial societies (i.e., the political suppression of race or nation as an adjunct of material oppression) while at the same time skirting the class position of subordinate peoples within capitalist America, mostly satisfied both the sense of race and nation and the demands of a class analysis.

The notion of internal colonialism was also attractive—as one of a group of ideas—because it found so many resonances throughout the world and thus drew (parochial) American race relations analysis back into the world schema where it belonged (as Park, incidentally, knew full well). Much of the rest of race relations literature (at least that part of it which is a new departure in this second grapple with the same problem or group of problems, i.e., the relations of race questions to questions of class structure, state and nation, and market relations—divided labor markets, the exploitation of migrant labor, the position of the unemployed, unemployable and underemployed, de-skilling, technological change and the marginalization of whole categories of workers). The internationalization of race relations writing occurs either by seeing the international ramifications of the American system or by seeing structurally comparable systems elsewhere. This work is variously exemplified by Carmichael (1963), Blauuer (1972), Geschwender (1971), Bonacich (1973, 1976), Hein (1976), Burawoy (1976), Wilson (1978) and by a whole group of writers whose work has appeared in *The Invented Societies*, especially the special issue of Fall 1980. A rather different group is constituted by the historians such as Gutman (1976), Genovese (1968), Litvak (1979), Coneo (1976), and Fredericksen (1971) who, in rather varying ways, have imported Marxist theories or ideas of class and analysis back into the understanding of slavery and American 'race' history.
This is not to trace all the developments in this field—and does not for example mention the very considerable literature growth in Britain in response to a new and changing situation there—but it does point to some of the most important ones. What then does this imply for our assessment of race and sociology in Hawaii?

My estimation of Park's contribution is high and accordingly I would suggest that, on the whole, his influence via those students who came to Hawaii as professional sociologists was a very beneficial one. Speaking theoretically (and not specifically as Hawaiian), there are a number of reasons for this. These overlap with the reasons why I think the Parkian paradigm can be regarded as in some ways superior to some that followed.

1. A major element of Park's thinking was its international emphasis—he had his particular understanding of both a comparative and a world-wide context. In other words he not only was ready to compare directly 'mixed blacks in South Africa' with similar constellations elsewhere, but was also sensitive to processes of change which affected the world system simultaneously.

2. Though Durkheim rather than Marxian, there was in this work a clear conception of struggle, power and conflict. The competing units may at certain points have been seen as 'ethnic groups' but he was sensitive to the importance of class struggle and suggested that struggle expressed in ethnic or social terms might increasingly become expressed in class terms.

3. The 'cycle of race relations' model was in the whole advanced as just that—a model—from which deviations could be expected and observed. It was sufficiently grounded in the real experience of many immigrant groups to yield an interesting and convincing harvest of comparative study. In my view there are many examples to illustrate that the Hawaiian group of sociologists understood the model in precisely this way—and were alert both to actual deviations from the ideal-typical processes and to structures in social history where such deviations seemed possible.

4. The interest shown by representatives of particular ethnic groups in Hawaii in documenting the progress and cultural peculiarities of their 'people' has yielded case studies which may lack technical import but provide rich in the way of close observation.

Finally, on the Parkian influences, I should add that the full development of the potential of the ecological model is most skillfully illustrated by Andrew Lind's An Island Community (1938), a study which in my view, stands very high in the catalogue of Hawaiian sociological literature. This study, more than any other, shows what can be done within this framework, and, incidentally, demonstrates how the Park/ecological model can be used to direct attention to most of the significant social, economic and political processes which would be pursued within a Marxian framework. I am thinking of the data and analysis Lind assembled around such areas as (a) Hawaii's position in international commerce, (b) the movement of capital and the pressures bearing, internally and externally, on the Hawaiian capitalist class, (c) analysis of the mode and relations of production within Hawaiian society, and (d) the ideological and institutional correlates of the trading and plantation economies. A good case could be made for a replication of Lind's study in the 1980s.

