The Political-Economy of Hawaii

Gerard Sullivan
Gary Hawes
Guest Editors

Social Process in Hawaii
Volume 31, 1984/85

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................... v
FOREWORD ............................................................. vii
Sam Pooley, for the Editorial Board
BIOGRAPHIES OF CONTRIBUTORS ................................. xi

ARTICLES

THE TRAGIC MATURING OF HAWAII'S ECONOMY ...... 1
Bob H. Stauffer
RING OF STEEL: NOTES ON THE
MILITARIZATION OF HAWAII ................................. 25
Ian Y. Lind
THE GREAT HAWAIIAN MILK CRISIS:
SCIENCE, POLICY AND ECONOMIC INTEREST .... 49
Richard Pratt
SECTORS OF PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL
AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN HAWAII, 1975 .......... 77
Joyce N. Chinen
HAWAIIANS, AMERICAN COLONIZATION,
AND THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE .......... 101
Haunani-Kay Trask
THE HAWAII MUSIC INDUSTRY ................................. 137
Elizabeth Bentzel Buck
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HAWAII
AND WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS .......... 155
Edward D. Beechert
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Gerard Sullivan,
Guest Editor
FOREWORD

It has been 15 years since anti-war protests at UH culminated in arrests at Burchard Hall. Shortly thereafter, Hawaiian and land use activists were the target of arrests at Kalama Valley. That period was full of political awakening in Hawaii, and the effect was felt within the University, especially in the formation of the Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies programs, and New College. Political activists tried to become better organized, from Catholic Action to the Kaho'olawe Ohana, and a small left press was born. Yet the participatory democracy and community involvement which seemed the promise of the early seventies has not been fulfilled, and failures in social analysis may have contributed to the political malaise we now face, for political action in Hawaii is overwhelmingly and narrowly issue oriented.

This is a special issue of Social Process in Hawaii and is our attempt to promote research and discussion on the political economy of Hawaii. Yet the concept of political economy itself has its own ambiguity in Hawaii, an ambiguity tinged with the disparate directions of liberal, radical, and Hawaiian politics in this state. A few years ago, political economy became a magic touchstone for contemporary social theorists throughout the U.S. While one might wish to claim that this paradigm became acceptable because of its sweeping acceptance as a world view, such is obviously not the case. Neither historical materialism, dialectics, nor more recent realist versions of social science, informs the majority of work passed off as popular political economy. The reason political economy was even approached by mainstream social scientists undoubtedly lies in the failure of liberalism (the best and the brightest) to comprehend the wide social changes which have beset modern corporate capitalism since 1968 (the year of the Tet offensive in Vietnam and the Paris and Czech uprisings), and with the success of radical theorists in gaining an audience for alternative perceptions of social reality.

The declining social relevance of the Democratic Party in Hawaii, the demise of a number of local environmental organizations, and the ossification and gentrification of much of the University of Hawaii are all aspects of the failure of liberalism, and for that matter, radicalism as well. Perhaps only in the native Hawaiian movement can some success be claimed in nurturing an alternative conception of the Hawaiian heritage and in developing a widespread political base at the grassroots level. Even so, the Bank of Hawaii and other corporate "sponsors" are trying with some success to subvert this social movement for their own purposes. Critical analysis of the social relations of modern corporate capitalism must still fight for the right to speak.
The essence of critical political economy in the U.S. has been concentration on a historical and systematic view of social and political activity in which economic structures play important (if not determining) roles. After all, that is the etymology of the expression. The process of political economy is an intellectual battle, often linked to political practice, to create a coherent picture of the social interrelationships which comprise the modern corporate capitalist world. As abstract as these relationships are, they are real and they have real effects. Knowledge of these relationships does much to sort out the myriad facts and presumptions of everyday life. Yet it is the nature of the concrete impact of this social system on people which presents the focus for political economy.

Political economy is not a monolithic discipline, and that is clearly shown by the heterogeneity of points of view incorporated in these pages. Political economy allows considerable variation in its frame of reference, although our central orientation as we prepared this issue of Social Process in Hawaii is certainly toward the collective interests of the mass population of these islands, and not toward some classless social welfare. Political economy is not, however, the politics of economics, nor is it the economics of politics. These are merely the adaptations of traditional social scientists to widespread objections to the standard practice of “disinterested” research. Hawaii has had the benefit of a large number of liberal pluralist studies of the social processes which comprise the social fabric of this state. Many useful insights have been derived from these studies, and many of us offer thanks to these researchers. However the essence of modern political economy is a rejection of the pluralistic hopes of modern liberal social theory.

The alternative perspectives of political economy have had a hard row to hoe in Hawaii. Traditional departments at the University have maintained largely traditional orientations toward research. The Ethnic Studies and Women’s Studies programs have had to fight regularly for survival. Political periodicals, such as Modern Times and Ka Hula’au have had to fight for an audience. The most notable exception has been Noel Kent’s Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence. Even here, the UH Press rejected the work of one of its own faculty, leaving publication to Monthly Review Press. We believe this issue of Social Process in Hawaii should provide space for a number of arguments which help stimulate a discussion directed toward developing a cohesive alternative perspective of Hawaii’s political economy. Although diverse in their orientation and depth, we are pleased with the directions these articles suggest.

The essence of political economy (as a method of social investigation) is that it should lay bare the structured relationships which lie beneath the surface appearances of social intercourse. The nature of Hawaii’s political economy (as a social system) has been the subject of deep controversy since the growth of multinational tourism in Hawaii. Last year’s debate between the foes and promoters of tourism raised emotions about Hawaii’s future to a high pitch, but the debate also showed how weak is the defense of tourism. As Noel Kent said of tourism’s defenders, “The emperor has no clothes.” Bob Stauffer (jr.)’s lead article in this issue of Social Process in Hawaii, is an ambitious attempt to marshall the State’s own statistics against the “maturation” of Hawaii’s economy. Stauffer’s piece goes to the heart of Hawaii’s political economy and to political economy as method. His argument is that to trace the flows of income originating from tourism as a system of production and distribution is to trace the loss of local control of Hawaii’s political future. The data are not definitive — not only are the concepts of value addressed by Stauffer difficult to measure, but the techniques of national income accounting analysis are not designed to challenge the hegemony of the multinational financial intermediaries who operate in Hawaii. Stauffer extend Kent’s dependency argument and by doing so should help focus the issues over local control of Hawaii’s economy. Joyce Chinen makes a parallel contribution by applying James O’Connor’s seminal sectoral analysis (from The Fiscal Crisis of the State) to Hawaii’s industrial structure. Her analysis examines some of the structural causes of inequality in Hawaii.

The dependency perspective offered by Kent and Stauffer has not been universally applauded, even on the left. In our book review section, Bob Cahill writes an imaginative review of Kent’s Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence. In a lengthy essay, Cahill first addresses how the book will be received by the powers that be in Hawaii, amongst others, and explores the state of political myth. This section indicates the conceptual problems and practical difficulties alternative analytical perspectives have in Hawaii. Cahill quite rightly points to the different evaluative criteria which face political economy, and he argues that providing an alternative “effective myth” concerning Hawaii is Kent’s most important contribution. Finally he evaluates the text as a source of scholarship on Hawaii’s history. Ed Beechert provides a counter-conception of political development, emphasizing the role of organized labor in defining political and economic agendas in Hawaii. Ian Lind’s discussion of the U.S. military presence in Hawaii complements this historical political economy.

Political economy is not limited to structural analysis of largely economic phenomena, important though those may be in orienting new scholarship. Aspects of political ideology are deeply implanted in the social relations of dominance and subordination in capitalist Hawaii. Haunani-Kay Trask is already infamous from Hawaii’s ruling
elite point of view, and her interpretation of haole cultural and materialistic influences on Hawaiians will not assuage those views. Her piece, more than any other in this issue, points to the polemical aspects of an effective political economy.

In a different tone, but in the same vein, Betty Buck’s discussion of Hawaii’s music industry suggests how even cultural renaissance is limited by the exigencies of private production. Dan Boylan provides a review of Ron Takaki’s oral history of labor in Hawaii, *Pau Hana*. Takaki’s work indicates the depth of understanding that can come from the voices of the people of Hawaii themselves. In our commentary section, Noel Kent makes his voice heard again, updating his arguments concerning the dependency of Hawaii’s economy.

Finally, an issue dedicated to the political economy of Hawaii would be nothing without a critique of the ruling political organization of the state: the Ariyoshi administration. Dick Pratt’s insightful analysis of the heptachlor milk case provides deep clues into the paralysis faced by bureaucratized liberalism in Hawaii. And, for what it is worth, we think Pratt’s orientation is an example of the latitude that political economy can accept, since his analysis is far from the structural orientation of Stauffer, Chinen and Kent. Both perspectives provide information on the operation of this social system, its ruling elite, and its dominant social relationships.

Much more work needs to be done on the political economy of Hawaii. We believe that a more explicit recognition of the structures that bind Hawaii’s capitalist social relations would provide a fertile ground for socially and politically relevant research. *Social Process in Hawaii* is a continuing journal and we hope further contributions will be forthcoming. Comments by readers on the direction taken in this issue, and on the arguments raised by our authors, are welcome. To the extent possible, these will be included in a forthcoming issue. We hope this issue of *Social Process in Hawaii* makes a positive contribution to resolving the incipient crisis which faces Hawaii today.

Sam Pooley,
for the Editorial Board.

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**Edward Beecher** has been teaching in the History department of the University of Hawaii at Manoa since 1968. He holds a Ph.D. in U.S. Economic History from the University of California at Berkeley. Before coming to the University of Hawaii, he taught at a number of colleges, including Mexico City College, Sacramento State University and the University of Hawaii at Hilo. His current research interests are comparative plantation labor systems and patterns of worker resistance.

**Betty Buck** is a Research Associate in the Institute of Culture and Communication at the East-West Center, where she has conducted cross-cultural research on television and sex-role values. She is also a doctoral candidate in the University of Hawaii Political Science Department. Her current research interests include cultural policies in developing countries, and the sociology and politics of culture and cultural change.

**Bob Cahill** is a professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. He teaches courses on the politics of Hawaii, and on religion and politics.

**Joyce Chinen** is a doctoral candidate in Sociology at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She is writing her dissertation on women in the garment industry in Hawaii. She teaches sociology courses at Honolulu and Leeward Community Colleges.

**Noel J. Kent** has been interested in the political-economy of Hawaii for several years. From this interest has flowed a number of academic papers, magazine articles, a doctoral dissertation and a book (which is reviewed in this issue of *Social Process in Hawaii*). His other academic interests are dilemmas in American civilization, nuclear war, and American-Soviet relations. He is currently writing a biography of the American industrialist, Henry J. Kaiser.

**Ian Y. Lind** is the executive director of Common Cause in Hawaii. He is currently working on a larger political history of the military in Hawaii, and is involved in an ongoing study of the link between the tourist industry and the incidence of crime in Hawaii.
The tragic maturing of Hawaii's economy

Robert H. Stauffer

The removal of a large share of the affected countries' previously accumulated and currently generated surplus [capital can] not but cause a serious setback to their primary accumulation of capital (Baran 1968:143).

This article explores the current status of Hawaii's balance of trade and investment with the mainland U.S. and the rest of the world. It goes on to discuss the effect of these investment patterns on the islands' business classes and local government. The impact of Hawaii's maturing economy on its people is then addressed. This article argues that we must distinguish between growth for outside capital and true economic development which benefits all sectors of Hawaii's population. Growth for outside capital can occur independently, and sometimes to the detriment, of true local development.

Current balance of trade

When looking at the modern era in Hawaii's economy, it is noteworthy that a primary device used to drum up public support for Hawaii's statehood was the old saw "taxation without representation." That is, Hawaii's residents sent taxes to Washington before 1959 but could not elect voting members to Congress to decide what share of that money would come back to the islands. The implication was that the islands' residents would get a fairer share of federal tax monies if they became a state and opened their shores up that much more to American investors.

What is not mentioned in the record of the struggle for statehood is that in 1958, for every $1.00 sent to Washington as federal government payments, Hawaii received $2.39 in government services, while in 1980 island residents received only $1.96 for every dollar sent to Washington (Department of Planning and Economic Development 1982a:162-3,172-3). Other figures show that while Hawaii had a positive net balance of trade in 1958 of $129.7 million (in 1980 dollars), by 1980 the corresponding figure was a negative $529.7 million.

The islands as a whole exported $100 million for every $144 million imported in 1958, creating a preliminary, negative balance in the current account of $497.6 million. (See the appendix example for an introduction to these types of balance of trade figures.) Hawaii did not need to draw on its reserves, borrow money, or sell off its assets to balance its trade (the standard solutions discussed in the appendix). Instead, it received economic "aid" in the form of the above-mentioned federal subsidies. These federal subsidies funneled to the islands were so substantial in 1958 that Hawaii had a final positive balance of trade of
$129.7 million. Once the Washington subsidies were included, for every $1.00 of goods and services exported, imports were kept under 93 cents.

The current account was, therefore, balanced and the economy appeared healthy. But, as the economy matured, things changed. By 1980, the preliminary balance of trade ratio — not counting federal subsidies — was only slightly improved: $1.41 in imports (c.f. $1.44 in 1958) for every $1.00 exported. But because of the growth of the economy, the size of the negative balance of trade was over two billion dollars, and there was no equivalent growth in federal subsidies to balance the current account.

As will be shown in this article, the expansion of the economy since statehood is closely tied to the sale of local productive assets to non-residents and the creation of new assets under non-resident ownership. One result of this has been that the preliminary negative balance of trade has grown to 18.3% of the Gross State Product (GSP) versus only 13.8% in 1958. Put another way, as the economy grew, so did both the real and the relative size of the slice of the current account owned by overseas investors (Heller & Heller, 1973).

The current account figures provide an indirect method of tracing the proportion of overseas-owned productive assets in Hawaii. Published by the State of Hawaii’s Department of Planning and Economic Development (DPED, 1982a), these figures show the trade of goods and services between Hawaii and overseas locations, including the U.S. mainland. The figures include the payment by Hawaii of interest on loans and the payment of profits on Hawaii’s assets which are owned by overseas investors. The figures show an increasing amount of fees and profits has been exported since 1959, reflecting the declining local ownership of Hawaii’s productive assets.

By 1980, the federal subsidies — relatively smaller since island residents gained representation for their taxation — could not stem the flow of local funds lost to non-residents. Instead of the positive net $129.7 million balance of accounts posted in 1958, the total balance for 1980 was negative, and over one-half billion dollars. In effect, for every $1.00 of goods exported in 1980, instead of a net 93 cents in imports as in 1958, there was now $1.08. This represents a relative decline in Hawaii’s balance of its external accounts of over 16% since 1958 (DPED 1982a:20-1,26-7,172-3).

This negative external balance is not just a matter of losing previously accumulated as well as currently generated surplus. It can be argued that this loss means a decline in the local economy and a loss of jobs because the rate of re-investment of profits in Hawaii may not be as high as it might be if profits remained here. It can be further argued that this loss leads to a general decline in average per capita disposable income and wages with its corresponding drop in living standards.

Another implication of the depletion of Hawaii’s locally-owned capi-

tal stock is a deepening dependence on outside sources for investment capital, leading to further debt. This, in turn, only leads to higher levels of current account loss as the profits and fees exported to non-residents ($1.4 billion in 1980 alone) continue to rise. Indeed it can be argued that these supplies of non-resident capital could have been, until only recently, Hawaii’s own.4

Beyond these arguments, however, it remains the case that the $529.7 million negative external balance in 1980 — to use the words of the State’s economists — “conceptually indicates a claim held by non-residents on future production by Hawaii” (DPED 1982a:171). The net result of the maturing of the Hawaiian economy is that local residents are, in effect, involuntarily or unknowingly mortgaging their future surplus labor to satisfy current costs and to cover profits sent to non-residents.

In summary, Hawaii has a net external investment account which is negative (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Annual Net External Investments Owed to (or by) Non-Residents in Millions of Current Dollars: 1958-1980 (DPED 1982a:172-3).](image)

It has a negative balance of trade equal annually to nearly a fifth of its Gross State Product (see Figure 2). It has a growing amount of exported funds, in the forms of profits and fees paid to non-residents, equal to one-eighth of its annual Gross State Product (see Figure 3). And it has a general evacuation of its remaining major locally controlled enterprises and reserves of capital (DPED 1982a:172-3). Judging by recent trends, it seems likely that this decline in the status of local capital
stock and Hawaii’s general standard of living will continue unless economic policies are changed.

The BUSINESS SECTOR

The maturing of Hawaii’s economy, at least since 1958, has produced changes in the relative size of the slices of the economic pie (GSP). There has been a 4.1% decline in the share of GSP going to labor (see Figure 4).  

and a substantial 38.3% cut to the “small business class” share (see Figure 5). Note the general decline in the small-business class’ share of the economy during the first third of the 1958-80 period. This was followed by a further decline of 25.1% during the second third, and another decline of 17.6% during the most recent period, making a total drop of 38.3%, clearly leaving the small business class the hardest hit since statehood.

During the first third of the 1958-80 period, the big business class’ share of the economy’s income actually declined slightly, followed by another small (under 1%) decline in the second third. During the most recent period, however, the big business class’ slice increased in size 34.1%, for a total gain of 33.4% (see Figure 6).

The general flow of investment into Hawaii in recent times has coincided with three distinct changes relating to big business. First, the relative decline in the role of the local resident big business class as compared with the non-resident big business class. Second, the reduced
that expansion is small compared with the amount of capital exported overseas to Hawaii's true present big business class — the primarily non-resident owners of Hawaii’s productive assets. These are individual investors and corporations based on the U.S. mainland and in Japan, S.E. Asia, the Middle East and other overseas locations.

Hawaii’s local big businesses are also on a relative decline. Of the six large companies which formerly made up Hawaii’s main corporate structure, three have been sold outright to outside interests. The stock of the remaining three is increasingly held by outsiders, and the present areas of investment of these companies are away from the islands, and the remaining company — Alexander & Baldwin — has large corporate offices outside of Hawaii.

Table 1 shows the proportion of locally owned stock in major Hawaii corporations as of December 31, 1982. In the spring of 1983 Dillingham Corporation converted to a closely-held private corporation primarily owned by non-residents and no longer trades its stock openly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Shares held in Hawaii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander and Baldwin, Inc.</td>
<td>3,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anfac, Inc.</td>
<td>2,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancorp Hawaii, Inc.</td>
<td>2,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(owner of Bank of Hawaii)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle and Cooke, Inc.</td>
<td>2,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Brewer &amp; Co., Inc.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillingham Corp.</td>
<td>4,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Hawaiian, Inc.</td>
<td>2,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(owner of First Hawaiian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc.</td>
<td>2,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian Telephone Co.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maui Land &amp; Pine Co., Inc.</td>
<td>1,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Resources, Inc.</td>
<td>7,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theo H. Davies &amp; Co., Inc.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the twelve major corporations listed in Table 1, only three are listed as having majority resident control. But even this figure is misleading. For example, in interviews with executives of the companies concerned, it was found that the 20% of Pacific Resources stock
held by Alexander and Baldwin is considered locally owned. But A & B is in turn primarily owned by non-residents. Over 28% of First Hawaiian’s stock considered “locally owned” is held by the Damon Estate and A & B. Damon’s beneficiaries, in turn, are primarily non-residents.

Maui Land and Pine, a relatively small firm concentrated on Maui which has been experiencing losses recently due to its unsuccessful diversification into the tourist industry, is the only one of the 12 firms truly locally owned (by two principal stockholding blocks).

What does this mean? Simply, that the economy had previously been organized in a local, hierarchical system with surplus flowing to the top. The top was made up of local residents who tended to keep the surplus capital at home through re-investment and through maintaining local ownership of local productive assets. But now that the top has been largely bought out, the surplus is increasingly exported to non-resident owners. The potential for local political or labor influence on this outside capital is naturally smaller than previously existed with local capital.

But that is only half of the picture. While being bought out, the old Big Six have also been humbled by a build-up of new productive assets through direct outside investment (much like the Honolulu-owned build-up of hotels on Kauai in the appendix example). This has resulted in a further increase in the amount of funds exported as fees and profits.

The exported fees and profits represent surplus no longer available for investment in the local economy. So large is this lost surplus that the $1.4 billion exported in fees and profits from Hawaii in 1980 could have paid all local sales taxes, corporate income taxes, individual income taxes and real estate taxes.

The money paid in fees and profits to non-residents represented 12.1% of the GSP. In effect, the first hour everyone worked every day of that year went into the creation of wealth which was then entirely paid to non-residents.

According to a Bank of Hawaii economist, the bulk of these payments to non-residents are bankwired out of Hawaii the evening after they are accumulated and deposited. These funds added up to $1,400 for every man, woman and child in the islands, so an average family of five was $7,000 in after-tax cash because of the fees and profits paid to non-residents. This outflow in the current account equaled $4 million daily or $2,500 every minute of every day.

The outflow of $1.4 billion in 1980 was not purely profits, to be sure. It was made up of three roughly equal types of payments to non-residents. One-third consisted of profits. Another third was payments for “fees.” Quite often, however, such fees are a form of transferring funds to a home office for services rendered and are a form of profit-transfer. The final third consisted of payments for things such as flights on non-locally owned airlines.

Obviously, the last group of payments and some of the second group are not all pure profits being exported. Yet, if these home offices and transportation companies had been locally-owned, the funds would have stayed in Hawaii and strengthened the local economy. Thirty years ago, most of the companies operating in Hawaii, including the Matson shipping company with its monopoly on Hawaiian - U.S. transport, were locally owned.

The exported fees and profits have increased in size by 296.1%, as adjusted for inflation, between 1958 and 1980 (DPED 1982a:26-7,172-3). This is a change from 1953, when instead of exporting profits there was an importing of net profits to local residents. Hawaii received $26 million income on its investments overseas that year, and only $23 million was returned overseas on investments in Hawaii. Since then exported profits have increased nearly 60 times over, and there has never been another year of net imports of profits (Schmitt 1977:555).

* * *

During the modern period when the Hawaiian economy has been undergoing its particular type of development, small business proprietorships have been particularly hard hit. In 1958, 86.3% of them made a profit. By the late 1970s this figure dropped to 65.8%, meaning that over a third of the proprietorships actually were losing money (Schmitt 1977:568-9; DPED 1982b:378). In the same period, small business’ share of the GSP steadily declined (see Figure 7).

During the first third of the 1958-80 period, the proportion of economic activity accounted for by small business declined somewhat. During the second third there was a further decline of 24.8%, and in the current period it fell another 38.8%, for a net decline to the small business class of 54.0% (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Ratio of Small to Big Business Incomes: 1958-1980 (DPED 1982a:20-1; 1983a:1).

(Numbers below 1.0 show the degree that the small business class’ income exceeds the big business class’ income)
These adverse trends for small business have not come about by acci-
dent or oversight. The government of the State of Hawaii has energeti-
cally worked toward a particular type of economic development. Total
business taxes as a percentage of government revenue fell by 13.9% be-
tween 1958 and 1980, while the percentage contributed by personal
taxes paid by residents has risen 36.9% (DPED 1982a:64-5). But the
government has not favored all business equally. Government policies
have actually increased local small business taxes, while providing rela-
tive reductions in total business taxes primarily to non-resident big
business owners and speculators.

As general business taxes have been proportionately cut, the tax
burden on local small business proprietors has actually increased due to
two major factors. First, big business can purchase away from Hawaii
their wholesale goods and services which go into their final products
sold in Hawaii. Such purchases are spared much of the weight of the
state’s wholesale business tax, as is the case for all transactions dealing
with local commerce consummated outside the state. Local small
business, not enjoying such a wide field of maneuver, must therefore
carry the full brunt of such taxes on purchases and sales. Secondly,
there has been a shift in the local business tax system towards regres-
see taxes, employer taxes, which hit small businesses the hardest
while completely exempting speculators.

As a result of these policies, labor-intensive small businesses which
purchase goods locally are penalized and driven out of the marketplace,
while capital-intensive big businesses which purchase goods outside
the state, or simply speculate locally, pay a much smaller percentage of
their incomes as tax.

While it is outside of the scope of this article, a preliminary analysis
of government policies regarding the taxation and subsidy of businesses
in Hawaii has uncovered the following rules:

(1) Rewards are given to businesses with dealings outside Hawaii,
    and penalties are given to those businesses making local purchases;
(2) Rewards go to investors and speculators, and penalties go to
    employers;
(3) Rewards are given to capital-intensive mechanization, and penali-
    ties to job-creating employers;
(4) Rewards flow to employers of part-time labor, and penalties go
to full-time employers; and
(5) Rewards are made to businesses which utilize labor not covered
    by social insurance programs (through various manipulations of labor
    laws) while penalties accrue to those employers who do give full social
    insurance program coverage to their labor force (Stauffer 1982).

Some writers suggest that the particular type of economic growth
seen in Hawaii should be labeled dependent development (e.g. Kent,
1983). This theory holds that with expanding Gross National or State

Products coinciding with declining real wages and a loss of local control
over local productive assets, local economies become dependent on
outside sources of capital for further economic growth. In 1950 for
example, Hawaii residents had $44 million more in investments outside
Hawaii than non-residents had in the islands. By 1971 this situation was
reversed and non-residents held $763 million more in investments in
the islands than vice versa (Schmitt 1977:557).

GOVERNMENT POLICY

The State of Hawaii receives a majority of its revenue from a unique
pyramid tax (similar to a Value Added Tax or VAT) that is not charged
directly to final retail buyers but rather is a tax of varying amounts
charged to all wholesale and retail sellers. A senior state tax official
has estimated that if the state’s VAT-type tax was converted to a
normal sales tax it would need to be raised from its current limit of 4%
up to 11% or more to generate the current level of revenue. While the
tax appears low (0.5% to 4%), Hawaii actually has the de facto highest
sales tax equivalent (a regressive form of taxation) in the country.

Primarily because county government does not pay for public educa-
tion in Hawaii, the county real estate taxes charged to landowners are
some of the lowest in the nation.

Total state tax collections for 1980 were $1.1 billion, including state
VAT, income and corporate taxes. Total tax collections for the counties
were $0.2 billion, for a total of just under $1.3 billion. If exported fees
and profits to non-residents ($1.4 billion) went towards government
services, all local taxes could have been abolished in 1980, and there
still would have been a surplus for the year of over $90 million to spend
on further public purposes (Chamber of Commerce 1983:4).

Local public debt has increased from $214.4 million in 1958 to
$925.5 million in 1971 to $2,359.5 million in 1982 (DPED 1983b:267;
Schmitt 1977:649). Local governments have primarily kept their credit
alive through their protective relationship with the federal government.
Without such easily acquired credit, a very real fiscal crisis might have already arisen.

It is a common misconception that local government has impropor-
tionally expanded in relation to the GSP since 1958. In actuality, local
government has simply maintained its position relative to the GSP.
However, who is paying for local government has changed.

The wealthy have seen the percentage of government revenues con-
tributed by local inheritance taxes fall by 17.5% between 1958 and
1980. Corporate income taxes have fallen a relative 23.3%. Personal
income taxes — the bulk of which is paid by average-income people —
have risen 28.2%. Non-taxes, like car registration fees, which are the
most regressive form of local government revenue because they hit the
common citizen the hardest, have risen 90.3% (DPED 1982a:66-7).

Federal government actions in Hawaii have followed a similar pattern
over the past two and a half decades. While the size of the federal involvement in Hawaii has remained about the same (or shown a slight decrease) in relation to Hawaii's GSP, federal taxes have shifted away from the big business class to the citizenry.

In an effort to make up the loss in revenue no longer collected from the rich, residents have seen government, especially since 1980, raising social security, gasoline and other regressive tax and non-tax revenue programs aimed at the general public. Where these new taxes have not been sufficient, public debt has been expanded which in turn increases the amount of government expenditures paid to the debt service account (i.e. payments to primarily wealthy non-resident investors in the public debt).

In the current State biennium budget (1983-85), for example, the poor's primary welfare program costs $91 million, or $45 per resident annually in taxes, while the debt servicing program costs roughly $300 million, or $148 per resident. The welfare program is actually shrinking as its 4.5% annual growth rate is less than the rate of inflation. Meanwhile, the debt servicing program, already over three times larger, is expanding with a 10% annual growth rate (Tax Foundation of Hawaii, 1983:4-5).

While local government has remained about the same size in proportion to the GSP, who pays its taxes and who gets its benefits has changed. As a whole, it would appear that the rich, and primarily the non-resident big business class, have benefited in both cases.

## WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS

If local big and small businesses have been hurt, the effects of the maturing Hawaiian economy have been felt most acutely by the average residents of the islands who work for a salary or wage. Between 1970 and 1982 the average annual wage and salary payments per worker in Hawaii declined in real terms by 22.3% (see Table 2).

One common response to these statistics is that at least Hawaii has a relatively low rate of unemployment. But so did the antebellum (pre-Civil War) American South. Jobs, per se, should never be the focus of discussion. Jobs, adequate to support a family, should be (see Table 4). Furthermore, Hawaii's level of disguised unemployment and under-employment may also be substantial. Women, while historically a major part of Hawaii's work force, may well be feeling the brunt of these factors, together with certain ethnic groups (Chinen, 1984).

Another common response to these statistics was voiced by an economist who suggested that the real wage declines shown in Table 2 should be understood in the context of similar trends in the U.S. as a whole. Hawaii's decline in wages, however, has been notably worse than the U.S. as a whole, as will be discussed later in this article.


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>9,752</td>
<td>9,480</td>
<td>8,732</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>8,759</td>
<td>6,367</td>
<td>6,478</td>
<td>-26.0</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>8,726</td>
<td>6,658</td>
<td>6,645</td>
<td>-23.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>6,849</td>
<td>5,694</td>
<td>5,339</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,424</td>
<td>6,075</td>
<td>5,768</td>
<td>-22.3</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Workers</td>
<td>87,424</td>
<td>14,471</td>
<td>15,367</td>
<td>107.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index (1970=100)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>194.9</td>
<td>207.0</td>
<td>107.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Budget</td>
<td>127,776</td>
<td>31,893</td>
<td>34,032</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index (1970=100)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>249.6</td>
<td>266.4</td>
<td>107.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* "Family Budget" is the intermediate budget for an urban family of four persons on Oahu, as estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. It includes consumption, gifts and contributions, social security, disability payments and personal income taxes.

While wages have dropped in real terms in Hawaii, they have nevertheless shown increases in current-dollar terms. The current cost of living, however, rose during this period at a rate 55.5% faster than the rise in wages (see Table 3). For every dollar in pay raises between 1970 and 1982, the cost of living rose $1.56.
While this is startling enough, the fact is that wages are continuing to fall behind the cost of supporting a family at an accelerating rate (DPED 1982b:290, 1983b:322,372).

In 1970, two average salaries in Hawaii produced $14,848 while an average family budget was $12,776, permitting all the bills to be paid by two working parents, with 16% of the family’s income left over. By 1982, this positive balance was replaced with a shortfall of 10% (DPED 1982b:290, 1983b:322,372).

The average local wage in 1982 was $15,367 with a moderate family of four’s budget estimated at $34,032. The recent development of declining real wages means that both spouses working average full-time jobs cannot even provide a moderate standard of living for their family. This fact has long been true for workers in the high profitable (i.e., high surplus producing) hotel industry, where an average wage of $11,004 in 1982 meant two spouses holding down three full-time jobs still could not make ends meet for a moderate standard of living (see Table 4). Apologists for the figures shown in Table 4 argue that the low rate of pay for retail and hotel jobs should be understood within the context that a greater proportion of part-timers, students, etc., are employed in those industries as opposed to career-oriented workers. (Indeed, most workers in the hotel and service industries are part-time. This means that the part-time salaries actually received by hotel and retail workers are actually below the already low figures shown in Table 4. As such, the 3.6 or 3.1 jobs needed by parents in these industries to support their families may be underestimates.)

But the scarcity of even moderate-paying jobs and the expansion of job opportunities primarily in the retail and hotel industries (and at the above-noted wage levels) does not bring welcome news to the serious career-oriented adult facing today’s job market in Hawaii. In any event, it is a fact of life that it now takes 2.2 full-time, average-paying jobs in Hawaii to support a family of four, whereas in 1970 it took only 1.7 (DPED 1982b:290, 1983b:322,372).

Table 5: 1981 Honolulu Annual Wages and Salaries as Compared with Average Wages in Seven Similar Western U.S. Metropolitan Areas (Stanford Research Institute 1982:A-21).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Average Annual Wage</th>
<th>Percentage Below West Coast Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>$12,480</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typists</td>
<td>10,920</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting Clerks</td>
<td>9,672</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Punch Operators</td>
<td>11,648</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Operators</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Programmers</td>
<td>18,928</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Systems Analysts</td>
<td>24,752</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics Technicians</td>
<td>17,992</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Mechanics</td>
<td>21,525</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Drivers</td>
<td>18,512</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shippers and Receivers</td>
<td>13,490</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehousemen</td>
<td>16,370</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forklift Operators</td>
<td>13,288</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitors, Porters &amp; Cleaners</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Engineering B.S. Grad</td>
<td>18,008</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The seven Western cities are: Phoenix, Arizona; San Diego, San Jose and Sacramento, California; Vancouver and Seattle/Everett, Washington; and Portland, Oregon.

For many years, it was thought that high wages locally balanced off Hawaii’s cost of living. “At least wages are higher here,” was a common comment. It is surprising, therefore, to find that despite a cost of living 32% above the mainland, the average wages and salaries paid in Hawaii are not simply declining but are already largely behind those paid in other states, particularly in the western U.S. In Table 5, for
example, not a single Honolulu job classification makes more than the average in comparison cities. Honolulu is now the most expensive U.S. city to live in, having overtaken even Anchorage, Alaska (Star-Bulletin, 4/19/82:A5).

The decrease in wages and salaries shown in Table 4, in relation to this rising cost of living in the last decade, means that if a family earned $15,000 to pay its bills in 1970, those same bills would cost $39,960 in 1982. However, that family’s earnings from doing the same amount of work would have risen to only $31,050, for a shortfall of $8,910, resulting in a decline in their standard of living.

Put yet another way, in 1970 two wage-earners with average incomes could pay all the costs of a moderate standard of living with a $5,445 (1982 dollars) surplus. In 1982 the same family would have a shortfall of $3,298. This adds up to a total decline of $8,743, which is a drop in income of over 22%. Such a decline places the bulk of families in Hawaii now below even a moderate standard of living (DPED 1982b:290, 1983b:322,372; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1981:404,471).

Robert Schmitt, the state’s chief statistician, recently commented on the comparison of the local standard of living with that of the mainland:

Inflation has climbed at a faster rate in Hawaii in the last decade than it did on the Mainland... For that same period, from 1970 to 1980, Hawaii’s rate of growth in per capita income was the lowest in the nation.... Hawaii’s cost-of-living rose from about 20 percent above the national average for a four-person family in 1970 to 32 percent in 1980.

At the same time Hawaii’s per capita income, which was 18 percent above the national average, had shrunk to 3 percent above the national average....

Our cost-of-living has increased more rapidly than the Mainland and at the same time we ranked lowest among the 50 states and the District of Columbia in percent of increase [of] per capita [income]. So we’re losing ground rapidly. Sad isn’t it? (Star-Bulletin, 5/12/81:6).

Put another way, in 1970, wages in Hawaii were 2% below mainland wages, as adjusted for the cost of living. In 1980 however, local wages were 29% below those on the mainland on average — a relative drop of 27%. This decline was on top of a fall in mainland workers’ real earnings of over 12.9% between 1973 and 1980 (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1981:404).

In 1979 11.5% of the total state income was paid out in profits and fees to non-residents. At home, the poorest 43.3% of resident adults in Hawaii individually received adjusted gross incomes of under $10,000 and altogether received just 15.0% of total adjusted gross state income. This total was roughly equal to the income of the wealthiest 3.1% of resident adults that year, who individually had adjusted gross incomes of over $50,000 and together received 13.7% of the total adjusted state gross income. So at least some residents were profiting from the maturing local economy. Four residents had adjusted annual gross incomes of over $500,000 in the year 1970; there were 50 in 1979 (DPED 1982b:14, 37, 239-40).

While unashamedly controversial, it is my conclusion from the above data that, with the exception of the decimation of the native population during the 18th and 19th centuries (caused primarily by the introduction of biological agents), never before in the history of Hawaii has the standard of living of the average citizen declined to such a degree and in such a relatively short time as statistics show for the 1970-1982 period.

SUMMARY

Before 1982, the Economics Division of the Bank of Hawaii provided a gauge of the local economy through their “Index of Business Activity.” This was a composite index of eight business indicators which were adjusted for inflation and graphed back to 1960.

The index was discontinued in April 1982 and did not go out on a note of optimism. It showed slowed growth during the recessions of 1966, ’70, ’74 and ’80. The best period of sustained growth was in the 60s (peaking around 1969 with an average sustained growth rate of 14.3%). This represents the benefits of outside investment. But after that high point came an accelerated slowdown in the 70s — verified by other economic figures discussed in this article — as the economy experienced the liabilities of outside ownership. Between 1980 and 1982, the index actually decreased at an average annual rate of 3.0%.

The 1980-82 average decline was the only negative showing in the index’s history, and the decline had begun to accelerate. The last annual rate available from the bank was a 5.6% decline in 1981-82, and the final monthly figure, extrapolated at an annual rate, showed a decline of 7.2%. The bank’s concluding statement on the index was that it, “continued its downward course and remained below the previous month’s figure for the thirteenth consecutive month” (Bank of Hawaii 1982:4).

It was noted earlier that expanded outside trade has produced an overall negative effect upon Hawaii. This is largely because increasing that trade volume expands the islands’ deficit and so leads to a sell-off of local capital reserves or productive assets in an effort to balance the trade deficit. A second factor arguing against expanded trade is that, at least since the time of statehood, Hawaiian exports have consistently fallen behind inflation in value, while imports have consistently risen in value ahead of inflation. As such, Hawaii faces outside trade with the deck stacked against it because the price of exports and imports are not
set locally and can be — and have been — set against Hawaii’s best interests.\footnote{3}

It is my opinion that a further study of economic data will show the following tendencies to especially occur in Hawaii during external trade-related recessions:

1. The big business class’ share of the GSP spurs forward;
2. The local labor class’ share of the GSP declines;
3. Hawaii’s negative balance of trade increases;
4. The islands’ negative net external investment (i.e., IOU) account owed to non-residents gets worse; and
5. There is greater demand for more outside investment.

Two facts are plain from all of the above data. First, the economic facts of life for the average citizen of Hawaii are bad. Second, the policies behind Hawaii’s peculiar form of open-door economic development and expanded trade over at least the past two and a half decades are today worthy of critical review and debate.

It is non-resident big businesses, their owners, and associated speculators who have benefitted since 1959 from the maturing of Hawaii’s economy, as have a small portion of the local populace allied with that economic class. The vast majority of Hawaii’s people, on the other hand, have seen a deterioration in their living standards in recent years and the data examined in this article points toward a continual and perhaps accelerated deterioration of living standards unless local policies are changed.

CONCLUSIONS

The criteria which have been used to characterize [Hawaii] as an example of successful development are increasingly recognized as being insufficient. GSP growth is not enough. It also becomes clear that the political and social implications of having adopted an [economic] strategy such as [Hawaii’s] are, indeed, rather negative (Villalobos 1979:242).

The facts of modern Hawaiian development are plain. Growth has occurred. The size of the GSP has expanded as has the level of local business activity (especially involving those businesses representing non-resident capital investment). State figures (DPED 1982a:20-21) indicate that the GSP increased about nine-fold between 1958 and 1980 in current dollars, or three times in constant dollars. The Bank of Hawaii’s economic index also shows this tripling of the economy in real terms since statehood.

Such growth, through an open-door policy towards outside investment, serves as an objective example of the results of trickle-down, supply-side economic policy. Despite the economy tripling in size, average real wages are falling. In effect, only the economic squeeze has “trickled down,” while the expanded economy has led to a general upward redistribution of wealth.

We have seen how the maturing of the Hawaiian economy has widened this gap between the rich and non-rich. Had the wealth created in Hawaii in 1980 been kept at home and equally divided, for example, the average family of four would have had an income of $49,332, over twice the $22,750 that average families received in actuality (DPED 1983b:339,347).

This would have been more than enough to set aside capital for reinvestment and still provide for a more than adequate standard of living. In short, it would also have ameliorated many current social problems concerning housing and other shortages. It would have helped ease the multitude of troubles stemming from the stress of inadequate incomes and the widening gap in the distribution of wealth.

But the results of local government policy to open up Hawaii’s economy to outside investment has caused more than a decline in wages. It has precipitated the rising supremacy of non-resident big businesses (sometimes referred to as trans-national corporations or TNCs). It has led to the takeover and break-up of the old local big business sector (the Big Six). It has led to the general decline of local small business. And it has squeezed the local wage and salary-earning class.

The time has come for a broad debate over an open-door economic policy which has manifestly failed. In the marketplace of competing social classes, it is time for change and a swing of the pendulum towards a fairer and more equitable distribution of the control of Hawaii’s productive assets and of the islands’ currently generated wealth.

APPENDIX

The types of numbers discussed in this article are difficult to work with, even for those familiar with them. Therefore, I have prepared a hypothetical example to illustrate the concepts involved, which is similar to the actual situation affecting Hawaii today.

Let us say that we are looking at Honolulu and Kauai a hundred years ago. Honolulu has a capital stock of $100 million and Kauai has one of $50 million.

What do we mean by capital stock? For an answer, let us go back in time to the landing of the first people at these two places. These humans found certain plants and animals available on the land and in the sea which, with a certain amount of exertion, could be taken and eaten. A value can be placed on that natural environment.

If humans had left this initial stock of capital in its purely natural form, that stock would remain at a constant level. But humans did not. After spending whatever number of hours per day needed to simply
feed themselves, they then invested additional, surplus, labor which created surplus stocks of capital. They created pathways and roads. Irrigation systems and agricultural and aquacultural complexes were built. Structures, instruments and equipment were made. These and other changes had effects on the capital stock, increasing it most of the time, perhaps decreasing it at others. The sum total of productive assets is the capital stock.

The changes in the capital stock can be viewed as part of a capital account in national income accounting terms. Additions to the capital stock represent a positive flow of accumulated surplus in the economy, or credit to the capital account. Decreases to the existing capital stock (through depreciation, destruction or trade) represent a debit to the capital account. Usually, capital stock will increase over time because most people will not work extra hours — invest their surplus labor — unless they receive some material benefit as a result. In this hypothetical example, the capital stock or accumulated surplus, rose to $100 million for Honolulu and $50 for Kauai.

For our purposes, let’s assume the capital stock of Honolulu and of Kauai are owned by the residents of those two places. If these early settlers did not practice monetized exchange of the products of labor, we might expect either hierarchical or communal control of the capital stock. If the humans had been money-oriented but economically democratic, we might expect a broad, decentralized pattern of ownership. If the humans had been oligarchic, we would see ownership of the capital stock in the hands of a relative few — a big business class.

In foreign trade terminology, the capital account shows the changes of capital stock in each locale, and the current account shows the trading going on between the two. Let’s say that Kauai and Honolulu’s economies are capitalistic and Kauai sells raw sugar and some other agricultural commodities to Honolulu for $10 million in one year. Honolulu in turn sells Kauai $10 million in processed goods and technical services. The result is an even balance of trade between the two places.

As long as this current account remains balanced, the only changes in the capital stock of the two places would be internal ones. Extra (surplus) labor might expand the capital base, raising the capital stock of one or the other. Ill-advised changes might just as well decrease it.

Now, let us say that Honolulu managed to sell $12 million in goods and services to Kauai in one year, while Kauai exports only $10 million to Honolulu. Trade between the two is now unbalanced, and Kauai has what is called a negative balance of trade. Kauai’s trade deficit creates an immediate debt to Honolulu which must somehow be paid off.

One solution to this deficit problem is to dip into Kauai’s capital stock reserves. It has, after all, amassed $50 million of capital over the years through surplus labor. Most of this capital stock is in the form of structures, equipment, etc. But some of it is just reserve money in the bank, and $2 million of this reserve money could be taken out and given to Honolulu to pay off the deficit.

Kauai has now given Honolulu $10 million in goods and $2 million in capital reserves, in exchange for $12 million in goods and services from Honolulu. Trade is now balanced. The only cost is that Kauai’s capital stock has been reduced from $50 million to $48 million.

Now let’s say that the following year trade is once again unbalanced, and Kauai owes Honolulu another $2 million. This time Honolulu offers to give a loan to Kauai. Things are balanced as far as trade goes, but Kauai now has a capital stock of $48 million in assets and a capital account debt of $2 million, for a net value of $46 million. The next year, trade is again in Honolulu’s favor with Kauai owing another $2 million. But now a new factor comes into play. It seems the loan from Honolulu had pretty stiff interest terms attached to it, and Kauai now must pay $1 million in interest for the year. To pay this total deficit off, Kauai sells Honolulu a $3 million hotel on Kauai. Kauai’s locally-owned capital stock is, therefore, reduced to $43 million.