For example, it is clear that the tourist economy was barely pre-figured in the 1930s period and the sheer technological advances in air travel could hardly have been predicted at all. But although Lind and Adams sometimes assume the continuation of a basically agrarian economy, Lind (1939:17) in particular devotes a significant passage to the potential of tourism. Just as An Island Community addressed itself to physical resources, capital flows, labor markets, and the institutional and ideological adjacents of a plantation society, so it is possible to apply the same conceptual and analytical tools to the structure of a 'tourists' society. Occasional references to the hotels as the 'new plantations' are not enough. We should be asking, for example, about the structure of capital ownership and capital flows; Lind's and others' analyses of the capitalist class in Hawaii stressed at several points the importance of the largely land-based character of capital; making capital responsive to local sensitivities in a way that did not happen, for instance, in much of the Caribbean. What then of 'tourist capital'? If the contemporary analysis of Hawaiian political economy is to be drawn into the ambit of international capital, how does, say, Del Monte Investment in Hawaii, sit with Del Monte investment in Mexico or the Philippines. How is island and crop investment in Hawaii affected by capital and labor movements in other areas—Central America, Philippines? (see Harbeck and Flynn, 1980.)
could ask similar questions about real estate, hotel and general tourist development, as well as tracing out their particular local effects.

Changing Modes of Approach and Hawai'i's Sociology

What then of the subsequent influence on race relations sociology which I have mentioned? On the whole Hawaii seems to have by-passed the fraudulent influence on sociology and perhaps at no great cost. Equally the debate about caste has, understandably, had little direct impact on Hawaiian sociology. But one should add an important rider here. The Hawaiian writers—because of the traditions from which they came—were fully alerted to this literature and were therefore aware of the linkages drawn between plantation systems of production and caste-like forms of social organization. Therefore the absence of caste-like structures had to be mentioned and at least tentatively explained. Similarly the claims—advanced by some—that the plantation system constituted a relatively stable base of social organization had to be examined in the context of Hawaiian society. Lind, for example, is able to show how and why Hawaiian planters did not exhibit a 'raw' exploitative attitude to their labor force; some of this analysis might benefit, retroactively, from a thoroughgoing application of the concept of paternalism—as developed by Genovese (1968) in the context of the American South. Lind—who did not of course have Genovese at hand—nevertheless reached strikingly similar conclusions about the ways in which planters were forced to recognize the humanity of their slaves/contract labor.

The local ramifications of Myrdal's (1944) work are very many—if mostly indirect. The obvious difference is that whereas Myrdal speaks of a contradiction between two 'public' codes—the American constitutional tradition and racism—in Hawaii, if Adams (1938) was and remains right, the public code was anti-racist. Therefore when pressures towards racial egalitarianism surfaced in Hawaiian society, they were on Adams' argument, relatively stifled by that code which forbade it. A re-estimation of the strength of this public code—the race norm of Hawaii—is surely due. One could do worse than begin by testing the hypothesis that the code of equality, once established, acted as a brake on inchoate racist ideas in Hawaii—or at least prevented them from gaining the ascendency and public legitimacy.

It contains within it the sub-hypothesis that the nature of the publicly legitimated code is extremely important—i.e., as long as the contrary pressures are not too great it is capable of resisting movement in an opposite direction. This type of analysis could be very nicely juxtaposed with arguments which suggest that the racial equality norms of Hawaii are a 'more' public posture which masks a substratum of racism or racial inequality. It would certainly be very interesting to conduct a kind of sociology of knowledge exercise on these lines—who is most vociferous in proclaiming Hawaii's egalitarian ideology, who is most vociferous in questioning them, and for what reasons?

Rather similarly, the civil rights movement and the later affirmative action programs pose special problems for Hawaii, given the fact of Hawaii's complex ethnic situation. The Affirmative Action office in Hawaii has more than once said that it is at a loss in determining how mainland principles should be applied locally. On the other hand, the noted, though still small, presence of Black Americans on the island has raised 'mainland style' issues of discrimination in recent years and it may be that an alert watching brief is indicated here. The earlier Hawaiian sociologists were always aware of this, and on two fronts: one, they were alert to the possibilities implicit in the 'importation' of racist ideas by mainland whites, and, two, to the possible consequences of a Black presence in Hawaii, the latter however always remaining too small to deserve much more than brief notes, of which there are several. Equally there are some tantalizingly brief references in Mary Pukui's work to 'traditional' Hawaiian attitudes to hapa alelo, to black skins, to the Kalua, and to slavery (Pukui et al., 1972, 1979).

Of the group of arguments and concepts which grew out of the Black Power movement and the revived race/class debate and cultural nationalism are perhaps the most relevant to Hawaii. Adams has confidently asserted that racial divisions have not followed class lines in Hawaii; in some major respects this is true. One should remember that the scholars of the 1930s were concerned with world-wide comparisons—and by comparison with the slavery/African descent co-determinacy, the post-slavery racial subordination in the US, or the racial divisions of South Africa, the Hawaiian situation looked much more complex. Adams realized that the emergence of a predominantly endogenous missionary and planter class and the mostly
non-white rural poor and plantation labor classes, there was a possibility of an avowedly white supremacist regime developing. The judgment of the extent to which it was developed is one that needs to be re-examined. We must remain some support for Adams' view that, in no mean degree, such a development was stifled. We assume that the Hawaiian-haleiwa nexus, and the continuing if precarious Hawaiian hold over legitmate politics played a major role in this respect. To be sure there was an absence of a clear white-supremacist ideology, of any public legitimacy of a doctrine of this kind, of any laws proscribing intermarriage, and of fixed patterns of deference which characterized, let us say, the American South from 1880 to 1940. On the opposite side of the ledger one would want to re-examine the patterns of deference on the plantations, the legal and citizenship disabilities of the Oriental population, the effect of private and semi-private racist beliefs, especially in the 1930s when the buffer effect of the Hawaiians was very greatly weakened by their diminished social, political, and economic power, and when the military presence brought new influences which were to a considerable degree insolated or isolated from the Hawaiian mora.

Within a reconsidered historical perspective of this kind, one might look anew at the present situation to determine the extent to which racial and economic lines of distinction coincide with lines of social, political, and economic power. But classes should not be understood as static categories to which proportions of the population can be assigned (nor can the race-ethnic categories be regarded as fixed).

Rather the analysis of classes must be primarily the analysis of class relations, and this means an analysis of the main social relations developing around land, labor and capital in a Hawaii dominated by a tourist economy. Precisely how these structures are making their impact on segments of the population may be more-or-less defined by ethnic or racial categories, is what is argued in a race-class analysis of Hawaii.

This requires an analysis of capital investment in Hawaii—where does it come from, how concentrated is it, how does it articulate with capital movements outside Hawaii? An analysis of labor—where is plantation labor recruited from, are whole classes of people becoming marginalized in Hawaii, what are the pressures to reduce labor costs, and what movements, if any, will these pressures have for the prospects of working- and middle-class people sustaining a livelihood in the islands? What patterns are emerging in ownership and use of land and how successful are forms of political opposition to class relations which will not only uncover the nature of the 'race/class' nexus in Hawaii but also the major forces impelling social and economic development in one direction or another. On the whole, this kind of analysis—since Lind's landmark in Island Community—has been de-emphasized in Hawaii, although some of this work may have been done outside the ambit of the sociology department. Today it would probably arise from a Marxist-informed perspective rather than from a Parkian perspective, and in this respect the visits of such scholars as James敦chender and Elina Bonacich have provided a new impetus. Whether and how this impetus might be taken up remains to be seen.

Finally we should consider some of the arguments concerning 'cultural nationalism.' Broadly speaking this may be seen as a dispute—or at least a difference of emphasis—between those African-American activists who stressed the 'purely' cultural aspects of Black Power, and those who stressed the need for political struggle, for violent struggle and for action based on an appreciation of the class position of America's Black people. There was, of course, always an intermediate position which envisaged the cultural-ideological struggle as an adjunct of the political and economic struggle, which argued that strengthened group consciousness would lead in-hand with strengthened political and economic demands. Some argued against political alliance with radical whites on grounds of racial separa tion, some on grounds of the temporary necessity of asserting the independent black will to strengthen pride and self-consciousness; yet others argued for alliance. It seems to me that the central kind of tactical and ideological argument faces the Hawaiian movement today. Some see it as an overwhelmingly cultural assertion or at least as the necessary re-establishments of cultural pride to provide a springboard for socio-economic advancement and social change. Others deny that cultural renaissance is possible unless it is based on the land, land being understood as the cornerstone of Hawaiian culture. In some phases the Hawaiian movement is expressed chiefly as a struggle against structured social disadvantage which has taken on some of the characteristics of what is loosely described as 'institutional racism.' Yet it is still clear that there are major political and economic concerns which are shared by people who cannot claim ancestral links...
with the Hawaiian people, as well as the specter of divisions along the lines of 'degree' of Hawaiian ancestry. This would include concerns about land use, planned permissions, Hawaiian lands, immigration, education, the place of the military, and other related issues. It is by no means easy to determine politically what the 'right' course of action is, nor from an observer's point of view to envisage what the likely developments are to be. The conclusion of this paper is that answers to some of these questions will require a more 'totalizing' sociology of Hawaiian society of a kind which has been seen soon in some major respects, which has been relatively submerged by subsequent interests, but which has recently shown signs of reappearance.