The year after, through tight austerity measures, Kauai agrees to buy from Honolulu only $10 million worth of goods, for which it exports the same value of goods to balance its trade. But Honolulu still wants $1 million in interest for the year on its previous loan, and collects another $1 million in the surplus (profits) created by the hotel which it owns on Kauai. The result is that Kauai still owes $2 million to Honolulu for the year, and must sell off that much more of its capital stock.

Worse, some of the residents of Kauai are now starting down the road of putting in surplus labor to create surplus capital (profit at the hotel) that in no way benefits themselves or their local economy.

At this point Kauai’s leaders might decide to try and solve their economic problems through expanded investment and greater economi- growth. Honolulu capitalists are encouraged to invest $10 million to build new hotels on Kauai. This results in an increase in the capital stock, but Kauai has a $10 million debt to the Honolulu investors, plus future payments in the form of profits on the investment.

The size of Kauai’s economy has now expanded, but it is not owned by Kauai. The new hotels simply create further surplus (profits) which are taken by the overseas investors. It is possible that the money being borrowed by Kauai to balance its current account was previously Kauai reserve monies paid out to Honolulu. Honolulu investors are now beginning to collect interest and profits on loans and investments to Kauai made up of Kauai money being loaned back to Kauai.

Kauai, therefore, is becoming economically dependent on Honolulu as its control over its own capital-poor economy disappears through a steady drain of capital. But these negative trade figures result from, and point toward, the previous sell-off of ownership of the productive assets of Kauai.

This article explores the connection between negative trade figures and the sell-off of capital stock with regards to the current situation between Hawaii as a whole and its overseas trading partners.
NOTES

1. Roland Kotani, Franklin Odo, Sam Pooley and Robert B. Stauffer, all associated with the University of Hawaii at Manoa, are acknowledged for their editorial assistance on the article.

2. Some economists note, nevertheless, that $1.96 back on every dollar sent to the United States is still a good deal for Hawaii because it represents an inflow of purchasing power.

3. The federal subsidy funds referred to in the text are technically known as federal transfer payments and represent the gap between funds sent to Hawaii by the United States and those sent to the federal government by Hawaii.

4. Some economists suggest that this export of funds is justified because the original investment came from outside. I do not believe this to be the case, however. At the end of WW II, Hawaii owned more investments (and collected more funds on those investments) outside the islands than vice-versa. Relative to most colonial and semi-colonial areas of the world, Hawaii was at that time remarkably capital rich and under local autonomous economic control. While certain local political forces may have wished to humble local big business capitalists by bringing in outside capital, Hawaii did not need that capital to sustain its economic growth. The original investment which created the local economy was, at its foundation, local and not outside capital. Although outside capital may have assisted in the importing of machinery and other industrial equipment, the major assets in Hawaii’s development came from the expropriation of land from native Hawaiians; from revenues raised through Hawaii’s role in trade; and through the surplus produced by the labor of Hawaii’s people.

5. The State of Hawaii’s published and unpublished economic figures have been utilized in this article as they are the best available and have the longest track record. It should be noted that while they are the best available, many people question the credibility of these official statistics. One of the difficulties with the statistics is that they do not give any direct figures relating to economic classes in the islands. The state’s wages and salaries account, for example, includes remuneration paid to normal working people, and salaries of high corporate officials more properly considered part of the big business class. Corporate earnings include big company revenues as well as those of small businesses. A discussion with one of the state’s economists and access to some of their raw data has helped, but at best the three classes referred to in the text are rough approximations and the figures given are valuable primarily because they are constantly applied over the 1958-80 period. For the labor class statistics shown in Figure 4, the first third of the 1958-80 period showed a slight increase in its share of the GSP, and a further small (under 1%) gain during the second third. In the most recent period, however, labor’s share was down 4.8%, for an over-all drop of 4.1%.

6. This figure excludes the cost of imports.

7. Between 1958 and 1970, exported fees and profits, in real terms, increased by 140%. They increased another 65.0% in real terms between 1970 and 1980 for a net increase since statehood of a substantial 296.1%.


9. Revenue from (generally non-progressive) personal and (low) corporate income taxes is also collected by the state.

10. Recent government proposals to encourage high technology industries to locate in Hawaii do not promise much for the average worker either. Most of the workers in California’s Silicon Valley, for example, are non-unionized and are paid less than $5 an hour.

11. An example of thisproblem is the 1973 rise in oil prices and accompanying recession, which represented a quantum leap in non-resident big business class income from Hawaii, and exacerbated the State’s balance-of-trade problems (see DPED 1982a:171-182).

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RING OF STEEL:
NOTES ON THE MILITARIZATION OF HAWAII

Ian Y. Lind

Oahu is to be encircled with a ring of steel, with mortar batteries at Diamond Head, big guns at Waikiki and Pearl Harbor, and a series of redoubts from Koko Head around the island to Waianae.

General Macomb, U.S. Army
Commander, District of Hawaii
1911 (quoted in Addelman, 1946:9)

Every day is national defense day in Hawaii.

Governor Wallace Rider Farrington
1924

Over the last century, Hawaii has experienced a dramatic process of militarization. Beginning as a remote island outpost serving as a coaling station for naval vessels in transit to the Pacific Coast, Hawaii has been transformed into a modern garrison community serving dozens of military installations, including the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, the world’s largest military command.

From a contemporary perspective, the military presence seems pervasive. Defense is the state’s second largest industry, and the naval base at Pearl Harbor remains the state’s single largest employer. In 1980, there were 120,417 active duty military personnel and their dependents living in the islands, fully 12.5% of the total population. On the island of Oahu, where most of the military personnel are based, they are nearly 16% of the population (Department of Planning and Economic Development, 1983).

The military services also control over 259,000 acres of land, including public lands “set aside” by executive order for defense purposes, lands leased from the state and from private landowners, and lands owned in fee. Although two major land use reviews were conducted by the Defense Department during the 1970s (Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 1973, 1979), they resulted in no significant reduction in the total area under military control. The military’s total holdings make up 6.3% of the total land area of the islands, a larger percentage than in any other state in the nation.

There also appears to be a close and cooperative relationship between the military and the centers of political power in the civilian community. For example, the Army established a “Citizens Advisory Group” in 1956 to strengthen the Army’s presence in Hawaii. When a membership roster was published in 1980 (U.S. Army Western
Command, 1980), it read like a “Who’s Who” of island society, including more than eighty top corporate officers, union officials, the publishers of both daily newspapers, the Chief of Police, Superintendent of Education, University president, and many more.

This overwhelming military presence has prompted some analysts (Albertini et al., 1980:1) to describe Hawaii as, “the most densely militarized state in the nation.” Given the prominent role that the military has come to play in Hawaii, this characterization would appear to be accurate. Hawaii would certainly fit the definitions of militarism and militarization developed by contemporary analysts (Eide and Thee, 1980), which stress both the prominent role of military institutions and the weight of military values and outlooks in society.

A traditional analysis of the militarization of Hawaii would place primary emphasis on the context provided by national and international events, explaining the dynamics of island history as simply an epiphenomenon of global forces. Such an approach has obvious intellectual merit and should not be ignored. However, such global perspectives are also inherently anti-political. Persons living, working, and attempting to sustain political activity in Hawaii, or in any other specific location, will search in vain through discourses on international politics or military strategy for elements capable of informing actual political behavior. By their very terms of analysis, such approaches overemphasize our role as victims of complex global forces and underestimate our potential as political actors (see Lind, 1977; 1981).

This brief essay examines the militarization of Hawaii from a different, perhaps more intimate, perspective. Moving closer to the actual dynamics of militarism, it concentrates on civil-military relations in Hawaii, and begins to suggest the outline of a political theory — that is, one capable of sustaining politics in action. The local focus does not imply a willingness to simply dismiss the import of events external to the islands, but rather to dramatically emphasize the view that all such events are necessarily mediated by the reactions and feelings of the people involved. In this view, for example, the obvious fact that American strategy in the Pacific led to an expanded military presence in Hawaii is simply not as important as whether this was welcomed or resented, accepted or resisted; for it is in these reactions that one can identify the seeds of political change.

This essay is an initial attempt to demonstrate the value of such an approach, and suggests two major conclusions. First, militarization cannot be adequately understood simply as a matter of military policy. Instead, as Regehr (1980:132) suggests, “the origins of militarism may lie instead in the civilian population, the economy and the governments.” In his view, military institutions may be used — even misused and exploited — by civilians. This would appear to have been the case in Hawaii, where the military was a factor — sometimes a wildcard — in the struggle for economic and political power. Militarism developed, in part, because of common interests between the military and certain segments of the civilian community.

Further, this analysis suggests that despite surface appearances, militarism is inherently unstable. A review of the militarization of Hawaii reveals numerous structural sources of tension between the military and civilian sectors which have persisted over time and which do not appear capable of ultimate resolution. While the military seems to have achieved a position of hegemony in island affairs, the reality is quite different. Beneath surface appearances, the process of militarization is less than complete, more of a show — an ostentatious display, than a fundamental reality. Civil-military alliances have changed over time, reflecting transitory conflicts, as well as changes in economic relations within the islands. The presence of such conflicts suggests, in turn, potential sources of social change which might ultimately lead to reductions in the power and influence of the military.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that the military has had a major impact on the development of Hawaii during the twentieth century, its effects have remained largely unseen. There is little attention paid to the military or to civil-military relations in popular accounts of Hawaii’s history. While both Fuchs (1961) and Daws (1968) include passing references to the role of the military, neither rate such matters important enough to deserve a chapter, and neither the Army nor the Navy even appear in Daws’ index. Recent events, such as the post-1976 opposition to continued military training on the island of Kahoolawe, have begun to develop a literature of their own, both official and popular, but earlier events, those which account for the roots of militarism in Hawaii, remain obscure. Accordingly, in the pages which follow, events occurring prior to World War II are treated in somewhat more detail than those of more recent vintage. Neither treatment manages to be more than suggestive, however, and a full account of Hawaii’s military history remains to be written.

THE ROOTS OF MILITARISM

The early development of military institutions in Hawaii was prompted by the desire to protect and extend American trade in the Pacific. Although a certain amount of interest in Hawaii’s potential as a military outpost had been expressed by Navy officers in the mid-nineteenth century, the small size and limited capabilities of the American Navy prior to the Civil War prevented serious plans from emerging (Albion, 1980). The active pressure for an increased military presence appears to have emerged from the civilian sector. Stevens (1945) observes that U.S. diplomats in Hawaii began to view the islands as a vital outpost for the defense of trade routes to Asia in the late 1860s. American sugar planters in Hawaii quickly attempted to take advantage of this renewed interest by linking it to the stalled talks over sugar tariffs. The Chamber
of Commerce, in an 1873 letter signed by Charles Bishop, formally proposed that Pearl Harbor be ceded to the United States in partial exchange for dropping of tariffs on Hawaiian sugar entering the U.S. market. There was considerable opposition to the proposal from native Hawaiians, and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 guaranteed only that no other country would be allowed to control any island harbor. However, when the treaty was renewed in 1887, it contained language explicitly granting the U.S. sole access to the military potentials of Pearl Harbor.

The years following annexation in 1898 were a period of great military expansion. The construction of the naval base at Pearl Harbor was underway, and other bases to provide for defense of the harbor were also being developed. Many of today’s island landmarks — Fort Shafter, Fort DeRussey, Fort Ruger, Schofield Barracks — were established in the years prior to World War I. During this period, the local business community exerted considerable political pressure in support of an increased military presence in the islands. In 1905, both the Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants Association of Honolulu urged Congress to provide additional funds for military development. The Chamber urged that $150,000 be appropriated for “additional fortifications” at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. The Merchants organization called for “an increase in the number of men to be stationed here”, and described the military needs as among “the most pressing requirements of the mercantile community” (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1905).

An important factor in the enthusiasm of the business community for an increased military presence was the expectation that Pearl Harbor would be available for commercial as well as military use. Just as the Navy had maintained facilities at Honolulu Harbor without displacing private shipping, it was clearly expected that Pearl Harbor would be available for civilian shipping once dredging and other improvements were completed. In July 1910, a representative of H. Hackfield & Company asked whether Pearl Harbor was prepared to accommodate ships of the American-Hawaiian and Matson lines. Rear-Admiral Rees (1910), commandant of the Naval Station, wrote in reply: “I have the honor to state as follows...it is believed that it will be the Government’s policy to maintain the Entrance Channel at Pearl Harbor open to commercial traffic in time of peace.” Rees then suggested that company representatives confer with the Navy’s civil engineers to determine whether the length, draft, and turning radius of their ships would allow them to maneuver in the newly dredged channel.

Following these consultations, the civil engineer (1910) updated the commandant on matters that were discussed.

...as the deepening and straightening of the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor progresses, commercial interests are considering the building of wharves at various points along the shores of Pearl Harbor and of its islands with a view to making shipments of freight by sea direct. In this connection it is recommended that the building of wharves of length more than 200 or 300 feet be restricted to the shores of the three lochs, and that in the channel and narrows no wharf be permitted to extend beyond the curve of 25 feet depth. The entrance channel must of course be kept unobstructed, and in addition it is believed to be imperative, in the interest of the Navy Department, that the full width of channel around Ford (or Mokuume) Island be retained... There is little doubt that commercial interests will soon take steps in the matter of building wharves, as the channel is entirely practicable; and it is therefore urged that the Navy Department take immediate action looking toward the preservation of such channels as are required for the proper handling of its vessels in these waters.

The tantalizing prospect of major commercial shipping facilities located much closer to the sugar plantations of leeward Oahu than Honolulu Harbor must have been a major incentive for close civil-military cooperation in the years prior to World War I.

The vast expenditures on the development of Pearl Harbor, and the establishment of additional military bases designed to defend the harbor, also provided a lucrative area of operations for aggressive local businesses. For example, the Dillingham family business interests shared in the more than $50,000,000 spent developing Pearl Harbor (Dillingham, 1928), and even maintained their own lobbyist in Washington to seek out other government contracts.

Another common ground shared by the military and Hawaii’s haole community was a general fear of the growing influence of the Japanese in island affairs. Even before annexation, a prominent military strategist, A.T. Mahan (1898), publicly cautioned that Hawaii might fall under Japanese domination “if we do not hold the islands ourselves...” Similarly, those involved in management of the sugar plantations feared both the growing power of Japanese-led labor organizations and the potential political power of the Japanese community.

A secret report prepared by military intelligence officials in Honolulu in 1920 seemed to express many of the common fears. The report pointed to “the Japanese problem,” which, it stated, “is in its finality a racial problem which will not go down.” Prepared by Lt. Col. George M. Brooke, Assistant Chief of Staff, the report paints a grim picture of racial conflict:

...No one without thorough study of and contact with the Japanese problem here can form a true estimate of its seriousness. The Japanese community here which is half the population, is a practically impervious and self-sustaining body. Its tentacles, in the form of economic agencies such as workers, servants, contractors, etc., penetrate every phase of American life in this territory from government bureaus to the homes of very poor people. The Japanese are employed on military reservations,
construct the barracks and other buildings, conduct stores close to the reservations, and are not only brought in close contact with our military establishment, but the army is dependent upon them for the accomplishment of necessary work.... There are signs that point to an irrepressible conflict due to diametricaly opposed ideals. In truth, America may be said to be the standard bearer of the occident and of the white race... (Brooke, 1920:24,26).

In December, 1920, the Federal Bureau of Investigation dispatched an undercover agent to Hawaii to investigate the Japanese community and to coordinate surveillance by the bureau and local military authorities. In a confidential report on his mission, the agent noted that the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) maintained a network of Japanese and Filipino informants (Hopkins, 1921). The agent was able to arrange for the HSPA to enlarge the scope of its intelligence operations to include Japanese activities of a military, political, economic, and "radical" nature, and for copies of all HSPA intelligence reports to be shared with the FBI and the local military command.

In testimony before a congressional committee the following year, Royal Mead, a Washington-based lobbyist for the HSPA, underscored the racial overtones of this particular alliance:

...I believe that the great majority of the plantation owners in Hawaii would rather see their fields dried up and turned into absolutely arid areas than to have that country turned over to the Japanese, either through their purchase of the lands or otherwise. That is what I think of the white people of Hawaii. You must remember that the holdings of the stock of the plantations in Hawaii are by people who are Americans or those who are white American citizens, and that they are living there. They have their homes there, and they propose to have that country a white American country (U.S. House of Representatives, 1921).

When asked how it would be possible to keep the Japanese from gaining political power in the islands, Mead suggested "[a] commission form of government, the commission being composed largely of military or naval men."

In less than a quarter of a century, the military had become an integral part of Hawaii. A major naval base had been established at Pearl Harbor, and facilities to defend the port stretched from Fort Ruger, on the slopes of Diamond Head, to Schofield Barracks on Oahu's central plain. The military shared with some of their more influential civilian counterparts a fear of Hawaii's ethnically diverse population, and this common interest formed one important basis for civil-military cooperation. When Governor Wallace Rider Farrington announced in 1924 that "every day is national defense day in Hawaii", he was probably guilty of only minimal exaggeration.

**SOURCES OF CONFLICT: LAND**

In this early period, as well as in years to come, the militarization of Hawaii created its own sources of tension and conflict. These centered in two major areas: competition for resources, with land being the most important; and competition for political power and control.

By 1900, the military had taken control of 16,500 acres, a figure which reached over 22,000 acres in 1920 (Schmitt, 1977:Table 12.6). Conflicts emerged almost immediately. In December 1907, the Governor of Hawaii wrote to the Secretary of War requesting that a 14,400 acre area in central Oahu be returned to the Territory (Addelman, 1946). The land had originally been set aside as a rest and recuperation center for soldiers returning from service in the Philippines during and after the Spanish-American War. However, the Governor pointed out that the land was not in fact used for the stated purpose: "experience seems to show that it can not be, or is not likely to be put to such use. Soldiers who have served in the Philippines return directly to the mainland." On the other hand, the Territory desired to utilize the land for homesteading. "There probably is no tract in the Territory more suitable for this purpose in soil, climate, and transportation and marketing facilities than the tract in question," the Governor argued (Addelman, 1946:5). Despite this pressure from the Territorial government, however, the land stayed in military hands and, in April 1909, a new Army post on the site was named Schofield Barracks in honor of Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield (Vandergrift, 1938).

Most of the major expansions of military control over land in Hawaii met with strong opposition as both private citizens and the Territorial government sought to assert local use and control of the islands' vital resources. The Territory carried out extensive negotiations with the military, seeking to have military lands returned to public use. A War Department memo dated April 10, 1924, noted that the Territory was "stimulated and urged by local commercial interests which resent the possession of land by the War Department that could be utilized to produce revenues for the Territory."

The military itself remained hostile to all attempts to reduce its land holdings. The War Department's position was put quite bluntly in a 1928 cable (Collins, 1928): "The War Department Policy is consistently and unalterably opposed to return of any lands of military reservations to Territorial control." Even areas with no military value were vigorously defended by local commanders and by the military bureaucracy in Washington. Those few cases which did lead to the return of land to military control required the high-level intervention of the Interior Department, members of Congress, or even the President.

Suits were filed by private citizens to prevent the taking of, or to obtain adequate compensation for, lands around Pearl Harbor, in Lualualei Valley, Kaneohe, Kahoolawe, and other areas. Certain of these
court actions lasted literally for decades. In 1912, for example, the Navy began the process of condemning private fishing rights in and around Pearl Harbor, an area which then yielded 10-15 tons of fish monthly (U.S. House of Representatives, 1919). The Navy began condemnation proceedings, despite an opinion by the Attorney General of the United States (Collins, 1945:712) that “no legal authority existed for the U.S. to condemn the property in question for the purpose intended.” The first of many damage suits was filed against the Navy in 1924 by the Li Estate. The suits dragged through the courts for decades, and the last claim was not settled until the arrival of statehood (Collins, 1945; U.S. Senate, 1959).

It should be noted that while opposed by some, military land policies worked in the interests of others. Governor Farrington, in a 1927 letter to the Army’s commanding general in Hawaii, expressed opposition to the attempts by “certain private interests” to negotiate land exchanges with the military at the expense of the public. Farrington described one land exchange in which the Army turned over 62 acres, including “over a mile of the best beach in the Maile beach section of the Wai'anae District”, to Walter F. Dillingham. Farrington argued that “there is no need or justification under the heading of either military necessity or national financial economies to alienate to private holdings another foot of land along the Wai'anae beach area or any other beach section of the island of Oahu.” The public, and not private interests, should be the beneficiaries of land released from military control, according to the governor’s view.

SOURCES OF CONFLICT: POWER

These issues of land use and control reflect a broader pattern of conflict between military and civilian authorities. Prior to annexation, the military served as the representative of the United States in the islands. American military officers and businessmen shared common political interests as well as class and ethnic backgrounds.

...Naval officers serving at Honolulu circulated in the society created by the more wealthy American residents. They absorbed inevitably the political views of this group, and were even inclined to present these views to their superiors in official reports. The high diplomatic importance of their service over a long period of time tended as well to give the naval officers a sense of responsibility for supervising and reporting on the affairs of the islands second only to that enjoyed by the American minister. As representatives of a more powerful nation dealing with a much weaker and insignificant power, they likewise developed a sense of superiority and condescension (Stevens, 1945:210).

According to Collins (1945:14), naval officers “served as arbitrators in business disputes, negotiators of trade agreements, and defenders of law and order.” Following annexation, however, the rapidly growing military establishment began to chafe at the emerging opposition of the civilian government to its policies and priorities. The Navy was able to retain more direct political control in other island outposts, such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and American Samoa, and the requirement to recognize the nominal power of Hawaii’s civil authorities caused obvious discomfort.

Military authorities kept close watch on the actions of the government. Prior to World War II, the Commander of the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor, submitted regular intelligence reports to Washington on island politics, legislative matters, and community groups (Collins, 1945:42). The variety of topics covered by these Navy reports is surprisingly wide, including such matters as the ethnic breakdown of the voting population; assessments of ethnic influence on island politics; periodic reviews of “vice conditions”, labor organizations and activities at the university; a critical examination of Japanese schools, their personnel and community influence; and surveillance of foreign visitors. In more recent years, military authorities have maintained files on groups known to hold views critical of the military, and as late as 1969 maintained “intelligence” files on members of the State Legislature (U.S. Senate, 1971:461).

To further complicate matters, the different military services jealously guarded their respective prerogatives and power. Each service sought to extend its own control over land, water, and other resources, in competition with each other as well as the surrounding civilian community. This led to a duplication of services and functions, which inflated the amount of land determined to be “required” to maintain the island’s military establishment. Each service sought to obtain its own facilities, from training areas for holding maneuvers to beach areas for recreation centers. Inter-service rivalries continue to impede progress in release of “surplus” federal land in Hawaii. The results of a 1973 Department of Defense study of land requirements in Hawaii were rejected by the Government Accounting Office when it was determined that each service had attempted simply to justify the “reasonableness” of their existing land holdings rather than to evaluate their actual needs (U.S. GAO, 1975).

Such inter-service rivalries sometimes involved purely political issues. Snowbarger (1950:143) notes, for example, that “another subject of hard feeling was raised in 1914, and continued for some years, concerning the relative precedence of rear-admirals and major-generals.” By 1922, this rivalry had reached significant proportions to be brought to the attention of the President, who was informed of “sharp differences as to seniority” of the ranking officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. Military officials in Washington apparently
contributed to the confusion, and in September 1923, Governor Farrington reported that the situation was "a standoff," with each military commander "under orders to maintain the priority of his precedence." A critical stage was reached shortly thereafter, when Admiral McDonald informed the Governor that "he would not accept any position at any function which did not recognize his precedence over Maj. Gen. Sumner" (Farrington 1923b). The issue was still not resolved when, in mid-1924, the approaching visit of the British Fleet to Hawaii brought matters to a head. In May 1924, the War Department informed the Interior Department that the Attorney General had determined that the Admiral in fact was the ranking officer. This did not, however, put an end to the controversy, as the Army sought to gain Congressional approval of a bill which would have once again given its officers precedence over their Navy counterparts.

The debate flared anew in early 1928, when Governor Farrington again wrote to the Secretary of Interior:

I know that you will smile when I tell you that there will undoubtedly arise in connection with the incident, a question as to whether I represent the President, or am merely a plain, garden variety Territorial Governor. The Commandant of the Naval Station at Pearl Harbor has developed the complex that the Governor of Hawaii is entitled to a salute of only seventeen guns. This, as you are doubtless aware, is in a method of denoting the representatives of the Civil Administration, so that he shall not have more or as much recognition as an admiral of the Navy. The salute for the Governor under the Army regulations is the appropriate status of a State or Territorial Governor.

A count of the ceremonial guns provided only one indication of the tensions existing between civil and military authorities. As relations became more strained, military leaders looked toward the possibility of establishing a form of direct military rule in the islands. As noted above, a "commission" government made up of military leaders was one possibility discussed, often in the context of a perceived need to control the "alien" population of Hawaii.

Evidence of this can be seen in a secret Army memo dated July 25, 1933, which summarized a study by the War Department, and concluded that "reasonable safeguarding of our national interests demands, as a minimum, a change in the organic law placing the Island of Oahu under military control" (Marley, 1933). The study noted, however, that this would be politically impossible to accomplish, and recommended several alternative courses of action. One alternative was passage of legislation eliminating a three year residency requirement for appointment as Governor, coupled with an appeal to the President to appoint "a general officer of the line" as Governor. The study characterized American citizens of Japanese ancestry as being of "doubtful loyalty," and pointed to the resulting "dangers, from a national defense viewpoint, of the present form of civil government".

Military officers also supported a commission government for another, very different reason. Accustomed to the approach of the world from a military perspective, they were less sympathetic to the particular needs of local residents. Their view was shaped by military considerations, and they were accustomed to exercising their authority within the command structure of military reservations, where obedience was a cardinal virtue. This was vastly different from the wielding of political authority in the civilian community. According to Snowberger (1950:213-214),

[The military community] considered at least the island of Oahu as first and foremost, an outpost of the national security. Arguing that he believed in the basic principles of democratic government, especially legislation by representatives of the people, Admiral Stirling asked, "but do we apply this axiom of government to our ships of war and to our military reservations?" The concept of Hawaii as a strategic outpost contrasted with the idea of an island home held by local residents.

In the aftermath of the famous Massie affair (Van Slingerland, 1966), Admiral Yates Stirling emerged as a vocal advocate of military rule. While Hawaii's civilian government managed to remain intact, the basis for the future imposition of martial law was apparently set in place at this time. The military requested that the President issue secret orders to the Governor of Hawaii (Marley, 1933), instructing him to "cooperate with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in planning for transfer of control to the military in an emergency and...to effect such transfer upon request of the Commanding General." This is precisely what came to pass with the imposition of martial law in December 1941 (Anthony, 1975).

The end of martial law did not, however, stop the supporters of military government. For example, in September of 1944, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin editorialized against yet another plan making the rounds in Washington to put Hawaii under Navy rule. This plan, authored by Representative Cole of New York, was being readied for presentation to Congress after the elections. The Star-Bulletin (September 22, 1944) observed that "Hawaii hardly needs a detailed explanation of what navy control and direction would mean to the people of this territory and their affairs, their businesses, their whole lives." Referring to the experience of Guam and American Samoa, the editorial pointed to their treatment as "as subjects, as colonists, as wards of an all-powerful and paternalistically authoritative government." While carefully couching their critique within the context of praise for the Navy's role in the war effort, it was clear that these spokesmen for Hawaii's political and social elite were no longer enamored with the military establishment.
The underlying basis for the conflict between civil and military authorities was captured succinctly by Patrick Hurley, Secretary of War, in a letter to the Secretary of the Interior in June, 1930:

It may aid in the clarification of any further consideration of this general subject, to point out that the War Department necessarily must deal with this matter from the point of view of the national interests. On the other hand, the attitude of the Territorial authorities, as revealed in the present and earlier correspondence, is expressive of a purely local point of view.

This particular disjunction between civilian and military perspectives was not unique to Hawaii. Similar problems have been identified in Guam by Rambaud and Rambaud (1977), and by Wolf (1969) in Turkey. On the basis of her survey, Wolf concluded that the tension between military and civilian perspectives in such settings is structural and unavoidable:

The official assumption that the military community can pursue its military mission the one hand, and yet, on the other, effectively undertake the mission of good relations with the host community and even be an adequate representative of a democratic country appears to me to be a contradiction in terms. Given the military organization as it is, it seems more likely that its response to the external community would be preponderantly that of closure; and to expect an organization which is characterized by authoritarianism, barracks neatness, and hierarchical order to represent other than just that seems dangerously naive and quixotic. (Wolf, 1969:259)

Hawaii’s experience would certainly offer no grounds for questioning this conclusion.

THE DAYS AFTER

World War II brought dramatic changes to Hawaii. The effects of martial law, and of the war itself, have been discussed by Allen (1950), Anthony (1975), MacDonald (1944), and others. The military was the center of a “military-industrial revolution” which dramatically altered the structure of Hawaiian society. Ratcliff (1962) identifies the broad outlines of this war-induced social transformation. Plantation agriculture lost its dominant role in the economy as military expenditures rose more than ten-fold in the 25 years following 1930. In the decades between 1940 and 1950, agricultural employment dropped by one half, the urban population grew by 33%, and union membership tripled. Military land holdings reached a peak of more than 600,000 acres in 1944, then dropped rapidly to about 250,000 in the immediate post-war period, a level which has remained relatively constant since.

The war also spawned a vast revolution in Hawaiian politics. The battlefields of Europe and the Pacific provided a harsh testing ground for the young men of Japanese ancestry who volunteered for military service in large numbers. At the war’s end, these veterans realized that after risking their lives in battle, they were not willing to return and simply take their accustomed places in Hawaii’s highly stratified society. Daniel Inouye, now Hawaii’s senior representative in the United States Senate, described the feelings of the returning veterans:

...what I had come to believe with all my heart and soul, was that the time had come for us to step forward. We had fought for that right with all the furious patriotism in our bodies and now we didn’t want to go back to the plantation. Times were changing. The old patterns were breaking down. (Inouye, 1967:191)

Quickly becoming involved in politics, these Japanese-Americans confirmed the long-standing fears of some by forming a political block that swept to power in the Territorial Legislature in 1954.

Ironically, this political transformation led to a new partnership between the military and the young Democrats. These young men were committed to ending the plantations’ economic and political domination of the islands, and were well aware that there were few existing economic options that could be relied on to reduce Hawaii’s dependence on the plantations. The military had demonstrated that it could provide significant income to the islands, and the newly empowered Democrats embraced defense spending as a welcome alternative.

One result of the new political alliance was a lessening of Territorial efforts to regain control of military-held lands. Immediately after the war, the military had requested that additional areas be set aside for their use (Lind, 1983). These moves were vigorously resisted by the Territorial government, which was successful in getting Presidential approval for a joint civil-military panel to review existing land holdings and make recommendations as to areas that could be returned to civilian use. The Governor’s Land Use Committee was formed in 1946, and issued a secret report with recommendations in 1951 (Marks, 1951; Lind, 1983). While the Territory was not successful in obtaining release of all parcels of disputed land, it was able to make substantial progress despite determined resistance from military negotiators.

However, the Democrats proved unwilling to exert their newly won political power in continuing efforts to return military lands to civilian use. Indeed, when the administration of Republican Governor William Quinn brought suit against the federal government, the move was actively opposed by Hawaii Democrats at home and in Congress (Horwitz, 1969:78-92). The Democrats’ position eventually prevailed due to their political power at home and a Democratic majority in
Washington, and for the next two decades, political opposition to military land policies in the islands was effectively muted.

In one sense, it can be argued that the Democrats simply accommodated themselves to the newly emerging political economy of the islands. Throughout the first five decades of this century, plantation agriculture was the undisputed center of the economy. However, defense spending became the dominant economic factor during the 1950’s, and by 1960 accounted for a larger share of the islands’ income than sugar and pineapple combined.

The Democratic political “machine” benefited directly from its association with the militarized economy. Local contractors, who over the years provided the essential financial support for Democratic candidates, have been among the chief beneficiaries of military spending in the islands. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on military construction projects in Hawaii in recent years, and Senator Inouye’s favored position on the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee ensures that the flow of dollars will continue. In turn, these interests, along with the union members working in civilian defense jobs, have comprised a potent lobby for continued high levels of military appropriations. It thus appears that the military draws its principal support from those with immediate pecuniary interests in the prevailing pattern of defense spending. The Democratic “establishment”, in turn, buttresses its own political power by continuing to deliver defense dollars into the islands’ economy.

SPECULATIONS ON THE FUTURE

Five developments in the post-statehood period portend a significant long-term decline in the military’s role in Hawaii. First, tourism has replaced defense spending as the dominant force in the islands’ economy. Fueled by corporate investment from around the world, tourism overtook defense as the state’s largest industry in 1972. While the direct income generated by defense and tourist expenditures were approximately equal in 1970, tourism grew twice as fast over the following decade. By 1981, tourism contributed $3.2 billion to the local economy annually, with defense expenditures accounting for less than half that amount, $1.4 billion (DPED, 1982:305). The continued growth of tourism will not only further reduce the State’s dependence on defense spending, but will inevitably create additional pressures for the transfer of lands from military to civilian use.

Second, technological developments, including satellite communications, computer networking, and long-range jet aircraft, have combined to reduce the military value of Hawaii’s mid-Pacific location. While there is little public discussion of this controversial situation, and no major installations have been closed, there have been significant consolidations of functions and transfers of military activities to the West Coast.

As a result of these technological changes, traditional assertions concerning the military importance of Hawaii’s mid-Pacific location, would appear to exaggerate the islands’ contemporary military value. One important indication of this is the dramatic reduction in the number of ships homported at Pearl Harbor. This dropped by more than 50% (from 80 to 38) between 1970 and 1984, indicating in graphic terms the declining value attributed to Hawaii by military strategists (Hawaiian Economic Development Project, 1984).

A report compiled by the state legislature reached similar conclusions.

When reviewing the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, it appears that Hawaii is not the center of the universe around which the protection of the United States revolves. Like Korea, it may be more a political benefit and a comfortable way station than a military necessity. (Hawaii State Legislature, 1977:118)

The legislative report also noted the failure of military authorities to produce hard data to support the view that Hawaii continues to be of prime military importance. When requested to substantiate the “need” for continued military use of the island of Kahoolawe, the military argued strenuously that it was both “convenient” and desirable. However, the legislature concluded that “what remains questionable is the actual need based on hard data.”

Another indication of the declining strategic significance of Hawaii is the tendency of arguments in support of maintaining current levels of military activities to stress their economic contribution to the community rather than their contribution to national defense. An Army review of alternative basing plans, for example, found that a transfer of all Army facilities to the U.S. mainland, while it might cause economic hardship for Hawaii, would not necessarily have any negative effects on defense capabilities (US Army Support Command, 1979:151-152). Similarly, the controversial use of the island of Kahoolawe for bombing and other types of military training has been defended largely on economic grounds (Hawaii State Legislature, 1977; Pearl Harbor Association, 1978).

Finally, union and business groups, hoping to convince the Navy to base a reconditioned battleship and supporting vessels at Pearl Harbor, were informed by Hawaii’s senior U.S. senator in May 1984 that the military “could just as easily pick another site” (Homeport Hawaii Task Force, 1984). In order to influence the Navy’s decision, they were advised to assume a “high visibility pro-military” posture on a variety of local issues unrelated to the actual value of the Hawaii port for national
defense. This would clearly be unnecessary if Hawaii retained the strategic value of an earlier era.

One Navy officer (Boyum, 1971), candidly recommended that economic factors be stressed in order to accentuate the “feeling of support emanating from the left hip pocket” of the business community. He argued that the military could increase levels of community support by facilitating new forms of defense spending on the neighbor islands. Indeed, this “left hip pocket” strategy has increasingly supplanted military or strategy factors in official and unofficial discussions of the military’s future in Hawaii.

Third, the growth of Hawaii’s civilian population has exacerbated competition for use of land at the same time that new military technology demands increases in training activities. Areas devoted to training activities, including Makua Valley and the Kahuku Training area on Oahu, Barking Sands on Kauai, Kahoolawe, and Pohakuloa on the island of Hawaii, comprise the bulk of military-controlled lands in the State, and even military authorities admit that their use is “increasingly incompatible with urban growth” (U.S. Army Support Command, 1979:145; also Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 1979; Kelly & Quintal, 1977). In an international survey, Lumsden (1981; also Lumsden, n.d.) found that tensions caused by increasingly incompatibility of civilian and military demands for usable land are growing more common in all parts of the world. It is, therefore, not surprising that the training area in Hawaii have been at the center of growing political conflicts between military authorities and the civilian community.

A fourth factor contributing to a lesening of the military’s hold on the island has been Hawaii’s political integration into the American mainstream. In the years prior to statehood, there were clear limitations on political opposition to military policies. The actions of the Territorial government were tempered by the background threat of a military-led commission government, and by an understanding that the military could ultimately gain Congressional approval of almost any action by cloaking it in the mantle of national defense. The interests of the Territory would almost certainly be forced to yield to the “national” interest if matters had to be brought to a vote. In addition, dissident opinion within Hawaii was tightly controlled by a closely interlocked structure of social and economic power. Dissent was possible, but it carried costs that few were willing or able to pay.

In the twenty-five years following statehood, however, these political constraints have been largely removed. Admission as a state eliminated the threat of direct military rule, and full representation in Congress has given the State additional leverage in negotiating over matters of military policy. Additionally, the transformation of the islands into a more open and diverse society has encouraged political activism and protest among previously disenfranchised sectors of the community.

The final factor has been the emergence of a Hawaiian “renaissance”, a cultural and political movement which is reasserting the importance of being Hawaiian. This movement has encouraged a resurgence of popular interest in Hawaiian religion, dance, music, and language. The movement has also had a political dimension embodied in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, organized lobbying at the U.S. Congress for “reparations”, and a small but influential network advocating sovereignty for the Hawaiian nation (see Native Hawaiian Study Commission, 1983; Burgess, 1981).

As Hawaiians have become more assertive culturally and politically, more attention has also been directed to the role of the United States military in the “revolution” of 1893, which brought an end to the Hawaiian monarchy. In turn, this has served to legitimate open criticism of contemporary military policies which impact on Hawaiians. For example, testimony in opposition to the continued use of the island of Kahoolawe and Makua Valley on Oahu for military training includes numerous statements linking the emergence of ethnic awareness and pride with criticism of Hawaii’s military commands (Environment Impact Study Corporation, 1979: Chapter 11; Kelly and Quintal, 1977: vol. II)

There are other subtle, yet perhaps more pervasive indications of civil-military conflict available to the perceptive observer. These include crimes committed against military personnel, psychological and social isolation of the military community, a low civilian compliance with draft registration, and tensions in schools between civilians and military dependents. Indeed, evidence of conflict between Hawaii’s civilian community and the military is to be found in many places, from the halls of Congress to the beaches of rural Oahu.

Taken together, these five factors would indicate continuing difficulties in civil-military relations in Hawaii, and a gradual but distinct reduction in the military’s importance to, and presence in, the islands. The objective importance of the military in Hawaii will decline at the same time that conflicts over land and related resources grow more intense and more difficult to contain. Opportunities to facilitate the demilitarization of Hawaii will become more frequent, especially in the crucial area of providing an economic transition as the defense sector is reduced to more normal proportions.

Is Hawaii a militarized state? The answer, based on this brief review, would necessarily be positive. However, it is also apparent that militarization is a dynamic and continuing process. Militarization must be continually reinforced and recreated, its rewards reasserted, rituals reenacted. Sources of conflict and resistance, or, more subtly, ambivalence and hesitation, are properly seen as potential sources of demilitarization. Those seeking clues to reducing the extent of global militarization would do well to attend more carefully to the details of this continuing process.
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THE GREAT HAWAIIAN MILK CRISIS:
SCIENCE, POLICY AND ECONOMIC INTEREST

Richard Pratt

In the spring of 1982 people living on Oahu went through what many would readily identify as a health crisis. It occurred when the milk supply was threatened, an event which elicited enormous controversy over why that happened, what it meant, and how it was handled by public officials. What began in 1982 has continued in different forms through the present, leaving the impression that milk contamination in Hawaii has acted as a triggering event for conflicts which before January 1982 had lain dormant.

This article considers the episode with two purposes in mind. One is to argue for a different perspective on the issues constituting the "crisis" and its aftermath, a perspective which might bring a different approach to policymaking. The other purpose is to use it to elaborate on certain characteristic features in the difficult relationship between knowledge, the public interest, and political processes.

An event like this offers us a number of opportunities for reflection and analysis. Some of the most important of these are how the events were shaped by broader processes than the competences of the actors immediately involved; whose interests those processes affect, and in what ways; and who can, or will, be involved in specific decisions. By dealing with these points it is more likely we may avoid the mistake of failing to distinguish problems which are primarily individual and idiosyncratic from those lodged in the social or economic structure and emanating from politically defined relationships.

I argue here that three structural elements are significant in the creation and handling of this incident. These are the issue of proof and responsibility in health science; the function of what I label the Public Sensor; and the political-economy of the dairy industry. My contention is that the affect of these factors is rather unpredictable and exemplary of issues attending the convergence of health science, politics and public policy in seeking the public’s health.

BACKGROUND

The island of Oahu, which has a population of about 850,000, has nineteen dairy farms. These farms supply approximately 250,000 gallons of raw milk each week to the state’s two largest processors, most of which they pasteurize, homogenize, “enrich” with vitamins, and deliver to retail outlets. On the basis of protocol established by the state’s Department of Health, milk samples are drawn every six months from the three dairy areas into which the nineteen milk producers have been
divided, as well as from the two processors. These samples are then tested and evaluated against established standards in the Department of Health’s Laboratories Branch. The results are sent over to the Department’s Food and Drug Branch, which has the responsibility for standards enforcement and any remedial reaction.

In the week of January 11, 1982 the analyses of these routinely collected samples revealed the presence of heptachlor epoxide in amounts exceeding the “action level” standard established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1 Heptachlor epoxide is the metabolized form of the insecticide heptachlor, having found its way through the cows’ system and been excreted in either milk, urine or feces. Heptachlor is a potent substance applied in spray form and used in Hawaii by the pineapple industry to control the ant population. The ant is a problem for pineapple production because it protects the mealy bug from predators so it may feed on a substance the mealy bug excretes. The mealy bug uses the protection provided by the ant to feed unrestrained on the pineapple plants and thereby produce more food for the ant.

The insecticide represented a death sentence for the ants, but was itself under sentence as a restricted product to be applied only with a special use permit issued by the EPA. This was established in 1976 following a typically difficult and protracted series of hearings about its health effects, and in particular its links to cancer and liver damage (See Epstein, 1976 pp.275-280). The settlement was negotiated between the EPA and other interested parties. The parties included the heptachlor producer, Velsicol; users; and consumer groups. The agreement was that heptachlor could be used for another five years provided there be no obvious danger to human health. This settlement was agreed upon because the economic consequences of discontinuation would be substantial. The five year sentence was designed to give users an opportunity to find an alternative treatment 2 while protecting the public from harm through the monitoring and enforcement of “no effect” standards.

In this process the EPA set a zero tolerance level for heptachlor epoxide residue in cow’s milk and other foods. This means that milk known to contain any residual of the insecticide must be judged unfit for human consumption. In practice, however, the legal limit necessary for action against a batch of milk became 0.3 milligrams per kilogram fat (parts per million, or ppm). 3 The 0.3 “action level”, adopted by the Department of Health in the state of Hawaii, was negotiated as the operational rule to simultaneously protect industry from the economic consequences of a false alarm and guard the public from serious threat. 4

In Hawaii heptachlor found its way onto store shelves and into human bodies via the mouths of an unknown number of Oahu’s 20,000 Holsteins. This happened because, just as the mealy bug and ant formed a symbiotic relationship, so too the milk producers and pineapple producers had discovered some ‘economic ecology’. A small opera-

tor found it profitable to come into the pineapple fields to collect and then shred the leafy remains of the harvested plants. This company made money selling the resulting “green chop” to the dairy farms. The farms obtained a regular source of cheap roughage for the Holsteins while the pineapple companies obtained small payments and cleared fields. 5

In order to insure the public’s safety in this mutually accommodating relationship, EPA rules stated heptachlor must not only be applied in a prescribed dosage and manner, but must not be used in the fields less than one year before harvest. These rules were established to insure the insecticide was not taken into the fruit, but of course are relevant to any other part of the plant directly or indirectly consumed by humans. The responsibility for meeting these conditions rests with the pineapple producers, since the Department of Agriculture does not have the resources to monitor their activities on a day-to-day basis. 6

On January 22, eleven days after the first results of concern, the Hawaii Health Department’s Food and Drug Branch concurred with the Laboratories Branch’s unelaborated recommendation that the samples be sent to the Food and Drug Administration Laboratories (FDA) in San Francisco for further testing. Approximately six weeks later, on March 2, the FDA confirmed to the Food and Drug Branch that acceptably high levels of heptachlor epoxide had been found in the milk samples. On March 9 the Food and Drug Branch called for further tests of Oahu’s milk, later justifying this by noting that a sample taken after January 11 had shown no residues. In light of the high heptachlor levels in the new samples, on March 16 the Director of Health was told that there existed a problem with Oahu’s milk. The Department of Agriculture quietly ordered dairy farmers to stop using green chop.