NOTES

1. I am thinking of, let us say, the study of the incidence of convictions for certain types of crime, which includes some index of ethnic ancestry in the independent variables. It is revealing that at least one researcher in the present department has told me how difficult 'ethnicity' is to operationalize in this sense.

2. By "universalizing" I mean the tendency to see social processes in Hawaii as parallel to processes generally identified in advanced (Western) societies, e.g., urbanization, the changing position of women, etc., and their correlates.

3. I am speaking of a matter of emphasis. Clearly (a) some permanent members of the department retain an interest in ethnic relations, and (b) visitors like James Gescheidt and Edna Bonacich have stimulated debate.

4. The foundation of distinctive schools of sociology can be dated to the 1960s, but the radical break with scientific racism should probably be traced to the 1970s. See Gossett (1965, 1971).

5. Adams, Linn; Hattman, and Glick warmly refer to him in their writings (although Adams, 1938, briefly mentions Porteous and we know that there was little rapport between the two foci of 'race' research.

6. In June 1931, Park delivered the University of Hawaii commencement address, "The University and the Community of Race."

REFERENCES


Ponzi, E. Franklin

Frederickson, G. M.

Garrovale, Eugene

Geschwindner, James A.

Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan

Gordon, W. Lloyd

Gorski, Thomas

Guanini, Herbert

Handlin, Oscar

Lieberson, Stanley

Lind, Andrew M.


Litwack, Leon

Myrdal, Gunnar

Novek, Michael

Pukui, Mary Kanahele, E. W. Haertig, and Catherine A. Lee
1972 *Kane 'I ke Awa (Look to the Water), Vol. 1*. Honolulu: Hale Niihiakani Children's Center.

1979 *Volume 2*.

Wilson, William Julius
Despite this support, much of it well-meaning, serious questions remain concerning the exact nature of Native Hawaiian problems, and the capacity of O.H.A. to address and alleviate them. For example, there are doubts about the ability of any umbrella organization to represent different Native Hawaiian communities which are at varied levels of socio-economic and political development. There is the question of why power should be vested in nine individuals rather than in the communities themselves through their own representatives. There is also an urgent need for Hawaiians to assess significant related issues: the political effectiveness of the Native Hawaiian Movement and any potentially negative impacts on it by O.H.A.; solidarity between Native Hawaiian communities and the possible effect which the Office may have on sustaining and enlarging that solidarity in the interests of State rather than Native Hawaiian goals; the likelihood that O.H.A. will exacerbate rather than quell Native Hawaiian discontent by raising false because impossible hopes (for example, there is a prevalent hope among poorer Hawaiians that O.H.A. will enable them, in the near future, to receive land for homes and agriculture).

Each of these issues, among many others, deserves thoughtful exploration. However, I wish to address only one area here—the nature of Hawaiian problems, specifically land alienation—by using a critical approach suggestive of the kinds of questions Native Hawaiians should be asking about their political future.