Shortly after this the problem became a public issue, or as many would come to say, a crisis. This change of status was attended by a sequence of eleven milk recalls, each recall followed by a statement that the milk was now safe. At first the Department of Health announced contamination was confined to whole milk, but later recalls included skim milk, yogurt, cottage cheese and ice cream. On March 19, the state Senate began an investigation of the incident, and on April 20 a “Milk Action Plan” was submitted to a Joint House Committee for Health and Agriculture. 7 At the end of March, the Director of the Department of Health suddenly announced his decision to act on an option for early retirement, stating that he had accumulated enough vacation time to leave immediately and that his decision had little if anything to do with the milk issue. Shortly thereafter the Former Director of the Department of Education, a chain smoker with a reputation as a no-nonsense administrator, was introduced by the Governor as the new state Health Director. In the meantime, the issue was serious enough to raise, through the local media, questions about the Governor’s chances for re-election in the fall of 1982. 8
During this period it was clear that most people on Oahu were concerned, with a sizable number very upset. They had every reason to believe the supply of vital food had been endangered. In spite of newspaper articles interviewing Department of Health employees having milk with lunch, and declaring they continued to supply their own children with the several gallons consumed in an average week, many were suddenly doubtful about providing families with adequate and safe nutrition. Moreover, there was apprehension because local newspapers reported milk may have contained the toxin for up to eighteen months. Thus, parents had been paying the high cost of locally produced milk, only to learn it may have been dangerous to them and their children.

Ultimately, however, the biggest problem faced pregnant women and nursing mothers. Some heard there was no real risk, others that there was. A few prominent clinicians and pediatricians, photographed in front of the Hawaii Medical Association offices, discounted the threat by saying neither fetus nor nursing infant could absorb enough to be threatened. Other professionals in research positions suggested there quite possibly was a threat simply because we were witnessing the unfolding of a classic food chain. In such a chain, the toxic substance is "magnified" and concentrated in the reproductive system and in the offSpring. Moreover, they suggested, the fetuses and infants were less able to tolerate toxins; had poorly developed mechanisms for removing them; and in the case of nursing infants, were relying on milk as most or all of their diet.

As both the confusion and the shortages grew, state officials decided against importing milk from California out of respect for the state's Milk Control Act. The dairy industry reported it's daily losses in the thousands of dollars as sales dropped and the costs of herd replacements were considered. When opinion polls began to show a long-term change in attitude about milk consumption may have occurred, the local industry announced its survival was in jeopardy and began to look to Washington. In September, 1982, after weeks of reports about an intense debate within the agency, the EPA announced that the action level would be dropped from 0.2 to 0.1. This change occurred as a response to the troublesome Hawaii case, and some argued that the change was politically feasible only because the five year grace period for the Instruction's use was ending. In early January the Reagan administration announced it would postpone consideration of seven million dollars in aid to the Hawaii dairy industry until local law suits were settled, and about two months after that a local court declined to dismiss a lawsuit against the state for adopting and carelessly enforcing a standard which permitted a known carcinogen in the food supply.

In the meantime the Safeway grocery chain, with numerous outlets in Hawaii, decided the time was propitious to petition the Board of Agri-culture to import mainland milk regularly. After weeks of hearings at which the dairy industry mobilized itself to combat the arguments of Safeway and consumer groups, the Board declared itself unable to decide, and in January 1984 re-opened the process. On May 14, the board, its option to restrain the importation of milk taken away by a Federal Court ruling, gave Safeway a one year permit to bring in milk from California.

This development was countered by efforts in the state legislature where bills were introduced to limit processed milk to a specified selling period. The bills, heavily promoted by the dairy industry as a way of protecting the consumer from "spoiled milk", were attacked by consumer groups as nothing more than a device to protect the legal industry at the expense of consumer choice. The bill finally passed by the legislature stipulated a ten day shelf life. It was signed on June 12 by the Governor who declared the legislation "reasonable," and denied it was a way of undermining the market incentives for importation ("It struck home to me that milk was a very fragile thing") (Honolulu Advertiser, June 13, 1984). Shortly thereafter, the Fresh Milk Industry of Hawaii, the local dairy industry's lobbying arm, was willing to run this more than slightly ironic half-page advertisement: "Now You Have A Choice! Milk That's Days Fresher or Days Older" (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, June 20, 1984), and on June 29, Safeway filed a suit arguing that the shelf-life legislation is an unconstitutional restriction of interstate commerce, passed for the primary purpose of giving advantage to a local industry.

In this episode there are a great many more details concerning who did or didn't do what at what time. My purpose is not to report those as the relevant "facts" of the matter, but to offer an interpretation of what they add up to. Most reports, by their very nature, implicitly argues for considering problems in terms of disconnected occurrences or particular actors. That approach, however subtle it's influence over how we come to define these events, ought to be contrasted with a different accounting which weighs the structural elements connecting events and affecting what people were able or willing to do.

HEALTH SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PROOF

One thing clear about the Hawaiian milk crisis is that while there was some disagreement among technicians, researchers and Department of Health advisors about the actual numbers of bacteriophage in milk and milk products, there was much more controversy about what its presence meant for human health. The question of amount is understandable as primarily a technical problem. The issue of what it means gets at the difficulties in the relationship between health science and policy, and tells us something about science in the role of health advisor for contemporary diseases originating in the environment.
What this case, and others like it, suggests is that the distinction between the knowledge process and the introduction of its "results" into social contexts dominated by more instrumental and self-interested concerns, is in certain important respects not much greater in the science of health than it is in the social sciences. Where the "hard data" is difficult to come by. In particular, health scientists find it extremely difficult to be conclusive in attempts to show the causes of many contemporary diseases, or to mention locating the "causes" of health, about which there is a reluctance to even offer theories (c.f. Geist, 1980; Evans, 1978). What I'll call "problems of proof" especially attend work in the field of chronic diseases, the long term, degenerative and generally irreversible afflictions which have replaced infectious diseases at the center of health science's attention in post World War II affluent societies.

The same problems of proof are a part of the milk episode, and in a form which makes it exemplary of the structural character of this issue. The episode occurs in a context where some sort of policy recommendation is called for, and is a dramatic instance of a profession, self-defined as scientifically-based, being called upon for policy advice on a problem of considerable social importance. The primary "effect" we're talking about, after all, is cancer - its long term increased incidence in the population of Oahu. Those who wait for advice should understand the difficulties in formulating it and consequently the degree to which such subsequent policy is or is not informed by something other than bureaucratic predispositions, interest group lobbying, or someone's best guess about what sort of action is most likely to reduce active protest from affected parties (For an example of the argument for waiting until something definite is known, see Affleck, 1978).

This point was nicely illustrated at a forum on "The Heptachlor Problem." Participants included professionals who regularly advise the Department of Health in standards setting and enforcement, and biochemists doing basic research. Much of the time was used to present information about the techniques of sampling and analysis; the concept of safety margins; and descriptions of the very small amounts "we're really talking about here" (less than one drop in ten gallons of water). When these people began to talk back and forth to one another, however, it became evident that, in spite of years of study - including the lengthy debates held by EPA prior to restricting Heptachlor's use - it was now hard to know what to tell this audience and the general public.

At the end of the exchanges a biochemist dramatically made this point. "What we can definitely say is this: We don't know. After that nothing should be said. Period. But things are said. There are various demands for things to be said. Then you have a basic choice to make. You can either say 'It's not known to be safe,' or you can say 'It's not known to be unsafe.'"
jured party is faced with the requirement of having to prove what is essentially unprovable. Given that unprovability seems to be built into the nature of the problem, it is reasonable to ask who should bear its burden. The question then is, when does it become appropriate to shift the burden of responsibility for trying to prove what may be unprovable? Such a shift would mean that a producer must show that its activities did not result in injury, which in turn means that some more plausible explanation than what the injured party is arguing must be established. (For example, an issue of this conflict involving heptachlor, see Epstein, 1978: 276, 278: For discussion of aspects of this issue in a legal setting, see Klandsho & Burke, 1960; and Musser, 1976).

This problem of responsibility may never fall out of the milk case as a legal matter. The possible health consequences of this, and incidents like it, may be too distant in time and too difficult to connect. This is not to say there may not be such consequences, or that they are unimportant; simply that they may not be demonstrable at a level sufficient to justify the shift suggested here.

The problem of policy as non-action is more immediately pertinent. This refers to the fact that it is common for health researchers to make no explicit policy recommendations of any kind when the scientific basis is not sufficiently established. This seems an intrinsically reasonable position until two things are taken into account. First, it is entirely possible that for many problems of this type the scientific basis will never be sufficiently established. Second, non-action is itself a policy position. That is, not doing anything allows policies — or the absence of a public policy — to continue. But this is a subtle issue and most faced with it may continue to prefer a definition of scientific integrity which implies that THE WORD is attainable; and that until it arrives, not talking about policy is a way of avoiding policy making.

THE POLITICS OF THE PUBLIC SENSOR

While one structural element in this episode raises questions about the location of the public’s interest in light of the difficulties of proof for chronic diseases, another directs attention to factors impinging on, and shaping, the decisions and performance of people charged with protecting a public interest defined to be threatened. Why, then, was the heptachlor incident managed the way it was?

As noted above, shortly after the extent of the milk’s contamination became public knowledge, the Committee on Health in the state legislature issued a report analyzing what had happened (Senate Committee on Health, 1982). It focused on the Department of Health’s role in the incident and offered a number of conclusions and recommendations. The Report notes “failure of communication”; excessive caution motivated by hope that the data would soon look better; unwarranted assumptions about self-regulation in the industry. The report’s conclusion emphasized the role of individuals, and asserts that “the responsibility for the Department of Health’s failure to act promptly and effectively can be attributed to more than one individual.” (Senate Committee on Health, 1982:5). It goes on to recommend that the Governor take prompt action against these individuals; that the state Attorney General decide whether civil or criminal legal action is warranted; that the legislature undertake an investigation in search of preventative legislation; and that a loan program be developed immediately to help out dairy farmers adversely affected by this incident.

It is possible that, as the Senate Report concludes, the main cause of the long sequence of delays, miscommunications and contradictory — perhaps even illegal — decision-making, is primarily explainable in terms of qualities of the individuals involved. Certainly the values, skills and interests particular individuals brought to the situation are factors. On the whole, however, other elements deserve a much stronger hearing than the committee’s analysis provides. This section outlines some of those elements, and suggests that they help to tell us why these people acted the way they did, and that the actions are common to contemporary institutional actors charged with the role of the “Public Sensor.”

The concept of the Public Sensor is useful because it brings insight about the physical capabilities of human beings, together with a consideration of the realities of the agents we rely upon for protection once those capabilities are exceeded. It evolves out of three inter-related factors.

The first is that human beings are ordinarily equipped with a remarkable set of sensing devices which, among other things, provide warnings about things in the environment likely to be physically harmful. These senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell are not only extremely acute, they are adaptive. If one is impaired, the others become more sensitive in an attempt to make up for what was lost.

The second factor leading to the Public Sensor is that in spite of sensory acuteness and adaptability, there is a broad range of environmental elements falling outside of their threshold of detection (that is, our senses either don’t detect them at all, or until damage has been done). In fact, we ought to say that our senses are subtle and adaptable within a rather narrow range of the possible environments we might experience. In historical terms we have developed defensive devices which operate extremely well within a specific evolutionary setting. When we leave that environment, or when it is transformed around us, our senses become much less useful in their protective function.

For contemporary man, changes in the natural environment are often less important than changes in the man-made environment. We “leave” the realm of our senses by eating foods with additives, carefully designed to serve a particular cost-efficiency function without setting off
our sensory arms (Ehald, 1974); by working in places which utilize subthreshold chemicals as part of the production process (Ehald, 1973); by living in cities where we breathe undetectable-by-products of internal combustion engines. A fact of life in a society so reliant on technologi
cal transformations is that it is harder and harder to live in an environ
ment from which our own sensory apparatus can provide us reasonable protection. (Toxic Substance Strategy Committee, 1989).

The third factor contributing to the notion of the Public Sensor is the development, especially over the last two decades, of a number of agen
cies largely justified by their purported ability to protect the public from man-made environmental factors which are beyond individual powers of detection. In fact it is probably accurate to argue that one of the principal reasons there are these agencies at all is that it has become so patently unreasonable to suggest that, in those circumstances, individu
als can be responsible for themselves. (For an interesting example of the strength of the individual responsibility model in accounting for dis
ease among Americans, see Chase, 1975). It is simply more and more difficult for even the most committed classical liberal to argue that the responsible individual can be expected to act in his or her own interest.
Thus, the limitations of the human sensory system, the wide range of incentives in industrial society to place human beings in envi
ronments containing potentially harmful elements which fall above or below their sensory thresholds, and the dramatic irrelevance given to classical notions of individual responsibility by these developments have together led to what I am calling the role of the Public Sensor.

The purpose of the Public Sensor is to use its technical resources to act authoritatively as our agent in areas where we can't protect ourselves.

Given what the Public Sensor is supposed to do, the environment which operates on those actors who constitute it is necessarily of importance. It's characteristics, apart from and in addition to the qualit
ies of particular individuals, will help to determine what it is reasonable for people “out of their senses” to expect. What were the characteristics of the Public Sensor's environment in the hepatitis incident?

That environment is like others in which (1) an administrative agency is responsible for protecting a certain segment of the public from the potentially serious consequences of industrial practices (2) in the light of uncertainty about the impact of those practices, and (3) where there is certainty of harm to the industry from administrative action. In these circumstances the Public Sensor's activities are shaped by those mutually reinforcing factory bureaucratic conservatism, an identification with the concerns of those who are supposed to be regulated, and ambivalence about the public vs. private nature of what is supposed to be regulated. These factors, together with the less pre
dictable use value the issue might have for other political conflicts, create a context which defines how the problems of proof described in the previous section are interpreted and acted upon.

"Bureaucratic conservatism" refers to a number of practices charac
teristic of complex organizations charged with administrative responsibilities, and accountable to several constituencies having dif
ferent interests in their activities. One of these practices is the separa
tion of expertise from authority, occurring as a part of the general divi
dionalization of tasks and responsibilities. This separation is common, so we shouldn't be very surprised that the people who have to act on the basis of lab reports may not know how to interpret them. ("To us, we don't know lab lingo. 'Suspicious Peaks'? What is that?") Statement of
supervisor in Food and Drug Branch. Honolulu Star Bulletin, April 14, 1982.) Another is that there are indeed incentives to be cautious and make very certain of being "covered" before taking any non
routine action. ("If we had diaried the dairy and we were wrong, we could have got in trouble for false dissemination of news." Statement of
supervisor in Food and Drug Branch. Honolulu Star Bulletin, April 14, 1982.) Part of this "cover," made possible by the divisionalization of responsibility, is of course the ability to avoid being defined as responsible. ("We only print the results. If there's anything sneaky down there, its for them [the Food and Drug Branch] to doubt, not me." Statement of supervisor in Laboratories Branch. Honolulu Star Bulletin, April 14, 1982.) Here, then, the people who have the informa
tion aren't authorized to act on it; those who are authorized both can't make sense of it, and have every incentive to remain in that condition.

The importance of this conservatism is exaggerated by the real uncer
tainties of knowing described in the previous section. It is difficult enough for people operating in a context of highly divisionalized re
sponsibilities and skill specializations to know how to utilize this kind of knowledge. Consider then that hepatitis is, from their perspective, just one of many economic practices which may be harmful to the public's health at some time in the future. (For a description of the magnitude of the problem, see Department of Agriculture, 1969, which anticipated and assured a warning for this kind of problem more than a decade ago. It then didn't go far enough, which the whole thing to seem "unrealistic," "exaggerated," or perhaps even "dull," making it easier to do what is least troublesome within or outside of the agency.

A second factor shaping what the Public Sensor does or doesn't do is a "natural" identification with the concerns of the people being regulat
ed — in this case dairy farmers and milk processors. The result of this identification is the public agents coming to define their roles in pri
marily a way that reduces their interests. ("We have always tried to protect them [the dairy industry]. If we had responded sooner, there were a lot of other problems like this." Honolulu Star Bulletin, April 14, 1982.) This happens for a number of fairly well-known reasons. One is simply familiarity. Those monitoring the milk industry by its people and are regularly apprised of their present or potential econom
ic problems. Because of this there was a strong inclination to minimize
the implications for the consumer of milk's contamination. For the Public Health, making it "a problem" would clearly harm the industry whose difficulties and personalities are known. And just as clearly it would upset the general public (perhaps bringing calls for accountability as well). Both of these things would happen, while contamination itself might be harmful to the public's health sometime in the future.

The need for trust, required in day-to-day operations, also shapes identification. Trust is a requirement because the state does not allocate sufficient resources for the Department of Health to monitor without assistance, making it necessary to rely heavily on the good faith of the industry.21 The agricultural and milk industries must be trusted to obey regulations and report irregularities, even when it is clear such obediance and reporting may not be in their economic interest. The problem is that the trust which is necessary — and institutionalized — in normal operations has spilled over into situations where it is inappropriate.

The third factor is milk's ambivalent status as a public or private commodity. Because the legislature and the Governor agreed that milk is an essential food, and developed laws and administrative procedures to protect its local producers while maximizing its consumption, milk in Hawaii is in a sense a public product.22 However, if it is reasonable to protect producers, it also seems appropriate to expect some degree of public control. In fact, what has happened is that while the public has declared to have a specific interest in milk, that interest is unevenly applied.23 Milk producers are guaranteed a price and protection from competition. At the same time, they can successfully claim to be a private industry in regard to most of their practices. One practical consequence of this is the separation of information from responsibility: what the public needs to know to protect its interest is controlled by the producer, who both manages access and is defined as having little responsibility for its use.

MILK AS A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PRODUCT

The essentiality of cow's milk is an important factor shaping this incident. This was a "crisis" for the public and for various elected officials and administrators, rather than an economic problem for the milk industry and an inconvenience for everyone else, precisely because milk is presumed necessary to the public's well-being.24 If Mini Potato Chips were essential and became adulterated, there would be a crisis and not just an inconvenience. Since they're not, any adulteration of them experienced by a public agency would leave no question that a "special interest" was being protected at the public's expense.

The MIL Act was passed in Hawaii in 1979. It guarantees the producers a profitable return by establishing minimum milk prices, and protects the local milk industry from internal or external competition.

The Great Hawaiian Milk Crisis

The Board of Agriculture, in implementing the Act, declared that "milk is an essential food in the daily diet and lack of such milk is injurious to the public health and welfare of our inhabitants."

The purpose of the Hawaii Milk Control Act is to protect an essential product from the vicissitudes of the marketplace. The local milk industry has argued successfully that there are threats to continued milk production in Hawaii. These might leave the local population dependent on a transoceanic connection, which in turn could be broken by shipping strikes, war, poor weather, and so on. One threat is increased costs for basic feed products purchased locally and on the mainland and for transporting mainland feeds to Hawaii. Another, probably more significant, is an uneven demand for milk during the year. These "wide fluctuations" coincide with the schedules of the public schools.25 The problem, of course, is that the milk producers are unable to "shut off" the cows when institutional consumption drops. Milk producers contend that all these circumstances create an incentive for them to produce less and sell less milk. The MIL Act interprets this as an imminent peril to the public health and safety, and forms a package of protection. The contingencies of the Act raise one of the most interesting aspects of Hawaii's milk episode, and at the same time connect it to a national pattern in which an economic interest has successfully used the state to create and maintain a favored position. The thread which leads into that pattern is whether milk is in fact an essential product, and indeed whether it is even a useful one for most people. Although milk is authoritatively endorsed as a necessary commodity, what is known about it is in many respects quite different. Just how different is a matter of dispute, although there seems little question on some points.

One is that milk is simply not an essential food per se. What it provides that is required can be at least equally well — in terms of quality and cost — from other sources. Another is that many adults — actually most — may not be able to use what milk potentially has to offer (Bayless et al., 1975 Gilat, 1979). The problem is that they do not produce, after the first few years, an enzyme necessary to assimilate and metabolize its nutrients. For these people the consumption of milk can bring anything from a mild discomfort to more serious health problems (Gilat, 1979; Oski and Bell, 1979). Many adults have experienced "miraculous" improvements in their health by simply eliminating milk.

Related to the problems which adults have with milk are the allergic reactions found in infants and young children. Bohm and Heiner (1980) have shown in their extensively detailed study of milk's effects on American children, that between one and three per cent of males and females up to the age of three develop varying degrees of allergic reactions.

The third point on which there is a high degree of agreement is the role of cow's milk in human obesity. Cow's milk is known to provide...
calves with rapid growth and weight gain. When humans use it regularly it leads to a rapid build-up of fatty cells. This is a particular problem for people who as infants develop an undesirable quantity of fat cells, forecasting difficulties with adult obesity (Whitehead, 1976; Oski, 1977).

Concerns about milk as a food product which have less agreement suggest its role in atherosclerosis; the effects of pasteurization on the quality of the calcium, protein and bacterial flora; and the manner in which it acts as a "spoon" for certain chemicals used in industrial agriculture, as in the heptachlor case. Without trying to decide the correctness of these and their counter-arguments, what we must say about cow's milk is that its value is clearly in doubt. It can be a source of some essential nutrients for some people and a source of mild to more serious health problems for a good many others. The nutrients provided to those able to utilize it can be obtained from other sources. The same points hold for its derivative products, such as cheese and cottage cheese.

Since a food product which is so problematic has become institutionalized, it is safe to assume the milk industry has represented itself well in the corridors of power. When we consider it may be not merely unessential, but an active problem, it becomes clear milk producers have been represented very well indeed. It is at this point the Hawaii milk episode becomes a local manifestation of the national political-economy of milk.

Milk is a $35 billion business in the United States. The dairy industry is also one of the best organized for the purposes of promoting milk consumption and using the state to protect its interests - that is, for converting economic interest into political power. The industry's lobbying and advertising organizations derive their funds from mandatory fees assessed cooperative members, and in 1982 its 18 political-action committees (PACs) contributed "at least" $1.8 billion to various congressmen. (Donahue, 1983:62) This amount exceeded that given by the American Medical Association's PAC, illustrating why the milk lobby for some time has been considered one of the most powerful in the nation.

The result of the long-term efforts of the milk industry is that in 1983 the federal government spent about $2.4 billion buying dairy products in order to preserve established prices. As of July 1983 it owned 481.1 million pounds of butter, 932.7 million pounds of cheese, and a surplus of milk equivalent to about 150 eight ounce glasses for every American. All of what the government owns is worth an estimated $3 billion, and costs over $500 million a year to ship and store. (Donahue, 1983).

While it is difficult to guess what the price of milk would be without government supports, the added cost to consumers is frequently placed in the billions of dollars. Local peculiarities aside, to a great degree Hawaii's Act is a reflection of the national political-economy of milk. On the mainland, Milk Con-
The second example is local and involves the Milk Action Plan, a set of recommendations for action in the aftermath of the milk crisis, made by representatives of the Departments of Health and Agriculture and the University of Hawaii's College of Tropical Agriculture. (Milk Action Plan, April 20, 1982). The group offered a number of proposals involving the purification and monitoring of dairy products, as well as indemnity payments to the industry. One of their primary missions, however, was to "re-establish fresh milk as a vital human nutrient." (Milk Action Plan, 1982:2,20) This would involve creating an education plan for primary and secondary schools, since "otherwise there is no point in re-establishing previous production levels" (Milk Action Plan, 1982:20). But the Plan goes beyond even this commitment of public resources and suggests the wisdom of trying to increase fluid milk consumption, noting that Hawaii trails other states in that area. Following the spirit of this concern for the industry's well-being, dairy representatives lobbied the 1984 legislature for $50,000 to help "restore confidence in milk," arguing the resources they could devote to that purpose were exhausted.

Several consequences of importance flow from recognizing the role of the political-economy of milk in this incident. One is that while there has been a crisis for the local milk industry, the Health Department, and even consumers accustomed to drinking milk, there is hardly a "health crisis" in terms of the loss of an essential food. In all probability many people are feeling better because they have been forced to abstain.

Another is a situation which is, from almost any perspective but that of the economically vested interests, ironic and difficult to rationalize. A food product is defined as essential; its essentiality raises the costs to the very consumers who supposedly need it; and, because public policy rests on protection of the local industry, contamination of the needed supply is not judged adequate reason for milk to be brought into the state on an emergency basis. Lodged in this network of seemingly contradictory actions and reactions are of course the political arrangements holding together what otherwise might fall if exposed to a different point of view.

A third consequence is that the created essentiality of milk has helped preclude any serious discussion of alternative sources for the nutrients milk is supposed to provide. Although alternatives are readily available to anyone having basic information, at no time during the episode did the Department of Health utilize its resources to provide such information. On the contrary, most efforts were aimed at assuring the public of the safety of the milk available while promising that a "regular supply of pure milk" would soon be back on store shelves. This distinction is particularly surprising in a place where soybean products, an excellent source of calcium, protein and other nutrients, are more commonly used and therefore easily accessible. 31

Another manifestation of milk politics is an implicit ethnocentrism, something made more evident in multi-ethnic Hawaii. As noted previously, milk is not a food easily assimilated by most people. The "normal deficiency" has been shown to vary across ethnic groups, and to be based upon ethnicity rather than geography. Moreover, movement from one place to another does not change this (Gilat, 1979). What is perhaps most surprising of all, a very high proportion of Asians are deficient in lactase, while a high proportion of Caucasians have it (Gilat, 1979; Barless, 1975; 1972). In a state where non-Caucasians constitute most of the population, milk's public endorsement is even harder to justify. Essentially an ethnic food has been officially sanctioned without consideration for its less-than-universal qualities. And while Hawaii's population mix shows this dramatically, the same point applies in other parts of the United States, where blacks are predominantly lactose intolerant.

Finally, an understanding of milk as a political phenomenon must raise questions about agricultural policy in Hawaii. If it is clear milk is not an essential food, protection by the state cannot be justified on that basis. Knowing this would seem to require asking what other reasons there are for milk's privileged position in public policy.

There are some potential justifications. It might, like sugar, be defined as essential to the state's economy. Or it might be part of the state's long-term goal of establishing a higher degree of independence in food production through agricultural diversification. Whatever it is justified in terms of, it isn't defensible — and in fact is mainly ironic — to continue relying on its essentiality. In the long run, the current "milk crisis" may be useful if it focuses attention on the need to reassess the political-economy of milk and milk policy in the light of a better informed understanding of the public's interest. In Hawaii, the factors most likely to maintain the milk industry as a ward of the state are the institutionalized understanding of milk, the organizational strength of the milk lobby, and the fact that most costs of the Milk Act go directly to the consumer as higher prices rather than appearing as an item to be defended in anyone's budget.

CONCLUSION

Part of what constitutes this issue is the competence, or lack thereof, of specific individuals. It is also the case that the revelation of a potent insecticide in the milk supply is an event which has use-value. It is exploitable by the media to attract the public's attention, a capability — we need to constantly remind ourselves — upon which the media's well-being rests. And it is a tool to be used in electoral campaigns as well as less public struggles for power. And of course there is the matter of bureaucratic inefficiency in handling the unexpected.
The point I want to emphasize in this article, however, is the significance of certain structural factors in shaping what this incident means. Of most importance is the likelihood that the features which shaped this incident will shape others. It is hard to imagine, given the heavy reliance of modern agriculture on biochemical agents, that other substances will not find their way into the food supply. In fact, since the heptachlor episode, there has been a spate of contaminations, each of which has been dominated by uncertainty of effect and conflict over proper policy. Should — or when — pesticides or something else turn up in still another part of the food supply, we ought to anticipate how the problem of proof, the environment of the public sensor, and the political economy of the product shape its handling. How can this anticipation be used to advantage?

First, what I've described as the "don't know" position of the scientific adviser ought to be appreciated more than it is by those "administrating" public policy. This appreciation should incorporate understanding that their role necessarily involves making decisions which cannot be defined or defended as only, or even mainly, technical. And it should encourage efforts to improve the quality of communications with the scientific community in order to better receive and interpret the advice which it gives.

Next, people who are charged with protecting the public's interest — in health or something else — often do so under extraordinarily complicated circumstances. I've tried to summarize some of that complexity by focusing on the extreme divisionalization of responsibility and authority, low access to pertinent information, and inevitable uncertainty about what is the "public interest." If we expect officials to meet their responsibilities, then more attention needs to be paid to both the organizational setting they work within, and the kinds of training they receive for dealing with both the routine and the extraordinary.

Third, what products should be given public standing? I've suggested that the status assigned milk is rich in irony. This irony results from a manifestation of the rational-political economy of milk adapted to local conditions. Of equal import is the point that the essentiality issue has more general influence as a part of political and economic life. Since producers have a natural interest in the likely benefits, many attempts to have their products defined as essential. The basis for the presumed indispensability includes the characteristics of the product (such as milk or medicine), the importance of the industry (such as automobiles or agriculture), or the value of a stable market (such as airlines or dairies).

All of these claims may be justifiable - that is, they may contain interests substantially beyond that of the economic actor advancing them. That is a matter of careful analysis. But it is certain that the political-economy of essentiality, if not analyzed, has important consequences for both the treatment of uncertainty and the actions of the public sensor. In the case of milk, the politically derived and authoritatively enforced definition of milk's essentiality has unquestionably lead to poorer decision-making. Decision-makers were ultimately in the position of evaluating whose interests would be affected in what ways. A different understanding of milk's importance, simply by altering the presumed relationship between needs, risk and potential harm (i.e., why risk anyone's health over something they don't need), would create different incentives and different decisions. Changing the definition of milk's importance would, in other words, make it clearer that the public interest doesn't lie in it.

NOTES

1. One might think that the Food and Drug Administration would have authority in this area. It falls within the EPA's jurisdiction because, while a food product, the milk has not yet reached the consumer.

2. Heptachlor is itself the replacement for another banned insecticide named Mirex.

3. The residues combine with the milk fat molecules.

4. The origin of the 0.3 standard is an interesting element in this incident. There is nothing obvious about it in biochemical terms. It was a negotiated agreement which balanced (1) the fact that a five year sentence had been established, making it harder to justify requests for protracted testing, (2) the knowledge that lower level amounts of pesticides and herbicides commonly come and go in milk samples (a reflection of the technologies of contemporary industrial agriculture), and this standard would tolerate them without calling for "too hasty" action, and (3) possible errors of detection. One of the side issues is the supposed increase in error associated with trying to specify smaller and smaller ppm. The idea of the error range has subsequently provided — as in this incident — a rationale, and perhaps even an incentive, not to take any single result seriously, especially if the consequences of acting are dramatic. Many contend that, given available technology, there is virtually no error at these levels, and mentioning it only creates a smokescreen for other reasons not to act. Their position is that technology has improved since the action standard was set and now it should be lowered to meet the intention of the zero tolerance rule. They note the World Health Organization has established 0.15 ppm as the action level. Another
interesting side issue is that for unknown reasons, the 0.3 ppm action standard was never published in the federal register for public review.

5. The 'economic ecology' described here was facilitated by the Animal Sciences program at the University of Hawaii. Acting under promises about the importance of the milk industry in the state (see section three), that program developed machinery for removing and cutting up more and more of the plants' leaves. Unwittingly, their activities probably contributed to the problem, because pineapple leaves nearer the ground contain higher concentrations of heptachlor (it is sprayed onto the soil and carried up through the plant). The higher concentration in the leaves, together with the fact that dairies have increased the percentage of green chop in cows' feed, is one factor accounting for its presence at the levels which paralyzed the Department of Health.

6. It is also likely that the incident resulted in part from disregarding application rules.

7. The Senate Committee's conclusions are reviewed in the conclusion, and the Action Plan is considered in the third section of this article.

8. In the 1978 campaign the Governor used the slogan "Quiet but Effective," with apparent success. By May 1982 signs and t-shirts had appeared depicting a molecule, over which were the words: "Heptachlor, Quiet but Effective".

9. From this perspective one is led to think of diethylstilbestrol (DES) daughters and sons.

10. The Hawaii Milk Control Act is discussed in the third section.

11. Different labs may use different methods of analysis; samples from the same source will vary from test to test, even if only a short time has elapsed. There are the matters of adequate training and the boredom factor in reading analyses.

12. Since other diseases are involved, the problem is naturally more complex. Short-term toxic reactions are very unlikely at these doses. However, heptachlor is thought to be a contributor to long-term liver disorders. In addition it has been suggested that consumption of the pesticide may contribute to behavioral (as opposed to morphological) disorders. (see Dabanoski, 1984; Weiss, 1983)


14. Dr. Frederick Greenwood, Director, Pacific Biomedical Research Laboratory, University of Hawaii, April 14, 1982.

15. It is important to note that the problems which chronic diseases present have placed considerable stress on the paradigm health science has used to explain disease. This model was inherited from laboratory work, and proved to be quite successful when applied to infectious disease. The fact that it works less well for chronic diseases with environmental components suggests that, given the social importance of doing something about these diseases, the health science disciplines might see a transformation of their paradigm. In fact it is now possible to find people in the field treating the paradigm as problematic. (c.f. Stallone, 1980; Marmot, 1976).

16. It is not surprising, then, to learn that, "After seven hours of testimony yesterday, state Senator Cayetano had not learned to what extent heptachlor was dangerous to adults or babies. What he did learn is that nobody really knows." The Honolulu Advertiser, May 22, 1982.

17. There are a number of interesting aspects here. One is the degree to which people feel it necessary or desirable to "override" the warnings of their sensory systems. Hearing loss is now commonly the result of an individual's decision not to respond to noise levels associated with work. Cigarette smoking is perhaps the best example of the consequences of these override decisions, and in addition points to another part of the phenomenon: the attempt to educate people out of their senses. This in turn leads to the phenomenon of economic benefit deriving from the ability to alienate people from their senses. Obesity is a good case in point. Finally, there is a development in which sub-threshold activities have been made illegal for some kinds of private uses, and legal for others. Subliminal advertising in the television or radio media is illegal, but retail stores may send unheard admonitions against stealing through the Musak system.

18. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 illustrates this nicely. To oversimplify, at the turn of the twentieth century it was possible for employers to successfully make the case to judges and lawmakers that they should not pay damages for injury or allow the enactment of compensation laws which would obligate payment to workers injured on the job. They argued some combination of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule (other em-
employees are responsible), or — as a last resort — assumed risk (the employee accepts the possibility of injury when taking the job). By 1970 the technology of the work place had changed so much that it was not only impossible to avoid the problem of work-caused disease (as opposed to injury), but it was also untenable to say that the worker or his/her peers could know enough to avoid being burned or doing harm. The DEC Act thus reflects the changing relationship between man-made environments and human competence brought about by the introduction of profit-producing technologies. The Toxic Substances Control Act, on which the EPA is based, also reflects a recognition of this same changing relationship.

19 There seems little question that its occurrence in a gubernatorial election year affected how this was handled. The incumbent administration was concerned about the issue developing in a way which made it susceptible to campaign uses. This in turn created an incentive to "contain" the issue longer than others might think appropriate. It also explains the importance given to statements that the problem was "not serious" once there was some suggestion of mishandling and irresponsibility. But beyond the dynamics of electoral politics, there is the possibility that an issue may provide advantages for one individual or group in the multitude of issue and personality conflicts which are always around.

20 The issue of knowledge utilization is significant and separable from the problems of proof raised here. While it's not discussed in this analysis, the matter of how scientists and administrators talk to each other is an important part of this issue.

21 On the island of Oahu eight health inspectors are charged with monitoring all local manufacture and distribution of foods, including milk.

22 This part of the issue is elaborated in the next section. In the specific matter of milk's public character, see Peter Mortenson Milk (Introduction to a Public Utility (1940-66)), who states that "milk... because of its special importance in protecting and promoting the public welfare, should become a public utility like water, gas and electricity."

23 This pattern of public protection and private control is characteristic of other areas, the most notable of which is undoubtedly the medical profession.

24 The impact of the processedessentality is illustrated by an incident which occurred at the University of Hawaii, after the island's milk supply was known to be contaminated. As part of the University's anniversary celebration, Food and Nutrition program students developed a display which, among other things, purported to instruct passers-by on healthful eating. A prominently placed sign informed already anxious citizens that "Every Body Needs Milk." Allegiance to Mark Spitz aside, it was removed when discovered by the program's chairman.


26 It may be worth noting that the passage of the 1967 Act coincided with the loss of another institutional consumer. As part of the war effort, thousands of troops left Schofield Barracks on Oahu for Vietnam.

27 After a survey of the problem Glot points out that in the last ten to fifteen years we have come to understand that what was seen as a deficiency in handling milk is in fact the normal condition. The so-called deficiency is genetically controlled by a regulatory mechanism for adult humans, who don't need milk. As will be suggested by points made below on the ethnic specificity of milk, seeing the inability to use milk as abnormal probably reflects the cultural biases of Western-based science.

28 Lactose, or milk sugar, is a disaccharide made up of the monosaccharides glucose and galactose. Lactase is an enzyme produced in the small intestine which converts lactose into the simple sugars for absorption through the intestinal wall into the bloodstream. It appears that most people stop producing lactase after about the fourth year of life, which is of course the time mothers would stop producing milk. Some research suggests that the consumption of cow's milk by lactose-deficient adults can reactivate production of the enzyme, thus reducing the importance of a genetic explanation. (See Glotz, Glotz, Johnson et al. 1980 & 1981.)

29 In the fiscal year ending September 1982, the federal government bought dairy products derived from 1.6 billion gallons of milk, which is about ten per cent of the year's total milk production.

30 Even though they failed in other respects, the 1930s milk had become institutionalized thanks largely to the work of the
cooperatives. A good example of its status is provided by Crum- bine and Tobey's "The Most Nearly Perfect Food - The Story of Milk," published in 1929. The title page is faced by the photograph of a cow standing alone in the tall trees next to a lake, peacefully--almost contemplatively--looking across its grazing area. Noble Clark, from the Agricultural Experiment Station at the University of Wisconsin, writes in a preface that, "More than any other food product milk has won recognition as a food vital to the health of our people. Each day the milk must reach the hospital and the homes where little children are--in spite of storms and regardless of strikes or other civil disturbances." In this light, the cow's contemplative stance becomes more understandable.

31. Hawaii's Milk Control Act was passed in 1967, in the same year that the National Farmers Organization put together a politically successful "milk dump" in twenty-five states to protest excess production and falling prices. (Walters, 1968.)

32. In Hawaii, one-half gallon of milk costs about $1.65. The current price in Southern California is $1.05. The Hawaii manager of a national retail food corporation told us that without any question milk could be airflown to Hawaii and sold for less than what is charged locally. It hasn't been until recently because of the Milk Act.

33. The soybean relationship to the milk story is itself an interesting one. The United States is the largest producer of soybeans, but Americans consume a very small percentage of them. Instead they are used as, among other things, the basis for producing foods which are more expensive and in many ways less healthy. They are, for example, used as a feed for dairy animals.

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SECTORS OF PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN HAWAII, 1975

Joyce N. Chinen

Many studies of the social situation in Hawaii have noted that income and occupational patterns seem to be related to such characteristics as ethnicity, education and sex, but it is difficult to find a study that systematically explores the social structural bases of these patterns. Most studies have taken a socio-historical approach, and assume that over time social conditions will tend to either improve or deteriorate for certain populations (Lind, 1980; Fuchs, 1968; Daws, 1968; Kent, 1983). Thus, in this study of income inequality in Hawaii, a structural approach will be used. It will begin with a brief review of some recently used theoretical perspectives on income inequality, discuss the rationale for using a structural approach, and then formulate some research questions to guide the study. Following this section, the research methodology, including the variables and data set to be used, will be described. Finally, the results of the analysis will be reported and discussed.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Studies of income inequality in the United States in recent years have focused on wage differences, but there is not yet agreement on which factors most affect wages. One researcher, Almquist (1979), has noted that there are at least three schools of thought on this matter. They are (1) the human capital and status attainment theories; (2) the dual labor market theory and (3) the structural or radical economic theories. These theories differ in terms of their political orientations regarding the desirability of income inequality and approaches to its reduction. Even more important, however, the theories vary in terms of which units are selected for analysis (e.g., individuals, labor markets, sectors of the economy). This is an important consideration since some of the units are more inclusive than others.

The human capital perspective focuses on individuals and assumes that behavioral choices have been made by them in acquiring skills, education, union membership, etc., which then affect their attractiveness to prospective employers. While the status attainment perspective parallels the human capital perspective, it recognizes that social factors such as family background affect the kinds of choices that individuals make in acquiring their skills, education, etc. Both perspectives agree, however, that individuals’ motivations and/or actions are the primary determinants of their income levels.
The dual labor market theory represents a middle level theory. It focuses on the conditions faced by aggregates of individuals because of their representative positions in one of the two segments of the labor market. The work of Doeringer and Piore (1971) suggests that jobs in the primary labor market tend to be more stable, with higher wages and better working conditions, while those in the secondary labor market tend to be unstable, with low pay and undesirable working conditions. Here the unit of analysis is the segment of the labor market, and the focus is on aggregates of individuals whose income levels are determined by their location in one of the segments.

Finally, structural or radical theorists, such as O'Connor (1973) and Bluestone (1973), focus on the features of advanced industrial capitalism, class conflict, and the segmentation of the whole economy. In this perspective, the structure of the political economy is emphasized, and it represents the most inclusive unit of analysis because it subsumes not only aggregates of individuals in different labor markets, but also those in different segments of the economy. While the explanatory factors at this level are impersonal and further removed from individuals' experiences and characteristics, they also structure the variation among the specific aggregates of individuals.

Each theoretical approach to the study of income inequality involves both strengths and weaknesses. Human capital and status attainment models, which are most popular, focus on the specific characteristics of individuals, but ignore how those characteristics are socially ordered. The dual labor market theory focuses on the social ordering of personal characteristics in the labor market, but ignores the structural features of the larger economy. Only the structural theories take into account the structure of the entire economy. For this reason, this investigation of income inequality in Hawaii will take a structural approach and focus on sectors of productive capital as the primary determinant of income inequality in Hawaii. Since the study will adopt the theoretical framework presented by James O'Connor, some of his ideas will now be examined.

O'CONNOR'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In The Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973), James O'Connor analyzes the troublesome condition which is increasingly facing the state in nations with advanced capitalist economies: the condition of simultaneously expanding expenditures and declining revenues. Chronic fiscal instability and periodic crises tend to be the result, and according to O'Connor, the reason for it can be found in the contradictory role that the state must play in capitalist national economics. That contradictory role requires that the state both assist in the process of private capital accumulation and provide the conditions of social harmony in the society.

The latter function (legitimation) is essential and related to the successful performance of the former function (accumulation), but increasingly, meeting the accumulation function produces social dislocations and overall disharmony in the society. Thus, the state continually needs to expand to perform both functions, but it must do so with a constricting resource base.

Essentially, O'Connor asserts that there are three sectors of productive capital: monopolistic, competitive, and state. The first two sectors are engaged in economic production for private profit, while the state sector is engaged in production presumably for the whole society's benefit. But while monopoly and competitive sectors both produce for private gain, they differ considerably in the particular way they produce for private gain. These differences lie in their respective relationships to the state, and result in differences in their respective levels of profit.

According to O'Connor, the growth in the power of both the monopoly and the state sectors are interdependent. Monopoly sector industries tend to use economies of scale and rely on state sector production to socialize much of their pre- and post-production costs; they can therefore reap higher levels of profit. The state sector, in turn, relies on the monopoly sector for its legitimation, its justification for its continuing expansion and, to some extent, its capital (taxes). Competitive sector industries, by contrast, do not enjoy the same kind of relationship that monopoly sector industries have with the state sector; thus, the benefits and levels of profit of competitive sector industries are much lower than those of monopoly sector industries.

Differences in benefits extend to workers in the economic sector as well. O'Connor explains that the costs of wages, benefits and working conditions of monopoly sector workers tend to be administered, or simply passed on in the prices of goods and services produced by the monopoly sector. In contrast, competition in the marketplace determines the wages, benefits and working conditions of workers in the competitive sector. And, since the state sector is tied to the monopoly sector, the conditions of state sector workers tend to resemble those of monopoly sector workers, although to a somewhat lesser degree. Thus, wage levels are presumably highest in the monopoly sector, and lowest in the competitive sector, with state sector wages in between the two, but closely following those in the monopoly sector.