Problems in Native Hawaiian Communities—Land Alienation

The major problems which Hawaiians confront today are of two different kinds: (1) legal and institutional problems, including problems of commercial and governmental encroachment and legal rights; (2) cultural expression, including the teaching of Hawaiian religion and its principles of protecting the land and the people of the land (kūma 'ike, kūma ke ho'e) and the preservation of Hawaiian life-style (for example, near the water in fishing villages; in the valleys planting taro); (3) community services, including the areas of health and cultural education, including negative social diseases such as unemployment, crime, and family disintegration are crucial rather than causes of these three fundamental problems.
Land Alienation and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs

The major concern for Native Hawaiian communities today is much the same as that of a hundred or two hundred years ago: alienation of the land and a concomitant decline in Hawaiian culture. Loss of the ‘āina (land)—the material, spiritual, and psychological foundation of Hawaiian culture—is clearest in the area of resort and commercial development which has made Hawai‘i’s economy increasingly dependent on tourism. Random examples include a dozen proposed hotels in South Kohala from Kona to Waimea; major tourist destinations at West Beach and Waikulaula (Queen’s Beach) on O‘ahu; 2,000 upper-income estates on Molokuli‘i; commercial parks in Waimanālo, Papakoua, and Kahuku; restaurants and amusement parks in Mākahāui‘i–Nīhau on Kaua‘i. But loss of the land occurs in other ways: through Federal and State parks (Kāne‘ohe, Mānoa, Sand Island, O‘ahu); through upper-income housing (Mānā, Kāhei Kāhei, Kāne‘ohe Valley) through industrial expansion (Ko‘olina, Lanai, Campbell Deep Draft Harbor). For Hawaiians who take their subsistence from the land, the manner of land expropriations is nearly irrelevant when compared to its predicted effects: a smashing of community and ʻohana (family); a severing of the intimate relationship between the ʻāina and the people; the creation of homeless families forced into overcrowded housing projects and shadows in the villages. The results of this process show up as crime, unemployment, and the appalling fact that Native Hawaiians suffer the worst health profile of Hawai‘i’s five largest ethnic groups in areas ranging from infant mortality and congenital birth defects to adolescence drug abuse and life expectancy. A loss noticeable but in many ways more devastating is the cultural mourning and spiritual devastation which continue to afflict Hawaiians as a people.

Loss of the land to development is a product of several factors: Hawai‘i’s international reputation as a prime tourist destination; the massive influx of mainland and foreign (especially Japanese and Canadian) capital by way of multinational corporations; the serious difficulty that small, predominantly rural, resource-poor communities experience in trying to withstand the combined pressures of government and developer interests; and finally, State policy which encourages tourism for economic gain through encouragement of business investment; through resort land use designation; through specific sale or lease of lands to developers; through capital improvement projects in tourist areas; and through advertising campaigns (mainland and foreign consumption).

Each of these factors is sufficiently complex to warrant individual analysis, but my concern here is to put one obvious but consistently unasked question: If land development is a serious root cause of Native Hawaiian problems, can the Office of Hawaiian Affairs do anything to curb or stop land development? For example, can O.H.A. pass any laws, buy any lands, or demand privileged treatment through negotiations or other avenues to prevent alienation of the land?

A clear understanding of Hawai‘i’s politics gives a negative answer to those questions. Land development is regulated by various political structures such as zoning commissions, City Councils, the legislature and the State Department of Land and Natural Resources. O.H.A. has no jurisdiction, and therefore no political power here. While O.H.A. may use its offices to negotiate for lands on behalf of certain Hawaiian communities (Trustee Nalani Solomon’s successful effort to extend the lease of Mālo‘i‘i’s lands from the State is an example), the Trustees’ ability here is tenuous at best because the Office has no means of assertion other than moral argument. Secondly, large infusions of money by local and outside corporations are enormously effective in breaking community resistance to development, which can be bought off, compromised, or simply crushed, often with the tacit approval or open physical support of the State and local government (evictions of residents at Sand Island, O‘ahu, and Kāne‘ohe, for example). In such a situation, O.H.A. has no comparable resources here: no money, no large staff, no physical support with which to oppose development assuming this to be a desired goal. Thirdly, O.H.A. is only minimally funded by the legislature. (The failure of O.H.A.’s funding proposal in the 1982 legislature underscores the financial dependence of O.H.A. on other State agencies: Admittedly, the expansions of four O.H.A. trustees to seek legislative seats in the 1982 election suggest that they understand O.H.A.’s relative powerlessness when compared with the legislature. If successful, O.H.A. may become a training ground for political office rather than a powerful political office itself.) For larger sums of money, the Office must await Federal reparation case for eligibility before considering the purchase of lands. And the question of whether land will be given to O.H.A. has been answered.
by at least one Congressman who claimed, during House
preparation hearings in Hawaii' in 1979, that it would
be a "cold day in hell" before any land is returned to
Hawaiians in compensation for America's conquest of
Hawaii in the nineteenth century. Indeed, this atti-
ditude can be said to characterize government policy in
general regarding land cession. Additionally, the
getting of Senator Inouye's Hawaiian Education Amend-
ments to the Higher Education Bill of 1980 is a clear
indication of Congress' need with respect to compen-
satory programs for America's indigenous peoples.
Finally, those realities lead us to ask deeper, more
nagging questions. If O.H.S. cannot prevent further
cession of the land through recent development,
purchase the Office was specifically envisioned by its
state architects as a development corporation for
Native Hawaiians. If so, O.H.A. may become a conduit
through which willing Hawaiians can receive a larger
share of the "development" pie.