One attempt to empirically test O'Connor's ideas as they apply to the conditions of labor was conducted by Randy Hodson (1978). Using Current Population Survey data from March 1973 for a cross-sectional analysis, Hodson demonstrated that sectors of productive capital seem to structure inequality into the wage, unemployment and underemployment conditions of the U.S. labor force. However, the data also indicated patterns which did not exactly correspond to those predicted by O'Connor's framework, particularly the proportional distribution of the labor force across the sectors. O'Connor expected that the work-
force would be evenly divided among the three sectors, but Hudson found the workforce distribution to be 24% in the monopoly sector, 43% in the competitive sector, and 17% in the state sector. Both O'Connor's framework and Hudson's empirical work involved analyses of the political economy at the level of the nation-state. This study will attempt to extend their respective work, to see whether this framework might be equally useful in understanding income inequality in a local-level economy. There are some problems, however, in taking this approach. First, as O'Connor has pointed out, state and local governments' borrowing and debt are governed by different political economic principles from those of the federal government; state and local government debts involve limited-term private financing, whereas federal debt is indefinite and administered (O'Connor 1973:193). Second, state and local government operations tend to be circumscribed by the structure and operations of the federal government. But to the extent that O'Connor's major propositions about the dual and contradictory functions of the state (to facilitate both accumulation and legitimation) also apply to the state at state and local levels, the framework may also be used to study the structural basis of income inequality in Hawaii.

This study will be guided by three major research questions. The first inquires about the proportional distribution of employment and social characteristics across sectors. The answer to this question will permit comparison of the sectoral distribution in the national and Hawaiian economies. The second concern, the distribution of incomes across sectors, will indicate whether there are indeed structural bases of the income inequality in Hawaii, just as there appear to be at the national level. Finally, the effects of social characteristics on the sector-based income levels, will be examined to see how these variables interact to produce particular kinds of income patterns.

**METHODOLOGY**

**Data**

The data set to be used in this investigation is a subsample of the 1975 Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Census Update, a random sample survey of households for the island of Oahu. Although other islands were included in the statewide survey, there were problems with the Kauai data, so this study will limit itself to the Oahu sample. This should not cause any problems since 80% of the state's resident population is located on Oahu. Also, this county incorporates both urban and rural areas, with both corporate and entrepreneurial agricultural activities represented in rural areas. Moreover, Honolulu, the capital and largest city in Hawaii, is located on this island; Oahu, therefore, represents quite well the social, political and economic activity for the State of Hawaii. Thus, the data set for this study consists of a random sample of the Oahu sample survey and includes 1656 subjects, of which 485 were employed full-time.

**Variables**

This study has proposed to investigate the relationship between sectors of economic production and income inequality. Income level will therefore be considered the dependent variable. Since income was coded into income-range categories, calculations of mean income levels will use the mid-point of income-range categories. The mid-point of income categories will therefore be used as the indicator of a subject's income. Because income levels are affected by the type of employment, most of the analysis will be performed on full-time employed persons.

The determination of the productive sectors represents a somewhat more complex task. While O'Connor has provided a description of the characteristics of each of the sectors, he has not provided precise criteria for their determination. Instead, O'Connor suggests that the sectors are composed of different types of industries, and this is why Hudson used industries to indicate sectors. Unfortunately, however, the criteria Hudson used to assign specific industries into the specific sectors are also not clearly specified. Nevertheless, both authors point to the need to view the sectors of economic production as being organized in terms of industries. In this regard, they are not alone. Other scholars, such as Robert Bluester, have previously noted that industries differ in their economic structure as well as in other characteristics, and that these differences have important implications for workers in those industries (1964:10).

The methodological question, then, is: on what basis should industries be distinguished? The answer depends both on theory as well as on the kinds of information available on industry characteristics. On the bases of both theoretical considerations and a review of two sources of census data, two characteristics will be used to differentiate industries into the three sectors of economic production: workforce size and amount of sales or receipts.

Workforce size will be used because O'Connor states that monopoly sector industries tend to utilize economies of scale. Furthermore, the usefulness of this criterion has been empirically supported. For example, Aldrich and Weiss (1981:283) have demonstrated that workforce size is an important characteristic which internality differentiates the capitalist class. Similarly, although the 1975 County Business Patterns data show an average per-firm size of 15.7 employees for all industries, there is a considerable range, from an average of 3.7 employees for the 99 dentist offices, to 750 for a single electrical service
firm. Based on these considerations, the criterion of 25% or more firms in a given three-digit industry category with fifty or more employees, will be used to distinguish monopoly sector industries from other sectors’ industries. 6

The second characteristic which will be used to differentiate industries into productive sectors is the average per-firm amount of sales or receipts of industries. The use of economies of scale would also require sizeable sales (or receipts) by monopoly sector industries. The 1972 Census of Manufactures, of Wholesale Trade, of Retail Trade and of Services were examined for information on amount of sales or receipts. They show that average industry per-firm sales or receipts vary from $107,624 for services to $1,236,869 for manufctures. Thus, industries with average per-firm receipts of $1,000,000 or more will be considered to be monopoly sector in this study. 7

Finally, both the distribution and effect of social characteristics such as age, education, ethnicity, and sex across sectors will be examined. Grouped categories will be used for age and educational level, and comparisons will be made among the five largest ethnic groups for ethnicity (non-Portuguese Caucasian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese and Part-Hawaiian).

To summarize, then, income will be considered the dependent variable in this study, and the mid-point of income-range categories of employed persons will be used to measure income. Productive sectors will be considered the independent variable, and two factors, workforce size and per-firm sales or receipts, will be used to classify industries into monopoly, competitive and state sectors (see appendix). Lastly, in order to examine the effects of social characteristics on the sector-income relationship, the effects of variables such as age, education, sex and ethnicity will also be considered.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Size of Sectors

The first task of this study is to determine the proportional distribution of Hawaii's productive sectors. Table one presents information on the relative size of each of these sectors, and is accompanied by O'Conor’s estimates and Hodson’s national level findings. The figures show that total employment in Hawaii’s state sector is comparable to that found by Hodson at the national level. The monopoly sector, on the other hand, is extremely small, less than half the size nationally; thus most employment is found in the competitive sector.

While it is possible that these figures are the result of sampling error, the phenomenon of a large competitive sector and a small monopoly sector is quite understandable in light of the kinds of industries that make up the Hawaiian economy. Most of Hawaii’s firms are engaged in service or retail trade areas; manufacturing, which is usually associated with monopoly sector industries, represents only about 7% of economic activity in Hawaii, and most of that is in non-durables. As a result, the four leading industries in Hawaii are tourism, the military, sugar and pineapple, in that order (Department of Planning and Economic Development, 1980:233). Furthermore, Hawaii’s modern social history—its legacy of colonialism, the agency system, the use of contract immigrant labor, concentration of political power in the hands of a few and the resulting need to use external capital to fuel its recent economic development efforts—all point to the reasonableness of finding such distortions in these economic sectors.

Table 1: Distribution of Employment in Productive Sectors
(in percentages, with numbers in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productive Sector</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(172)</td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(1259)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employed</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(130)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(252)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hodson’s findings</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Connor’s estimate</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 One missing case.
2 Hodson’s findings are based on a subsample of the Current Population Survey (CPS) or March 1973. It consists of the experienced civilian labor force (CLF) which is comprised of all non-agricultural males over fourteen years of age who worked last year.
3 Hodson also found 5.6% of the employment in the construction sector. Since construction functions as a local-level monopoly, employees, construction was kept separate for national-level analysis, but subsumed under monopoly sectors for the Hawaii analysis.
**Distribution of Social Characteristics**

O'Connor's assertions regarding the properties of the sectors would suggest that certain social characteristics should predominate in certain sectors. Youth and old age, female, minority racial/ethnic background and low education are all characteristics associated with lesser privilege in this society. Thus, if sectoral location affects the levels of derivable privilege, as O'Connor suggests, a greater proportion of persons with the previously mentioned characteristics can be expected to be found in the competitive sector. This is precisely what Hodson discovered in his national level study. But, what about the situation in Hawaii?

In spite of the differences between the national and the Hawaiian economy in terms of the size of the monopoly and competitive sectors, the distribution of social characteristics in the sectors, for the most part, appears to parallel Hodson's findings. However, there are also some important differences, as Table two shows, in the sectoral distribution of such factors as age, sex, and education.

While the prime age group dominates in each of the sectors, their representation is highest in the state sector (84.6%). The monopoly sector prime age workers make up 65.4% which is not too much more than the competitive sector (60.3%). Youth and older workers appear to be excluded from the state sector, but appear evenly represented in both the monopoly and competitive sectors. Thus, contrary to the theoretically generated expectations, the state sector appears to be the preferred sector in Hawaii, and the one from which both youth and the aged tend to be excluded.

Sex is another ascribed characteristic which may affect sectoral location. Table 2 also shows that women were more likely than men to be located in the competitive sector, and less likely to be in the monopoly sector. This finding is consistent with the expectations from O'Connor's model and Hodson's national level findings.

Educational variation within the sectors generally seems to parallel the age and sex distribution. Educational levels vary only slightly in the monopoly and competitive sectors, and in both, lower educational levels predominate. Higher (post-secondary) educational levels seem to dominate in the state sector. This is reasonable, since civil service and other equal employment opportunity requirements within this sector tend to stress the use of educational credentials as "objective" indicators of competence. Additionally, much of state sector work involves the collection and management of information, and would require personnel with higher levels of skill and training.

These findings generally parallel those of Hodson, but with one exception. That is that educational levels in all of Hawaii's sectors appear to be slightly higher than those nationally (the percentages for post-secondary schooling in the monopoly, state and competitive sectors in Hawaii are 32.2%, 38.5% and 41.0% as compared to 28.7%, 49.9% and 28.8% respectively at the national level). One reason for this difference may be the restricted size of Hawaii's monopoly sector which seems to have forced even those with post-secondary levels of education into the competitive sector.

**Table 2: Age, Sex and Education of Full-Time Employed Persons by Sector (in percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-17</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-34</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 plus</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 0-8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9-12</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Trade</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Work</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 21.4585 \text{ with 6 d.f., signif. } = 0.0001 \]
\[ \chi^2 = 21.2857 \text{ with 2 d.f., signif. } = 0.000 \]
\[ \chi^2 = 36.0156 \text{ with 10 d.f., signif. } = 0.001 \]
Ethnicity is probably one of the most important social characteristics in multi-ethnic Hawaii. Table three shows the distribution of ethnic groups across productive sectors, and while there are again a few unexpected findings, the results generally conform to the expectations of the sectoral theoretical framework. The most frequent location for the bulk of most ethnic groups is the competitive sector, and this finding is consistent with an earlier one that showed Hawaii's competitive sector being larger than its national level counterpart. However, contrary to expectations, a sizeable proportion of Filipinos and Part-Hawaiians were located in the monopoly sector. Also, Japanese and Caucasians were not as dominant in the state and monopoly sectors as expected. Noting the dominance of tourism, sugar, pineapple and construction, etc., in the monopoly sector, it can be speculated that the relatively large percentage of Filipinos and Part-Hawaiians in that sector may be due to their location in blue-collar type jobs of the monopoly sector industries. Similarly, their low percentage in the state sector may reflect that white-collar jobs are more likely to be occupied by Chinese, Japanese and Caucasians. This is certainly consistent with the ethnic occupational patterns for civilian males found by Lind in the U.S. Census and Hawaii Health Surveillance Program Survey data (Lind, 1988:82, 85, 87, 88).

Table 3: Ethnic Background of Full-time employed by Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productive Sector</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Hawaiian</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 31.238 \text{ with } 10 \text{ d.f.}, \text{signif.} = 0.0196 \]

In Tables two and three, the sectoral distribution of four social characteristics (age, sex, education and ethnicity) were examined. This was guided by the expectation that because certain social characteristics were more highly valued in the society, those characteristics would tend to dominate in certain sectors. Of the four variables examined, only the sectoral distribution of sex in Hawaii’s economy was found to conform exactly in the manner anticipated by O’Connor’s framework and Hodson’s national level findings. The sectoral distribution of the other three variables seems to suggest that the state sector appears to be the preferred sector, and that these patterns may be related to the small size of the monopoly sector in Hawaii. This study will now turn to an examination of the impact of sectoral positions, and address the major question of this study: Are income levels structurally affected by positions in sectors of economic production? If this is so, in what ways does the composition of sectors affect the income levels found within them?

Income by Sectors

Mean income patterns appear to both conform to, and deviate from, those expected by O’Connor’s theory and Hodson’s national level findings. As anticipated, mean income appears to be lowest in the competitive sector ($2,247). However, contrary to expectations, the mean income in the state sector ($10,555) seems to surpass that in the monopoly sector ($10,369). An eta value of 0.52 for income by sectors, indicates that a moderate association exists between these two variables, such that knowledge of sectoral location may enhance the prediction of income values by about 26%.

How then should these sectoral income patterns be understood? It appears that the lower mean income in the monopoly sector in Hawaii is related to the limited size of that sector (nearly half the size of its counterpart nationally). Size of the monopoly sector may be important in two interrelated ways. First, O’Connor has asserted that the growth of the state sector is tied to the growth of the monopoly sector because the state must facilitate monopoly capital accumulation. Extending this reasoning, it would be logical to expect that state sector activities should support, rather than surpass, the activities of private monopoly capital. Thus, if and when state activities extend beyond those of monopoly capital (as is indicated here by the relative size of the sectors), it would suggest a situation where state activities have taken priority over the interests of monopoly capital. Under these conditions, it would be reasonable to find mean income in the state sector to be somewhat higher than that in the monopoly sector.

Another possibility for the larger size, and thus the higher income in the state sector, may be found in the very nature of Hawaii’s monopoly and state sectors. As stated earlier, the monopoly sector is largely dominated by services and non-durable manufacturing industries.
which are less likely to generate much capital. At the same time, state sector activities involve at least three distinct governmental bureaucracies: County, State, and Federal (including the four services of the military). The activities of these various bureaucracies may tend to increase the size and influence of the state sector, and to limit the size and influence of the already small monopoly sector. Under such conditions, a disparity in mean income between the two sectors can again be expected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-17</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-34</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-plus</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sectors of Productive Capital

While the monopoly sector seems to follow the state sector in terms of mean income, its mean income is over four times that found in the competitive sector. Furthermore, when the ratio of monopoly to competitive sector income in Hawaii is compared to the national ratio in Hodge's sample, the monopoly to competitive income ratio in Hawaii is much higher than it is nationally (1.64 for the civilian labor force as compared to 4.61 for the Hawaii sample). This suggests that it may be more important to be located in the monopoly sector relative terms rather than in absolute terms in Hawaii, and that this may be related to the structural features of Hawaii's political economy.

The examination of sectoral incomes has found important differences in the mean incomes of the three productive sectors. Competitive sector income was clearly much lower than either monopoly or state sector incomes. While this finding was anticipated by the theoretical framework used, the magnitude of this difference was much greater than anticipated. On the other hand, the finding that the monopoly sector mean income was the lowest of those of the state and monopoly sectors was not anticipated by the theory, but does provide some important information about the nature of the monopoly sector.

This study will now turn to an analysis of sectoral income with regard to four social characteristics: age, sex, education and ethnic background. Since income level is tied to the number of hours worked, the following analysis will only examine full-time workers in the subsample (i.e. only those working 35 or more hours per week).

Sectoral Income by Social Characteristics

Table four shows the mean incomes in monopoly, competitive and state sectors for the various age groups. As expected, younger members of the workforce have the lowest mean incomes of all age groups. Human capital theory would attribute this to their lack of work experience. The O'Connor framework, however, would suggest that this represents a structural pattern of discrimination which is based on the specific characteristics of each sector. The latter contention appears to be supported in these data, since younger members of the workforce (18-25) not only seem to have the lowest mean incomes, but also have the lowest incomes which vary by sectoral location. Thus, those located in the monopoly sector have the highest income ($7,864), followed by those in the state sector ($6,214) and finally those in the competitive sector ($5,663).

The curvilinear relationship between age and mean income anticipated by O'Connor's framework appears to hold only in the competitive sector. This finding seems fairly reasonable since the theory asserts that competitive market conditions tend to operate in this sector, consequently the older age of workers would form a basis for discrimination against them. By contrast, in the monopoly and state sectors, mean in-
comes tend to increase with age. Human capital and status attainment theories would suggest that this pattern results from greater experience and career progression. The structural framework, however, would assert that the monopoly and state sectors’ use of concepts such as seniority to permit wages to be administered rather than set competitively; the practice of administering wages thus accounts for the pattern of higher income with age in monopoly and state sectors. Once again, however, higher incomes seem to be associated with the state rather than the monopoly sector. While this pattern deviates from those expected by O’Connor and Hodson’s work, it is consistent with the pattern found earlier in this investigation.

With regard to the characteristic of sex, Table four also shows that the mean incomes of males are consistently higher than those of females, and even the highest of the female mean incomes is lower than the lowest of male mean incomes. However, there are also important sectoral differences in these mean incomes. For both males and females, mean income is highest in the state sector ($9,774 for females and $14,743 for males). It is lowest for females in the competitive sector ($6,543), whereas it is lowest in the monopoly sector for males - $13,614.

Perhaps a more important finding was that the ratio of male-to-female mean income appears to be considerably affected by productive sectors. In relative terms, women appear to benefit most from being in the state sector: the male-to-female ratio for income is 1.51, as compared to 1.94 in the monopoly sector, and 2.13 in the competitive sector. This is consistent with the earlier findings, and also with O’Connor’s framework, which suggests that women and other minorities tend to benefit most by being located in the state sector where the legitimation function encourages more egalitarian treatment of minorities.

Education is one of those characteristics that human capital and status attainment theorists seem to stress in order to account for differences in income levels, and in Table four, it is evident that mean incomes vary by educational levels. However, while higher education is generally associated with higher mean income, sectoral location also produces considerable variation in income, even for those with the same level of education. For example, the mean income for those with college education is generally higher than for those with only primary or secondary education; however, the mean income in the college-educated category in the state sector was $14,606, or $1,606 higher than in the monopoly sector, and $3,429 higher than in the competitive sector. Finally, it is noteworthy that, with the exception of the graduate educational level, mean incomes in the competitive sector are consistently lower than those in the two other sectors, and this is true for all levels. Clearly, sectoral placement makes a difference.

The relationship of ethnic background to sectoral mean income will now be examined. Table five shows that there is considerable variation in mean incomes by ethnic background. In general, the mean incomes of Caucasians and Japanese are higher than those of other ethnic groups, while Filipino mean incomes are consistently lower than those of other ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, some ethnic groups, like the Chinese and Part-Hawaiians, have considerably more variation in their mean incomes, while others, like the Japanese, have less variation in their mean incomes across sectors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>16,868</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>15,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11,855)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14,911)</td>
<td>(15,514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>5,221</td>
<td>5,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4,906)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4,806)</td>
<td>(4,906)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>5,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14,562)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13,921)</td>
<td>(14,562)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Hawaiian</td>
<td>13,922</td>
<td>8,734</td>
<td>8,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6,990)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6,793)</td>
<td>(6,793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>11,972</td>
<td>11,169</td>
<td>12,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,862)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4,603)</td>
<td>(4,793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>8,672</td>
<td>8,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,794)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5,861)</td>
<td>(5,854)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean incomes vary by productive sectors as well as by ethnicity, but only Filipinos follow the expected pattern of having their mean income highest in the monopoly sector and lowest in the competitive sector. This is probably related to their concentration in blue-collar jobs within monopoly sector industries such as sugar, pineapple, tourism and construction, and their underrepresentation in state sector industries (Lind, 1980:82, 100). Part-Hawaiian mean income is also highest in the monopoly sector, but it is still much lower than the monopoly sector mean income of Caucasians. Japanese and Chinese, whose mean incomes are highest in the state sector, followed by the competitive sector, have their lowest mean incomes in the monopoly sector. This is a deviation from the pattern expected by O’Connor; however, it is con-
Sectors of Productive Capital 93

Hudson. However, in the manner predicted by O'Connor and Hudson, the least valued characteristics seem indeed to predominate in the competitive sector.

Finally, the examination of sectoral mean incomes shows that mean income appears to be highest in the state sector and lowest in the competitive sector in Hawaii. While this finding does not conform exactly to theoretical expectations, it is nevertheless consistent with this study's earlier findings on size and the distribution of social characteristics across productive sectors. Furthermore, while mean income patterns vary by education, age, sex and ethnicity, those variations generally follow the patterns of sectoral mean incomes found earlier in this study.

These findings also suggest that future studies of income inequality might benefit by taking into consideration the following points. First, while the variables emphasized by the human capital and status attainment perspectives appear to be related to income levels, structural variables such as productive sector location should also be considered. This is because they seem to affect income patterns beyond the effects of the variables suggested by the former perspectives.

Second, while O'Connor's structural framework of productive sectors appears to be useful for studying income inequality, it is also problematic in two ways. Theoretically, the criteria for conceptualizing sectors require further clarification; otherwise, these ideas will be difficult to test empirically. Also, the political economic functions of the state at state and local levels require theoretical explication; otherwise the differences in the units of analysis may block potential analyses of state and local political economies, and thus neglect the effects of the connections between these and the national political economy. The third point that studies of income inequality need to consider is the influence of capital external to the nation-state. As capital continues to be internationalized, it will increasingly penetrate not only national economies, but also state and local ones. Hawaii's political economy seems to be a good example of the consequences of this international capital penetration, and judging by the experience of newly industrializing nations, it may mean even greater aggravation of the condition of income inequality in the years to come.

This paper has taken a structural approach to the study of income inequality, and it has discovered that distortions in the structure of the economy can have important consequences for the patterns of income inequality in Hawaii. It is hoped that the merits of this approach will invite other researchers to utilize the structural approach in their future studies of other aspects of Hawaii's social patterns.
APPENDIX

The criteria for determining monopoly sector industries were: a) that at least 25% of the establishments within a 3-digit industry classification of U.S. County Business Patterns employed 50 or more employees, and/or b) that industries have per-firm sales of $1,000,000 or more per annum according to the Census of Manufactures, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Services.

Industries considered to be monopoly sector:

| (E)  | 071 | soil preparation |
| (E)  | 142 | crushed stone    |
| (E)  | 144 | sand & gravel    |
| (E)  | 201 | meat products    |
| (E)  | 202 | dairy products   |
| (S)  | 203 | preserved fruits |
| (S)  | 204 | grain mill products |
| (E&S) | 205 | bakery products  |
| (E&S) | 206 | sugar            |
| (S)  | 209 | Misc. food & kindred |
| (E)  | 245 | wood buildings   |
| (E)  | 265 | household furniture |
| (E)  | 271 | newspapers       |
| (E)  | 287 | agricultural chemicals |
| (E)  | 291 | petroleum refining |
| (E)  | 324 | cement, hydraulic |
| (E)  | 327 | concrete products |
| (E)  | 331 | blast furnace    |
| (E)  | 341 | metal cans       |
| (E)  | 373 | ship building    |
| (E)  | 414 | charter transp.  |
| (E)  | 445 | water transp.    |
| (E)  | 446 | water transp. svc n.e.c. |
| (E)  | 458 | air transp. svc |
| (E)  | 481 | telephone communications |
| (E)  | 499 | communication svc n.e.c. |
| (E)  | 491 | electric service |
| (E)  | 492 | gas prod. & distribution |
| (S)  | 501 | motor vehicles - wholesale |

* E = employment (criterion 1 above)
S = sales (criterion 2 above)

Industries considered to be in the state sector:

411 local trans. (MTL)
417 bus terminal fac.
431 U.S. Postal Service
449 merchant marines
495 dept. of sanitation
911-998 government (fed., state, municipal, other nation, other U.S. states)

Industries considered to be in the competitive sector:

all else

In order to estimate the validity of the method used to classify the industries into productive sectors, the resulting distribution of sectors was compared with one resulting from the classification of industries by face validity (or intuitive knowledge of the industries). The comparison of the two, which is shown in the following cross tabulation, suggests the classifications probably represent an accurate picture of the sectors.
4. By *socialize* O’Connor means that certain costs of production are thrust upon the society and its general population rather than being paid for by those who are actually using such services. These include direct and indirect costs, and costs prior to, as well as resulting from, the production process. These may include such costs as research facilities; access to water, transportation, and energy; industrial parks; low interest loans; pollution cleanup; unemployment compensation; and so on.

5. Hodson also retained a special category for the construction industry, which he observed "...is similar to the monopoly sector because of its regional monopoly power and because of the powerful position of both sectors in relation to the state" (Hodson, 1978:451). He found about 5% of the workforce in that sector, with the remainder in agriculture or self-employment. Additionally, mining, manufacturing industries (especially of durable goods), and finance, tend to dominate among the industries of the monopoly sector.

6. The workforce size criterion was determined by dividing the number of firms with 50 or more employees in a given industry category by the number of firms in that category. If the resulting quotient was 0.25 or greater, the industry was assigned to the monopoly sector.

7. Average per-firm amount of sales and/or receipts was determined by dividing the amount of sales and/or receipts in each industry category by the number of firms in that category for the manufacturers, services, wholesale trade and retail trade.

8. Two essays summarizing Hawaii’s historical and present-day dependent development can be found in *Occasional Papers in Political Science*, 1(4) published by the Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa. The first is by Noel Kent, and the second by Deanne Neubauer and Sam Pooley.
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HAWAIIANS, AMERICAN COLONIZATION, AND THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE

Haunani-Kay Trask

THE COLONIAL ANALYSIS

The fact that the United States is a colonial power, as well as imperialist, is the best kept secret in the world.

Representative, Zimbabwe National Liberation Front, 1977

Hawaii has been a colony of the United States of America since the early 19th century. First through economic domination (beginning in 1810), and later through political incorporation (annexation in 1898), America came to control the lands and indigenous people of Hawaii. But until recently, neither Americans nor Hawaiians have understood this colonial status because America's ideology has represented itself as the main force of anti-colonialism around the world. 2

The truth, of course, is that Americans have been colonizing peoples of color for nearly four centuries. During the long span of the "age of discovery," the Indian lands that became America were first colonized by Indian-hating Europeans. Then, after the American Revolution, the rest of the continent was colonized by Indian-hating Americans. Indians accused America of inventing a nation by stealing land that was originally the Mother Earth of 10-12 million Indians (Dobyns 1966:395-416). Only white conquest and genocide brought these lands into an expanding United States, resulting in massive depopulation and dispossession of indigenous people through four centuries of encroachment. Without cultural and physical genocide against Indians, the United States would have been stillborn. But fed on the theft of Indian lands in her infancy, America became the most powerful imperialist nation in the twentieth century. 3

Despite her bloody history, however, the understanding of America as a colonizing power has only recently taken hold. While wars of liberation in Asia, Africa, and India began to tear apart the European colonial system in the post-World War era, America was establishing its economic and military hegemony world-wide. Moving toward pre-eminence as the "leader" of the so-called Free World, America assumed the neo-colonial mantle in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific. Even Europe came within the American orbit (Greene 1971). The history of Indians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians revealed how white America rose to world power on the bones of her indigenous people, and on the backs of other people of color (Jacobs & Landau, 1971). As in every other situation, land and labor became the
battleground. Continuing Indian wars in the twentieth century, historians showed, were still being waged for natural resources on Indian reservations. Blacks, Chicano, and Asians enlarged the attack, revealing how their slavery, peonage, and contract labor supplied the large work force needed to transform an agrarian America into an industrial America. Together, these groups unmasked the fallacy of “work ethic” America, where “rags to riches” white ethics allegedly built a “super” nation. While success was no longer the result of personal effort, but rather the structured goal of a system of savage exploitation of people of color.

Voices of dissent began to apply the Third World analysis of colonialism to the position of people of color in America. Thus, beginning in the 1960’s, colonial theory encompassed exploited racial groups within imperialist countries and not only those in colonies geographically and culturally separated from Europe and America. A connection was drawn between people of color in the United States and the larger process of European colonization throughout the world. The Third World abroad became the Third World within, and the analysis of colonialism was focused on America and its “internal” colonies. In the words of sociologist Robert Blauner:

The economic, social and political subordination of Third World groups in America is a microcosm of the position of peoples of color in the world order of stratification... Racial domination in the U.S. is part of the same historical drama through which white Western people expanded their culture and economic system, bringing their rule to virtually all of the world (Blauner 1972:249).

Blauner argued that although Asians, Blacks, and Indians are unique cultural groups, they share a history of internal colonization as people of color. They came to be “Americans” under different life conditions than white ethics. Conquest (Indians, Alaskan natives, and many Chicanos), contract labor and peonage based on race (Asians and other Chicanos), and enslavement (Blacks), characterized their historical experiences which have been different in kind from those of white people who were neither conquered nor enslaved, and whose labor was sold under freer market conditions than those surrounding people of color. For American Indians particularly, colonization has been of such long duration and unrevealed severity, they have had to struggle against extinction.

Meanwhile, for the white world, the colonial agony of the Third World within, like that of the Third World abroad, has been the precondition for industrial capitalism. The human and natural resources of both the continental U.S. and her overseas colonies continue to feed the American imperialist machine, enabling the crime of endless, wasteful consumption and the proliferation of a vast military network to maintain and expand that consumption.

While America’s colonization pattern has been very like that of her European forebears, there is one obvious exception: America has never given up any of her possessions either within her continental borders or beyond them. Alaska, Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands remain attached to the United States. Micronesia and the Marianas continue to suffer a neo-colonial legacy, and the Philippines, allegedly independent since 1946, is so closely tied to America it is a de facto colony.

This hold over its colonies is, of course, a direct result of America’s world hegemony. But it is also a product of the myth of American democracy, which, in its mythic dimensions, promises liberty and justice for all — whether on small island nations or large continental masses. Since, within this legitimizing myth, colonialism has no place and colonies cannot exist, they are transformed into self-determining little Americas that have, allegedly, “freely chosen” to become territories or states attached to a distant nation. When predictably counterposed to the “Communist threat,” the ideology of “democratic” America thus works hand in hand with economic penetration and military presence to ensure continued American dominance. The planned effect is therefore achieved: America’s colonial empire is simultaneously expanded and obscured.

One of the long-term challenges to this obscure imperium comes from the colonized themselves, those wretched of the earth who live the fallacy of American democracy. Thus, the Black Movement, the Chicano Movement, the American Indian Movement, the Puerto Rican Independence Movement, and recently, the Hawaiian Movement.

Not only have these movements revealed America’s colonialism at home, they have connected their struggles to liberation movements in other parts of the world. Just as the internal colonialism of the United States is part of the larger process of European colonization of the world, so too are the liberation struggles of America’s people of color part of the larger picture of Third World independence movements. Along these lines, Stokely Carmichael & Charles Hamilton explained the international significance of Black Power in 1967:

Black Power means that black people see themselves as part of a new force, sometimes called the “Third World,” that we see our struggle as closely related to liberation struggles around the world.

After discussing the struggle of black South Africans against white rule, Carmichael and Hamilton concluded:
During the Vietnam War, many American Asians identified their colonial status in the Chinatowns and Japantowns across the United States as extensions of America's exploitation of Southeast Asians. The racist war that American men fought against the "gooks" and "slants" overseas was seen, by many Asians in America, as part of the war waged against them by white Americans at home. The Third World of Vietnam was easily linked to the Third World of American Asian ghettos (Tachiki, Wong & Odo 1971).

In the meantime, Chicanos in the southwestern part of the United States, struggled toward their own liberation. Defining their oppression as colonialism, they identified with American Indians as a conquered people. In 1972, Rodolfo Acuña listed some of the experiences of colonization:

1) One's land is invaded by another people who use force, military or otherwise, to take and maintain control.
2) The original inhabitants become subjects of conquerors involuntarily.
3) The conquered have an alien government and culture imposed upon them.
4) The conquered become victims of racism and cultural genocide and are relegated to a subjugated status.
5) The conquered are rendered politically and economically powerless.
6) The conquerors feel they have a mission in occupying the area in question and believe that they have undeniable privileges by virtue of their conquest (Acuña 1972:3)

Although only indigenous people suffered the invasion of their lands, Acuña's other categories applied in common to America's people of color.

Acuña argued, with evidence from hundreds of years of Chicano oppression, that the United States had taken Chicano land and exploited its people. He also concluded, like Carmichael and Hamilton before him, that a struggle for liberation was a natural reaction to American colonization.

One working definition of colonialism appeared in 1976. Formulated by a Chicano scholar, Mario Barrera, it was intended to apply in all "colonial" cases: direct or indirect, classic and "neo," external and internal. From the perspective of a Third World American, colonialism was seen as...
cultural to political struggle was characteristic of independence movements. In America, this belief has been born out time and again. When Blacks, for example, began to understand their oppression in colonial terms, they searched for a cultural past in Africa, and not only in America. Similarly, American Indians who returned to the reservations from urban slums had reclaimed a spiritual power from their Indian heritage. In these cases, cultural assertion was not only a repudiation of subjugation to white racism and white values, but a positive statement of Black and Indian culture as preferable to Euro-American culture. In the context of colonialism, cultural struggle becomes central rather than peripheral to independence (Fanon 1965; Cabral 1973). The same has been true in Hawaii.

HAWAI'I AS A COLONY

The foreign songs have only eroticism, no spiritual meaning. The dances are lascivious; there is no sacred interpretation. The land is ravaged by concrete monsters; neither the sea nor the sky is safe from destruction. There is racism — which our ancestors never knew. And neither the young nor the old can be down by the wayside in safety as Kamehameha I desired. There is nothing Hawaiian left; it is all haole [white] now.

Lydia K. Akana, 1978
Haunui (adopted) daughter of Queen Liliuokalani

The cultural and political assertions of movements on the American mainland have been echoed in several nationalist struggles throughout the Pacific. While the French and British are confronted by liberation movements in Tahiti, New Caledonia and New Zealand, the recently independent nation of Vanuatu has helped to focus the question of a nuclear-free and independent Pacific.

This push for independence has been framed within the context of other anti-colonial movements. On the opening day of the 1983 Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Conference (NFIP) in Vanuatu, the Honorable Sethy Reganuvu, Deputy Prime Minister of Vanuatu, asserted the following:

'Ve have been subjected to forced assimilation, conquerors have imposed their own culture and destroyed our traditional ways of living. This has resulted in a loss of identity and a loss of cultural heritage. The people of Vanuatu have been subjected to a system of domination and exploitation that has led to a loss of cultural pride and identity. This is unacceptable, and Vanuatu will never be silent in the face of such oppression. We will never allow our culture to be destroyed, and we will never allow our land to be stolen from us.'

This statement has been echoed by other Pacific island nations, who have stated their determination to maintain their cultural identity and to ensure the survival of their cultures. The Pacific region is a place of great diversity, and each culture is unique and valuable. The people of the Pacific are determined to ensure that their cultures are preserved for future generations.
The NIFAP conference was attended by a voting delegation from Hawaii. They will focus on the assertion of independence for Pacific peoples, including themselves. They spoke about their own experiences against American colonialism: for example, against the large American military presence in the islands; against the penetration of American and foreign multinational corporations; against tourism and nuclear weapon storage in Hawaii.

But while an understanding of colonialism is growing among some Hawaiians, the process of psychological de-colonization has been slower in Hawaii than in other Pacific nations. Part of the explanation for this is political. Hawaii, like Alaska, has entered the category of other states within America. Because of the myth of American democracy, Hawaii's statehood has become an explanation of why it cannot be a colony (since it is the equal of other states) and instead why it must be an integral part of America rather than a territorial possession geographically and culturally distinct from America.

But the primary reason for the Hawaiians' lack of a critical consciousness is simply that colonization has taken its toll. For almost two hundred years, American values and economics have undermined and transformed Hawaiian culture. After nearly a century of economic colonization by Americans in the 1800s, Hawaii was annexed to the United States in 1898. With increasing capitalist penetration in the 20th century, there has come increasing racial oppression and exploitation of Hawaiians: first, under the missionary-descended, haole ruling class who governed Hawaii with an iron hand from 1893 to 1954; and later, under the political power of descendants of Japanese immigrants who have dominated Hawaii since 1954. One result of this haole-Japanese coalition has been a pervasive feeling of cultural and racial inferiority among Hawaiians. This attitude has kept them psychologically enmeshed and politically crippled until the rise of the Hawaiian Movement in 1970.

At that point, community struggles to preserve rural, agricultural ways of life piled upon Hawaiians against haole and Japanese capitalists anxious to develop Hawaiian lands to serve their own upper-income subdivisions. As they lost their homes and farms to development, Hawaiians experienced what generations of Hawaiians had suffered throughout the 19th century: exploitation of their sacred aina (land) and their culture for the benefit of rapacious foreigners.

During the 19th century, Western penetration in the form of Christianity and capitalism nearly destroyed Hawaiian cultural practices such as stewardship rather than ownership of the land, sharing of work and its products, the primacy of the extended family rather than the individual, and the sacred inter-relationship of all life. As the century advanced, ever-increasing numbers of haole and Asian immigrants to Hawaii demanded more land, a larger socio-economic slice of the capitalist pie, and finally, political control. To most of these non-indigenous people who had arrogantly come to think of Hawaii as

Hawaiians, American Colonization, and The Quest for Independence

"rightfully" theirs, Hawaiians and their cultural ways were but backward-looking obstacles in the path of "progress."

Thus, Hawaiian powerlessness in the 20th century has its origins in the 18th and 19th centuries. Fifteen hundred years of Hawaii's isolation from the West was shattered by European adventurers who brought disease and death to a "primitive" people in 1778. The massive depopulation of Hawaiians which predictably followed made them easy targets for the next and possibly most destructive group of foreigners: American missionaries.

To missionaries, as to many of the traders and businessmen, Hawaii was one of the "heavenly" places "destined" for the Americans' god, and their system of profit. Thus, in 1820, the Rev. R.S. Storrs spoke before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), and linked the Manifest Destiny of territorial expansion with the crucial role of the missionary in paving the way for the capitalist economy.

If the manufactures of our country find their way to Africa and China, to the Sandwich Islands and India, in increasing abundance, and produce correspondingly remunerative returns, it is because the ladder of salvation has gone stiffer, seeking the welfare of the people, changing their habits of life, breaking down their prejudices and creating demands for comforts and wealth before unknown (quoted in Schlesinger, 1974,345).

American diplomats, like Charles Denby in China, concurred with Storrs:

Missionaries are the pioneers of trade and commerce. The missionary, inspired by holy zeal, goes everywhere, and by degrees, foreign commerce and trade follow (quoted in Schlesinger, 1974,345).

By the 1890s, the decade when Hawaii would become a possession of the United States, the Hawaiian Islands could publicly confirm America's policy regarding the role Hawaii was to play in the advance of "civilization."

In the interests of our commerce...we should build the Nicaragua canal, and for the protection of that canal and for the sake of our commercial supremacy in the Pacific we should control the Hawaiian Islands and maintain our influence in Samoas...and when the Nicaragua canal is built, the island of Cuba...will become a necessity...The great nations are rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and their present defense all the waste places of the earth. It is a movement which makes for civilization and the advancement of the race. As one of the great nations of the world the United States must not fall out of the line of march (quoted in Zinn, 1989,291).
America’s colonization of Hawai‘i meant, at one level, a transformation of the traditional economic system from subsistence production to a plantation economy and later, with tourism, a service society. Always a peripheral part of the larger world system of capitalism, Hawai‘i was never self-sufficient after European contact. Throughout the 19th century, Hawai‘i became increasingly dependent on the core capitalist countries, and remains so today (Kuest 1983).

At another level, however, colonization also demanded that Hawaiians either be removed from their lands or contentiously succumb to disease. Syphilis, introduced by the original “tourist” Capt. James Cook in 1778, was but the first of a European scourge of bewildering, incurable diseases that maimed and killed Hawaiians by the tens of thousands. Because of these new diseases among them influenza, measles, whooping cough, and cholera, Hawaiians suffered enormous depopulation. From an estimated 500,000 people at contact, less than 45,000 remained by 1878, a decline by a rate of more than 10 to 1. 1

With the demise of the people came the rapid demise of their culture. The kinship system of chiefly stewardship was replaced by a monarchy soon after contact and as a direct result of the introduction of Western firearms. With political centralization came other kinds of exploitation: heavy taxation, a large administrative structure, and finally, a Western legal system aimed at the establishment of private property land tenure as a replacement for traditional land use where no one owned the land and everyone had rights of use and access to both land and sea. Paramount among these legal modifications was the Great Maoli of 1848 and the Kukui Act of 1850. These acts comprised a major land redistribution forced onto the monarchy by Westerners (ex-missionaries and businessmen) who needed security in land tenure for large plantations.

Hailed as bringing fee simple ownership to Hawaiians, these land divisions actually alienated the land from them. The Maoli and the Kukui Act divided the lands into a 1.6 million acres, about 30% of the land, went to the king; 1.5 million acres, about 36% of the land, went to the Crown; and only 28,600 acres, less than 1% of the land, went to the common people who worked the land, the Maka‘aiaina. This last group of Hawaiians made up about 99% of the population (Kelly 1980:65-66).

While the Maoli divided the lands between the chiefs, king and government, the Kukui Act supposedly guaranteed to the maka‘aiaina the simple title to small plots of land. But these lands could only include that which the tenant “really cultivated.” It did not include common pasture or lands cultivated with others. Since taro cultivation, like fishing, was a group endeavor, separation of the individual from the group—a Western value—meant starvation for most of the people. Apart from the fact that few maka‘aiaina received any land at all (only 50% of the adult male population), the plots which they did receive were often too small to cultivate successfully. As a result, Hawaiians either sold their lands or were prohibited from subsisting on them (Kelly 1980:65-66).

The ostensible justification for these land acts was that they would preserve the rights of the people while satisfying the needs of foreigners for land. This, of course, did not happen. In the first place, the needs of foreigners for land could not be satisfied, since their economic system depended for its success on the continual expansion of profits. Thus foreign desire for land might be temporarily abated by the Maoli but it would never be quenched, as the subsequent history of 20th century Hawai‘i shows. The enormous economic power of Americans was on the rise and it was essential that land become a spur to profits rather than an obstacle.

In the second place, traditional land rights had been successfully protected through the use of these rights by hundreds of thousands of Hawaiians over numerous centuries. The sudden division of the lands with a new alternative of private property could not possibly have had the beneficial effect on Hawaiians claimed for it. According to Marion Kelly, student of the Maoli-period:

> It was the Americans, Rev. William Richards and Dr. Gerri P. Judd, who drew up the plan called the Maoli. They convinced the Hawaiian king and the chiefs of the Privy council to accept it. They told the Hawaiians that if they didn’t convert to private ownership of land, any foreign invader that annexed the Hawaiian Islands would not recognize Hawaiian land rights. They said a foreign ruler would take over everything, leaving the king, chiefs, and Hawaiian people landless. (Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report, Vol 3 1983:712.9

Of course, the history of the Maoli shows that private property land tenure was the death knell of the maka‘aiaina. They received less than 1% of the land. The chiefs and the king did better but, under increased pressure to sell these lands as well, the bulk of the land found its way into the plantation economy. The ‘ho‘oulu (white) triumphed. They were enabled to buy vast acres, either from the maka‘aiaina who were starving, or from the chiefs and the government who were heavily indebted to Western merchants. In both cases, the results were the same. The great bulk of the land came under Western ownership. Kelly judges the role of the ‘ho‘oulu and the purpose of the land division in the following way:

> It was the American missionaries who changed the Hawaiian land tenure system into the American system of private ownership of land. This was done to provide land for American enterprise and save investment schemes for American money. (Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report, Vol 3 1983:712.10

Hawaiians, American Colonization, and The Quest for Independence 111
Such an imperialist design, with such devastating effects on the common people, can hardly be called the birth of democracy. It is more accurately described as a triumph of colonial policy: the power of American foreigners to dispossess and subjugate an indigenous people — the Hawaiians.

The victory of the white settlers meant, in the words of political scientist Noel Kent, "cultural debasement, economic destitution, and a third-rate status for Hawaiians in their own homeland." Meanwhile, "the division of the lands continued the policy of appropriating Hawaiian resources to further the ends of capitalist accumulation and had the ultimate effect of undermining once and for all, the viability of the "Hawaiian way." For the white entrepreneurial class, "...dispossession of the Hawaiians was an essential precondition for the flourishing of capitalist export agriculture" (Kent 1983:32).

This export was to be sugar, grown on vast acreages of what was once the land base of the Hawaiian people. Thanks to a host of Americans, missionary and businessmen alike, foreign power had changed "Hawaii's laws and customs to reflect those in the United States, and land legislation and agricultural practices were brought in line with foreign notions" (Kent 1983:29).

It is important to point out the role of Western law in this land seizure. The imposition of Western concepts through the Great Mahele and the Kukana Act was crucial to the taking of the lands. Legal scholar, Neil Levy:

"Western property concepts were imposed on the legal structure and would facilitate the rapid, steady takeover of Hawaiian owned lands during the next several decades. Moreover, the government's commitment to selling its remaining land put Westerners, with their access to capital, in a position to take Hawaiian land through the legal procedures they had established. Western imperialism had been accomplished without the usual bothersome wars and costly colonial administration (Levy 1975:857, emphasis added).

As trade was introduced throughout the 19th century, Hawaiians became increasingly embroiled in the needs of expanding European and American capitalism for various commodities: provisions, sandalwood, whale products, and, into the 20th century, sugar and resort lands. British, French, and American military forces guaranteed access to these resources for their respective entrepreneurial countrymen, while the ali'i (chieftly class), enamored of Western luxury items, attempted in vain to control trade. Like their elite counterparts in the Third World, the ali'i became unknowing conduits for Western imperialism.

It is crucial to note here not only that Western economic expansion directly contributed to the destruction of Hawaiian society, but that America, among others, pressed its commercial interests with military power. Even the dean of Western historians of Hawaii, Ralph Kuykendall, admitted that

"The traders brought their difficulties to the attention of the United States Government, with the result that in 1826 two American warships visited the islands, their commanders instructed to investigate the situation and render all proper aid to American commerce....Herein we see the genesis of the national debt in Hawaii (Kuykendall 1938:93).

The practice of supplementing verbal demands with warships was used by nations other than the United States. For example, 1836 saw British, French, and American gunboats in Honolulu within a period of two months. In 1839, the captain of a French gunboat forced the Hawaiian king to sign a treaty. And in 1842, the French man-of-war that had taken over the Marquesas Islands and established a French protectorate in Tahiti, arrived in Honolulu amidst fear that the French would take Hawaii. In 1843, Lord George Paulet of England confiscated the islands and ruled them for five months. Another foreigner, Rear Admiral Richard Thomas, restored the kingdom to the Hawaiians later that year. But in 1849, the French took possession of the Hawaiian fort, again over a dispute involving debts, and forced an unequal treaty on Hawaiians (Kelly 1980:59).

Throughout the 19th century, Hawaiians were at the mercy of foreign traders and warships. They were increasingly disadvantaged by forced treaties and agreements, and they were pressured into finding allies among the foreigners themselves. The pattern which emerges here is a classic one of colonization: the more powerful country dictates the economic direction of the less powerful nation, which in turn becomes increasingly dependent and helpless in the face of the colonizer's superior military strength.

Simultaneous with these military pressures had come missionary pressures for religious conversion, and, as we have seen, for a change in land tenure. When Kaahumanu, astute and politically ambitious wife of Kamehameha I, broke the religious kapu affecting eating, the people were cut adrift in a confusing world. Their fellows were dying in record numbers while their ali'i were dismantling rather than upholding the traditional way of life. The breaking of the kapu was, like other major changes in the 19th century, the result of foreign impingement.

The example of the foreigners, their disregard of the kapu, and their occasional efforts to convince the Hawaiians by argument that their system was wrong, were the most potent forces undermining the beliefs of the people (Kuykendall 1938:67).

This judgement is confirmed by Marshall Sahlins in his recent work, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (1981). As an interpretation
of western contact in Hawaii, Sahlin's analysis supports the general conclusion that foreign impact was directly or indirectly, responsible for the breaking of the kapu (Sahlin 1981).

When the missionaries arrived from Boston in 1820, the population had already declined by more than 50%. There was a religious vacuum because the kapu had been abrogated the year before. Once the ali'i converted, especially Kaahumanu, the people willingly followed. In 1824, Kamehameha II died in England, and his brother, Kauaikaui, became king. Because he was a minor, Kaahumanu assumed the Regency. Under her leadership, Hawaii was officially a Christian nation by 1840 (Bradley 1968:168-213).

More than the merchants, the missionaries were powerful agents of cultural destruction. While the traders came expressly for profit, leaving disease and alcohol in their wake, the missionaries came to settle. Boring from within, they spread throughout the islands, with churches in Wai'anae and Hilo, Lahaina, Honolulu, and Kailua. Convinced of their duty to "Christianize" and "civilize," the missionaries insisted that Hawaiians had lived miserable lives before the coming of the West. Under missionary eyes, the ancient Hawaiians had been ruled by bloodthirsty priests and despotic chiefs. Peopled by promiscuous women who murdered their own children, Hawaii was kept in vile darkness through the reign of a cannibalistic religion.

Without any evidence to support these malicious statements, the missionaries were nevertheless content to repeat them for posterity. The most vicious of the lot was high-brow Hiram Bingham, self-styled leader of the mission. He began the memoirs of his sojourn in Hawaii with a characteristic description of Hawaiian culture during the 1400 years prior to his visit.

Looking back into the obscurity of Hawaiian history, in order to respect the character of the unknown islands who have passed over the stage of earthly existence in preceding generations, we may assert that their corruption and debasement by the principles and religious practices in which they trained and left their children, and by the vile songs, and sports, the creeds and usages prevailing among them, there is no exception to the narrative of the lives of their leaders. Their religion, their politics, their amusements, and the examples of rulers, priests, and parents, all tended to sanction and to foster lust and malversation. The national history, so far as it was preserved and known by the people, must have continued, without the counterevocative influence of a better religion than was known to them, to be debasing, instead of producing or promoting virtue. Violence, fraud, theft, and pollution pervaded the whole history from the oldest traditions of the origin of their land and of their system of religion; and whether that history be true or false, its effects upon the moral sense, so far as it was relied on, were deadly. Even the story that cannibalism was once practiced in

the mountains of Oahu, does not show, as tradition relates it, that any king or chief cared to protect the people from the supposed devourers of men; or that any public sentiment, at the time, was expressed against it, any more than against human sacrifices to the gods, which it was believed the king and priests might offer and did offer at their pleasure (Bingham 1846:23-24).

While other members of the mission were generally less vituperative than Bingham, they nevertheless shared his sentiments: Hawaiian culture and people were descended from a pagan, inferior race whose enlightenment it was the missionaries' burden to ensure (Bradley 1968; Dibble 1909).

With this view of Hawaiians, Bingham and his brethren were determined to replace the Hawaiian way of life with Western practices. Towards this end, Bingham continually pressed the ali'i for work-free Sabbaths, the abolition of the hula, the adoption of Western dress, the construction of Western houses, even the practice of Western burial. As the "most trusted counselor of Kaahumanu," Bingham relentlessly instructed her in the necessity of "moral reform" through legislation. Thus, in 1824, Kaahumanu ordered her people to cease work on the Sabbath, which, in some cases, created real hardships for a people dependent on work in the fields and occurs for sustenance (Bradley 1968:173-174).

The missionaries also wrought cultural havoc through the establishment of a Western-style educational system. Aided by the newly-converted ali'i the missionaries succeeded in opening some 900 schools, by the late 1830s, to teach reading and writing. Once again, Kaahumanu had paved the way, when, in 1824, she required her subjects to receive a book; i.e., missionary education.12

Predictably, the first textbook was the Bible. From that small volume, Hawaiians were indoctrinated with a foreign morality based in original sin and the evil of man. And they were taught this frightening moral and philosophical system in their own native tongue.

Beyond the technical changes made by the missionaries in their reformation of the language to written form, the most critical change was in the use of the language as a tool of colonization. Where the language had once been inseparable from the people and their history, communicating their heritage between and among generations, it now came to be used as the very vehicle of alienation from their habits of life. The missionaries used the language to inculcate in Hawaiians a yearning to be Western, and a sense of inferiority regarding the Hawaiians' own culture, including their dance, habits of dress, their laws and rituals, even their marriages and affections. Thus, as Frantz Fanon has remarked about missionaries in general, they did "not call the natives to God's ways, but to the ways of the white man, of the master, of the oppressor" (Fanon 1965:32).
Himns that told of a suffering Jesus and a sinful humanity replaced chants of the origins of the universe, the evolution of life forms, and the genealogy of an entire people. No longer was an ancient history recited, no longer were new chants composed. A repressive sexual morality reduced the fecund, sensual imagery of the Hawaiians to concepts of evil and filth. For example, where the Hawaiians once criticized their environment with sexual names, they were, under Christian influence, to rename their natural world, as their children, with safe English-language references. Indeed, an 1860 law required Hawaiians to have two names, where before they had had only one, and to call themselves by a Christian first name (Kimura 1983:173-197). This is how the Hawaiian people came to have so many Ruths and Davids, Miriams and Johns among them.

Meanwhile, a foreign tale about a foreign god was daily recited and the Hawaiian aumakua (family gods) were gradually neglected for the story of a Jewish child from a far-away land. Hawaiians were unknowingly removed from the spiritual strength of their own time and place, and refocussed on another people — a white people — from a strange time and an alien place. Native history and native culture were all but lost along the way.

Fanon and others, like Albert Memmi and Vine Deloria Jr., have analyzed how colonization is, above all, a process of deculturation of the native people. It is a pervasive totality which seeks "the liquidation" of a native people's "systems of reference" as well as the "collapse of its cultural patterns" (Deloria 1973; Memmi 1967; Fanon 1967:38-39). Because missionaries focused on transforming habits of thought (e.g. through their schools), styles of behavior (e.g. through their imposition of Western dress), and customs of governing (e.g. through their imposition of Western law), they were engaged in the breaking down of Hawaiian culture. Their efforts were directed at uprooting natives from their customary life, and then enslaving them with the artifacts of Western culture, which ranged from Mother Hubbard dresses and the Sabbath, to Conventions, private property and the notion of sexual sin. What many Westerners call acculturation to their "civilized" ways is really deculturation, in which, as that defender of colonization O. Mannoni long ago described, "the personality of the native is first destroyed through uprooting, enslavement, and the collapse of the social system" (Mannoni 1956:40).

Nowhere was this deculturation more in evidence than in the school system which was, according to historian Ralph Kuykendall, "in all essential respects an outgrowth of the work of American Protestant and, to a much lesser extent, of Roman Catholic missionaries; its form and spirit were American..." (Kuykendall 1966:106).

While the ABCFM had explicitly forbidden political activity by the missionaries, they nevertheless formed an alliance with the ruling ali'i. By 1826, this alliance was so thorough, missionary historian Sheldon Dibble acknowledged that a union between church and state existed "to a very considerable extent" (Dibble 1909:78). Although vehemently protested by the merchant class who saw clearly that missionary dominance over the government meant temperament and anti-prostitution laws, the church-state union in the early years of the mission set a dangerous precedent for reliance on the missionaries which was to reach its tragic peak during the reign of Kamehameha III. Then, under the tutelage of missionaries, the lands were officially alienated from the people.

While the missionaries preached the superiority of Western civilization, the Hawaiian population continued to decline. Ostensibly concerned with the increasing death toll from Western diseases, the missionaries' real concern was that the Hawaiians die as Christians rather than as pagans. As for the survival of the Hawaiian culture, the missionaries were determined that it pass from the earth as quickly as possible. In their own words, they wanted "to produce an entire change in the former state of things in these islands and to aim at nothing short of raising up the whole people to an elevated state of Christian civilization" (Quoted in Bradley, 1968:180). This "Christian civilization" entailed the dominance of American values, religion, language, economics, politics, even habits of dress and domestic behavior. The missionary domain was to be secular and cultural, not merely religious.

Thus, not only did American businessmen and missionaries invade Hawaii in the 19th century, bringing disease and death, but they successfully penetrated Hawaiian society at the religious, economic, and political levels, creating a settler colony, a mini-America. Anxious for incorporation into the United States, these white settlers overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 with the willing aid of American military force. Over a hundred years of American economic and ideological power in Hawaii was then secured by annexation in 1898 (Kent 1983).

The racism surrounding the controversy over annexation deserves some comment. What historian Christopher Lasch has pointed out regarding the 1898 Congressional debates over cession of the Philippines was equally true about the controversy over the annexation of Hawaii. Both sides "accepted the inequality of man — or, to be more precise, of races — as an established fact" (Lasch 1973:71). Thus, the substance of the debate focused on whether the Constitution should be applied in the colonies, and whether the American empire should be hemispheric or global. The question of whether Hawaiians should be consulted about annexation was answered by the likes of Senator Hoar, who argued that asking what the Hawaiians wanted was "as reasonable to take the vote of children in an orphan asylum or an idiot school" (Quoted in Drinnon, 1980:311).

Meanwhile, in Hawaii, annexation mania had characterized the 1890s. The native planters' newspaper, the Advertiser, had warned its readers, "It is the white race against the yellow. Nothing but annexation can save these islands" (Quoted in Kent, 1983:60-61).
As for the missionary element, C.M. Hyde, of the North Pacific Missionary Institute, reiterated what his predecessor Hiram Bingham had always believed: the Hawaiians were not fit to govern themselves, especially as Hawaii was, by the end of the 19th century, "mainly American" in institutions and business. Hyde reasoned after the overthrow in 1893:

"I see nothing better than immediate annexation...I think that intelligent Hawaiians, who have at heart the best interests of the country and the people, are very generally of that opinion. Give us annexation, and plans will be at once pushed for such development of the country as can not be even thought of under any other circumstances. Talk about a protectorate is idle. We have had enough of legal fictions. The institutions and connections of the country are mainly American. Let us have the name, as well as the appearance; the real power as well as the nominal acquisition, and the Hawaiians will accept the situation. They will have to make the best of it, whatever may be decided upon for them" (quoted in Blount, 1895:827-828).

While Hyde was perfectly willing to dictate the future of Hawaiians, he was incorrect about the "intelligent Hawaiians." According to Commissioner Blount, sent by President Cleveland to investigate the overthrow, Hawaiians were against annexation by a margin of five to one. This is the main reason why the hoolei leaders of the Republic of Hawaii (1894-1898) conspired with the hoolei elite in America to prevent Hawaiians from voting on annexation altogether. Finally, Hyde could not resist linking the overthrow of a lawfully empowered government to the triumph of Christianity and prosperity. He concluded his testimony to Blount by stating that "the overthrow of an obstructive and ruinous social and political system (i.e. the Hawaiian Government), is the best preparation for the spread of the Gospel" (quoted in Blount, 1895:827-828).

As a result of these actions, Hawaiians became a conquered people, their lands and culture subordinated to another nation. They were made to feel and survive as inferiors when their sovereignty as a nation was forcibly ended by American military power. Rendered politically and economically powerless by the turn of the century, Hawaiians continue to suffer the effects of American colonization: land alienation; unemployment and employment ghettoization; the worst health profile in the islands; the lowest income level; a deep psychological oppression manifested in crime, suicide, and anomie, and, finally, the grossest commodification of their culture for the international market of tourism. This latest afflication of colonialism has meant a particularly insidious form of cultural prostitution. The hula, for example, has been made ornamental, a form of exotica for the gapping tourist. Far from encouraging a cultural revival, as tourist industry apologists contend, tourism has appropriated and cheapened the accomplishments of a resurgent interest in things Hawaiian (e.g. the current use of replicas of Hawaiian artifacts like fishing and food implements, capes, helmets and other symbols of ancient power to decorate hotels). Hawaiian women, meanwhile, are marketed on posters from Paris to Tokyo promising an unfettered, "primitive" sexuality while Hawaiian men bare their bodies for sexually repressed tourists.

This transformation of cultural value into monetary value has been called "commodification" — the process of objectifying a person or a cultural attribute for the purposes of profit-making. While capitalist society commodifies nearly everything, the Hawaiian people suffer particularly because, in addition to all their economic and social burdens, their culture is plasticized for the world market.

But while tourism has grown to monstrous proportions in Hawaii, a protest movement of increasing magnitude has accompanied it. Similar to the indigenous Indian Movement on the American mainland, and to other indigenous movements in the South Pacific, the Hawaiian Movement can be seen as one radical response to American colonization.

THE HAWAIIAN MOVEMENT AND THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE

Kau ʻili makou
Nui ko ahoʻo no ka ʻaina
We are few in number
But our love for the land is great

from Mele o Kahoolawe
by Harry Kunitio Mitchell

Like the American Indian Movement, the Hawaiian Movement has evolved from a series of protests against land abuses through various demonstrations and occupations to dramatize the oppressed conditions of Hawaiians, to assertions of native sovereignty based on indigenous birthrights to the land. Occurring in the decade of the seventies and continuing into the eighties, this progression marked a new consciousness among modern Hawaiians about their history, their culture, and their subjugation to Western values and institutions, including capitalism, formal education, and Christianity.

One result of this consciousness was a growing activism in rural Hawaiian communities to preserve the remnants of their life-ways against encroaching urbanization and military use. Resistance to evictions, to commercial development of sacred sites and farming areas, to suppression and commercialization of Hawaiian culture, and to military occupation of Hawaiian land, characterized one part of the Hawaiian Movement. In the meantime, the new consciousness also gave rise to a revival of artistic interest in things Hawaiian: hula kabiko
ancient hula), ʻokūlo (Hawaiian language), and various forms of arts and crafts, including canoe-building and lei-making.

Along with this artistic flowering came a serious search for the spiritual source of Hawaiian culture. As many young people journeyed back through a century and a half of colonial repression to the pre-European sources of their culture, they discovered, with the help of their elders, that Hawaiian religion was rooted in a profound relationship to the land. Because Hawaiians took their sustenance from the land, their daily activities — planting, fishing, building, even eating — expressed spiritual as well as physical aspects of being. This understanding of life as a relationship between the spirit of the land and the people of the land, between material survival and cultural expression, between work and a respect for the wondrous and varied bounty of nature — all this shaped Hawaiian philosophy, music, art, dance, language, and, indeed, structured the core of Hawaiian kinship, the extended family or ohana (Handy, et al., 1972; Handy & Pukui 1950; Charlot 1983; Trask 1983). The gradual re-learning of this cultural heritage led activist Hawaiians to demand what their nineteenth century counterparts had demanded: a land base for the practice and transmission of their culture, especially taro cultivation and religious observances.

The Movement’s growth from community struggle and cultural resurgence to collective assertions of Hawaiian claims for religious freedom, political power and finally, independence as a sovereign nation, was preceded by a fundamental transformation in Hawaii’s economy. From dependence on cash crops of sugar and pineapple, and on military expenditures in the first half of the 20th century, Hawaii’s economy shifted to an increasing dependence on tourism and land speculation with rising investment by multi-national corporations in the second half of the century.

After statehood in 1959, burgeoning tourism led to an overnight boom in hotels, high cost condominiums and subdivision developments, and luxury resort complexes which necessitated ever-growing demands for land. Concentrated land ownership, a problem since the onslaught of plantation agriculture in the 1800s, had actually increased in the 20th century. Small landowners controlled less than 10% of the land. The military, the State and large private estates, and foreign and American developers owned the remainder. As a result, large landlords drove up the price of land, capitalizing on the post-Statehood rush toward commercial development (Kelly 1980; Kent 1983).

Already economically exploited and culturally suppressed, rural Hawaiian communities, which had been relatively untouched during the plantation period, were besieged by rapid development of their agricultural areas beginning in the late 1960s. These areas — among them, Hana, East Molokai, Keaukaha, Nanakuli, Wai‘anae, Waimanalo, Ha‘ula — had managed to retain many traditional practices such as taro farming, fishing, and the spoken Hawaiian language. Given the effects of educational and religious colonization in the 19th century, and the great decline in the native population, these Hawaiian communities, although remnants of a once dynamic civilization, were nevertheless crucial to the perpetuation of Hawaiian culture. Their threatened extinction by urbanization and other forms of development was correctly perceived by many oppressed Hawaiians as a final attempt to rid Hawaii of Hawaiians and their culture. In many ways, it was predictable that the Hawaiian Movement would begin and flourish in rural areas where the call for a land base would be the loudest.

While proceeding out of historical abuses of Hawaiian land and people, the Hawaiian Movement should be distinguished from other protest struggles in Hawaii by the demand for a native land base. (“Other struggles” include those involving the rights of non-Hawaiian residents — e.g. Filipinos in O‘ahu Camp, the Chinese in Chinatown; and those involving preservation of the environment — e.g. the fight to stop the H-3 freeway, and the Save Our Surf (SOS) struggle). This call for land arises out of an understanding of the native claims of Hawaiians as the indigenous people of Hawaii.

Many community struggles — e.g. against evictions and development — raised the issue of land rights. At the beginning of the decade, communities often took a stand in terms of the rights of “local” people. The term “local” included Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian, long-time residents of Hawaii. The assertion of their rights to live on the land was opposed to the rights of property owners like the State, developers, and private estates.

But as the decade wore on, the assertion of indigenous Hawaiian rights as historically unique from the rights of immigrants to Hawaii began to characterize more community struggles. Independent of their “local” supporters, Hawaiians began to protest development by occupying lands, or by refusing to be evicted from land scheduled for development. They also protested through mass demonstrations, legal actions, and through cultural assertions such as the construction of fishing villages. These forms of protest placed the Hawaiians’ demand to live and transmit their culture on a specified land base at the front of the movement. The rights of “locals” were not thereby opposed. But Hawaiians’ historic and cultural claims to the land as the first and origin...
nal claimants were increasingly seen, at least by Hawaiians, as primary. Struggles at Kukailimoku Village in Kona; at Sand Island, Mokaua Island, Waimanalo, Kahana Valley, Waianae and Nanakuli on Oahu; on the east end of Molokai; in Hana, Maui; and the struggle to stop the bombing of Kahoolawe all illustrated concerns for a land base for cultural purposes. Emphasis was given to fishing, taro cultivation, Hawaiian religious worship and various aspects of Hawaiian culture, such as dance and language. Unlike other, non-Hawaiian struggles, these rural, Hawaiian struggles were specifically concerned with the practice of Hawaiian culture. Because neither the people nor their culture can flourish without some kind of land base, Hawaiians organized their protests around a crucial common demand: land.

Claims to this land base were presented in several forms: as an argument for reparations from the U.S. for its involvement in the overthrow of the Hawaiian government in (1893) and the subsequent loss of Hawaiian nationhood and sovereignty; as a legal claim to special trust lands abused by the State and Federal governments (200,000 acres within the Hawaiians Homes Act and another 1.5 million acres of ceded lands in the Admissions Act) and by large estates (e.g., Bishop Estate and Liliuokalani Trust); and finally, as a right of residence by virtue of indigenous status, sometimes called aboriginal rights.

Beginning in 1970, Hawaiian political organizations began to push their native claims at the same time that besieged communities organized against eviction and urban development. "The Hawaiians," a State-wide, grass-roots political organization, was formed in 1970 to address abuses in the administration of Hawaiian Home lands. Meanwhile, Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian farmers in Kalaheo Valley tried to resist eviction that same year by the Bishop Estate and Kaiser-Aetna, who sought upper-income residential development on agricultural lands. "Kokua Kalama," a militant Hawaiian organization, was formed to help the residents resist eviction. Later, as "Kokua Hawaii," this organization expanded to address the needs of Hawaiians State-wide.

The following year the "Congress of the Hawaiian People" was created as a watchdog over the Bishop Estate, while another State-wide organization was formed in 1972 to lobby for reparations from the U.S. government. Called ALOHA (Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry), this organization's efforts eventually led to the establishment (in 1980) of a Presidential Commission to study the needs and concerns of the Hawaiian people, including reparations.

By 1973, several organizations and struggles had appeared around the State. Tenants at Nawiliwili-Niumalu on Kauai struggled against their eviction and against resort development; kuleana land owners on Windward Oahu organized as "Hui Malama Aina o Koolau" (The Association to Protect the Lands of the Koolau) to stop development of their agricultural lands; the "Homerule Movement" formed as a political lobbying group for Hawaiians; and the "Waimanalo People's Organization" fought eviction by the State.

In 1974, the first nationalist organization of the Movement, Ohana o Hawaii (Family of Hawaii) appeared under the leadership of Peggy Hao Ross, who has taken her case for the re-establishment of the Hawaiian Nation to various world forums, including the United Nations. Meanwhile, grass-roots Hawaiians in Kona occupied a shoreline area, and constructed a traditional fishing village as a cultural action against planned resort development. On Oahu, a major struggle erupted between farmers and land owners regarding urban sprawl into Waiahole and Waikane Valleys.

In 1975, the island of Molokai witnessed the birth of "Hui Ala Loa" (the Association of the Long Trails). As a political group representing a large Hawaiian constituency on Molokai, "Hui Ala Loa" organized around naive issues from beach and forest access, to water use and homestead land, to preservation of taro cultivation and fishing areas, to a moratorium on resort development. Meanwhile, on Oahu, two community struggles took place: a successful fight by fishermen on Mokaua Island against their eviction by the State, and a less successful struggle against eviction by residents of Heeia Kea on the windward side of the island.

The "Protect Kahoolawe Ohana" was formed in 1976 to stop U.S. military bombing of the island of Kahoolawe. As a State-wide organization, the Ohana served to link various land struggles on each island. It also asserted a Hawaiian cultural alternative — Aloha Aina, love of the land — to Western practices of exploitation of both people and land. A non-profit corporation of Waianae homesteaders, "Hoola Kanawai," was founded to lay claim of the ceded lands trust.

In 1977, leprosy patients at Hale Mohalu began a long fight to prevent their relocation to Leahi Hospital. Their issue was abuse of both the patients (most of whom are Hawaiian) and the land, which had been entrusted to the State by the Federal government expressly for the care of the patients.

In 1978, Kahoolawe Ohana members, Hawaiian homesteaders and other supporters, demonstrated at Hilo Airport against abuses of trust lands (part of the airport is built on Homestead land) and the bombing of Kahoolawe. Meanwhile, the Hawaii State Constitutional Convention passed a bundle of amendments concerning Hawaiians which called for reforms in the Hawaiian Homes Commission; protection of traditional Hawaiian access rights to the land and sea for religious and cultural purposes and for economic subsistence; the promotion of the study of Hawaiian language, history and culture; the abolition of adverse possession of more than five acres of land; and the establishment of an Office of Hawaiian Affairs administered by trustees elected by
Hawaiians, and charged with the care of the land, resources, and revenues from the State and Federal governments specially earmarked for Hawaiians.

In 1980, Hawaiian residents of Sand Island, Oahu, sought a live-in cultural park but were evicted and arrested by the State. In 1983, Hawaiian residents of Makua Beach, Oahu, asserted their aboriginal rights to live on the shoreline in a traditional way. They were evicted, and several arrests were made.

For over thirteen years — from 1970 to 1983 — Hawaiian discontent erupted in mass protests against land alienation and cultural destruction around the State. But where community struggles originally stressed the rights of "local" people, the political organizations began with a specific focus on the abuses of Hawaiian lands and Hawaiian people. With the birth of the Kahoolawe Ohana in 1976, the discourse of protest expanded from a focus on land abuse to an argument for a positive alternative. Phrased in Hawaiian, this alternative of Aloha Aina signalled the merging of political protest with cultural assertion. Thus, Hawaiian communities did more than struggle against land development. They also argued for a preferred alternative to capitalism: Hawaiian land use ethics of preservation, conservation and respect for the sacredness of nature; and harmony between people, their culture and their environment. These ethics were taken directly from Hawaiian culture.

This alternative was increasingly enunciated through the Hawaiian language, evincing another example of the merging of the political and the cultural aspects of the movement. But use of the language also indicated a profound evolution in the movement itself:

1) Western terms and English language referents were eschewed in favor of Hawaiian terms and Hawaiian language;
2) this was clear evidence that psychological decolonization had begun;
3) this shift signalled a growing move towards indigenous Hawaiian values;
4) these values gave Hawaiians pride and purpose beyond the activity of struggle; and
5) increased commitment to these cultural values became a source of increased demands culminating in the ultimate demand for sovereignty and independence.

While the Hawaiian cultural revival focused attention on Hawaiian dance, language and history, Hawaiians active in native claims struggles began to feel a sense of righteousness about their cause. This righteousness and pride were mixed with anger at the discovery that Hawaiians had been kept ignorant of their history by the colonizers. For example, many Hawaiians learned for the first time that they were fighting for a land base originally taken away by sugar planters and missionaries — two colonizing groups who had been praised in standard history books. They also discovered that the U.S., long described as the saviour of Hawaii, had actively participated in the overthrow of the Hawaiian government, and in the extinguishment of the Hawaiian nation. Pride in things Hawaiian led to a critical look at things hoole, and to a growing understanding that the "Americanization" of Hawaii had meant the repression of Hawaiian people and the decline of their culture.

Through study, political action and cultural return, Hawaiians began to experience what indigenous people had experienced in the decolonization period after World War II: a rejection of Western ways, and a re-education in the ways of their ancestors. For Hawaiians, as for other Third World people, this process of mental decolonization led to cultural revival and political organizing. As Fanon and Cabral had predicted, the freeing of indigenous minds from the vise of the colonizers gave birth to a liberation struggle. American ideological hegemony in Hawaii was threatened by the very presence of the movement.

If charted against Western values, the indigenous values that radical Hawaiians asserted, as well as the threat that they posed, are immediately clear:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hawaiian Values: Aloha Aina</th>
<th>Western Values: Capitalism and Individualism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Love of the people for the land)</td>
<td>(Primacy of the self, reproduction of profit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacredness of nature</td>
<td>Instrumental view of nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence of people and nature</td>
<td>Domination of humans over nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of nature</td>
<td>Exploitation of nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation of nature</td>
<td>Endless consumption of natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the inherent value of each living object</td>
<td>Commodification of people and nature for profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use and sharing among people of all resources</td>
<td>Individual ownership and individual benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohana (extended family, the collective) as central</td>
<td>Individual as central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laulima: cooperation among people; working together in harmony</td>
<td>Competition among people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokahi: unity</td>
<td>Class against class; individual against individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conflict, class antagonism
To Hawaiians in rural communities who wanted to preserve taro patches, fish ponds, and other bountiful wild areas of nature to feed their families and to perpetuate their culture, urban and resort development, freeways, gas stations and the rest, were clear signs of a rapacious, exploitative value system that placed gain over welfare, waste and consumption over the needs of the common people.

In stark contrast to Western culture, Hawaiian values revealed a culture whose religion, politics and economics were grounded in a fundamental love for the land and its people. This culture presented an admirable — and to many Hawaiians — a preferred alternative to the haole or Western way of life. More than this, such an alternative, if adopted by Hawaiian communities, would ensure not only the preservation of the aina but also the perpetuation of Hawaiian people as Hawaiians, rather than as colonized Americans. In desiring to be what their ancestry had bequeathed to them, Hawaiians followed a path taken earlier by other people of color: rejection of the white mask and its values.

The return to their culture thus gave to Hawaiians a sense of cultural pride and creative identity denied them by colonization. In addition, the more Hawaiians came to understand their culture through its actual practice, the more they came to understand the need for land. Political direction grew from that need until, by the end of the seventies, there was a unified call for a land base.

The de-colonization of Hawaiians was aided by connections with other people of color early on in the movement. For example, in 1971, Hawaiian representatives of the Kalama Valley struggle were sent to Black Panther meetings on the American mainland. Upon their return, the Kalama Valley support group, “Kokua Hawaii”, was re-organized along the lines of the Black Panther Party, including the creation of a Minister of Defense. This re-organization had been preceded by the visit of Panther Eldridge Cleaver to Hawaii. He had spoken about the commonalities between Hawaiians and Blacks as colonized people.

Indeed, an exchange of militants between struggles formed one part of the outreach effort throughout the Movement. In 1973, for example, Russell Means and Dennis Banks visited Hawaii. They brought the message of a common oppression as indigenous people. Hawaiians active in Welfare Rights struggles attended conferences with Blacks and Chicanos in Los Angeles in the early seventies. After the occupation of Kahoolawe by Hawaiian activists in 1976, several trips to the mainland were made to link up with Indian activists and other supportive groups. In 1982, Hawaiian activists spoke at the First International American Indian Tribunal, alongside Banks and Means, as well as representatives from Third World countries in Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific, Africa, and the Americas.

Visits from South Pacific islanders have also occurred. For example, radical Maori, Tahitian and Micronesian delegates to the 1980 Nuclear Free Pacific Conference held in Hawaii, contributed enormously to the Hawaiians’ consciousness regarding their sovereign rights. And the return visits of Hawaiian activists to the South Pacific have guaranteed an additional infusion of radical analysis into the Movement.

These connections have deepened the Hawaiians’ understanding of their oppressed conditions as well as their sense of solidarity with Third World struggles. In particular, contacts with American Indians and Pacific Islanders have given movement Hawaiians a heightened consciousness about their status as indigenous people. This consciousness has had a direct impact on political organizing both in Hawaii and internationally.

The effects of international networking have increased the political sense Hawaiians have gained from community struggle and cultural revival. Both sets of forces have shaped the Hawaiians’ demand for sovereignty. This demand has appeared in several forms: as a call for a completely independent Hawaii under the exclusive or predominating control of Hawaiians; as a call for “limited sovereignty” on a specified land base administered by a single Hawaiian council, but subject to U.S. Federal regulations; as a call for legally-incorporated, land-based units within existing Hawaiian communities linked by a common, elective council; as a call for a “nation-within-a-nation,” on the model of American Indian nations; as a call for the return to a constitutional Hawaiian monarchy.

While these forms are debated by Hawaiians in the movement, questions about socialist/communist parties and their role, including their positions on Hawaiian sovereignty, have also received attention. From the beginning of the movement in 1970, the Left and its socialist goals have been the source of intense controversy. For many radical Hawaiians, criticisms of the Left begin from the simple observation that Left parties do not, as a rule, have a substantial Hawaiian membership. Thus, Left participation in the Hawaiian movement is automatically suspect. Indeed, some Hawaiians resent the Left as much as Black radicals resented white liberals who sought to direct other peoples’ struggles in the sixties and seventies.

But membership is only the most obvious problem. More troubling to radical Hawaiians is the fact that the Left tends to adhere quite closely to a standard Marxist-Leninist view of history and thus tends to concentrate organizing efforts in urban areas where the working classes live. Now while most Hawaiians live in urban areas, they are not the activists calling for an independent land base and a cultural revival. It is the rural Hawaiians who have carried the movement and it is to them that the Left’s ideology is abrasive, appearing “too haole” (i.e. Western), anticultural, and, in specific, strategic instances, against the interests and rights of the Hawaiian people. This last concern is especially crucial, because rural Hawaiians are most impacted by the continued development of land.
To these Hawaiians, the Left ignores a central Hawaiian focus: culture. Driven by a certain kind of historical analysis and ideology, many Leftists view Hawaiians as regressive, in the sense of historical evolution, because they insist on preserving a spiritual and material relationship to the land. In a movement grounded in the indigenous people's land and culture, such a position of neglect or outright hostility by the Left is bound to alienate Hawaiians.

Beyond this blindness is the deeper problem which it suggests to Hawaiians: that Leftists have no genealogical connection to the land, no love of its history, no profound attachments, either culturally or materially, to its great, everlasting presence. Because they have no bonds with the land, Leftists are often perceived as no different from other interlopers: they are not of the aina, Hawaii. Rather, they are, as Fanon says of the colonizers, "the others."

The Hawaiian emphasis on land and culture also raises serious questions about industrialization — a key element in the achievement of socialist designs. From the perspective of Hawaiian nationalists, the Left cannot answer the criticism that industrialization destroys the spiritual relationship between humans and nature. For urban dwellers and other Westernized people, this destruction is almost incidental, an artifact of modern life. To the Left, it is a historical necessity. But to indigenous people whose heritage is defined by such a relationship, the loss of spiritual and material ties to the land signals an end to their way of life. The Left's often dismissive attitude regarding this concern has further divided them from Hawaiian nationalists. Unfortunately, this division can be so extreme that, in some cases, Hawaiians perceive the Left, rather than the capitalist establishment, as the enemy of the Hawaiian people and their indigenous rights.

These problems between the Left and radical movement Hawaiians will not be resolved, because the disagreements are fundamental ones of first importance. As in other movements, such as the American Indian movement, some members of the Left will continue to support the Hawaiian movement, despite their disagreements. Other Leftists will not offer support and will, indeed, join the forces of opposition. But the Hawaiian movement will continue, whether or not the Left supports Hawaiian goals.

While members of the Hawaiian community discuss various paths toward self-determination, the question of whether Hawaiians should be working for a land base recedes into the background. The presence of nearly two million acres (half the State) as Hawaiian trust lands — however abused by the State and Federal governments — fairly guarantees that such a question is no longer at issue. The problem for nationalist Hawaiians, therefore, is how to proceed politically to achieve an independent land base.

Several suggestions have been put forward by various movement leaders and organizations which can be grouped under the following strategies: active education of Hawaiians about their history and native rights, and about the need for a land base; litigation against the State and Federal governments for abuses of trust lands and for reparations; offensive political demonstrations such as land seizures, illegal protests at restricted places, and disruptions of institutional activity; offensive cultural actions such as religious worship on sacred sites closed to such worship, the construction of fishing villages and taro patches on lands scheduled for other economic activity, and the disruption of tourist attractions which commodify and degrade Hawaiian culture. The purposes of offensive actions are threefold: they awaken both Hawaiians and the general public to Hawaiian problems; they assert rights through direct moves against abuse, or in support of cultural practices; they advance the movement forward towards independence rather than holding it within the parameters of civil rights actions.

Such strategies have been used throughout the movement and will continue for the foreseeable future. With these events, it is clear that the Hawaiian Movement has matured into a full-blown nationalist struggle. Whether the quest for independence will lead to the establishment of a sovereign land base for Hawaiians depends on the force of the movement, and the strategies of its members, particularly networking with international groups. But the desire for independence burns on.

NOTES

1. Editor's note: Dr. Trask submitted this article with the proper di-critical marks on Hawaiian words. However, because of technical limitations of the equipment we use to produce Social Process in Hawaii, we were unable to include them.

2. For the purposes of this article, the term Hawaiian includes both full and part Hawaiians, defined as those individuals whose ancestors were natives of the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778.

3. For a discussion of Indian-hating as ideology and as practice, see Drinnon's exhaustive, monumental study Facing West: The Metaphysics of Empire-Building and Indian-Hating (1980). Drinnon brilliantly argues that American attitudes and policy against Indians serve as a model for American imperialism overseas. He illustrates his argument with rich examples from the Puritan era through the Vietnam period.

4. The best account of the continued rape of Indian lands by the American government and by multi-national corporations is
Hawaiians, American Colonization, and The Quest for Independence

12. Hawaii was annexed by Congressional Resolution. Hawaiians had no part of this vote. The estimate of Hawaiian feeling about annexation if it were to be put to a vote was made by Blount at the end of his report to President Cleveland. This knowledge was, of course, a fact of political life to the local haole elite and the American elite, whose enemies would have defeated annexation if it had been presented on other procedural terms. But the question never was presented to Hawaiians in terms of a vote, and thus, America annexed Hawaii without the consent of Hawaiians.

13. For one example, among hundreds if not thousands, of tourist industry apologists and their justification in terms of furthering the Hawaiian cultural revival, see the editorial by A.A. Smyser on "Hawaiian Problems" (1922), and my response in "A Hawaiian View of Hawaiian Problems" (1982).

14. For statistics on Hawaiians, see the Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report, Vol. 1, 1983. By 1970, tourists had increased five-fold, while Hawaiians suffered the worst fate of the five major ethnic groups (the haole, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and Hawaiian): higher unemployment; occupational ghettoization in low-paying, non-professional jobs; high drop-out rate for school; lowest income levels; overrepresentation in prison and drug treatment facilities; worst health profile.


16. The analysis in this section is based on my own research through oral histories and primary documents regarding the Hawaiian Movement. The only other analysis readily available is an article by Davianna McGregor-Alegado (1980), but her article fails to distinguish Hawaiian struggles from other ethnic struggles. McGregor-Alegado gives scant treatment to the trend towards nationalism either from a cultural or a political perspective, and provides little in the way of a theoretical context through which to appreciate Hawaiian conditions. There is no treatment at all of problems with the Left.

17. The indigenous values that contemporary Hawaiians assert are often taken to be fabrications of young and idealistic radicals.

10. This quote is from a response written by Marion Kelly, Mililani Trask, and Haunani-Kay Trask to the Draft Report of the Native Hawaiians Study Commission which is reprinted in the Final Report of the Commission. Ms. Kelly wrote the section of the response that is reproduced here (1983).

11. Kelly's judgement is based on research on the *Māhele* conducted over a period of some thirty years while she has been an associate of the Bishop Museum.


5. For personal testimony from Indians about their current plight on the reservations, see Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (1977).

6. The delegation from Hawaii was composed of five voting delegates (four indigenous, one non-indigenous), two non-voting Hawaiian elders (kupuna), and non-voting staff people from the Pacific Concerns Resource Center in Honolulu.

7. For demographic information on Hawaiians see Schmitt (1968). For a general discussion of Hawaiian health in pre-contact and post-contact times, see Dr. Kekuni Blaisdell's report on native health in the Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report (1983). It should be kept in mind that the estimates for the pre-contact population are guesses by Europeans who knew nothing about the culture or the inland settlements of the Hawaiians. My feeling is that the Hawaiian population estimate at contact will be revised upward, as the Indian population estimate has been, as a result of better archaeological work and statistical estimations based on it. To my knowledge, no such work has been completed to date. Given my general understanding of Hawaii at the time of contact, I have chosen the highest recorded estimate by a European because my sense is that the actual population was considerably higher.


9. This quote is from a response written by Marion Kelly, Mililani Trask, and Haunani-Kay Trask to the Draft Report of the Native Hawaiians Study Commission which is reprinted in the Final Report of the Commission. Ms. Kelly wrote the section of the response that is reproduced here (1983).

However, knowledge of Hawaiian culture, Hawaiian land tenure, Hawaiian songs and chant, and Hawaiian religion, all reveal the great respect Hawaiians had for the land and their relationship to it. The disbelieving should consult the work of Marion Kelly (1956), Craighill Handy (1972), Mary Kawena Pukui (1950), John Charlot (1983), and that masterful rendition of the Hawaiians themselves, the *Kumulipo* (1981). Given the prevalence of Western culture and its values, these need no citing.

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THE HAWAII MUSIC INDUSTRY

Elizabeth Bentzel Buck

Hawaiian music and dance is perhaps the most vital element of a culture that has undergone tremendous change over the last two-hundred years. Ancient and modern hula and chant are avidly studied and performed; the beautiful music of the King Kalakaua period is still appreciated, sung, restyled and recorded; much of the hapa-haole music of the territorial period is still popular; and in the last fifteen years Hawaii has experienced what has been called a “cultural renaissance,” one of its strongest manifestations being a resurgence of interest in Hawaiian music.

Throughout Hawaii’s history its music has reflected the social, economic and political changes taking place in the islands. While musical change has been an ongoing process since the early 1800s, the rate of change increased rapidly with the introduction of new communication technologies and their related industries, and the emergence of tourism in the early 1900s. Radio broadcasting and record-making made it possible for music to transcend space and time in ways that changed the traditional relationships of artist and audience, as well as the functions of music. More importantly, with these new technologies, operating as privately owned channels of communication, came the commodification of music and a whole new set of values related to music. In effect, Hawaiian music was reconstituted as something that could be marketed, sold to and consumed by mass audiences. Concurrent with the early development of broadcasting and recording enterprises (in part as a result of it), the Hawaii tourist industry was beginning to be felt as an important social and economic force within the islands. The combined forces of technology, the radio and record industries, and tourism have had a major impact on the styles and functions of Hawaii’s music.

The focus of this paper is the Hawaii music industry and the role it has played in the creation, production and performance of music in Hawaii. The local music industry comprises all of the people, organizations and communication channels that are involved in producing and selling music — local music composers and performers; record producers; music publishers; music distributors; retailers and promoters; radio and television broadcasters; music critics; hotels and nightclubs that are venues for music; as well as music consumers.

While we are primarily concerned with the local music industry (that which is locally owned and operated), we must keep in mind that it operates within the broader context of the national and international music industry which, while now only marginally involved in the actual production and distribution of local music, still sets the professional
norms for the local industry and the legal framework within which it must operate. The “hits” of the national/international music industry, at any point in time, influence local music styles. And the ultimate in musical “success” for many local musicians is to break into the mainland market.

The local music industry is organized to exploit two primary markets — the more than four million tourists (approximately 4.8 million in 1984) that come to Hawaii each year, and the permanent residents of the state which in 1984 numbered approximately one million. While many local residents are enthusiasts of Hawaiian music and some tourists share this interest, the large majority of people making up the tourist market and the local market have only a limited interest in and appreciation of the Hawaiian music heritage. Only a small proportion of local residents are active consumers of Hawaiian music in terms of being record purchasers or paying customers at local performances. A larger share of the local resident population are passive consumers who watch the occasional Hawaiian music program on television, such as the annual Kamehameha School Song Contest or the Merrie Monarch Hula Festival, or tune in from time to time to KCCN, the Hawaiian radio station.