From this sketchy but suggestive analysis, it
should be clear that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
lacks the legal jurisdiction, political clout, and
financial resources to stop land development, including
military abuse of lands (for example, O.H.A. would have
no power to stop the bombing of Echo's Rock). Clearly,
the Office is indispensable in dealing with at least one
major cluster of Native Hawaiian problems. Moreover,
the Office is indispensable in dealing with at least one
major cluster of Native Hawaiian problems. Moreover,
there are questions about O.H.A., contributing to
commercial development itself, and by extension, to
further alienation of the 'Aina. For Hawaiians in
beleaguered areas, this reality means that solid com-

the sovereign kingdom could be reinstated. According
to attorney and Native rights researcher, Mailani
Trask:

This act of cession (as a matter of international law
and as distinguished from taking of lands by discovery
and occupational warfare) had the effect of protecting
the property rights of the people of the ceding sovereign,
namely, the Hawaiian people.

Our great Queen Lili'uokalani foresaw, indeed. She
knew that to resist the force of the United States
Government and to go to war and be conquered would
forever forfeit the rights of her people to their lands.
By ceding the lands and the nationhood of Hawaii to
the United States Government, Queen Lili'uokalani pro-
tected the rights of the people to their 'Aina (land).

When the United States Government accepted Hawaii as
a territory, by and through the Newland Resolution (30
Oct. 75), the United States Government expressly
acknowledged the property rights of the "inhabitants"
of the Hawaiian Islands.

However, despite these rights, Native Hawaiians
have lived as wards of both State and Federal govern-
ments rather than as a sovereign people. For example,
the two trusts established by the Federal government
with the State government for the betterment of the
Native Hawaiian people have been shamelessly abused
by the State. I am referring to the Hawaiian Homes
Trust established by the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act of 1920, and the 5(3) Trust concerning 1.5 million
acres of ceded land contained in the Admissions Act of
1959.

In 1921, the Federal government set aside over
230,000 acres for Native Hawaiians to be administered
by a State agency: the Department of Hawaiian Homes.
Nearly sixty years later, only 25,000 acres are
actually used by Native Hawaiians. The great bulk
of the land is leased to nonbeneficiaries, many of
whom sub-lease their parcels for a large profit. In
addition, over 6,000 Hawaiians remain on the Depart-
ment's waiting list. The Department's justification
for leasing is simple: because they are the only
State agency without funding from the legislature,
administrative monies must be generated through
leases, thus lands set aside for Native Hawaiians for
farming and homesteading are used by non-beneficiaries.
Finally, a 1980 report by the Hawaiian Affairs
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recommended that

Alternative—Self-Determination

As the hours of this issue are questions of ownership,
authority, nationhood, and self-determination for the
Native Hawaiian people. In 1893, the historical loss of the
'Aina (and, therefore, of nationhood) was traced to
Queen Lili'uokalani's cession of Native Hawaiian land
titles, under threat of force, to the American Govern-
ment in 1893. By this act, the Queen ceded the sovereign
ty of the Hawaiian Nation to the U.S. Government,
there to be held in trust by the United States until
the Department of the Interior enforce the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and immediately recommend to the Department of Justice that breaches of trust be investigated and litigation to enforce the Trust be initiated. Regarding the ceded land trust, the story of abuse is much the same. Hawai‘i was admitted as a State through the Admissions Act of 1959, Section 5(f) of this Act grants 1.5 million acres of ceded land (about 30 percent of State land) to be held in trust by the State for the benefit of two beneficiaries: the general public, and Native Hawaiians as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. To this very day, twenty-one years after the Admissions Act, the State has not distinguished Native Hawaiian lands and their revenues from the lands held by the Department of Land and Natural Resources for the general public. As a result of this conglomeration of lands and monies, Native Hawaiians have never enjoyed the benefits of the 5(f) Trust. Meanwhile, the State of Hawai‘i continues to be guilty of a serious breach of their responsibilities regarding this trust.5