Because this is a paper on the music industry of Hawaii, its musical term of reference will be the “music of Hawaii” — the all-inclusive term that the industry uses. This includes all the sheet music, tapes and records that are sold in local record stores in bins or on racks with the label “Hawaiian Music”; the music considered for awards in the annual local music industry competition (the Na Hoku Hanohano Awards); the music played by KCCN, the only all-Hawaiian radio station; and the music that tourists and local residents pay to see and hear with the expectation that the performers will sing, play and dance Hawaiian music. When I do use the term “Hawaiian music” it is to distinguish music which has some characteristic that people generally identify with Hawaii from locally produced music that is indistinguishable from mainland popular music. I recognize that such crude labelling will satisfy few readers, nor does it satisfy me, since it includes as “Hawaiian music,” music whose only claim on our attention is to exemplify how badly traditional Hawaiian culture has been distorted by tourism and the mainland music industry (e.g. The Hawaiian War Chant which is a commercialized version of a love song written by Prince Leleiohoku in the 1860s).

PERSPECTIVES ON HAWAII'S MUSIC INDUSTRY AND THE PRODUCTION OF MUSIC

Several theoretical orientations provide useful frames of reference for understanding the processes and dynamics of musical development in Hawaii, and particularly the role played by the music industry in this process of cultural change. Roland Barthes’ concept of text and intertext, Raymond Williams’ neo-Marxist approach to culture, and the body of writings on cultural imperialism are three.

Music as Text

The first is Barthes’ (1981) view of text as something woven out of the past and the present, something found in all signifying practices - literature, painting, music, film. Text, in this sense, is a productivity of continuous significance, not a finished product with an “embalmed” signification waiting to be uncovered. Text is where creator, Other, and social context interact, creating and recreating meaning through space and time. In and through texts, language is redistributed, deconstructed and reconstructed, producing intertexts.

The music of Hawaii can be read as such an intertext. As the cultural, social, economic and political contexts of the islands have changed and continue to change, so too does the music change — in its instrumentation, its style, its content, its definition of what is Hawaiian music, and (very importantly) in its motivations for being. It is a mixture of traditional and modern music (hula and chant, hymns, jazz, rock and roll); of religious beliefs (Hawaiian and Christian); of different cultural values and experiences (Hawaiian, Western, Asian); of myths (precontact and ad-agency created); of economic constraints and incentives; and of political ideologies (feudalism, capitalism and the new Hawaiian political consciousness). In other words, the music is a productivity that has been evolving since before recorded time, something that is still evolving as each new wave of outside cultural and social influence reaches the islands (Buck and Feltz, 1983).

Materialism and Culture

In this paper we are particularly interested in reading those threads of the musical text that have been shaped by the political economy of the islands — in other words, reading the text from a dialectical materialistic (Marxist/neo-Marxist) orientation. This leads us to Marxist cultural theory as another theory useful in understanding the production of music in Hawaii.

Raymond Williams’ (1980, 1981) approach to Marxist cultural theory complements Barthes’ conceptualization of text and intertext. According to Williams, a Marxist approach to culture must look at specific activities in existing social and economic relationships with the intention of seeing how economic base and superstructure interact in a dynamic process of reinforcement. Incorporating Lukacs’ (1971) concept of the totality of social practices and Gramsci’s (1978) concept of the hegemony of the dominant class, Williams sees writing, visual arts and music,
film and broadcasting as parts of the cultural processes that contribute to the domination of an ideology, as well as central articulations which express and ratify the dominant culture in ways that deeply saturate the consciousness of society.

One contribution of Marxist cultural theory has been to highlight the interaction between cultural production and market forces. According to Williams, within market relations there are new kinds of controls that did not exist in pre-market cultural production. When works become commodities, produced to be sold at a profit, there is evident pressure, at or before the point of production, to reduce costs: either by improving the technical means of production, or by altering the nature of the work or by pressing it into other forms. It is here that manifest commercial modes of control and selection become, in effect, cultural modes. The contrast between market-originated and producer-originated work cannot be made absolute, once market conditions have been generalized. For producers often internalize known or possible market relationships, and this is a very complex process indeed, ranging from obvious production for the market...through all the possible compromises between the market demand and the producer's intention, to those cases in which the practical determination of the market are acknowledged but the original work is still substantially done (Williams, 1988:94).

Another related Marxist concept is cultural hegemony. An effectively dominant culture is always changing, adjusting to and accommodating alternative and even oppositional meanings, values, opinions and practices. These alternatives are tolerated, either because they do not go beyond the limits of the central corporate definitions, or because they do not threaten the hegemony of the dominant culture. Williams divides alternative/oppositional cultures into residual and emergent cultures. The residual cultures are lived and practiced on the basis of the residue of some previous social formation (for instance, Hawaii's preterritorial society), while emergent cultures are newly created. While residual and emergent cultures may be coercively eliminated if they are too threatening to the system, more frequently they are incorporated into the dominant system (i.e., what has happened to the rock music that was oppositional to the status quo in the sixties and is now marketed by the international music industry (Chapple, 1977)). Sometimes, however, alternative/oppositional cultures may be simply tolerated as marginal cultures since an effective dominant culture does not have to completely eliminate or incorporate such cultures.

Hawaii's history and development illustrates how a dominant culture interacts with alternative and oppositional cultures. For instance, those aspects of Hawaii that were obstacles to the political and economic goals of the dominant system were coercively eliminated and structurally reshaped with the overthrow of the monarchy and the imposition of an American political, legal and economic system. Other aspects of the culture have been incorporated into the dominant culture, as can be seen in the tourist industry's use and adaptation of traditional Hawaiian music and art for entertainment or image making. However, not all of Hawaiian culture has been eliminated or incorporated. There are still residual elements that persist on the margin, as well as recent amalgamations of residual and emergent cultures that are evident in the political demands and cultural expressions of certain segments of the Hawaiian community.

Cultural Domination

The third theoretical perspective that is useful in understanding the music industry of Hawaii and its music, is the theoretical perspective that has been called "cultural imperialism" (Galtung, 1971; Hamelink, 1982; McPhail, 1981; Nordenstreng and Schiller, 1979; Tunstall, 1977). This body of theory recognizes the dependent relationships that exist between the cultures of the developed world and the Third World or, more broadly, the relationships that exist between the large exporters of culture (U.S.A., Britain, Japan) and the cultures of "small countries" (countries such as Denmark and Sweden, as well as Third World countries) (Wallis & Malm, 1984). In many ways Hawaii's political, economic and cultural experience parallels the experiences of developing countries that have gone through periods of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The major difference is that for Hawaii imperialism proceeded to territorial annexation and, finally, to statehood.

Wallis and Malm (1984), in their study of music in "small countries," delineate different types of cultural interaction between countries: cultural exchange, cultural dominance, and cultural imperialism. All three patterns of interaction have been part of the textual productivity of Hawaiian music. The least threatening is cultural exchange. This describes the process wherein two or more cultures or subcultures interact and exchange cultural styles on more or less equal terms. Examples of this in Hawaii are the adoption, adaptation and incorporation of the guitar and the ukulele into Hawaiian music. With the guitar, which was introduced by cowboys (the paniolo) who came in the first half of the 1800s from Mexico and California, the Hawaiians developed their own unique style of playing — slack key. The ukulele was brought to Hawaii by the Portuguese in the 1870s (Kanahele, 1979). Both instruments were creatively integrated into the text of Hawaiian music in ways that were not simply imitative of another culture. An example of Hawaii as contributor to cultural exchange is the steel guitar, originally a mechanical modification of the guitar which Hawaiians pioneered in the late 1800s, and which has become a familiar sound in country-western music.
The second type of cultural interaction, cultural dominance, occurs when a more powerful culture is imposed on another in a more or less systematic fashion. During the 1800s, cultural dominance was evident in the missionaries' discouragement of *hula* and later (in the 1800s and throughout most of the 1900s) in the curriculum of Hawaii's schools where Western culture was taught while Hawaiian language and culture were neglected or even, in some schools, discouraged. Since the early 1900s the mass media have been instrumental in maintaining the cultural dominance of the mainland.

The third pattern of cultural interaction is cultural imperialism. Here dominance is augmented by the transfer of money and/or resources from the dominated to dominating culture. This type of cultural interaction was most evident through the first half of the 1900s when Hawaiian music was very popular on the mainland, and mainland record companies garnered considerable profits with very little of that money ever coming back to local composers and musicians.

**TOURISM AND HAWAIIAN MUSIC**

One of the major forces in the political economy of Hawaii is tourism which currently employs approximately one-fourth of the state's labor force (Hawaii Department of Planning and Economic Development, 1983). Since the 1920s tourism has played a major role in shaping the culture and music of Hawaii. A type of symbiotic relationship exists between tourism and the culture with tourism providing jobs for local musicians and a market for the local recording industry, and music, in its turn, providing a resource that enhances the lure of Hawaii as a tourist destination and entertains tourists when they're in Hawaii. Within the context of the tourist market, the basic effect of music commoditization is compounded by the unequal, essentially imperialistic, relationship that exists between the owners/managers of the tourist industry, which is dominated by multinational corporations (Kent, 1983), and local musicians/performers.

Culturally, tourism has played a major role in redefining Hawaiian values and practices. The perceptions that outsiders have of Hawaiians, and to some extent the self-perceptions that Hawaiians have of themselves, have been affected by stereotypes created by the tourist industry and further disseminated by media throughout the world. The more “positive” stereotypes of Hawaiians have been exploited by the tourist industry and the state to promote Hawaii. These are the stereotypes of beautiful, exotic *hula* maidens; friendly beach boys; happy lei makers; large, lazy, happy-go-lucky Hawaiians sleeping under coconut palms; ukulele-strumming musicians; and funny tour guides—not the images of people to be taken very seriously (Brown, 1982; Maretzki, 1974). The following song, popular in the 1950s, expresses the Hawaiian stereotype:

*Pitman/Magoon (49th State)*

During the territorial period, when tourists came by boat and remained for relatively long periods of time, they stayed in a few big hotels such as the Royal Hawaiian, the Moana, and the Halekulani. These hotels had their big bands, such as the Royal Hawaiians under the direction of Harry Owens and the Moana Orchestra under Johnny Noble, which played a combination of the big band swing music of that era along with *hapa-hauole* music that tourists could relate to. A lot of the *hapa-hauole* music was written by these musicians; for instance, Harry Owens wrote *Sweet Leilani*, and Johnny Noble wrote *My Little Grass Shack and Hula Blues*.

With the advent of statehood in 1959, the introduction of jet travel to and from the islands, and the rapid construction of hotels in Waikiki and on the neighbor islands, tourism became big business and, like other large industries, began to adopt techniques for increasing profits through economies of scale. For tourism this has meant the packaging of tourists into tour groups that can be moved in, out, and about the islands with ease (Kent, 1983). Along with the packaging of the tourists came the packaging of entertainment (Hawaiian music and dance, supplemented by other Polynesian music and dance) into shows prebooked by tour agents back home or by local agents in hotel lobbies. These big tourist shows, starring such names—entertainers as Don Ho, Al Harrington, and Ed Kinney, or the Polynesian revues of Tahiti, operate under long-term contracts ("Tying a Ribbon on the 'Strip Packet,'" 1974; "Entertaining the Masses," 1981). These shows sell
tourists a corrupted (and corrupting) version of Polynesian music and entertainment (a little of Hawaiian hula and singing along with Samoan knife and slap dances, Tahitian shimmys, Moors tongue-sticking routines and poi-ball twirling, and Fiji fire dancing) while, between numbers, the emcee tells "visitor" jokes, announces the birth-
days and anniversaries of those present, and tells where the tour groups are from. These shows, which are "offered" almost nightly throughout the year, cost approximately $35 for the dinner package or $20 for the cocktail package ("Tahiti's Drums: A Passport to Polynesia," 1984).

More than true of the recording industry or performances of music outside of Waikiki, commercial forces and motivations dominate the music of Waikiki. One of the ironies of the Hawaiian music scene is that with a few exceptions (for instance, Alfred Apaka in the 1950s) the best of the Hawaiian musicians - those respected by local lovers of Hawaiian music - are the ones least likely to "make it" in Waikiki. When they are performing in Waikiki it is often in less commercial venues, such as small lounges, or as background music for dining, or during the day when hotels, such as the Halekulani and the Hyatt Regency, hire some very good "old time" Hawaiian musical groups to provide an Hawaiian atmosphere. The value of music in Waikiki is based either on its ability to sell itself directly to tourists (what they will pay to go to) or, indirectly, to provide the tourist experience with a semblance of contact with authentic Hawaiian culture.

Although the relationship of tourism and music was characterized above as symbiotic, the power within the relationship is almost totally one-sided. The unequal relationship that exists between those who own and manage the hotels in Waikiki and the local musicians who work there is a function of the social and economic relationships that exist within the industry.

From the early days of tourism to the present, the hotel jobs that the majority of local people get have been menial, poorly paid and seasonal (Kent, 1983). While the jobs of local musicians and singing less menial, they are also poorly compensated and even more insecure. With the exception of the big-name entertainers, it is impossible for most musicians to make enough money to adequately support a family in Hawaii. Unionized musicians see themselves in a no-win situation: if the musicians' union pushes salaries higher than the hotels are willing to pay, jobs are eliminated or performances are cut back with the result that more musicians join the ranks of the unemployed or underemployed. Because entertainers' cut-backs and start-up costs for the hotels are minimal, entertainers have little bargaining leverage. In other words, the demands of the tourist industry are elastic (based on the health of the tourist industry and the musical tastes of tourists), while the supply of Hawaiian musicians is relatively inelastic. As a result most local musicians depend on other jobs for their main source of income.

Fortunately, not all of live Hawaiian music is devoted to entertaining tourists. The awakening of ethnic and political awareness among Hawaiians in the 1970s was expressed, in part, in a resurgence of inter-
est in the traditional music of the islands and in contemporary musical expressions of ethnic pride and political protest. Local musicians began performing outside of Waikiki in small clubs and restaurants, in open-
air concerts, and at numerous protest rallies. Hawaiian music also served as a symbol of protest for other groups disenfranchised with the status-quo and opposed to the dehumanizing development taking place in Hawaii. In the mid-1980s we still see a relatively steady fare of nontourist-oriented Hawaiian music at local clubs and restaurants, but not at the same level of activity as during the 1970s, and the explicit political nature of the music is less evident.

THE RECORDING INDUSTRY

Most of the music which the people that live in Hawaii listen to over the radio or television, go to hear, or buy in record stores comes from the mainland. Local retailers sell the latest popular music, radio stations offer the same Top 40 formats and/or canned news and features as mainland stations, the big rock acts come regularly to Honolulu, and the classical music offerings — symphony, opera, ballet — are similar to cities of comparable size on the mainland. Hawaiian music, even in Hawaii, is a marginal music. The marginality of Hawaiian music is evi-
dent in the fact that only one local radio station (KCCN) plays Hawaiian music regularly, although, as one of 17 AM and nine FM radio stations on Oahu, it generally manages to stay within the ten top stations in terms of listenership. Hawaii, however, is different from the rest of the U.S. in that it is the only state that has maintained a musical tradition and style of its own, as well as a separate music industry which, although heavily influenced by the mainland music industry, is now relatively independent.

The history and development of the record industry in Hawaii can be divided into two phases: the first period which was dominated by the mainland music industry; and the second and current phase in which the record industry has been locally owned and operated. The domi-
nance of the mainland record companies was virtually unchallenged from the first decade of the 1900s until the middle of the 1940s. During the 1950s a number of local recording companies were started which coexisted with the mainland giants until the sixties, when the mainland lost interest in "Hawaiian" music. Since then, except for occasional distribution of a local hit, the local recording industry has been left to the "homegrown" companies.

The relationships that existed between Hawaiian music and the main-
land record industry during the early period fits the definition given above of cultural imperialism: the transfer of money or resources from the dominated culture to the dominating culture. Mainland record companies used Hawaiian music (or music which seemed Hawaiian) to make money, little of which came back to the original composers or to the people whose culture was being marketed. Very similar processes of exploitation and expropriation have taken place and are still going on with regard to the music of Third World countries where the international music industry extracts music (i.e., reggae) for the international music market.

The recording industry in Hawaii goes back to the early 1900s when, following annexation, Americans became interested in Hawaiian music. According to Hopkins (1979), record-making started in Hawaii in 1905 with the arrival of the Victor Talking Machine Company. In one year Victor recorded and released 53 records. Five years later, Columbia arrived and began to record — both companies recording at this time primarily for the local market. When the Hawaiian music craze swept the mainland (as well as much of Europe) as a result of the Broadway musical, *Bird of Paradise*, and the appearance of Hawaiian musicians at the Panama-Pacific International Exhibition in 1915, the pace of "Hawaiian music" production was intense as record companies tried to capitalize on this huge market.

Composers and performers who had never even been to the islands began writing, performing and recording "Hawaiian music" for the large mainland market. Many of Hawaii's musicians also performed on the mainland during this era. By 1917 Victor had released 50 Hawaiian 78-rpm records. After a peak of recording activity between 1926 and 1929, during which time Brunswick, a mainland-owned company, had set up a local recording studio, the depression nearly ended the record industry. However, production picked up again in the thirties, with Decca the leading producer of Hawaiian music. 1939 catalogs showed Victor with 189 Hawaiian records and Decca with 391. During the fifties (following another break for the war) mainland record companies were primarily producing new versions of earlier *hapa-haole* hits, such as Andy Williams singing the "Hawaiian Wedding Song" and Billy Vaughn's "Hawaiian War Chant" (*Hawaii Mele*, March 1979).

The first locally-owned recording company began in 1936 as part of the operations of KGU, the first local radio station which was owned by the Honolulu Advertiser. At first the records were just transcriptions of live radio programs for use by other NBC affiliates. In time, however, Hawaiian Transcription Productions began to release singles for the local market — residents and tourists. The first local record company to dominate the local market was Bell Records which began in 1944. Bell produced the first solo recordings of Alfred Apaka, Andy Cummings and Gabby Pahinui. At the end of the 1940s Bill Fredlund, the owner of Bell, claimed he was selling "tens of thousands of 78-rpm records each month, most of them in Hawaii" (Hopkins:328). When Bell sold out, 49th State Records, owned by George Ching, a Honolulu record store owner, took over as the largest local record producer, putting out a tremendous number of Hawaiian records, mostly *hula* music for the tourist market. Most of the music of 49th State Records has been re-recorded on long-playing discs and is still available.

In the 1950s several new local labels were started: Waikiki Records, Tradewind Records (which stressed authenticity and released albums of *ukulele* and slack key guitar music), Hula Records (also with a more traditional orientation), and Music of Polynesia, the company of Jack de Mello which, more than the other local record companies, geared its music to the tourist market, producing a kind of Hawaiian muzac. The 1960s were years of inactivity for the Hawaiian music industry as rock and roll dominated everything. By 1969 the interest of the U.S. recording industry had declined to a point where Decca and Capitol, the two biggest national producers of Hawaiian recordings, dropped the Hawaiian category completely ("Music Seen as Potential," 1972). Even the local record companies had little motivation to record since the market for Hawaiian music seemed to be only tourists and oldtimers — both groups happy with re-releases of already-recorded music.

However, with the political and cultural revitalization of Hawaii in the 1970s the local recording industry took off. As the seventies progressed several new local companies started, such as Lehua, Makaha, Sounds of Hawaii, Poki Records, Pumehana, Mountain Apple, Seabird Sound, Paradise Records, and Panini Productions. It was the latter which "rediscovered" Gabby Pahinui, releasing a major album of Gabby and the Sons of Hawaii in 1971. Just as on the mainland, many of the local contemporary artists started their own labels in the seventies so that they could have more control over the production of their music and also receive more of the proceeds. However, with only a few notable exceptions (e.g., Peter Moon), the artist-controlled labels have not been as successful as the larger record companies, primarily because they lack the capital, but also because they do not have the "know-how" and contacts necessary to produce and promote a record.

It is in the "failure" of many local singers/groups that one becomes aware of the intricacies of the legal and financial systems that now control the production of music. For instance, if a musician wants to enter the music market, it is almost a necessity to have an agent or lawyer that can advise on matters of copyright and contracts with record publishers; on legal problems having to do with things like "residuals," "mechanicals," "performance royalties," and "synchronization"; on relationships with recording studios in Honolulu and/or the mainland (many groups/singers use mainland studios for the final "mixing" of their albums, and Hawaii still does not have a record pressing plant); and, on the advertising end of the recording process — packaging, promoting and selling the artist as well as his or her musical product.
It has been estimated that the minimum capital needed to produce a record locally is $2,000, but this would not buy much in the way of studio time or sophisticated recording backup. A more reasonable cost range is between $30,000, what it cost to finance the 1983 Hoku-winning album, Audy Kimura’s “Looking for the Good Life,” and $45,000, what it cost to produce “Harbor Lights,” the Peter Moon Band’s 1983 record (“Local Sound Battles Mainland Music, Economics,” 1984). These costs are not high by mainland standards, but such amounts are hard to come by for local artists, particularly for unknown artists. For an artist-initiated record, the necessary capital can be acquired in a number of ways—borrowed from friends and family, advanced by a record company with an agreement that part of the sales will cover the company’s costs and also provide a profit, or a recording studio might allow recording time in return for a percentage of sales. (Hawaii Songwriters Conference, 1983).

During the mid-1970s, the production and sale of local recordings was very strong, with some albums selling 50,000 to 100,000 units, where previously 5,000, or even 3,000, was considered a successful record sale. In 1978 an average of ten records a month were being released, with an estimated total of 250,000 units sold, generating a revenue of from one to six million dollars. Locally produced records accounted for about 20 percent of total record sales in the seventies, with about half bought by tourists (Koalana Mele, January 1980; “Multi-million Dollar Business,” 1979). Today local recording activity is down considerably from the 1970s. Whereas as many as ten albums a month were released in 1978, in 1983 only 35 albums were issued for the year. “Harbor Lights,” Peter Moon’s 1983 release, had sold only 15,000 copies, and Audy Kimura’s prize-winning album had sold only 12,500 copies after nine months. Now locally produced records account for only about 10 percent of the three to four million albums and cassettes sold here in a year.

With the cooling off of the local recording industry, it appears that commercial considerations are becoming stronger in the production and selection of music. In order to compete with mainstream music, Hawaiian musicians must produce albums that are as good technically as those coming from the mainland. To sell their albums they must also offer a selection of music that will attract the widest possible market. For instance, in his latest albums Peter Moon, one of the most successful of local artists and one who has managed to avoid Waikiki, tries to offer a musical mix that will have a wide appeal. His 1983 “Harbor Lights” album features a boogie-woogie number, some reimaginations of old favorites, a blues ballad, several slack-key pieces, reggae, rock, and several new songs in Hawaiian and/or about Hawaiian themes by local composers.

And to sell a record in the tighter market of the eighties, exposure is vital. According to Wayne Harada, the popular music critic of the Honolulu Advertiser, this requires having an act: “You can’t just plop four guys in a lounge, who have no concept of doing a performance, and expect critics or audiences to tolerate it” (“Local Sound,” 1984). It also means joining the Hawaii Academy of Recording Arts which makes an album eligible for a Na Hoku Hanohano Award. If a singer/composer/group in really serious it means getting a manager who can get club dates, TV commercials, radio interviews, items in the gossip columns, etc.

If the local resident market continues to decline, there is the danger that tourists, as record buyers or as a tempting live entertainment market, may become an even more important influence on local music. The Brothers Cazimero are an illustration of the successful commercialization of an act that prides itself on its traditional Hawaiian roots. However, they have circumvented the promotional merry-go-round that most local musicians are on only by selling large Christmas and May Day concerts (through intense media promotions) and with a long-running engagement in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel’s Monarch Room. According to their manager, Jen de Mollo, “To make a living at entertaining, you can’t turn your back on Waikiki. Waikiki is a very strong market; it has a lot of visitors.... If you’re only a local drawing act, you can’t go down to Waikiki and expect it to happen” (“Local Sounds,” 1984).

CONCLUSION

In the introduction we said that Hawaiian music in an intertext of many different texts, and that the codes, formules and structure of the capitalist music industries operating in Hawaii have been important texts within Hawaiian music. We also said that, while a dominant cultural system most often incorporates residual and emergent cultures into the dominant system so that they too become part of the definition of the dominant culture. There may be residual/emergent cultures that coexist with the dominant culture, managing to maintain some degree of separateness. Although it is evident that much of the Hawaiian music text represents a residual culture that has been incorporated within the dominant culture, there is still a part of Hawaiian music that is marginal and, to some extent, part of a residual/emergent culture that is trying to be at least an alternative culture, if not an oppositional culture. This Hawaiian marginal/residual/emergent culture is under constant tension, however, in its strain toward separateness and cultural autonomy vis-a-vis the dominant capitalist culture.

As a symbol of Hawaiian culture, many young musicians respect the music of earlier eras and continue to use it in their performances or in their own albums, sometimes with minor style modifications, sometimes with radical modifications. Because many local people do recog-
nize the cultural importance of Hawaiian music, participants in the industry — composers, performers, or at least are soon made aware, that what they produce or perform is subject to the criticism of other participants (including many involved listeners) — quite a few of whom are trying to protect and preserve the Hawaiian language and the integrity of Hawaiian music as an expression of Hawaiian culture.

At a 1983 conference of Hawaiian songwriters and performers, the future of Hawaiian music was discussed and debated by participants that included scholars of Hawaiian music and culture; composers and/or entertainers active during the last forty years or so; media representatives including staff from KCCN (one of the sponsors of the conference); record producers; as well as people who just listen to and enjoy Hawaiian music enough to give up one or two days from their weekend. Several issues were raised throughout the course of the conference. One had to do with the perennial debate as to what is Hawaiian music. Another, related issue, had to do with the importance of the Hawaiian language to Hawaiian music. Many of the young composers expressed a feeling of frustration that they could not compose in what should be their mother tongue, that if they want to compose an Hawaiian song, they must find someone who can capture the feeling expressed in the English words and put it into Hawaiian; while kapuna (elders) in the audience voiced their distress in hearing Hawaiian words used inappropriately or mispronounced, and expressed their willingness to help young composers and singers.

Concerns were also raised about the business of Hawaiian music and the future prospects of the local music industry in light of rising costs and a decreasing market, or about the possibility of contemporary local music and performers breaking into the mainland music market. However, some also wondered about the more fundamental problem of the effects of the market system on the integrity of Hawaiian music, particularly in a tight music market. Will the music continue to express the uniqueness of Hawaiian culture and continue to play a role in the political and ethnic consciousness of the Hawaiians?

In some ways Hawaii's local recording industry is an example of what Third World countries would like to achieve. -- a locally owned industry that serves as an outlet for the traditional music of the past and that offers contemporary musicians a system within which to produce their own music. However, the music industry of Hawaii also illustrates the danger that any capitalist mode of music production holds for traditional cultures when they must operate within the context of the larger international and national culture industries. Such a system, by its very nature, exerts a centralizing pull on marginal cultures. It remains to be seen if Hawaiian music, as a symbol of ethnic pride for Hawaiians and of an alternative culture for others, can survive as an active and creative force within Hawaii.

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HAWAII
AND WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Edward D. Beecher

In recent years there has been increasing interest in analyzing the development of Hawaiian society and its political economy. Differing from the traditional political elite-player type of historical analysis, some have tried to apply a Marxist scheme of analysis to the direction and character of Hawaiian historical development. Clearly, the accidental elite history leaves much to be desired. One knows a great deal about a handful of individuals, and very little about the mass of people who have made up Hawaiian society and who have been the chief producers of the modern economy.¹

Two recent interpretations deserve special examination. Noel Kent’s, Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence (1983), and Robert H. Stauffter’s The Tragic Maturing of Hawaii’s Economy (1984). Each of these finds the development of modern Hawaii’s political economy to be retrograde and one which has exploited and, to varying degrees, degraded the condition of Hawaii’s working class. Such developments as the transition from an industrial type plantation agriculture to a service-type economy, featuring a low wage tourist industry at one pole and government employment at the other, are vividly described in the two works.

Several important problems are raised by these conclusions about Hawaii. Although Kent correctly describes and rejects Kuykendal’s documentary approach to the political history of Hawaii, the majority of his analysis follows in that same tradition. The “movers and shakers” make decisions and the faceless masses follow along. Only in his conclusion does Kent come to the question of the level of the consciousness of the working class. Left unexamined are the many examples of working class behavior which suggest the dialectical nature of Hawaiian development. As is frequently the case in the use of the dependency model of analysis, there is an unstated, but ever present, assumption about a “different” historical experience which would have been available, absent the described “influences.” Favorable or unfavorable judgments about investment patterns are made according to these “influences.” Something or someone would cause decisions to be made which would have resulted in a more benign situation. Put another way, dependency theory tends to decry the present as a distortion of a past which would have been more benign, absent the “outside” influences.

Stauffter’s work explicitly uses this model in applying a version of Latin American dependency theory to Hawaii’s post-1959 development. By defining Hawaiian development as "colonial" rather
than "true, local development" he finds the modern Hawaiian economy to be "tragic." The model is similar to the one used by Kent, and is based upon the ideas of Andre Gunder Frank (1967, 1969) and the "dependency" thesis of international capitalism. To a lesser extent, Paul Baran's (1957) thesis of 'underdevelopment' is a model.1

In these studies the flow of capital from the metropolitan center to exploit the labor and resources of the dependent area determines the nature of economic development. Typically this is shown to be a type of development which promotes further dependency and poverty among the people of the dependent country and removes decision making to the metropolitan center.

Both of these studies are curiously static in posting an unchanging, dependent relationship and seem to rule out any possibility of change short of a revolutionary situation. The current crisis of world capitalism would seem to suggest that while strategies may be proposed and given striking titles (e.g. Pacific Rim Strategy), many factors can and do intervene to change those strategies or plans. Interestingly, the most progressive forces for change in the un- or under-developed world are found squarely rooted in local history and traditions — not in ideological abstractions. Witness the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the FMLN in El Salvador, and the struggles in the Philippines, to name only a few. While these movements against capitalist exploitation are led by "intellectuals" of varying persuasions, their wide-spread support is drawn largely from peasant populations who have for several centuries struggled against both local and foreign oppressors.

To reduce local history to a matter of the focus of capital is to fall into a fatalistic economism. It also involves casting the local "bourgeoisie" into the role of benevolent capitalist, at best, or that of subservient "lumpen-bourgeoisie' at worst (Frank, 1972). The evidence would suggest that they are very likely neither. HOLDERS of wealth usually make an effort to multiply that wealth and may send their capital in various directions. The scanty evidence available for Hawaii suggests that the local bourgeoisie did invest heavily in the local sugar industry after 1875. They also invested heavily in "foreign" economic opportunities, including the Philippine sugar industry, oil, manufacturing interests, railroads, and other opportunities on the mainland. From an early point (1859), the "missionary" families, Castle and Cooke, had New York financial advisors to assist in the placement of their surplus capital. Walker's Manual of Far Western Corporations and Securities (1911-1960) is filled with the names of Hawaiian investors in non-Hawaiian activities, as well as non-Hawaiian investors in Hawaiian sugar companies. Five of the large Hawaiian plantations were organized as California corporations between 1882 and 1899, including Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar.

Several important problems of definition and methodology need to be examined. The method of historical materialism would seem to suggest that such conclusions, stated or unstated, are distinctly outside the framework of a Marxist analysis. While the writers cited have located the motive force for change in the productive forces of the society — in fact, forces which determine civil society — they seem to have fallen by the wayside in projecting "...later history as the goal of earlier history...". Thereby history receives its own special aims and becomes a "person ranking with other persons'. In effect, such history becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Marx 1981:57-59).

The theme I want to explore here is best expressed in Marx's statement of the problem:

This conception of history depends upon our ability to expound the real process of production starting from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e., civil society in various stages, as the basis of all history...At each stage of history there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation...It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances." (Marx 1983:59)

Consider for a moment the problem of defining the working class of Hawaii. On a crude level, it is often assumed simply to be those who work. From this simple fact, it is assumed that there is a consciousness which translates into an awareness of the social relations of production. More frequently, the evidence of militant behavior, particularly organized strikes, is assumed to be a measure of class consciousness. Although class is clearly one of the most ambiguous of all Marxist terms, the development of consciousness seems more clearly marked out than most aspects of class analysis. The problem is whether or not the working class, "one among many competing interest groups," is constrained by legal, systemic barriers, or is transformed into a consciousness which acts as the agent of the workers in their struggle against capitalism, free to direct its power toward obtaining control over working conditions and perhaps to be the revolutionary gravedigger of capitalism (Aronowitz 1974:420).

The problem is not easily resolved. It has been pointed out that the worker (frequently) holds private views which contradict his organizational views. This is seen most often when workers accept the political recommendations of a union even if they hold private views quite different. "...[T]he class political attitude of the workers...is not at all the same as, and sometimes even contradicts, the sum totals of their private views" (Harrington 1974:152).

Marx divided the approach to class into two segments. On the one hand, there is the history of class struggle, as in the Manifesto. This has been termed the "macro" level of class struggle. At the point of class...
consciousness, one is dealing with the “micro” level of analysis. Although these two aspects are inseparable, it is important to distinguish between the two. In the sense in which we are using it here, class comes into existence at the point where classes begin to acquire a consciousness of themselves as a class in relation to another class. This is the point at which confusion and difficulty set in. The dynamic relationship which defines class is too frequently frozen to facilitate examination. The difficulty of using the concept, however, does not preclude a careful examination.

In one of his early writings, Marx clearly posed the problem of dealing with this dynamic relationship. “Private property”, he said, “is compelled to maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, in existence” (Marx & Engels 1956:31). In effect, the condition of the working class at any given point in history is a reciprocal of the ruling class organization of the means of production. A measure, then, of the state of society is to be found in the conditions of employment—the social relations of production. These two aspects of the dynamics of class must be considered simultaneously. Thus, to speak of the economy only in terms of capital investment, and to discern in the source of that capital significant conclusions as to the nature of the economy, is to ignore the fact that the patterns of investment will create a dialectic which will produce changes in the attitudes and responses of the working class. That the working class does not respond in an automatic manner is only to admit that while “Men make their own history, they do not make it just as they please,” but are conditioned by all of the inherited circumstances and traditions (Marx 1883:13).

Marx described two levels of class consciousness. In one sense the workers form a class in itself, and in a higher sense, a class for itself. In this latter role, organization is the means by which class consciousness expresses itself. It is through this means that the working class endeavors to bring about the changes in the work relationships (the social relations of production) which will objectively alter the conditions requiring change. As time passes, the political economy of Hawaii over the years, it becomes clear that the condition and consciousness of the working class are responses to the conditions imposed by capital. At each point of examination, we find the responses of the working class, as they perceive the situation, are often incorrect. The problem of “false consciousness” is one which recurs with a dismal frequency.

If one uses the technique of the dialectic to organize the meaning, one cannot draw conclusions about “tragic maturting” or “falling under” the influence of capitalism and the many sociological similarities used to identify and describe the Hawaiian political economy. The particular level of development one perceives at any given time is already in the process of transformation.

In the studies under review, there is the implication that the economy has taken a turn for the worse, creating “menial jobs” instead of more fulfilling, ego-satisfying employment. To suggest that such a development is the product of failed decisions of “leaders” is to ignore the history of capitalism (Kant 1963: 117, 153). A recent forum on tourism was devoted largely to attacking the industry for its creation of menial-type employment; without ever explaining what alternatives might have been created in the way of employment. This static mode of analysis obscures the important fact that the quality of employment under capitalism is no more than the sum of (1) the efforts of the employer to control wages in order to insure the maximum profit, and (2) the resistance of workers to these efforts. If employment can ever be said to be “menial,” in itself a dubious proposition, then this is a commentary on the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Employment per se cannot be menial or demeaning; the conditions attaching to the work can be, and often are, demeaning. This was the condition of the plantation workers until 1944.

The work of society can, and should, be carried on under conditions which maintain the dignity of the individual. This is measured by the level of remuneration and the relations prevailing in that employment. If the working class has sufficient consciousness of its role and has moved to express that role, the work required to be done will not be demeaning, menial, or whatever perjorative term is employed. Attention should focus instead on the qualities which degrade the work condition.

The description of work as demeaning or trivial echoes exactly the complaint Marx launched against the Hegelian and early 19th century critics of mass movements when there was a tendency among socialist writers to decry the “spiritless masses”. The answer Marx suggests to this tendency is applicable here.

The Great appear great in our eyes
Only because we kneel.
Let us rise!
But to rise it is not enough to do so in thought and to leave hanging over our real sensual head the real palpable yoke that cannot be subdued with ideas (Marx, 1956:111).

In the following section, we will review briefly the major points of development in the Hawaiian political economy from the beginning of the sugar industry to the development of the modern service sector, with a focus on the awareness and responses of the Hawaiian working class as a result of these transformations.
The Political Economy of Hawaii and Working Class Consciousness

of an adequate market forced a majority of the planters out of the business. Spurred by the sudden appearance of a market created by the American Civil War, sugar production expanded rapidly after 1861; from 572 tons in 1861 to 8,865 tons in 1864. This market continued with the growth of the Pacific coast population which became a virtual monopoly market for Hawaiian sugar.

Planters had considerable difficulty in financing the development of land and the mills. The semi-arid nature of much of the available land dictated the building of expensive and massive irrigation systems to ensure the expansion of production. Rapidly changing sugar refining technology was also prohibitively expensive. Hawaiian sugar could not meet the Pacific coast market with the old, low grade cake-sugar of earlier years. It was at this point that the Honolulu merchant community entered the picture to finance the expansion of the plantations, in company with loans from the Hawaiian government.

Up to 1875, labor demands in sugar had been met largely with Hawaiian labor. At that point, some two-thirds of the sugar workers were Hawaiian and only small numbers of Chinese had been imported. Although there had been much discussion of the "labor question" before 1875, it was mostly empty rhetoric induced by the Hawaiian's demand for decent wages.

Financing was the greatest obstacle to expansion. With the signing of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1875, the pattern changed dramatically. Admission duty free to the American market meant, in effect, a subsidy of 2 1/2 cents per pound of sugar, above the market price (Taylor 1935:16, 62-65; McClinton 1899:8).

The demand for capital changed the entire structure of the industry. With ready capital available, the industry expanded furiously. Equally great was the demand for labor. The declining Hawaiian population could not supply much more than the numbers already engaged. The Hawaiian aristocracy, fearing a loss of sovereignty, sought, unsuccessfully, to replenish their numbers with "captive" populations. Rapid increases in the numbers of Chinese workers temporarily met the need. Chinese, and later Japanese immigrants, were seen as solutions to this labor shortage problem. As the number of foreign laborers grew, fears of "infestation" by the never ending flood of single male Asians grew.

Objections to Chinese, from both Hawaiian and American political interests led to efforts to "Europeanize" the work-force, principally with Portuguese workers. The extreme cost of importing Portuguese families, and their tendency to depart Hawaii for California almost immediately, led to the search for Asian sources other than Chinese. Indentured labor conditions had little appeal to European workers, whose consciences about abuse tended to attract unfavorable attention from the U.S. and European press and public. The only available Asian source of laborers was Japan, and eventually, in 1883, an agreement
was reached for the importation of Japanese workers under a three year contract. Under the Masters and Servants Act, a contract worker faced drastic penaeous consequences for a refusal to work as ordered or for leaving the employment before the specified term had been met. In theory, the law also required the master to meet all of the conditions of the contract and forbade the use of corporal punishment, debt peonage, or unilateral extension of contract, reduction of wages or failure to provide housing and/or food, if specified in the contract. Needless to say, in such a system the worker was at a serious disadvantage. Workers brought to the magistrate on charges of "refusing bound service" could be given jail sentences and fines. Until such fines and the trial costs were met, the worker was confined to prison. In theory, if not in practice, there was no limit, other than life, to the length of such terms. In practice, these penalties were confined to more modest levels. Workers in prison produce no sugar.

Chinese workers quickly responded to the coercive conditions of indentured labor. A majority remained as sugar workers beyond their initial term, largely as free workers. As free, day workers, they organized a labor form which put them into a more advantageous position as regards discipline and supervision, always a sore point in plantation labor, and which allowed a more normal employee-employer relationship than that assumed under the master-servant relationship (CJS, 1936 [56]:24). Forming themselves into labor companies, they contracted with the planters through their self-appointed leader for the service sought. The money thus earned was divided according to their own rule. This system of labor contracting continued on into the annexation period. Japanese workers formed similar groups (Hawaii Kingdom Board of Immigration, 1882-98). A situation was thus created whereby three distinct labor forms could be found at any given time: indentured labor under penal compulsion; free day labor able to withdraw at any time for any reason — or discharged without notice — and a self-organized gang labor system contracting their services. This latter system closely resembled the "padrono" system found among Italian workers in southern U.S. agriculture in the late nineteenth century. Such self-selected groups were almost always ethnically distinct.

Given the pressure to expand production after 1875, labor was in steady demand. This pressure limited the plantations in the degree of authority they could exert, and certainly limited the extent of abuse which might have otherwise been used. Worker responses to the conditions on Hawaii plantations in this period were largely limited to individual reactions to personal abuse or group abuse. The conditions of work did not permit the possibility of organized resistance or defense. The major concern of the planters was (and is) to maintain a firm control over the cost of labor. Cultivating and harvesting accounted for approximately sixty per cent of the total labor costs of sugar production. To prevent wages from rising, sugar plantations everywhere have relied upon a steady flow of replacement labor to maintain a relatively low level of wages and to provide a regular exodus of workers. The planters, both individually and in gangs, was an attractive option to the sugar planters because it meant they could expand or limit production according to the price of sugar, without the fixed cost of maintaining a large indentured labor force. Free workers could be hired or laid off according to production needs. The important proviso was the maintenance of an adequate flow of imported surplus laborers who could be used to deflect wage increases. The scale of expansion suggests that the planters had neither the choice nor the luxury of shifting labor forces to suit notions of control. From a total of 20 plantations in 1870, the number had grown to 75 by 1890. The workforce increased from 3,260 to 37,760 in the same period. Clearly, the magnitude of the change reflects a far reaching change in the social relations of production.

The introduction of Japanese workers, recruited by the Japanese government under the Convention of 1885, also sharply affected the conditions of labor relations. Indentured for three years, the Japanese worker was under the nominal control of the Japanese government, including an Inspector of Immigrants. The control was nominal because such officials, of whatever race, tended to be exploiters of their countrymen rather than their protectors, as is suggested by their title. The number of Japanese workers remaining in Hawaii, as well as the eagerness of those at home to be recruited, suggests that the conditions were not intolerable or unfavorable for the majority of workers. The volume of money sent back to Japan between 1885 and 1894 averaged approximately two million yen per year (Okakura, 1973 [12]:226).

There is little or no evidence of any sense of cohesion or group identity among the different groups and types of workers in this period of free/unfree labor. Such evidence as exists suggests little more than spontaneous protest, often in large ethnic groups.

The growing number of free workers led, by 1893, to attempts to impose new controls over this body of laborers. Even before the overthrow of the monarchy, efforts were made to impose an internal pass system to control the movement of workers, under the guise of a national registration law for all adults. The move was vetoed by the Queen.

Shortly after the overthrow of the monarchy, the constitution was amended to permit the importation of what amounted to Chinese serfs, bound to labor on the plantations on pain of arrest and instant deportation. The presence of 18,000 free Japanese workers was seen as a distinct threat to the maintenance of a low wage structure. There were too many planters willing to offer higher wages to obtain skilled, experienced labor. That the workers were able to bargain for better condi-
tions or higher wages is evidenced by the complaints of the raided plantations (Boechert, 1981; forthcoming).

ANNEXATION AND NEW LABOR TERMS

The annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and the abolition of the penal contract brought drastic changes to Hawaii. Although supporters of annexation played down the dramatic change in labor relations, arguing that more than half of the workforce in 1900 was made up of free workers, the planters had lost the one effective device for maintaining some degree of control over the pressure on wages. Chinese workers were completely cut off by the Exclusion Act and Japanese became the mainstay of the labor force. There were now only the two possibilities of gang contracting or day wage labor. The rising frequency of labor disturbances, (there were several strikes by Japanese workers between 1900 and 1909), suggests the importance of that third, unfree element in restraining labor actions.

It was at this juncture that the racism which pervaded labor relations in Hawaii began to damage the situation. From the reluctance of the Hawaiian to accept sub-standard conditions was derived the notion of the “innate” indolence of the Hawaiian. Such ethnic stereotypes quickly enter into the conventional wisdom of the community and are accepted without question. Each group of workers in turn was hailed as the “solution” to the need for an adequate, low-cost, docile labor supply. Each in turn, from the Chinese to the Filipino, was to be deficient in some respect—most often in failing to respect their employers’ need for low wages and more work. As a general rule of thumb, each group moved from the position of saviors of the industry to that of devils, to again “acceptable” when the latest group proved to be intractable. One typical example of this progression is seen in the description by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor in his Report on Labor in Hawaii, 1903:

The Chintaman was the more steady and reliable but less energetic than the Japanese... The Japanese represents the radical, the Chintaman the conservative side of oriental civilization... His white employers consider him [the Japanese] mercenary, superficial and untrustworthy in business matters. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1900: 134-35)

Within a few years, another U.S. official reporting to Congress added a description of the last two groups to be imported to Hawaii: Puerto Ricans and Filipinos. He said, “The Porto Rican [sic] was considered very much inferior to all the others until the Filipinos was brought in, and it is conceded by all, that the latter is the poorest specimen of man that was ever introduced into the Islands” (Hawaii Territory Board of Immigration, Labor and Statistics 1911:3-4). The circle was now completed—each ethnic group, without exception, whether Asian or European, had been tested and found seriously wanting. Sugar plantations around the world have displayed remarkably similar tendencies in their attitudes toward workers and techniques of control. In almost all cases, labor came from Asia or Africa, and to a limited extent, from the Pacific Islands. In all cases, the labor force was racially distinct from the managerial class. In turn, the managers were either the ruling class or their direct representatives. Throughout the nineteenth century, and in some cases until 1914, labor control was based upon an indemnity labor system, modeled after the British Masters and Servants relationship, varying in details and degrees of control from place to place (Graves & Albert, 1984).

One of the more significant ideas of labor control in all plantation economies was that of exploiting racial differences. A corollary was to justify rigid control on the basis of racial inferiorities. At its optimum, the exploitation of racial differences presumed the presence of a sufficient number of surplus workers to enable the threat of substitution, which acted as a coercive device for each of the groups represented.

Given Hawaii’s restricted access to alternative labor sources, this technique remained primarily a verbal, ideological proposition. Employed on an ascending scale in the strikes of 1909, 1920 and 1937, the technique proved costly and ineffective. There were never sufficient numbers of racially different skilled workers available to replace the massive numbers involved in these strikes.

The global recitation of ethnic deficiencies was a part of the world-wide psychological rationalization of labor exploitation. The eminent sociologist Max Weber, in 1923, commented on the poor working conditions of the Polish immigrant workers in the Prussian sugar beet industry, explaining the demonstrably poor working conditions and treatment as being due to the fact that the Poles came from areas of lower standards of living (Low Kultur) than the workers of Prussia, (High Kultur).

It is not possible for two nationalities with different bodily constitutions, stomachs of different construction, to quite freely compete in one and the same area. It is not possible for our workers to compete with Poles... (Weber 1893:517)

The substantially different situation after annexation is seen in the Japanese strikes of 1909 and 1920. The first strike was organized through the Young Buddhist Association groups, and was led by Honolulu intellectuals associated with the Japanese language press. The Japanese had given early signs of a quick adaptation to American labor techniques. Strikes in 1903 and 1904 showed considerable ability to organize and present grievances, and considerable discipline among the workers. Although confined to single plantations, they were quite effec-
tive in securing redress of many of the grievances. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association (HSPA), organized in 1894, did not have sufficient control over the industry to effectively organize a uniform labor policy. In part through this strike, and even more so in the case of the 1920 strike, the HSPA gained greater authority and uniformity of policy. The strike of 1909, affecting only Oahu plantations, presented a cogent, highly analytical statement of the grievances of the Japanese workers. Most of these grievances were non-economic, dealing with the quality of supervision, housing, camp conveniences, as well as details of organization and wages (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1910).

Although the strike was technically lost and the employers refused to recognize the Japanese organization in any way, the workers made their point and forced drastic changes in the handling of labor. The employers resorted to a favorite mainland device — jailing the strike leadership on a variety of criminal charges. The expectation was that the workers would be unable to function without their leaders—a firmly held but seldom realized expectation.

In addition to a pay raise, the strike focused attention on the poor and chaotic housing situation of the plantation camps, a major grievance of the workers. A program of camp improvements was initiated by the HSPA, creating a new function for this employers' organization. The rapid expansion of the industry after 1875 had forced the location of camps in remote areas in order to get the workers reasonably near the work site. By 1909, the cane field locomotive had made such isolation unnecessary. The small, isolated camps were segregated by race, not so much from any deliberate policy, but from the order of arrival and the worker-felt need for ethnic homogeneity in these scattered communities.

The total lack of jobs for the communities forced the plantations to create their own communities, and to supply these with the necessary community services. With this necessity came an opportunity to exercise control over the workers by controlling access to housing and essential services. The worker had no alternative other than to leave the plantation and migrate to the urban areas of Hawaii—few and far between. Eviction from plantation housing became a device of labor control after 1909, reaching a climax in the strike of 1920.

THE WORKER'S RESPONSE 1920 - 1937

The Japanese were organized this time into a federation of plantation unions. Whereas the impetus for organization had come from urban intellectuals in 1909, this time it came from unions organized on each plantation, carefully excluding urban intellectuals, particularly newspaper editors. The Filipinos, imported as the principal labor force after the cutoff of Japanese labor in 1907, had formed a Filipino Federation by 1920. Their organization, however, was of a different order than that of the Japanese. Organized by a charismatic leader, there was little formal organization and no clear means of rank and file participation. The Filipino Labor Union more closely resembled a patriotic-religious organization than a labor union.

Despite these differences, an amazing degree of cooperation between the highly organized and financially strong Japanese union and the disorganized, poorly financed Filipino union was effected. This cooperation was in the face of a massive campaign of sabotage by employer agents, language differences, cultural differences, and severe limitations on finances (Beecberr, forthcoming; Reincke, 1979). Although the racial pay scales and grossly inadequate pay levels resulting from World War I inflation were important, the issues again were more than wages. Issues of respect and decent housing were equally important.

The severity of the strike and the scope of racial cooperation in the labor force, once again dictated a massive reorganization of the labor force and its deployment by the planters. A decision to switch over to cultivating and harvesting contracts, and to reduce the use of day wage labor to an absolute minimum, was implemented immediately at the conclusion of the strike. The HSPA created an Industrial Welfare Bureau to oversee the implementation of a sweeping program to convert plantation camps into communities, focusing on housing, recreation and medical care. In other words, a full scale program of welfare capitalism was implemented, based squarely upon a similar movement on the mainland in large scale industrial organizations.

The combination of a shift to short and long term contracts for a majority of the field workers and the new welfare program was effective in several ways and a failure in others. The program achieved the short term goal of reducing labor militancy and slowing the outflow of workers. Within two years, the well organized and broadly based Japanese plantation unions had vanished, never to reappear. The Japanese increasingly moved off the plantation to urban occupations. The conversion of the remaining Japanese to mill work, skilled labor tasks, independent cane growing and contracting work, accomplished the HSPA's program with efficiency.

For the growing numbers of Filipinos in the work force, the outcomes were somewhat different. Entering at the lowest skill levels, the Filipinos were effectively concentrated in field work. Although the welfare program produced a degree of HSPA control undreamed of in earlier years, the Filipinos remained stubbornly nationalism and independent. Re-forming their union, the Filipinos began in 1923 to prepare for a new round of struggle. The strike of 1924, one of the least planned, most badly conducted strikes in Hawaii's history, has been called by its principal historian, "The Filipino Picketed Sugar Strike". The strike was, nonetheless, drastic in its consequences, tragic in its
violence, and vivid evidence of the basic failure of the welfare capital-
ism program to achieve its basic goals (Reinecke, 1963; Brody, 1980:48-81).

"No other major strike in Hawaii was so haphazardly planned or
conducted or failed so completely," Reinecke concluded. Drawn out
over seven months, on four islands in turn, resulting in the death of
twenty people, (four police and sixteen strikers) the strike nonetheless
demonstrated conclusively that welfare policies and labor control tech-
niques based upon racial stereotypes were failed policies. Although the
 strikers were seldom unified in their views, when the companies resort-
ted to instant eviction of men and families, even unsympathetic Fili-
pinos felt they could not abandon their fellow workers and moved out
with the strikers. This was, as it had been in 1909 and 1920, convincing
evidence of the nationalistic solidarity and ethnic cohesion among the
principal groups of workers.

It has been suggested by one recent writer that the 1920 strike was a
terminal point in the development of class consciousness of the sugar
workers, emphasizing two elements: the attempt at Filipino-Japanese
cooperation in 1920 and the evolution of "their own language," the
"creole" language often termed "pidgin" (Yakaki 1983:174, 179). The
principal student of Hawaii's creole language has particularly cautioned
against this conclusion. He explained that:

...the makeshift language of the plantation environment of
Hawaii has been the perfect type of the species; that the
emigrants, like the East Indians indenture to the British Carib-
bbean lands and Mauritius, came under condition approaching in
many ways those of free immigration...In such an environment... they
were, perhaps, more up to retain their language...The conditions...were favorable for the mainte-
nance of ethnic solidarity and morale among most of the groups
coming to Hawaii, and, hence, for the retention of their
language. (Reinecke 1983:111-113)

Reinecke's conclusion is borne out by the fact that the Japanese seg-
ment of the workforce formed no more labor organizations, and made
no overt gestures of support for the striking Filipinos in either 1924 or
1937. Nor had the Filipinos learned from their previous experiences in
1920 and 1924. The appearance of mainland labor organizers was a
harbinger of the changes which were to take place in Hawaii's labor
struggles. In 1937, mainland organizers, reflecting the modern, Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) tradition of non-
discrimination, urged the Filipinos to organize all sugar workers. This
suggestion was rejected summarily by the leadership. Neither manage-
ment nor the workers had learned much from the 1924 strike, and both

attempted to replay the scenario (Beecher 1981:122-123).

From the Hawaiian's resistance to exploitation during the conversion
of the communal society to the 1937 strike, there is ample evidence of the
potential of the working class to move to a level of awareness of their
quality as a class for itself. This is the point at which class con-
sciousness can be truly said to exist, and the point from which the
potential comes into being for an organization to express that aware-
ness.

This consciousness does not depend on subjective factors, but on ob-
jective factors. It is based, according to Marx, on the reality of the struc-
ture of property relations in society. The many responses of the workers
of Hawaii to the rapidly evolving political economy of the nineteenth
to twentieth century, represent their degrees of awareness of their po-
sition in relation to the bourgeoisie. At each point, however, the work-
ers essentially responded by retreating into their naturalistic-linguistic
camps for the protection and security to be found there.

The potential for class consciousness required the arrival of an orga-
nization which incorporated certain basic ideas in its organization.

Coming to Hawaii first as the representative of Hawaii's longshoremen,
the emergent C.I.O. brought to Hawaii the notion of the class for itself
—and a long step forward from the ethnic militancy of earlier years. On
the urban level, the Communist Party arrived in 1937 to bring its ideas on
labor organizing to Hawaii, and to participate actively in the rapid pace
of labor organizing which began at that point (Beecher, 1979).

The pro-world war II campaign in Hawaii was primarily initiated by
local workers. The longshoremen, moved by the Pacific Maritime
strikes of 1934 and 1936, organized themselves and applied for
charters. Between 1936 and 1940, they demonstrated a remarkably dif-
f erent level of class consciousness and working class cohesion than had
previously been the case.

The different attitude was evident in the inter-racial solidarity dis-
played at Port Allen-Ahukini in 1940. Striking longshoremen evicted
from their plantation homes, in keeping with the old employer policy of
paternalism, refused to be divided into the three basic groups —
Hawaiian, Japanese, and Filipino — and moved out in a body and re-
main ed out over a protracted period (208 days). The significant element
this time, was the presence of a sophisticated labor organization, which
recognized racial and ethnic exploitation as one of the principal tools of
the employer (Zalburg 1979:48-50).

This movement spread to the plantation workers. The United Can-
nytry, Agricultural, Processing, and Allied Workers-C.I.O.
(UCAAPA), began to sign up workers on Kauai. More significantly,
this effort attempted to organize the workers politically. Two Kauai
senators, members of the island aristocracy, were replaced in the Tet-
ronial legislature with worker-endorsed candidates, a harbinger of
things to come.
The Political Economy of Hawaii and Working Class Consciousness

strike was to convince both the community and the workers that the workers could and must make such objectives their goal. They did. The second strike demonstrated the ability of the ILWU to successfully incorporate a nationalistic tendency into their strategy. In the disastrous 1947 pineapple strike the union suffered a serious set back in the form of humiliating contract conditions. The workers at Hawaiian Pine on Lanai, all Filipino, sought and secured permission of the leadership to reject the subsequent contract in 1951. As Louis Goldblatt of the ILWU (1979) explained, “there were no traditional strike issues. These guys were angry at the company because of their contemptuous treatment over the years.” For over 200 days, the Filipino workers held out, inflicting a loss of over $25,00,000 on the company. When the company asked for settlement, the ILWU used the occasion to restore industry wide bargaining which had been lost in 1947, a wage increase, and most of the social-community demands of the Lanai strikers.

The third strike was perhaps the most decisive. For obscure reasons, the employers — basically the Big Five — decided to force a showdown with the ILWU over the 1938 sugar contract. The union had prepared for just such an eventuality by building up a large strike defense fund. “The Aloha Strike,” so called for its good spirit and community support, lasted for 179 days. The ILWU secured an impressive retirement program, a housing policy which made available reasonable cost housing for its members, a comprehensive medical coverage program, which included families, and a meaningful wage increase. A sugar worker at this point was almost literally a “white-collar” worker in terms of benefits and job security. Mechanization had taken its toll of the work force, but the workers, through their union, had secured a greater portion of the returns from mechanization than in any other industry.

Kent (1983) characterizes the ILWU as a union which “sold out” in 1952 by abandoning its Marxist principles, and dismisses them from any further consideration. It is difficult to understand just what is meant. Given the National Labor Relations Act which carefully controls the scope of labor negotiations, Marxist principles are never on the bargaining table. Maintaining a high level of worker participation in a highly democratic organization, the ILWU would seem to be one of the more successful unions in achieving the Marxist goal of raising worker consciousness while building a strong organization.

THE QUESTION OF STATEHOOD AND THE MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Both Kent (1983) and Stauffer (1984) see in statehood a decisive step in Hawaii’s modern development — a step into the ravages of world capitalism and regressive development. The development of the tourist
industry is seen as the direct outcome of this manifestation. Stauffter characterizes the situation by showing that, in 1950, local capitalists had approximately $44 million more invested in "outside" corporations than in "local" corporations, which created a positive balance for Hawaii. By 1971, the situation was reversed, and "outside" capital exceeded local capital by $763 million, resulting in a corresponding outflow of payments. A further evidence of the decline of the Hawaiian situation is seen in the heavy spending for infrastructure such as roads, airports, sewers and water systems. As Stauffter puts it, not only was the private sector "sold off," but a heavy public debt was incurred as well.

Here one needs to step back and examine the national picture. State and local capital outlays had risen dramatically in the last two decades. Simply put, the expansion of population, the movement into the suburbs, and the long neglect of the infrastructure occasioned by the Depression and World War II, required massive outlays of funds. State and local borrowings increased on the order of 339% and 236%, respectively, in the period from 1950 to 1964. This was, in dollar terms, from $2 billion in 1945 to 23.1 billion in 1971 for state borrowings (O'Connor 1972:195).

In this context, Hawaii's rapid increase in bonded debt appears in line with the national experience. In that same period, Hawaii reversed a long term population decline, and began to rapidly increase its population, which, without regard to tourism needs, would have required an expansion of infrastructure.

More important than the sources of the capital are such facts as the development of the trans-oceanic airplane which made feasible the transportation of large numbers of new, relatively low income tourists, as compared to the Lusitania class of tourists. One has only to read of the near bankruptcy of Matson in 1950 and the comical operation of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel on the American Plan to realize the difference between modern, mass market tourism and the older, elite, relaxed tourism catering to the wealthy (Woroni 1981:123-124).

The impetus to develop Hawaii's tourist industry came initially from local investors, anxious to reverse the losses incurred after World War II and to increase the flow of profits from their investments in "local concerns." Harold Rice budgeted American Factors in 1955 into changing the Kaanapali Coast from a poor sugar growing area to a profitable land development area. He was tired of seeing all the revenue from Pioneer Mill going to American Factors, and he was especially incensed that Pioneer Mill had paid no dividend since 1944. What bothered many of the wealth-holders in Hawaii was the relative failure of Hawaii corporations to show the rapid appreciation in the price of securities as compared to what their holdings in mainland corporations were showing. This resulted in a demand for an end to the incestuous, interlocking, now unprofitable corporate management and a summoning of executive talent (Fuchs 1961:393-394).

The conclusion of that strike was seen by the members of Local 5 as having a significant meaning: "After two weeks, the strike was settled. More important than actual gains was the respect that Local 5 won for its strength and militancy." (Woroni, 1973:122). The workers and their organization clearly understood the nature of the changes taking place, and made a vigorous effort to establish their rights and position. That the effort was not always successful is only a comment on the resilience of capital and the ongoing struggle which confronts labor.

One cannot assume, as do Kent and Stauffter, that somehow local capital or some alternative pattern of development was available.

One can use the core-periphery model to examine the situation confronting workers in Hawaii, but not in terms of the world capitalism model of dependency theory. On a national level, we are confronted with a consolidation of large scale capital — truly an era of "monopoly capitalism." This development has...

produced two distinct types of business enterprise in the United States. A few hundred corporations with extensive market power at the center or core. Around them, in industries or branches of industry that the big corporations have not yet invaded, nearly 12 million small and medium sized firms — the economy's periphery — continue to survive. (Edwards, 1979:72).

In this stage of capitalism, we find a considerable change in the conditions confronting the Hawaiian working class. With plantation labor converted into a stable, well paid class of skilled workers, the basic employment opportunity remaining in Hawaii is to be found in what has been called the secondary market — the preserve of deadend, low paid, casual labor. It was to that arena that the ILWU turned in 1958, recognizing that further organization of the working class could only come in the service sector — the area of prospective growth.

The major unions in construction and the service industry have long recognized that if the local people were to be able to remain in Hawaii, there would have to be a considerable expansion of employment. Con-
struction was the most promising way of creating high-wage employment. Their endorsement of the Democratic Party program of development may have been short-sighted, and may have produced an inferior development. No reasonable alternatives for employment of local people came forward.

The alternative to development in the decade since statehood was emigration for employment, or poverty in Hawai‘i. From the perspective of a young person seeking employment, carpentry or hotel work offered a more attractive prospect than insured alternatives. The realities of the American economy cannot be overcome by structural analyses which disguise the nature of the transformation of the national economy. By 1979, 43 per cent of all Americans employed in the non-agricultural economy worked in services or trades. Put another way, since 1973, more than 70% of all new jobs in the private sector have been in these two low paid, short time, dead end sectors of employment (Rothschild 1981). Hawai‘i, like the rest of the United States, has been moving toward a structure of employment ever more dominated by jobs that are badly paid, unchanging, and unproductive. That the unions have not been as successful in altering these conditions in the tourist industry as they were in the basic industries of Hawai‘i suggests only that the character of the opposition has changed.

Workers in the United States generally have not been successful in coping with the rapid development of service sector, low-wage, low-security employment.

The working class has been unable to challenge capitalist hegemony because it is split into fractions. Each of these fractions has different immediate interests and has pursued these separate interests in the political arena. The result has been a demise of 'class interests' and the rise of 'faction' issues (Flaherty, 1979:201).

Here in Hawai‘i, as elsewhere, the worker has been isolated by the shift of grievance procedures away from the work site. This loss of job control has been accompanied by a corresponding tendency toward formalistic, bureaucratic union administration (Brody, 1978:198-211).

Despite these setbacks, workers in Hawai‘i and their unions continue to struggle. Organizing in the hostile environment of the National Labor Relations Board, the union record here is about equal to that of mainland unions — they win slightly less than half of the representation elections entered. "No Union" is a frequent winner — evidence of the massive anti-union campaign launched by the media and by corporations, and now joined, if not led, by government.

Confronted with unemployment and decreasing welfare assistance, workers are frequently forced to choose between a tourism development or no job. One cannot assume that history has stopped or that the basic struggle of class interests has ceased. "...The old class lines of

clerical work continue to exert their force, only now they do so within the context of class fraction politics" (Edwards, 1978:201). In a capitalist political economy, the workers do not dictate the terms of struggle. The only point about which we can be certain is that the class struggle will continue. There is no guarantee of short term victory. As one working class leader put it: "A revolution is not a dinner party." Out of this situation can come a new level of struggle and working class unity. An essential pre-condition is to recognize the problem, and not to blame the victim for the crime.

NOTES

1. The classic example of this type of history is Ralph Kuykendall’s, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 3 vols (1958). Gavin Daws’, A Shoal of Time (1968) is a modern version of this type of history, heavily dependent upon Kuykendall, but trying to develop a synthesis from the mass of data. A somewhat different approach was tried by Lawrence Fuchs in Hawai‘i Pono: A Social History (1961). A most useful, but often flawed work, Hawai‘i Pono relies upon mass-produced research which often creates careless stereotypes and has a poor grasp of labor. A little noted book, probably the best single effort at an analysis, is John Reinecke, Language and Dialect in Hawai‘i (1969). Reinecke locates the development of the Hawaiian creole language in the political economy of Hawaiian development. See particularly Chapters 3 and 5.

2. The word metropole is the obsolete form of metropolis, the parent state of a colony (See Frank, 1967;1969). For a comparison of countries and their experiences, see Crocker et al, 1975 and Baran, 1957. Fagan (1983) gives a general comment on these theories of development.


4. False consciousness is used here in the manner of Georg Lukacs, "...The basic categories of man’s immediate attitude to the world..." (Lukacs, 1971:89). See also Gabel (1975).

5. In pre-contact Hawai‘i, the chiefly system depended upon a distribution of the land to subordinate chiefs, who in turn made it available to commoners. The commoner’s principal attachment was to his extended family and particular ‘ohana. (Handy & Handy, 1972).
6. The survey found Hawaiians were "indolent and indifferent" to attempts to engage them in wage labor, unless wages were "high." In those situations, particularly in Lahaina and Honolulu, there was no shortage of Hawaiian workers at adequate wages. (Robert Wiley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Annual Report, 1848, "Answers to Questions...Addressed to all Missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands, May, 1846").

7. Marx describes this tendency in a vivid passage: "The enemies of progress outside the mass are precisely those products of self-debasement, self-rejection and self-estrangement of the mass which have been endowed with independent being and a life of their own. The mass, therefore, rises against its own deficiency when it rises against the independently existing products of its self-debasement, just as man, turning against the existence of God, turns against his own religiousness. But as practical self-estrangements of the mass exist in the real world in an outward way, the mass must fight them in an outward way" (Marx, 1956:110-111, Emphasis in the original).

8. The Hawaii Penal Code of 1850, was unique among the indenture acts employed in world sugar production in that it made no distinction between "native" workers and imported labor, save in the permissible term of indenture — five years for local labor, and up to ten years for imported labor when the contract was signed abroad. This latter provision was never effective since political circumstances and international considerations dictated much shorter periods. Basically, three years became the common period of indenture after 1885, and five years prior to that time. For example, the British authorities would not permit the signing of contracts of Chinese workers abroad. When the worker arrived in Hawaii, the five year rule could be applied. The Japanese government dictated the three year term for Japanese immigrant workers.

9. "Early expansion of the Islands' sugar industry was largely financed by the mercantile houses of Honolulu. Pioneer planters generally had few resources. After 1875, local private capital resources became inadequate and the Hawaiian government had to come to the rescue" (Mollett, 1961:61).

The Political Economy of Hawaii and Working Class Consciousness

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COMMENTARY

STRAWS IN THE WIND

Noel Kent

Nowadays, the notion of Hawaii having a special leadership role in the Pacific has about the same credibility as Ferdinand Marcos claiming pristine innocence in the Aquino affair, or Ronald Reagan preaching hard work and thrift to the unemployed steel workers of the Monongahela Valley. Yet, wasn’t it only seventeen or eighteen years ago that the then Governor of Hawaii, John Burns, would seize every possible occasion to warn grandiloquently upon Hawaii’s destiny as “the hub of the Pacific,” while prominent bankers, economists and academics spoke earnestly of the islands imminent arrival as “the Pacific Geneva?” Located at the “crossroads” of Pacific commerce, Hawaii was to become a spearhead of high technology and finance, throwing lightning bolts of (capitalist) illumination into the dark recesses of the southern and western Pacific. Here, went the popular wisdom, was the model that delivered, the one Pacific peoples had long been awaiting.

We live in a less bullish (if not more honest) era now. Amid the harsher light of the mid-eighties, Hawaii stands revealed as less a Pacific Geneva than a Pacific Puerto Rico; its landscape dominated not so much by corporate towers, stock exchanges and microchip research facilities, as by-rise hotels, condominiums and nuclear-laden military bases. Few take Hawaii seriously any more as anything but a center of escape and fantasy. From the east and west come an overlapping series of invaders: dollars and yen (some of it laundered or in flight), tourists seeking an ever elusive paradise, and immigrants from the Illicos, Samoa, Tonga, Hong Kong and Laos, seeking a piece of the Great American Pie; land developers, money men and hotel managers out of Toronto, Los Angeles and Tokyo. And as in Puerto Rico, a bustling acquisitive middle class exists side-by-side with an underclass of marginalized and frustrated locals. Class and ethnic cleavages sharpen amidst a cultural division of labor that is not terribly different in character from the old plantation days. With social mobility blocked (even for much of the middle class), outmigration is the final vehicle of hope for local youth. All in all, a familiar script for students of mis-development.

What remains historically constant is Hawaii’s subservience to the advanced centers of world capital. And if we may judge by two significant happenings during the last year, this process of peripheralization continues to intensify. The one most publicized, was the conclusion of the epic seven year battle over the rezoning of Nukoli’i (that lovely strip
of Kauai beaches) for resort development, with victory finally going to Haugwaa Komatsu, the giant Japanese developer, and its local allies.

Beaten in the November 1981 referendum on Nukoli'i by a decisive two-to-one margin, Haugwaa Komatsu, aided by the usual unhappy gaggle of local lawyers, politicians and businessmen that always appear on the scene in such cases in Hawaii, struck back hard. Demandind a second referendum on construction of its sprawling resort, the company most generously offered to finance the cost of holding it. A foreign corporation paying for a special public ballot: this was unprecedented even in the arena of Hawaii land politics. What followed was a well funded publicity campaign to convince voters that with the well-honed public relations campaign to convince voters that with sugar plantations closing down and work hard to come by, Nukoli'i represented a genuine option for future economic stability. This struck a responsive chord with many. Moreover, the advocates of construction at Nukoli'i were quite adept at using a substantial absentee vote to guarantee their victory. So on February 4, Haugwaa, now free of public accountability, ense more had Nukoli'i at its disposal.

Nukoli'i illustrates three points: First, the extent to which overseas capital will go in subverting local allies and in corrupting the local political process to attain objectives regarded as major. In Nukoli'i, this extended (with the concurrence of the Kauai mayor, county council and judiciary) to subverting even a semblance of democratic and constitutional process.

Secondly, and the flip side of point one; the degree to which local public officials and power brokers are prepared to collaborate with national capital in prizing open untouched new areas of Hawaii to tourism-laden development. Nukoli'i indicates that the local power structure is more than willing to accede to the demands by international tourism developers for radical new subsidies in the form of cheap money and tax holidays, demands sure to be raised in the future as the increasingly aged Hawaiian tourist plant requires massive new capital to compete with Acapulco, Cancun, the Caribbean, etc. In return for their unstinting concessions, Hawaii's allies will continue to maintain an open public treasury and provide sanction to new projects. Witness the strong support given to the Hiloa consortium's gigantic West Beach project by Mayor Eileen Anderson's administration and her $90 million "Waikiki 2000 Program" for renewal of the strip.

Indeed, government officials have been carefully chosen for their responsiveness to the powers-they-be. Amfac's Henry Walker, busily developing the "Islands of Elegance" (in conjunction with Hyatt), Marriott, Unid, et al. at Kauaiai, remarks gleefully, "I find the government officials much more receptive to business than they were a few years ago when the government hears us and is doing things such as appointing Kent Keith as head of the State Department of Planning and Economic Development." With dependable servoys such as Keith in the upper reaches of the state bureaucracy, Hawaii's role as a matured tourism society is secure.

There is a third lesson to be drawn from Nukoli'i also. The day of pure nay-saying is over. Times are difficult and uncertain, people feel deeply threatened on a number of levels, and the companies of tourism-laden development must offer a program that will mobilize a real constituency. There is reason to believe that had an alternative to the Nukoli'i proposal been available - this means a viable program for the economic development of Kauai replace with adequate jobs, public revenues and local control - many of the construction and plantation workers who voted pro-Nukoli'i would have voted "No." But in the absence of intelligent, believable alternatives which speak to deep-felt needs, there will be more Nukoli'is.

There has been one other noteworthy happening in the world of Hawaiian political economy. Within the space of a single year, we have witnessed both American Factors and Castle and Cooke, the two largest Big Five corporations, transferring their headquarters to San Francisco, while Dillingham Corporation, a fiercely multinational with worldwide interests in construction, transportation and minerals, was bought back, stock and barrel by mainland interests and its Hawaii headquarters liquidated.

From the perspective of half a century ago when the Big Five-Dillingham compees controlled Hawaii's agro-industry and the entire apparatus of shipping, banking, insurance, warehousing and marketing around sugar and pineapple, this is a dramatic change indeed. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Big Five exercised monopoly economic and political power in the territory; drafting and approving legislation in their company offices, using the legislature and courts as their pawns, making the deals that counted in their own Pacific Club. If Hawaii was dependent on the Mainland for its yearly sugar quota and a host of imports, it was still a limited dependency because the island elite had such potent local strength.

Once the old Kamakai hoak family owners who owned the Big Five decided to embark upon a massive program of diversification into other areas and new fields, it was inevitable that this relationship change. During the process of reorganizing the Big Five-Dillingham corporate bureaucracies along up-to-date mainland lines for the corporate expansion of the fifties and sixties, the old families lost control in overseas interests, who snapped up large blocks of new stock. Hawaiian capital could not an international giant like Castle and Cooke to the Philippines, Amrisha, etc.? without the financial backing of international capital located in the world centers. By the seventies, Castle and Cooke and Amfac, now billions of dollar a year multinationals, were largely mainland owned; C. Iquen had been bought up by the Philadelphia-based conglomerate International Utilities, and Theo Davies by Jardine Matheson of Hong Kong.
Thus, the past year’s movement of company headquarters to San Francisco and Dillingham’s closing hardly rate as shockers—it is merely the latest act in the making of Hawaii completely and utterly dependent upon overseas-decision making. The 210,000 prime acres of Hawaii land owned by Amfac and Castle & Cooke became hostage to the decisions of board members in San Francisco (a real Pacific center city, as opposed to Honolulu, an imaginary one). The chairman of Amfac’s board, Henry Walker, admits: “it’s only logical that the further away you get from Hawaii, the smaller Hawaii’s problems appear, particularly in the context of the big multi-national picture.”

So Nukoli’s red-brown earth is assaulted and concretized by forces from the west, and corporate headquarters move east. Two straws in the wind. And an ill wind it is.

Book Reviews


Dan Boylan

Hawaii has many stories to tell. It’s seen the development and near destruction of a Polynesian people. It’s watched European and American adventurers, both officially-sanctioned and entrepreneurial, vie for its possession. It’s suffered sandalwooders and whalers, missionaries and militarists. But undoubtedly none of Hawaii’s tales matches in significance the 19th century development of sugar as the islands’ principal economy.

For sugar wrought drastic changes in Hawaii: Economic, political and social. Sugar cultivation, with its attendant large capital investments, demanded security of land tenure. Consequently caucasian sugar planters worked their will on the Hawaiian monarchy and on Hawaiian landowners, seizing huge tracts of real property in which to plant their crops. In less than a half-century sugar’s endless demands for increased acreage effectively alienated native Hawaiians from their lands.

In 1893 the majority control of Hawaii’s sugar industry by Americans also compelled the potentiate illegal (patent to all but the Reagan administration) seizure of Hawaii as a Territory of the United States. American planters wanted to insure themselves a stable market. To do so they destroyed Hawaiian sovereignty.

In the wake of that seizure, Hawaii became a colony of the United States, run, in fact, not by officials of the United States government, but by major corporate leaders whose profits depended primarily on sugar production. Their suzerainty would remain secure for nearly sixty years.

Perhaps most important, sugar repopulated the islands. Nineteenth century sugar cultivation was labor intensive. Its gargantuan demand for workers matched its appetite for land. By 1875 Hawaiian sugar planters had engineered a reciprocity treaty with the United States, ensuring them a mainland market. Concomitantly, the ravages of western disease had decimated the native Hawaiian population. Planters looked to Asia, the South Pacific and Europe to fill their need for workers. A seventy-year-long tide of foreign laborers remade Hawaii’s society.

Finally, sugar industrialized Hawaii. To be sure, Hawaii was spared industrialism’s most visual evils. The air remained clear and the smokestacks of the sugar mills appeared at great intervals along island shores. Tradewinds and ocean tides carried away sugar’s effluvients.
Hawaii remained rural; only the port town of Honolulu knew to any degree the congestion and overcrowding of the world’s industrial cities. Still, industrialism ruled Hawaii. Sugar’s multi-ethnic work force followed a daily schedule no less rigid than the steelworkers in Andrew Carnegie’s Pittsburgh mills. Island sugar planters manipulated labor, land and capital with the same callousness as the mainland entrepreneurs of steel, coal and railroads. A paradigmatic climate and waving fields of green cane may have softened the rigors of industrialism, but only marginally.

Sugar dominated Hawaii for over a century. Plantation life molded an entire generation of Hawaii’s people, and memories of it, both good and bad, still play an important role among contemporary Island leaders.

In *Paau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii* (University of Hawaii Press, $14.95), University of California historian Ronald Takaki offers a fine and balanced account of sugar’s role in forming Hawaii’s people. Fortunately, Takaki recognized both the significance and the inherent drama of the sugar plantation. Equally fortunate, Takaki brings to his story-telling an acute sensitivity and considerable writing skill.

*Paau Hana* is people’s history. The economics of sugar and the politics of Hawaii interest Takaki far less than the everyday lives and the struggle for respect of the sugar workers. Takaki knows that profit statements make poor reading. He leaves them to corporate historians. He deals instead with the fabric of life for the mass of men and women: in the case of the plantation, with lunch pails and wake-up sirens, with palaka cloth shirts and the razor-sharp edge of a cane leaf, with bongo numbers and overcrowded housing.

Takaki also recognizes, however, the essential industrialization process in which Hawaii’s people labored. His first chapter deals with the pioneering effort of a 26-year-old Bostonian named William Hooper to establish a sugar plantation at Koloa, Kauai, in 1835. According to Takaki, Hooper came to Kauai to do more than grow sugar. He and Honolulu’s Ladd and Company, for which he worked, launched a revolution: “Hooper was there to remake Hawaii in an American image: to advance the market civilization of the United States beyond Indian lands and Mexican territory to a new Pacific frontier, undermining in the process native Hawaiian society and the people’s traditional relationship with their land.”

Takaki’s sympathies are obviously with the traditional culture, but he treats Hooper’s Koloa project with restraint and some admiration. Ladd and Company held a fifty-year lease on 980 acres on the east side of Waiholoholo Stream. Hooper gathered his labor force from the Hawaiian population of the region. For $2 per month, Hooper’s men cleared the land and planted sugar. Hooper saw himself as for more than a businessman: He brought progress and civilization. His planta-

tion and wages would “eventually emancipate the natives from the miserable system of ‘chief labor’ which ever has existed at these islands, and which if not broken up, will be an effectual preventative to the progress of civilization, industry, and national prosperity.”

It undoubtedly never occurred to Hooper that he emancipated native Hawaiians from one form of slavery only to replace it with another. Hooper transplanted Hawaiians from their traditional homes to plantation housing. He weaned them from subsistence agriculture to dependence upon a market system. More important, he trained them to respond to industrialism’s ultimate prerequisite, the rationalization of time: “As plantation laborers, they [the Hawaiian workers] found their time controlled by unfamiliar workday sounds, schedules, and rhythms.” From sunrise to sunset, day in and day out, the plantation ordered the worker’s day.

Hawaiians did not take to the new slavery. They refused to transfer their loyalty from ali‘i to plantation manager, and they balked at the demands of the plantation work day. Within three short years of the inauguration of Koloa plantation, Hooper proclaimed them hapless and inefficient workers and called for the importation of Chinese labor.

Mass importation of Chinese would wait until 1853, but Hooper’s demand for new labor foreshadowed the mass immigration which commenced in that year. Koloa Plantation succeeded, and sugar attracted needed capital. The Great Mahele of 1848 provided security in land for plantation development. Only sinew and muscle were in short supply for the burgeoning industry.

Thus began Hawaii’s great migration. Laborers came from China, Japan, Portugal, Korea, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Spain, Germany, and Russia. Their motives varied. Some, like the Japanese and Filipinos, sought the largeess of the plantation and eventual return to their homelands. Others found either the political unrest or poverty of their homelands sufficient reason to seek permanent residence in a new and richer country.

Whatever their dreams, plantation management saw them principally as factors of production: “Reduced to commodities, they were placed in a labor market where plants inspected them and chose the ones they wanted, and where sugar agencies made selections and filled ‘orders’ for the plantations.” Indeed, plantation managers placed orders with the Honolulu agencies for “tobacco, Portuguese laborers...20 men,...lumber, 7 ft. iron bar, wool mattress, olive oil.”

And plantation management tried mightily to deter them from banding together to assert their dignity and worth. Takaki thoroughly documents the planter’s efforts to mix nationalities in order to lessen the “danger of collusion among laborers.” Labor was necessary to make sugar profitable, but organized labor, from the outset of Hawaii’s sugar industry, was anathema to the planters.
Plantation labor knew reasons for organizing. In the book’s two most effective chapters, “A New World of Labor: From Siren to Siren” and “Plantation Camps: Community and Culture,” Takaki constructs a portrait of plantation life which demonstrates the inevitability of the rise of militant unionism. At 5 a.m. each morning, a siren roosted workers out of their beds and into the fields. The work was extraordinarily hard. “Planting, watering, hoeing, ploughing, cultivating, ditching, stripping dead leaves from the cane stalks, cutting the cane, carting the cane or loading the cane into small tram cars” consumed the worker’s day. All was done under a fierce Hawaiian sun and under the watchful eye of a lono (supervisor). By day’s end the rigor and numbing boredom of the work left the men and women who did it exhausted.

Like the Hawaiians before them, the new immigrant laborers quickly devised strategies of avoidance. Slacking became a plantation art, and the managers acted to meet it. They fostered competition between work gangs and ethnic groups. Extensive rules were devised for each plantation, and a schedule of fines often imposed for a variety of infractions.

Compulsion could be less benign. According to Takaki, “One of the essential functions of the police in Hawaii was to maintain law and order on the plantations.” Prior to Hawaii’s annexation to the United States and the death of the contract labor system, Island police devoted much of their time to chasing immigrant workers who broke their contracts and deserted the plantations. Police were also employed to squelch gambling among workers and to deal with frequent labor disturbances. Strikes of short duration were frequent on the plantation long before professional union organizers ever set foot on Hawaii’s shores. They erupted over working conditions or wages, or more often, physical violence.

Takaki quotes the views of several planters on the beneficial effects of whipping, and he quotes an equal number of laborers on the terror induced by the mere sight of a mounted foreman carrying a coiled black snake whip on his saddle. Hawaiian law banned corporal punishment of plantation workers, but it was practiced and the threat of it instilled fear. Workers. Takaki admits that paternalism softened the rules, the work, and the low salaries of plantation life. Still, a workplace where a man could be beaten like a dog needed far more than a soft-hearted manager.

There may have been boredom to the work and terror in the fields, but in the plantation camps a rich and variegated life evolved. Housing was often overcrowded. Sanitary conditions were poor. Medical care was often rudimentary. But as Japanese workers brought their picture brides from their homelands, the camps filled with wives and children. Plantation workers and their families shared the food, the festivals, and the religions of their various neighbors. Filipino, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Hawaiian, and Portuguese young men played together in plantation-organized recreation programs. Each ethnic group borrowed from the languages of the others to create a new medium of communication: Pidgin English.

Indeed, the community which developed in the plantation camps explains in large part the fond memories which many of Hawaii’s old timers, despite the low wages and poor living conditions, still harbor for their life in the sugarloaf plantation of Hawaii. The plantation villages did not abut an urban civilization. They were widely separated, self-contained communities surrounded by sugar cane, mountains, and the sea. Children and adults lived in a quiet, clean, if sparsely populated place.

Without the distractions of urban life, plantation residents found their entertainment and their society within their families and with their neighbors. People knew one another. Children knew their parents, not merely as disciplinarians but as co-workers during the summer months when teen-age boys often joined them in the fields or mill.

Plantation residents knew a rural society in which values were fixed. They brought with them from Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines and Portugal the mores of traditional societies. Confucianism dictated rules for the Oriental, and Catholicism did the same for Filipino and Portuguese.

And the plantation communities were small. They were comprehensible units in which a person knew his place and the place of everyone else. Mr. Takahashi met Mr. Ramelb in the fields, on the baseball diamond, in the plantation store, and at the movie on Saturday night.

Couples with the social rigidity of the plantation, residents might well find all this familiarity stifling. Indeed, many did. They left the plantations at the first opportunity for the towns, to make their way in trade or small business. But many found as well a sense of place and security that a 20th century urban Hawaiian would deny them and their descendants.

Ultimately, of course, the vicissitudes of hard work for little reward would outweigh the ameliorating aspects of paternalism and small town life. In his final two chapters, Takaki treats the “Patterns of Resistance” laborers devised and the development of self-consciousness among the plantation workers. He looks in detail at the establishment of the Japanese Higher Wages Association and its 1909 strike. The planters used every instrument in their command to break that strike. They attempted to split the Japanese community. They had strike leaders jailed. They evicted strikers from plantation housing. And they hired strike breakers at twice the regular pay rate. After four months, the workers gave in.

The ethnic solidarity demonstrated by Japanese labor in 1909 spurred Hawaii’s planters to consider means to blunt it. They looked to the Philippines for an answer to their problems. The shift to Filipino
immigration actually began in 1907, but it accelerated after the 1909 strike. The solution proved short-lived. By 1920, a Filipino labor movement emerged, and in that year both Filipino and Japanese workers struck the plantation. Again, after six months, the planters successfully broke the strike.

Takaki implies that in 1920, Hawaii's plantation labor learned the weakness of ethnically-based unionism. In the future, Hawaii's workers would organize on class rather than ethnic lines. Not so. Four years later a Filipino union would strike on its own, leading to greater bloodletting than the events of 1920.

In fact, Takaki ends with the 1920 strike because that's as far as he wishes to go. The 1920 strike was a seminal point in Hawaii's labor history, the first time workers cooperated across ethnic lines. But the lessons of class unionism were not as clear to all as Takaki would have us believe.

Takaki's decision to end his story of plantation life in Hawaii in 1920 is *Pan Hana*'s greatest weakness. By doing so, he neglects a full half-century of plantation experience that is, in some respects, it's most exciting era. The 1930's in particular saw the re-energizing of the labor movement in Hawaii and the first tentative steps of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union to organize island workers. The ILWU's success in its post-World War II organizing effort would completely change the face of plantation Hawaii. Paternalism gave way to the more egalitarian meeting of labor and management across a bargaining table.

The last fifty years saw another important change: Filipinos replaced Orientals as the largest element in the plantation work force. There are at least two important stories to be told regarding that change. Despite its governing principle of labor solidarity, tensions developed between Filipinos and Japanese that threatened the unity of the labor movement. In his *A Spark is Struck: Jack Hall and the ILWU in Hawaii*, Sanford Zalburug has touched on these tensions, but they deserve further study.

Filipinos also knew a decidedly different experience from the sugar workers who had gone before. Many Filipinos never left the plantation. A far greater proportion of Filipinos never knew the comfort of family life in Hawaii. Their history lacks the Horatio Alger quality of movement from sugar field to noodle shop to the professions. Few of their children went from plantation village to lawyer's office in one generation. It is a more depressing and heart-rending story, but one that needs to be told if the full plantation experience is to be known. In *Sakado: Filipino Adaptation in Hawaii*, Ruben Alcantara has dealt with the Filipino experience on one Oahu plantation, but his approach is more sociological than historical.

The last half century of Hawaii's plantation life also produced the generation of men and women who have, over the last thirty years,
NOTES ON THE COST OF LIFE IN MODERN HAWAII:
A REVIEW OF NOEL J. KENT'S
HAWAII: ISLANDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE


Robert S. Cahill

Put most succinctly, this is a book about the transformation over the past quarter-century of a society once based economically on plantation agriculture into a “society of tourism,” in which the resources of its people are mobilized into the service of an all-consuming “visitor industry” which, although immensely profitable to investors based in centers of economic decision-making far removed from that society and to their most effective agents based in the society itself, visits upon an increasing number of its people a burden of increasingly unbearable weight.