In light of this record, the question needs to be asked whether O‘H.A. will not continue, as the Hawaiian Homes Commission does, the wardship of Native Hawaiians to the State of Hawai‘i. Given that O‘H.A. is yet another State bureaucracy, conceived, structured and funded under State auspices (the Constitutional Convention of 1978, the State Legislature, the Department of Land and Natural Resources) there is little doubt in my mind that O‘H.A. will further the subjugation of the Hawaiian people.

For us, the natives of this ‘Ilima, the alternative to wardship is self-determination. At this moment, we have several examples to guide us in our discussion of the structures by which we can pursue self-determination: corporate forms (i.e., legal entities); tribal groups; Statewide groups; localized associations determined by traditional land divisions or by trust groupings (e.g., Hawaiian Homes lesions).

Our cousins to the North, the American Indians, have various sovereignty forms such as tribal councils which can serve as inspirations to our efforts. And our cousins to the South—the Maori, Tahitians, Samoans, Tongans—can yield up several patterns of self-determination.

But one characteristic should be clear. All these forms are anchored in a land base. If we pursue the investigation and prosecution of the State’s violation of their trust responsibilities to Hawaiians, we will then be in a position to command, at the least, the trust lands which are already set aside for the use of native Hawaiians. Using these lands as a base, we can then pursue questions of rent, lease, sale, and other financial arrangements regarding lands which are not easily available for our use. Questions of restitution and reparations will then be in a preferable position to be addressed by the Federal Government. And the Hawaiian people can then begin to act upon their rights of self-determination through a community-by-community discussion of alternative structures for self-government.

Many organizations have been working along these lines for the past decade. They include Hā‘a‘i Hana‘wai, Inc.; the Protect Kāhō‘ole ‘Oha ‘ohana and its parent organization, Ihi Aloha of Moloka‘i; the ‘Oha O Hawai‘i of Peggy Ha‘o ‘O Rosé; the Hui Hawaiians; and the chant ‘Ihualu Hokū Moʻo Welehu (Sand Island ‘Oha). Their efforts and those of other Hawaiian organizations have been focused on a search for the best forms by which our people can proclaim and assert sovereignty. It is these efforts, rather than those of the State, which we should participate in and further. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, seen in this context, is but one more obstacle in our journey toward self-determination.

NOTES

1. For a recent statement of the nature of contemporary Hawaiian problems see Hawaiian-in-Adversity: An Everett Alaka‘i Profile, by L.V.B. and Key Tracks representing the position of the Protect Kāhō‘ole ‘Oha ‘ohana in Aloha ‘ōnua, a publication of the Protect Kāhō‘ole ‘Oha ‘ohana, 1985, in the Alaka‘i and Pacific Collection at Hamilton Library, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa.


2. Compare health statistics on Native Hawaiians with those of the other four major ethnic groups in Hawai‘i in Department of Health Statistical Survey, State of Hawai‘i, 1979.
3. For the effects of tourism on the economy of Hawaii, see Spalding, "Fished, Jocks, the Influence of Hawaii's and the Centuries of Dependent Development," Doctoral dissertation in Political Science, at the University of Hawaii Library, Honolulu, Hawaii.
   Also see John Kelly, "Hawaii's Showme of Tourism, Land Alienation, and Foreign Control," paper presented at the 14th Malagasy Seminar, University of Papua New Guinea, May 2-9, 1974, in *file_in_the_Hawaii_and_Pacific_Collection*, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii.


6. See the definitive analysis of the Section 5(f) Trust in the Admission Act by William T. Trask, on file with Alu Lake, entitled, "A Study of Section 5(f) of the Admission Act of the State of Hawaii."