As political analysis this vision of Hawaii’s distant and recent past, and of the futures that may be imminent in it, is unlikely to engage the minds of the present generation of Hawaii’s movers and shakers, whether in government or the “private” sector. It is much more likely to seem altogether alien to their practical concerns. Nor is it likely to warm their hearts in its role as potential political myth inviting embrace by the people of Hawaii. Instead, it is much more likely to outrage them, if they do not find it merely licentious or boorish. How it will be received by other constituents of Hawaii’s body politic, who experience themselves more nearly as moved and shaken, is a more open question. And it is in the openness of this question that the primary significance of the work is to be found — for the movers and shakers, for the author himself, and for the moved and shaken whom both address.

The book should be evaluated in each of these aspects — as both analysis and potential myth — first of all because any such serious attempt to understand an ongoing political reality and then to share that understanding with its makers and bearers should be seen in each of these manifestations of the consciousness that authors it. To speak of myth in this context is, of course, to refer not to some ancient or otherwise alien “myth” which in our unfiltered enlightenment we have exposed as the enslaver of our ancestors or our contemporaries in more benighted cultures, but to refer instead to effective myth, powerful myth, myth which orders and accounts for the political experience of a people and reveals its prospects for creating its own history. In this context all serious political analyses of a society in process invite political understanding, and given that understanding, invite political commitment as well. This is true whether the vision articulated in the analysis is “established,” even if inherently liable to challenge and eclipse, or is
instead antithetical to the established understandings and commitments, and proposed in the hope of eclipsing the established myth in the brighter light of its own dispensation.

The only political analyses which escape this dual fate are those which are generated from a perspective wholly untouched by concern with any human interests at all, or written in language so arcane as to elude recognition by anyone at all or his or her own. Try as many politi-
cal scientists will to achieve this result, by way of gaining immunity from the charge of failing to be properly “disinterested” or “objective,” few if any entirely succeed. So much the better for political analysis, because the analysis that would entirely succeed by these stand-
ards would not be a political analysis at all, would be instead no merely non-political but anti-political. And in this context, let it be said loudly and clearly, Kent’s work is unquestionably a political analysis, and is therefore likewise a contender for the status in the hearts and minds of the people of the society whose political life it would reveal to view.

Beyond these general considerations, however, Kent’s work should be assessed as both analysis and myth for the very particular reason that Kent himself would evaluate it from both of these perspectives, and in-
vites his readers to do the same. His business in this work is not only to see the political reality of Hawaii and then to show his readers what he sees, but also quite explicitly to show them to embrace new prospects and new commitments in the light of what he has seen and shown them. He tells us straightforwardly enough that he wants his work to serve as at least a “humble beginning” to the creation of the kind of “political economy” that scholarship about Hawaii needs if it is ever to provide “a comprehensive, incisive analysis of the dynamics of past and contemporary social, political, and economic development,” some-
thing that “can be used to critique existing scholarship” and for which “the serious student of Hawaiian society [now] looks in vain.” With equal directness he tells us that he wants his work to serve “as a catalyst to help ignite people to play a creative role in the great social drama of our time,” and “as a means to empower them in their struggles.” He wants it to “open a door that has been closed too long” through which, to extend his metaphor, they can and will move in the light of the pros-
psects its opening puts before them in place of what may now seem a bleak and impermeable wall that is becoming bleaker and more impe-
netrable with each passing decade of modern Hawaii’s political development.

Certainly Kent would argue that there is historical truth in his analysis. While he disavows any claim that his work is in any way “definitive,” or even that it can stand as a “genuine academic history of Hawaii,” he is confident “that the historical analysis at the core of the study is both accurate and clearly argued.” It is clear, of course, that he regards his work as an interpretation of Hawaii’s political and

economic history, thereby acknowledging his role as mediator between the reality he would understand and the symbols in terms of which he would understand and have others understand it. And discovering the role of disinterested mirror, a role with which he believes some stu-
dents of Hawaii’s history have (too easily credited) themselves, declining as they have to recognize that “a variety of interpretations might exist.” So the truth of his analysis is presented as interpretative truth. But this is not to reduce the stature of his work to that of mere opinion, to use the idiom of modern journalism and its resolution of the problem of knowledge into the distinction between “fact” and “opinion,” a dist-
inction which is itself regarded as fundamentally unproblematic. It is instead political analysis: hard-won, anchored in a serious examination of relevant documents and experience — for Kent is no less a citizen than he is a student of Hawaii — and consistently self-conscious about the role of the framework of concepts and values that both enables and informs the resulting interpretation, making it possible in the first place, and in the second place giving it the shape and texture which sets it apart from the contending interpretations.

But beyond his confidence in the historical truth of the analysis he presents, in the region where analysis and myth come together with dynamic import, there is Kent’s own characterization of this nexus in his belief that the very utility of his work is to be found in its efficacy as catalyst for igniting and empowering the people of Hawaii. Not perhaps all the people: not the movers and shakers, not those already en-
trenched in power, already witnessing their own private interests embo-
died in public rhetoric and public policy, but instead the “ordinary people,” perhaps especially the “disenfranchised,” with whom he identifies and who now face the bleak wall in which he would open a liberating door.

In this context the issue posed by his work is not merely whether or not it contains historical truth — even though it surely does — but whether or not for whom, among the people of Hawaii, the vision in which his analysis is embodied will be true enough for them to embrace it as an image of the Real and the Good and therefore as a source of new commitments to transformation both in themselves and in the public realm. In what measure of their membership in Hawaii’s society makes itself known to them; true enough because it gives them an account of their experience in and at the hands of that society that they can recognize as their own, and in which their lives are redeemed beyond any value the prevailing mythology can give them; true enough, in short, to be embraced as myth, and therefore as the matrix for a genuinely new politics for modern Hawaii.
It is not difficult to understand why the movers and shakers of modern Hawaii will not warm to the embrace of this potentially mythic analysis of the political system whose command posts they now occupy, but two reasons may loom large enough as occasions for outrage to reduce all others to the status of petty annoyances. Assaulted in their vital by these dragons, all remaining insults may seem to them little more than follies by comparison.

The first of these dragons is embodied in the fact that both in its intellectual origins and in the primary themes and categories of analysis it employs — and despite the truth in Kent's statement that it was "first formulated in the 1960s to explain the widespread failure of development strategies in the Third World" — the "dependency framework" on which the analysis is built is patently rooted in the Marxist tradition. To be sure, the argument makes no explicit appeal to "Marxism" as a basis for either understanding or action, and the bugbear of "revolution" in any ordinary sense of that term is nowhere to be found in it. But this will probably count for little.

Hawaii, after all, is one of the fifty sovereign states of the most powerful nation in the history of the planet, and it is hard to find an issue of a daily newspaper that neglects to remind its readers of the axiom that the nation is engaged in a just and vital struggle against — not this or that people in this or that territory with this or that collection of markets, resources, and political leaders — but against "Marxism" and "Marxists" as such. In this context, particularly for those who hold the lion's share of political and economic power, evidence in public utterances of even the slightest indebtedness to the mind of Karl Marx is warrant enough both for outrage and for preemptory repudiation of any claim such utterances might make to have the power to illuminate the experience of any of the nation's citizens or the problems which they confront. Far from offering a basis for understanding or solving such problems, "Marxism" is the problem. So that any analysis which proceeds from "Marxist" premises or employs "Marxist" categories is seen not only as failing to provide understanding and a valid basis for political commitment, but indeed as being actively opposed to understanding and itself committed to misleading the unwary away from their true inheritance of wealth and freedom and into a false inheritance of brute “security” in the currency of “slavery.”

It is seen, in short, as demonic; and the only issue which might remain somewhat open for the standard-bearers of the prevailing myth, when confronted with proponents of such a demonic perspective, is the question whether these are self-conscious demons intent on possessing others or, instead, merely unsuspecting "dupes" themselves possessed by demons. What this means in practice is that, from the standpoint of the movers and shakers of private enterprise made public policy, images of political reality which reveal any taint of the "Marxist" heritage may well be either wicked or foolish, evil or insane — but they may never be either wise or good. Grounds enough, surely, for the leading spirits of modern Hawaii, as representative and responsible Americans, to be outraged by Kent's work, whether Kent be demon himself or merely possessed.

Beyond its display of Marxist genealogy, however, Kent's analysis will bring scant pleasure to Hawaii's leading spirits, either to the captains of local industry and finance or to those whom Kent commands us to see as their partners and agents in government, because it lays the burden of blame for what he condemns us to see as the disastrous reality of modern Hawaii squarely on their shoulders. Probably this would be bad enough, but matters may be even worse. Modern Hawaii, after all, has learned to live with its "oligarchic" plantation past, especially now that it has been officially transcended and displaced by the "New Hawaii" and the happy blend of pluralism and representative government it officially brings with it.

The eclipse of the old oligarchs and the advent of the New Covenant are embedded as axioms in public discourse, as well as documented and codified in the scholarship of Fuchs' Hawaii Pono and Daw's Sleep of Time. In this dispensation the "peaceful revolution" undid the dominance of the few and released both government and the many it was supposed to represent from their roles as instruments of the few and their drive for public power and private wealth. More than a commonplace, it is by now a requirement for Hawaii's political mythmakers to acknowledge the blame that in retrospect is due to these greedy and oppressive masters of Hawaii's past, while in the same breath to cherish and celebrate release from their mastery. So that even if at times the bearers of this blame have biffled under its burden — as Fuchs, for example, was made aware when his own vision of Hawaii entered the public domain and showed itself capable of producing its own ration of outrage — on the whole it has been borne with discretion and forbearance even, one suspects, without relish.

But in this foundation myth for the "New Hawaii," the oligarchs, even though surely enough blamed, are given the respect of being blamed for being authentically autonomous and powerful — for mastering the politics and economics of Hawaii with skill and daring, but more than that for master-minding the strategies for development to whose realization they gave their energies. They are blamed, in short, for dominating the people of Hawaii in the interests of policies which were unambiguously their own. They may have done what was necessary to conceal their private agendas from public view, but the agendas they did their best to conceal were indisputably their own agendas. And perhaps, in the nature of things, when the wolf is blamed by, or on behalf of, the sheep on which he has been feeding he may find ways of bearing the burden with relative grace, for he is being blamed, after all, only for being a wolf — and a wolf has his own dignity, his own pride, his own nature and integrity.
But the blame that Kent now lays on the shoulders of the present generation of Hawaii's captains of industry, finance and government affords no such reprieve. For in Kent's analysis, even though they are undeniably powerful over the people of Hawaii and on behalf of the developmental policies which shape Hawaii's economic and political life, they have all but entirely lost their power to design and implement their own agendas and instead are themselves by now all but wholly "dependent" on the prior and more potent agendas of others. While Hawaii remains the center of their own political and economic activities and their own demands for eminence and wealth, in the topographies of the real movers and shakers of modern Hawaii this center is but one of many spots on the "periphery" of the real center of power which is entirely elsewhere: in the metropolitan head- quarters of multinational corporations and investors' groups in the mainland United States and Japan, whose directors can dispose of concentrations of capital far vaster than their local cohorts can even imagine, and in whose agendas Hawaii has long since been scheduled for development as a society consecrated to mass tourism as a way of life.

In the context of this vision there is little prospect for even grudging redemption in the blame Kent settles on the local men and women of capital. Pooled in a periphery made such by the designs of the owners and controllers of truly immense concentrations of capital elsewhere in the world, they, like the "ordinary people" of Hawaii, are "under the influence." Far from being cast as wolves they are cast instead as jackals, earning their keep as the lion's provider by going before him to hunt up his prey, feeding on leftovers from the lion's share and on such smaller species as they may themselves bring down along the way. Far from taking Hawaii from its people and keeping it for themselves, they have collaborated in its deliverance to interests alien to Hawaii in exchange for the wealth and local eminence that still seem to come in amounts sufficient to bind them to the enterprise. To the movers and shakers of modern Hawaii, from whatever quarters it might have come, this cannot be a pretty image in which to be invited to see their own reflections; and coming from the ominous regions of "Marxism", it must be doubly unwanted or worse.

* * *

Just what is this "dependency framework" by means of which Kent develops his vision of Hawaii's economic and political evolution, what are its central concepts and problematics, the primary components of the picture of Hawaii that results from its application to the Hawaiian case? And what is the nature of the discourse to which, in the light of this analysis, Hawaii might be seen to have been brought? On whom have its burdens most heavily fallen? And finally, what if any are their prospects for deliverance from these burdens and for setting themselves on the way to a life that can be genuinely accounted good in Kent's perspective, and perhaps in their own as well?

At the center of any adequate "political economy," according to Kent, are two closely related domains of inquiry: "the ongoing dialectic between global capitalist development and local development," and "the special role of the state in relation to capital." As a vehicle for such a political economy, he argues, the dependency framework is valuable precisely because it attempts to work out a "coherent analysis of the global economic structure" and then to use this analysis "to analyze development in individual societies." So doing, it transcends traditional perspectives in which national and international processes are partitioned in splendid isolation from one another and focuses on "assembling patterns of intersystemic and international linkages" by means of which the "dynamics of social change and transformation" are set in motion, and can be revealed in their movement by the "use of history as an instrument" of disclosure.

Kent's design is to take this framework and apply it to Hawaii's economic and political evolution from the moment of first contact with the West to the moment of the completion of his own work. The central thesis to which the analysis lends its weight is given clearly enough in the preface, even if the text itself reveals the theme in significant variations over the course of Hawaii's history. From the moment of contact Hawaii has been "under the influence":

Change in Hawaiian development has corresponded historically to the development of the force of production in the advanced capitalist world, from a center radiating influence and change out to this mid-Pacific periphery. In short, Hawaii's development for the last two hundred years has been peripheral in nature, a reflex of expansionist needs in some metropolitan center.

With contact Hawaii ceased to be the center of its own political and economic dynamics and began its transformation into its role as peripheral dependent society subject to powerful forces based in and spreading out from one or another center of capitalist accumulation and disposition.

To be sure, the locus of the effective metropolitan center has itself evolved over time as the global topography of capital accumulation has shifted. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the center was to be found in England and France, but before the nineteenth century had run its course the center had moved to the United States where it was to remain until well beyond the middle of the twentieth century. At this point, as far as Hawaii is concerned, the United States finds itself joining in this role with Japan in an uneasy mixture of cooperation and competition aimed at implementing the "Pacific Rim Strategy," a
strategy for the sharing out of power over, and proceeds from, the material and human resources of the Pacific Basin. But for all this movement of the mantle of centrality from metropole to metropole, Hawaii's role as a dependent periphery has remained constant, even if the precise nature and degree of its dependency has in time undergone a metamorphosis of sufficient scope to merit emphasis in Kent's analysis.

The significance of this metamorphosis in degree and nature of dependency within the fundamental continuity of dependency as the defining characteristic of post-contact Hawaii is reflected in the organization of the text itself. It is divided into two parts. The first of these, "The Ties that Bind," deals with the period from contact to roughly the advent of the "New Hawaii" not long after the close of World War II and is intended to "establish a general model of the development of a plantation society as it emerged during the first century of contact between the Islands and outsiders." Part Two, entitled "Building the "New Hawaii," continues the analysis into the present and focuses on Hawaii's role in the Pacific Rim Strategy, the incorporation of the islands' political elite with old-line plantation companies into an "enlarged establishment" under the direction of overseas interests, and the growing development of Hawaii as a "tourism society."

This plan of organization symbolizes Kent's view that the advent of the "New Hawaii" marks a significant shift in the scope and depth of Hawaii's economic and political dependency, and the enclosure of the image of the "New Hawaii" in quotation marks signals his contention that the claims of this image to mirror the reality of Hawaii's economic and political life must be regarded as problematic. Indeed he represents Part Two as being an "attempt to answer the fundamental question: in terms of power relationships, economic and political control, and mass participation, how genuinely new is the 'New Hawaii'?" His answer, which sets his work off strikingly from that of either Fuchs or Daws, is loud and clear: if the "New Hawaii" is new at all, its newness consists not in deliverance from the burdens of pre-War dependency and its associated ills, as embodied in the organization of Island life around plantation sugar, but instead in its deliverance even more profoundly to them, as embodied now in the "'new plantation'" — tourism. In this context the relentless projection of the imagery of the "New Hawaii" into the public discourse of the islands emerges as a symbolically reassuring mask which conceals the ugly reality which the people of Hawaii encounter in their daily experience. As mythic imagery this "New Hawaii," declining to come honestly to terms with that reality, deprives them of the wherewithal to come to grips with it, rendering them powerless where Kent would have his work contribute to empowering them.

Part one tells the story of how the "ties that bind" Hawaii — bind it globally to the purposes of world centers of capital accumulation and lo-

Notes on The Cost of Life in Modern Hawaii 203
cally to the agenda of the capitalist elite of Hawaii — are gradually fastened and drawn ever more tightly until finally, the islands having become the focus of the fortunes of the King. This part of Hawaii's history is old ground of course, and Kent's mapping of this familiar territory adds few if any new "facts" to those that have already been detailed in serious scholarship about Hawaii, from Kuykendall to Fuchs and Daws.

What is new is the application of the "dependency framework" to this array of facts, and the resulting emphasis on the connections ("linkages") between transformations in the scope and organization of world capitalism and tandem transformations in the way in which capital is organized in Hawaii itself ("structures"). Indeed the "factual" materials for making these connections are themselves embedded in these earlier works, so that Kent's work provides no grounds for challenging this scholarship from the standpoint of its facticity, any more than it invites challenge from that scholarship on like grounds. Whatever challenges might in principle be exchanged are best regarded as challenges of interpretation, and these in turn reduce to challenges of the frameworks for analysis and interpretation which each brings to his task as well as to the social values to which each is committed.

It matters little whether these other scholars have explicitly acknowledged or even understood what they were doing interpreting the past and not reproducing it symbolically in its full reality — as Fuchs quite clearly did and Kuykendall and Daws less clearly did not. Aware or not, like it or not, each sifted and assessed the significance of the "facts" in the light of his own frame of reference whose premises embodied images both of what he took to be the primary mechanisms of historical dynamics and of what he took to be the criteria by which human beings might best measure their worth and the worth of their actions: images of both the Real and the Good around which to organize thought, action and concern and around which to organize thought and to Kent's own analysis into sharp relief and thus urge readers to deal with them as grounds for accepting a deliberately constructed and specified model of the reality they symbolize.

Kent's contribution to this body of scholarship consists in doing precisely that. In this context we should not be surprised to learn that Kent's critique of their contributions to the "dominant paradigm" in scholarship about Hawaii consists largely in his sense of their "lack of theoretical grounding" — of explicit testing of models of history against the facts of history — and of their "lack of self-awareness of the kinds of values (always middle class, mid-twentieth century, United
States oriented that inform the paradigm." This is what Kent means when he argues for the use of history "as an instrument to reveal the dynamics of social change," and this is why he is at pains in his own work to affirm his own value commitments. There is nothing cloying or denominational in his identification of himself as "someone committed to the idea that quite 'ordinary' men and women are capable of building a social order that [he] would define as 'rational', democratically accountable, socially just, and as ecologically sound as possible; in short, a society that answers real and universal human needs for dignity, self-respect, and genuine solidarity with other people," and that responds to "the real interests and welfare of the great majority of their fellow human beings." He makes it quite clear that he has no intention of giving his energies to the service of the merely self-apparent interests of that minority of human beings that is constituted by the American middle class at mid-century, interests which realize themselves in an "irrational" society in which ecological necessity, democratic accountability and social justice are too readily sacrificed on the altar of wealth and domination for the few, whether these be the minorities of national, global, or merely local capitalism.

This said, it should also be said that Kent’s work should be regarded as a genuine contribution to our understanding of Hawaii’s political and economic history and its present prospects, even though there is little reason to suppose that it will be regarded as such by all, least of all by those very capitalists on whom he lays the responsibility for Hawaii’s dependency and subjection. No matter. It deserves this status in the corpus of scholarship about Hawaii whether or not the focus it brings to bear on history yields a sufficient schematic for revealing its "essence" and whether or not its images of the Good are our own. It deserves it simply because it is unquestionably a serious, deliberate, and transparently straightforward attempt to understand and come to terms with a reality in which the needs and hopes of all the people of Hawaii are at stake, and in whose future prospects they have nothing short of vital interests.

To return to the analysis presented in part one, however, what is most important to note is with which of Kent’s takes to be the "legacy of dependency for Hawaii, and to note as well what specific form is taken by that legacy in the present. Here the "New Hawaii" that sits apart from the form he believes it to have taken in the period since that time. The "dependent society" which Kent’s analysis characterizes Hawaii from contact to the present might be resolved into five features: (1) virtually total concentration of the resources of the society — land, water, human labor — to the production of a single commodity produced for, and dependent upon, a single market in a "metropolitan center" whose managers see the producing society as "peripheral" to the center of exploitation solely for its capacity to respond to the fluctuating economic and military needs of the metropole; (2) concentration of local control over the production process itself in the hands of a small number of owners of the primary means of production; (3) concentration of local political control in these same hands, so that the society’s government becomes essentially an instrument of the owners of the larger parcels of industrial and financial capital and the vehicle for the translation of their private economic interests into the substance of public policy and the object of public expenditures; (4) mobilization of virtually all remaining elements of the population — those not sharing significantly in capital ownership — into productive roles in the dominant industry, either as laborers selling their labor directly to the industry’s "producers" or as smaller combinations of capital and labor providing ancillary services to the industry — the boundary between capital and labor sharing rough correspondence with that between different ethnic or cultural groups, and race itself symbolized in public discourse as the primary basis of social differentiation; (5) eradication not only of previously existing uses of the society’s resources and the social relations and cultural expressions associated with them ("lifestyles") that is entailed by their mobilization on behalf of the dominant industry, but also of any serious prospect for the consideration of alternative models for development — fueled in part by the systematic propagation of the myth that the welfare of the industry and that of the society are one and the same, and that objections to its continued dominance, or active proposals for change, constitute anti-social behavior.

In Kent’s analysis these features combine to represent an apt description of Hawaii’s political and economic reality both before and since the arrival of the “New Hawaii.” In the closing chapters of part one, however, he makes plain his contention that Hawaii’s dependency in the earlier period has to be regarded as less than total and, more concretely, less profound than has been characteristic of other "planter" societies. It was, instead, a period of "limited dependence," even if it was limited in only one important respect: that "unlike other dependent plantation societies, the plantation elite in Hawaii was able to maintain a certain political and economic authority within the islands vis-a-vis the metropole." This limitation, it is important to note, in no way suggests that the defining characteristics of dependency gave to carried less full force in the plantation era than they do in the modern era of industrial tourism. All that is being said is that in the plantation period, within the relationship between large capital concentrations at the metropole and those at the periphery, the local capitalists of Hawaii enjoyed more relative autonomy than their counterparts in other plantation economies the world over. Compared to these they were less a mere "collaborationist class," less a class of functionaries of the purposes of the metropole. They were able to hold this status precisely because of the strength and vitality of their control over local capital and local political life.
During this period local capitalists managed "to maintain financial control over the basic economic sectors" of Hawaii, which gave them "a certain flexibility in dealing with metropolitan elites." They were able as a class to "establish a real grip on the productive and financial apparatus, and to maintain it until well after World War II." Despite developments in global capitalism that bound Hawaii into ever more solid integration with the system as a whole "internally the elite managed not only to maintain its economic control, but also to deepen and broaden that control through monopoly over the Islands' basic industries and related financial and service functions, and through the adept use of political power and influence in Hawaii and the metropole." In other words, while Hawaii as a whole was dependent upon, and defined and dominated by, the interests and decisions of local capitalists, these entrepreneurs were themselves relatively free in their dealings with the metropole than were their counterparts in other plantation societies, more nearly electing to commit Hawaii to dependency on sugar than themselves depending for their own wealth and eminence on the success with which they implemented the interests and decisions of capitalist organizations outside of Hawaii.

In part two, however, even this exception to the otherwise universal character of the plantation economy is decisively withdrawn from the local capitalists of the "New Hawaii." In the new plantation of industrial tourism, which has by now all but displaced the agricultural plantation of old, the days of "limited dependency" are over. Local capitalists have all but entirely lost their capacity to elect Hawaii's fate on their own initiative, and have become little more than exceptionally well-paid local agents for the interests and choices of American and Japanese multinational corporations as these may apply in Hawaii. Even though Hawaii's government is no less their instrument they are themselves but instruments in the hands of others whose interest in Hawaii is in its role as a field for investment in mass tourism and as a basin for the military support of their power to transform the Pacific Basin as a whole into a means of profit for themselves. So that in Part Two of the text the "New Hawaii" emerges as "the age of almost complete dependency" for the islands, while tourism emerges "more than any other factor" as the "root of this dependency," and Hawaii's leaders look on, apparently "helpless on all sides." But no less rich, and no less dominant over the people of Hawaii for all that.

The key to this reformation as Kent sees it might be summarized into the following set of historical developments:

1. The decision by Hawaii's major industrial, commercial and financial corporations that plantation agriculture could no longer be expected to produce the profits it had in the past;
2. Their decision to seek other sources of profitability, both in Hawaii and abroad, thus to transform themselves into multinational corporations, a step which required vast new inputs of capital which had to be paid for in the currency of forfeited local control over economic policy to the investment priorities of the larger metropolitan sources on which they depended for new capital;
3. The resulting integration of these corporations into the organization of metropolitan capital and the subordination of their own investment strategies in Hawaii to those embodied in the Pacific Rim Strategy in whose vision of the Pacific as a vast "division of labor" Hawaii was scheduled for development as a tourist destination for the people of the metropole;
4. The direct penetration, with the help of formerly Hawaii-owned corporations, of other mainland and Japanese-owned multinationals in the form of massive investments in a radically expanded tourism plant;
5. The collapse of the new "revolutionary" Democratic Party and of the erstwhile radical I.L.W.U. as sources of serious resolve to alter the fundamental structures of economic and political power in Hawaii and their effective merger with corporate leadership in an "age of consensus" in support of this same narrowly circumscribed image of Hawaii's economic destiny;
6. The embrace by Hawaii's government — at first hesitant, expressing concern for the dangers of excessive dependence on tourism, but finally unrestrained and unashamed — of this same vision, its leaders forgetting whatever genuine autonomy they might have earned in the wake of their successful challenge of the "Old Hawaii," providing land-use decisions and massive public funding of infrastructural costs in exchange for sharing disproportionately in the proceeds that the unrelenting elaboration of industrial tourism would bring to those who had either economic or political capital to invest in it.

The resulting "tourism society," for all its enormous profitability for its major investors in and out of government, extracts similarly enormous costs from the ordinary people of Hawaii. These costs take a variety of forms but in Kent's analysis they are seen as converging in their effects. "Massive government subsidies" to the industry for the creation of the necessary infrastructure make steadily increasing infrastructure costs outweigh any potential gains for programs serving other constituencies. Governmental allocation of the basic resources of land and water to tourism development systematically liquidate such prospects for country living or small scale agriculture and community life as have survived the era of plantation agriculture.

Earning opportunities for workers in the industry itself are minimal — indeed this is a primary foundation of its attractiveness to investors. Wages are generally exceptionally low, temporary and part-time employment increasing, and callings above which local employees are unable to rise are kept low by the importation of management-level employees from metropolitan centers. No less burdensome is tourism's demand that its workers present themselves in the role of smiling servants, "catering to people with whom [their] only
tie is the cash nexus," a form of institutionalized humiliation which is made no lighter by the other stings that divide the industry's workers from their clientele. And as if this were not enough Hawaiians and others who identify with their concerns must witness the systematic debase-
ment of Hawaiian culture as it is increasingly reduced to the status of a commodity for sale to anyone who is willing to pay for it.

These costs may be borne gracefully by some, resigned by others, but for a growing constituency of Hawaii's people, they are increasingly experienced as feelings of resentment toward the industry and its clientele. Unendingly admonished not to bite the hand that feeds them, it would seem, increasingly they become aware that the premise of the metaphor casts them in the role of caged or domesticated animals whose lot is to be used for the gain or amusement of the industry and those who compromise its market, but otherwise to forfeit any claims to proprietorship over their own lives. And increasingly this resentment makes itself known in the public domain either in sporadic outbursts of spontaneous violence by individuals and small groups or in the "organized political struggle," centering on issues of access to land, water, housing, and dignified labor, and the preservation of authentically "local" lifestyles.

Given all this, the question to which Kent's analysis leads him — and should lead anyone who owns to a serious interest in Hawaii's political future — is this: what are the prospects for the continued growth of this constituency of resentment, and specifically for its discovery of the capacity to organize itself for effective political struggle on behalf of redress and of the redirection of Hawaii's development? Who among Hawaii's people, and how many of them, will come to experience the costs of the present development model as unendurably great, demanding more than they can give in exchange for whatever benefits accrue to them by continued deference to it? Who and how many will translate this experience into a basis for undertaking new commitments to sustained political action, along with the risks and costs which any such commitments inevitably entail? Or, to put the question in a broader historical perspective, is the unrelenting elaboration of industrial tourism at the hands of metropolitan and local capital, in partnership with Hawaii's government, unwittingly but inescapably creating the conditions for its own undoing?

In the concluding pages of his study Kent seems to find grounds, if not for faith, at least for hope that indeed it is. In the multiplex public expressions of resentment, organized and unorganized, a "common thread" appears: "the awakening of an anti-developer, anti-tourism consciousness, a desire to reassert local control and local integrity among large numbers of people." He tells us "there is a basis being laid for a new politics that repudiates the 'New Hawaii' developmental model and seeks to mobilize its victims (and non-victims) for economic, political and social change that will benefit all the people." A new constituency is emerging "for a break with Hawaii's role as a dependent society." Kent ends his study by noting that "ultimately it is only the people of Hawaii who can break the long chain of dependent development" and build a society in which decisions are made by local people, based on their contribution to the well-being and integrity of the majority of the citizens. Having presented his vision of their situation his work here is done. There is no detailed analysis of the constituency from which action on behalf of change might be anticipated, no breakdown of the cross-hatch of sub-constituencies and potentially contradictory interests that might be expected to impinge on the scope and force of its common concerns, no schedule of concrete organizational proposals, no manual of political strategy and tactics, no implied offer of expertise or leadership. Instead, Kent offers only the suggestion that if the people thus constituted are to succeed they will have to "formulate a comprehensive political program and economic strategy" and do so "with enough vision and good sense to attract the support of the growing number of disenfranchised." Thus, "and not the least," he writes in his concluding sentence, having indicated the contours of such a program in only the sparsest terms, "they will need to build an organization capable of implementing such a program." Readers who might find themselves in the constituency whose origins his analysis explains, or might be drawn into it in the light of that analysis, and who might want to be told "what to do about it all" are given little instruction, in short. What they are given instead is an invitation, to look through the door-
way he has tried to open and, if so moved, to walk through it — together.

* * *

Certainly Kent's work invites challenge as well. Readers who have not been wholly convinced of the merit of his argument before encountering it in this text will have quarrels and questions to bring to it. No doubt there will be as various as the political interests and perspec-
tives that inform them. But a review, even one that is broadly symp-
thetic — as this one surely is — might usefully suggest what some of those quarrels and questions might be, and by so doing extend the work of others, whatever their own broad sympathies, an invitation of its own: to view the text critically, in the light of their own experience, their own knowledge, and their own need to know.

To begin from the narrowest perspective of scholarship, for example, a routine check of a sample of footnotes in the book discloses absences of various kinds which the footnotes themselves are hardly telling against the overall responsibility of the author to the "facts," cannot but raise questions about scholarly care and fastidiousness. On Page 42, for example, quoting from an 1867 message from Secretary of State
Seward to his Minister to Hawaii, Kent cites Page 208 of the second volume of Kuykendall’s history as his source; but one looks there in vain for any such message, finally resorting to Kuykendall’s index in order to find it — accurately quoted by Kent — on Page 222. A search for the source of a letter from Secretary of State Webster to a representative of the Hawaiian government, which Kent notes can be found on Page 194 of Kuykendall’s second volume presents similar problems, although a little detective work turns it up on Page 194 of Kuykendall’s first volume.

A somewhat different kind of germelin appears when on Page 44 of Kent’s text Kuykendall seems to be cited as authority for Kent’s description of the Hawaiian government’s use of public funds to subsidize labor recruiters and create the infrastructure demanded by the planters, and its use of coercion against workers on behalf of planters. Checking out this citation one finds that on the cited page of Kuykendall the only information supplied has to do with the inauguration of a mail service in 1850. In the sentence which follows this citation in Kent’s text one finds him asserting that in 1854 the government spent $40,000 on harbor improvements and $15,000 more on wharves, while spending an additional $30,000 on harbors in 1855. Then, scanning the Kuykendall chapter in which the mail service discussion appears and discovering there a subsection dealing with “Harbor Improvements,” one finds Kuykendall telling his readers that only the $40,000 was spent in 1854, while both the additional $30,000 and the $15,000 for wharves was spent in 1855.

Still another kind of dropped stitch, unrelated to Kent’s citation practices but raising similar questions about scholarly care, turns up on page 62 of the text where Kent represents the constitution promulgated by Queen Liliuokalani in 1893 in her bid to reassert the power of Hawaiians in Hawaii’s government as being “nothing less than a blunt repudiation of the plantation bourgeoisie and the political institutions it had established in the half century [italics supplied] since the Bayonet Constitution” — certainly a surprising characterization of Hawaii’s constitutional history, given that earlier in the text Kent, like others before him, has located the “Bayonet Constitution” securely in 1887, or approximated it even more to the Queen’s reign. Certainly errors of this kind do not detract significantly from the merit of Kent’s argument as such, but neither do they strengthen its claim on our attention.

Grounds for other kinds of dissatisfaction can also be found. Surely some readers will be disappointed in the text not because they find its characterization of Hawaii’s political and economic evolution in any serious way defective but instead because, finding as an apt portrayal of the situation in which they find themselves, they will be frustrated precisely by the fact that Kent stops short of providing concrete guidelines for appropriate political action. Seen in this light Kent’s analysis begs for extension and pragmatic application to the situation thus disclosed.

This should take the form both of detailed analysis of the likely composition of — and differentiation within — the constituency which is emerging, in the sense of the gentry, of capitalist entrepreneurs, and of concrete proposals for personal and organizational strategy grounded in such analysis. It is hard to imagine either that the need for such an analysis is beyond Kent’s appreciation or that its execution is beyond his capacities. Even so, perhaps he can be forgiven this omission, given his understanding of his purpose in writing this work — to use history to reveal the dynamics of social change and to serve as a catalyst for the enfranchisement of others. Perhaps, indeed, given his identification with and confidence in the “ordinary people” of Hawaii, there is both wisdom and integrity in his decision to decline the role of strategist and the pretensions to leadership that go with it.

Some readers might find grounds for quarreling with Kent’s characterization of one or another of the array of organizations and institutions that come under review in the book. Questions might be raised, for example, about his explanation for the metamorphosis of the I.L.W.U., since the advent of the “New Hawaii,” from radical critic to enthusiastic supporter of the dominant social order in partnership with its former adversaries. Kent presents a picture of an organization which is politically beated into a posture of “friendly cooperation and collaboration with the bourgeoisie” as the price of survival, vitally weakened under the assault of post-War capitalist red-baiting and deprived of bargaining power by corporate transfers of plantation operations from Hawaii to Third World areas. But surely some case can be made for a quite different account of the evolution of the I.L.W.U. into an organization which, “comfortably assimilated into the existing order...ceased to think seriously of restructuring it.” Such an account would present an image grounded not so much in defeat and failure as in victory and success. Having finally established their right and ability to bargain effectively, and therefore to share in the control of the industry, in the process become comfortable beyond anything they had previously imagined, a new-found belief in the merit of the prevailing system, and a settled complacency about the interests of the working class as a whole, may not have been beyond them. If so, then the former role as collaborator might be seen not so much as something foisted upon them as, instead, something to whose embrace they freely gave themselves. It is not, after all, all that rare a thing for the wavering, even precipitous transformations of consciousness in the history of world socialism as has it emerged over the past century or more.

Of course, it might be brought to Kent’s characterization of the University of Hawaii and the role it has played in the elite’s development strategy for Hawaii. Kent paints a monochromatic picture of an institution conscripted to the service of this strategy. It would not be surprising if a good many readers were to find in this image but a pale reflection of their own experience. They may grant Kent’s point that...
the elite intended and still intends for the university to play such a role, but may equally decline to grant his apparent conclusion that their intentions have been wholly realized in university practice. These observers see the university instead as a fractured institution, some of whose elements are undeniably bound into service to the priorities of the dominant strategy, but others of which are quite clearly not so bound and instead routinely engaged in activities whose immediate political significance is to mount a challenge to it.

To name but one such counterevidence, some of whose strongest protagonists are to be found in the university, one can point to the development and persistence of the ecological critique of headlong tourist development and its implications. But the university has also been a primary source and facilitator of broad ranging social criticism, much of which must be understood as a challenge to the claims and interests of the development elite. There are even those, believe it or not, who would argue that much of the reason for the adversity quality of the State government’s relationship to the university, and particularly to its faculty, which has become so pervasive in the past decade and a half, is to be found precisely in the stubbornness with which these academics define themselves as having legitimate grounds for public support even when their work does not redound in any obvious fashion to the benefit of the development strategy to which the leaders of government have given themselves. If there is any truth in all this, as there surely is in the subsidiary observation that Kent’s very book has been immensely facilitated by the resources of the university, then perhaps he might want to reconsider his assessment. He might want to do so not only because his analysis of the university may be wanting in this respect, but also because it may alert him to the general danger in political analysis, as in political practice, of confusing intent with effect, and to that extent attributing power where it is not due.

A more basic question has to do with the application of the dependency framework itself, and particularly with Kent’s conclusion within the framework that the elaboration of industrial tourism in modern Hawaii well-nigh exclusively reflects Hawaii’s dependence, including the dependence of Hawaii’s economic and political elite, on the initiatives of outside sources of capital. The quillen here is certainly not with the notion that metropolitan capital has played a mighty role in determining both the rapidity and the scope of tourism development in Hawaii, but instead with the notion which seems to be carried in Kent’s work that it has all but uniquely determined its direction as well. If this is Kent’s conclusion, then it would seem that he would be prepared to argue that in the absence of outside capital and the control associated with it, Hawaii’s local capitalists and the political groups whose collaboration they have been able to count on, would have invested their resources in Hawaii in some developmental strategy other than mass tourism. To some observers this might seem a difficult argument to sustain, simply on the grounds that major capitalists everywhere, whether in the metropole or periphery, are unlikely to be solely oriented to the same fundamental objective: to invest their resources in enterprises which promise the very highest yields of sustained profit, and to evaluate geographical areas in which they might invest exclusively in terms of what is likely to be their “highest and best” use.

In this context there seems little reason to believe that the capitalists of Hawaii and those of the metropole would have made significantly different calculations with respect to the most profitable uses to which the land, water and people of modern Hawaii might be put. If this is the case then in the absence of metropolitan capital we might have expected less rapid and, at any point in time, less extensive development of tourism than has occurred in the wake of massive outside investment, but we would have no reason to expect either that mass tourism would not have been developed, or that it would not have been developed as rapidly and extensively as the profits derived from it would allow. If so, then the “dependency” of the local elite, which seems at times to resemble captivity in Kent’s analysis, might deserve a somewhat more textured assessment. Perhaps, however, this is the kind of issue Kent has in mind when in his Preface he acknowledges that critics of dependency models have “rightly pointed out” that such models need “more finesse,” more refinement, more “attention to nuance and sublety,” especially with respect to the way in which “degrees of dependency” are established and “what the distinctive forms that constitute a dependency relationship are.” If so, then perhaps he will want to consider the questions raised here as he continues to craft the “sensitivities and discernment” in the use of the dependency framework which he believes can make it an “entirely viable way of investigating the dynamics of past and contemporary Hawaiian development,” even in its relatively unrefined state.

Finally, whatever forms and degrees of dependency might obtain between periphery and metropole, underlying them all may be an even more profounder dependency, the rationale for which is to be found at the very center of capitalist mythology, and of socialist mythology as well. That dependency is symbolized in the belief that the “highest and best use” of the resources of a society — its land, its water, such other capital as it may have at its disposal, and the labor of its people — is that which promises the maximum possible yield of material wealth.

Of course, in these contending mythologies, this belief is hardly an admission of anything as pathological as “dependency.” Indeed it is represented as an insight into the very nature of the human species. If we believe it we do so because it seems to give a telling account of what we are; and we are apt to have little patience with anyone who might headlong suggest that we are as we seem to be because we seem to believe it. It is simply given in the nature of things, as an imperative of our being, and we go against it in the construction of our personal lives.
or our social systems at the peril of each. We may engage in global disputes about how properly to organize our responses to this imperative, how to arrange the production process itself and how to distribute the proceeds from it among those who play a role in it; but underlying these disputes, however virulent they may become, is a bedrock of agreement that however we organize our response we must give it all we have.

It is to be remembered, in this context, that the very most telling argument for the continued expansion of industrial tourism is the belief that from this means, and from this means alone, we can wrest from these islands the maximum amount of wealth that they can be made to give up in our era. Given the central imperative which our mythology insists we accept as real, however much capital we as individuals have at our disposal, and however much labor power we have to sell to those who have more capital than ourselves, this argument for the continued growth of tourism, and for the continued liquidation of everything in the islands that does not enhance its charms on their resources, or that in any way obstructs its growth, is all but overwhelmingly persuasive.

But in the constituency which Kent's analysis reveals to be growing in response to the contradictions of tourist development, perhaps at its very center, there are some who are not persuaded by the argument because they are unwilling to give themselves to its mythic premise. Chief among these are those native Hawaiians who are coming to a new awareness of their own cultural underpinnings and embracing the authentic personal and political responsibility that goes with it. In this new awareness they find themselves embracing as well a cultural premise which in some sense they have always known to be true, but which for generations before them has been under systematic assault by the culture which has dominated, even if it has not entirely displaced them. That premise, understood to be no less real, no less imperative to them than is the central premise of the dominant culture to those who embrace it, is this: that the highest and best purpose to which the resources that bless the islands should be consecrated is not the production of ever-increasing wealth but, instead, the unending creation of community itself. Given this premise, to be sure, there is no denying the need for an economic calculus as an element in the public life of the community or in the personal lives of its members; but equally there is no denying that this economic calculus must defer to the higher and prior claims of the essentially spiritual calculus that redeems it and gives it meaning in the first place.

The Hawaiians, however, are not alone in this constituency of the spirit. For many others in Hawaii they hold out a tantalizing prospect for release from the cramped quarters of the dominant mythology. Watching closely the Hawaiians in their midst those others sense their truth and the power for making community that is in it and is so unlike the power for domination that sometimes seems to be everywhere else. Sensing this, across channels of ethnic and cultural alienation, they look to the Hawaiians for insights into their own lives and the public reality in which they make their lives. If they do so it is because the mythology which surrounds them, for all the demands it makes upon them, fails in some important way to justify those demands and to give an account of their existences in which they can recognize their own experience, and by means of which they can share that experience with others. And in all this there is no small prospect that for these others, increasingly, looking is not enough. They want now to join with these Hawaiians in whose powers of understanding they have found grounds for trust and, perhaps, as well, for commitment to an authentically new, even if also authentically old, Hawaii.

If this is true then those who would make myths and offer them to the people of Hawaii, whatever the form in which they would offer them, would do well to look to those Hawaiians whose voices are finally now making themselves heard. More importantly, they would do well to listen to them, to hear what these past masters of the art of storytelling have to tell them about the reality of the human condition and the human spirit, and about conditions for the well-being of Hawaii. In his effort to understand the tensions and contradictions, as well as the promise, of modern Hawaii Kent's ear is better than most, but there may still be much for him to hear and to incorporate into his own gift of story to the "ordinary people" of Hawaii.

None of this, however, denies the real power of Kent's analysis or its real prospects for capturing the imagination of the growing constituency that finds itself awakening to the contradictions inherent in the onslaught of tourist development in Hawaii. Increasingly this unrelenting transformation of the natural and cultural topography of the islands creates a world in which nothing remains that can reasonably be called "local." Increasingly Hawaii becomes more than anything else a mere functional extension of the metropolitan society whose more affluent inhabitants are themselves bent on using its land, its water, and both the labor and the spirit of its people as a means of respite from their own worlds and their own labors. Increasingly, and to increasingly many of the people of Hawaii, it becomes clear that to survive at all is to pay the price of forfeiting every last vestige of any way of life they can call either Hawaiian or in any other sense their own. There is no question, in short, but that the constituency of resentment is growing, and while there is reason to expect that new members will continue to find their way into it whether or not Kent's vision is projected before them, there is reason as well to expect that many of its members will embrace Kent's perspective, if not as a sufficient truth, then as a more sufficient truth than is afforded them by the prevailing myth of the "New Hawaii." The vision which Kent has undertaken to offer them, in short, has the makings of a powerful myth which, by accounting for
and giving credit to their experience of life in modern Hawaii, may "open a door that has been closed too long" and reveal the prospect of a future more nearly adapted to their needs because more clearly of their own making.